



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


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The MANCHUS And their Neighbours To illustrate Ch. I, II, III, IV.







Ming Archer.

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THE MANCHUS,

OR

THE REIGNING DYNASTY OF CHINA:

THEIR RISE AND PROGRESS.


MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.



BY

REV. JOHN ROSS.

Author of "Corea."



PAISLEY: J. AND R. PARLANE.

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1880.

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PREFACE.

THE design of this work is explained in the Preface to my "History of Corea," which is introductory to the present history as well as illustrative of the past and descriptive of the present of the Korean people. Interesting though the story be of the rise and progress of the Manchus, it would never have been written by me were it not the best nail on which to hang as good a picture of the actual condition of the Chinese people as time, ability, and accessible sources enable me to draw. The history of the past of China is useful, because among so conservative a people, with a civilization so ancient, principles of action have not changed; and centuries there have introduced fewer innovations than years in Britain. The active motives of three centuries ago are the potent motives of to-day; and the phases of character appearing in this history are exactly similar to those seen in the existing state of Chinese society. The main value of this work is therefore that it represents what does now actually exist; and gives us in the west an opportunity of judging contemporaneous Chinese, their actual character, and their possible conduct. To one who knows the past history of China, her present resources, the intelligence of her people and their intense nationalism, the natural bravery of her soldiers when well led, and the mental ability of her rulers, the future of that country cannot but be matter of deep interest and solicitude. The ignorant may laugh at and treat her with contempt; but there is a day not very remote when China, if continuing free from serious internal convulsions, will astonish many. We have long inferred that China must, from her nature, assume an attitude of suspicion and defiance towards Russia; and she has long smarted under the humiliation of taxes levied on opium at the dictation, and under the compulsion, of the British Government. The Chinese will not always tamely submit to that degradation. If we persist in our opium policy, we shall have to pay for it.

For the ancient history of the Nüjun people, from an insignificant section of which sprang the Manchus, we must refer to the chapters *Liao* and *Kin* in "Corea," where also is detailed the Manchu conquest of Corea. The size to which the purely historical portion of this work has grown has compelled the exclusion of most of my intended geographical notices, and the whole of Manchu Customs except a very. For the same reason a chapter on "Literature" is represented only by a few sentences at the end of the "Preliminary Dissertation" and of "Officials." The Manchu language is referred to in "Corea."

Besides the Chinese sources of information mentioned in "Corea," the author is, in this work, indebted to a late edition of the "Manchu Laws," which are largely embodied in this volume; and which, like all laws, give the most authoritative description of the manners of the people. Since his arrival in this country, the author has examined the excellent translation of the Manchu laws by Sir George Staunton; who, however, greatly underrates the value of "*Da Ching Whi Dien*," or Manchu Official Dictionary, which details minutely and clearly the various duties of all the public offices and functionaries of the vast empire, and which has been found of great service in compiling the latter portion of this work.

The author is well aware of the need for a work of this kind. It remains to be seen whether he has been successful in his attempt to supply it. With weekly missionary engagements in various parts of the country, necessitating a good deal of travel and fatigue, it will not surprise anyone if the literary character of the two volumes, mostly written and printed within a year, is not equal to that of writers whose undivided attention, or whose more lengthened leisure, admits of that polished style which their severe taste demands. But whatever the literary character of this work and its predecessor, the author knows that both are of considerable political importance; and also that they present one of the strongest arguments to Christian men to exert themselves in quickly extending Christian teaching among the important people of China.

C O N T E N T S.

POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHINA.

Page
xi

INTRODUCTION.

Use of History—The Magpie—Manjoo 1

CHAPTER I.—THE NÜJUN.

Revenge—Battle of Goolo—Woola—Wise Generosity—E. t of Manchu—
Preparation for War 9

CHAPTER II.—CONQUEST OF LIAOTUNG.

First Battle with Chinese—Great Excitement—Battle of Sarhoo—Deer Horn
Camp — Manchu Joy—Mental Power — Environment of Manchu—
Emigrating Mongols—Chinese Demoralisation—Manchu Impressment—
Petty Troubles—Important Deserters 23

CHAPTER III.—CONQUEST OF LIAOSI.

Boastful Coward—An Able General—Noorhachu Dies—Condoling Letter—
Chinese Letter—Manchu Letter—Two Whangdi—A Bold Move—Siege
of Peking—Knighthood—Battle of Changshan—Reassuring Measures . 49

CHAPTER IV.—CONQUEST OF MONGOLIA.

Kortsin—Firm Friendship—Chinese Subsidy—Mongol Revolts—Great Raiding
Expedition—Increasing Weakness—Slow Beleaguering—Urgency Declared
—Terrible Collapse—Manchu Haughtiness—Manchus Ambitious—Second
Ruler Dies—Various Laws—Tobacco and Opium—Internal Danger . 75

CHAPTER V.—THE EUNUCHS.

Chinese Government—Minister Expelled—Ministerial Action—Plot Discovered
Silver Mines—Imperial Difficulties—Corrupt Court—Intrigue and Murder
—Serious Charges—Deified Eunuch—Righteous Rebellion 107

CHAPTER VI.—LI DSUCHUNG.

Land Boat—Geomancy—Famine Horrors—Fortune's Vicissitudes—City Taking—Rivals—Væ Victis—Difficulties—Fortune-telling—Eye Shot Out—The Jesuits—Angry Resignation—A Rebel Title—Rebel Army Regulations—Rebel Sappers—Double Happiness—Heavy Rains—Change of Conduct—A City of Heroes—Confession of Sin—Eastwards—Peking Exposed—Voluntary Contributions—The Garrison—Close Siege—One Faithful Eunuch—Peking Captured—Imperial Suicide—Blunder and Crime—Palaces Entered—Suicides	131
--	-----

CHAPTER VII.—INTO PEKING.

Sangwei's Letter—The Manchu Epistle—Anxious Commanders—Battle of Shanhaigwan—A Loving Warrior—Pursuit of Rebels—End of Dsuchung—A Crazy Aspirant—Mankia Caves—Etiquette—Imperial Reasoning—Threatening Language—Kofa's Reply—Imperial Succession—Proposed Alliance—A Faithful Minister—Might against Right	195
--	-----

CHAPTER VIII.—FOO WANG.

Election of Emperor—Military Insubordination—Ministerial Dissension—Internal Trouble—Court Bickerings—Unpalatable Advice—Court Entertainments—A Traitor—A Drunken Feast—A Daring Soldier—Chinese Marat—Wholesale Desertion—A Melting Army—The Soldier and the Man—Hiaman Emperor—Nanking Taken—Hangchow Entered	231
---	-----

CHAPTER IX.—TANG WANG.

New Emperor—Chihkiang again Lost—Order of Precedence—Another Emperor—A Brave Wife—Evil Omens—Obstinate Commandant—Gallant Garrison—Manchus Reconquer—Cruelty of Soldiers—Szechuen Conquered—Dsuchung's Remnant Army—Taxes and Contributions—Kanchow Endangered—Fukien Threatened—Tang's Reign Closes—Kanchow Falls—Cantonese Emperor—Opposition Emperor—Spoiler Spoiled—Chowshan—A Precious Litany	267
--	-----

CHAPTER X.—GWEI WANG.

Gallant Commandant—Stiff Fight—Imperial Fugitive—Hookwang Troubles—Important Desertion—Forced Labour—Frightful Famine—Universal Excitement—Blaze of Insurrection—Imperial Apologist—Weak Generalship—Shansi Recovered—Ho Tungjiao Dies—Gwei Wang's Court—Chungdoong Drowned—End of Shushu—A Dissolving Kingdom—Miracles—Imperial Generosity—A New Capital—Sharp Fighting—Internal Discord—Kowang an Emperor—Suicidal Fighting—Manchus Concentrating—Crushing Defeat—Clever Stratagem—Unfortunate Emperor—Imperialism under Difficulties—Emperor Strangles Himself—Last of Yuenyuen—A Pleading Epistle—Selfishness and Patriotism	313
--	-----

CHAPTER XI.—CONQUEST OF FORMOSA.

Independent Pirate—The Pirate Submits—Formosa Colonised—Island Emperor
 —Pirate Desertions—Reward of Treachery—Defiant Pirates—Sheep
 Mountain—Pirates Surprised—Wholesale Transportation—The Dutch
 Attacked—Curious Death—The Pirates Continue Free—Pirates again
 Active—Manchus Converge on Pirates—Low Birth—Naval Battle . . . 381

CHAPTER XII.—REBELLION OF THE THREE PRINCES.

Sangwei's Schemes—Disbanding—Revolt—Progress of Revolt—General
 Marching—Plan of Manchus—Gigantic Struggle—Desultory Fighting—
 Plain Speech—Uneasiness in Foochow—Washing Cannon—Three-cornered
 Fight—One Prince Submits—Kwangtung Revolts—Second Prince Submits
 —Result of Indecision—Kwangsi Recovered—Sangwei Dies—Rebellion
 Waning—Impeachment—Hemmed in—Imperial Post . . . 417

CHAPTER XIII.—CHINA'S ABORIGINES.

Missionaries—Brave Volunteers—Conspiracy—Clouds of Dust—Chinese
 Barbarians—Border Troubles—Internal Divisions—Rebels Defeated—
 Miao—Yao—Marital Difficulties—Stern Measures—Incompetency—
 Injustice Impolitic—Chinese Success—Gold River Subdued—Independent
 Savages—Chinese Growth . . . 463

CHAPTER XIV.—MANCHU IMPERIAL FAMILY.

Sacrificial Canonization—Uneasy Ambition—Dreams Rudely Broken—Treason
 —Imperial Marriages—Good Intentions—Chinese Hegelianism—Omens—
 Credulity—Curious Story—Words and Deeds—Imperial Traveller—Filial
 Emperor—Kanghi's Knowledge—Family Difficulties—The Succession—
 Propriety—Troublesome Brothers—Fourth Emperor—Imperial Protection
 —Palace Regulations . . . 513

CHAPTER XV.—OFFICIALS.

Tight Reins—Increasing Officials—Division into Boards—Wise Generosity—
 Censors—Cheese-paring—Mode of Appointment—Official Rotation—
 Retiring from Office—Fining—Impeachment—Curious Charges—Bribery
 —Smuggling—Degradation—Connivance—Influential Robbers—Suicide—
 Extortion—Guardians—Chinese Canonisation—Salaries—Government—
 Provincial Offices—Competitive Examinations . . . 557

CHAPTER XVI.—THE ARMY.

Three Eight Banners—Garrison Soldiers—Oppression by Army—Usurpation of Lands—Various Northern Tribes—Imperial Guard—A Million of Soldiers—Soldier's Pay—Exhausting Civil List—Imperial Horses—Military Talent—Declaration of War—Military Laws—Fire-arms—Pensions	609
---	-----

CHAPTER XVII.—TAXATION.

Taxation Standard—Poll-tax—Population—Land-tax—Transport—Penalties—Tax Remission—Reserve Funds—Measures of Capacity—Salt—Tea—Total Income—Native Products—Expenditure—Currency—Paper Money—Cash—Usury	643
---	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.—SLAVERY.

Origin of Slavery—Runaway Laws—Results of Slave Laws—Relaxation of Severity—Laws—Present Condition	699
--	-----

APPENDICES.



PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION

ON THE

POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHINA.

THE method in which a country like China is governed must command the interest and attention of every thinking man; especially when we consider the extent of its varied territory; the immense masses of its widespread population; the peculiar idiosyncrasies of its diverse races; and the striking differences in outward appearance, and in modes of speech,—for the north and south diverge no less in the character of the people than in their climate. Yet with all these external differences, physical dissimilarities, great mountain ranges and enormous rivers such as in Europe cause the existence of various kingdoms, the Chinese are one nation, united under one government, and possessing manners and customs which, in spite of local colourings, are of a generally homogeneous nature. No one can doubt that the continued existence and the ever-extending influence of the Chinese people imply principles of national conservation such as have characterised no other race; and that existence presents a problem not only curious, but one the solution and careful study of which would greatly benefit our modern European statesmen, not a few of whom seem to be conducting public affairs on principles which have from remotest ages deluged the world with blood, and have always brought to an untimely end the national existence of the people most devoted to them. Consul Meadows, in his "Chinese," correctly traces the unity of so large an empire as China to mental causes, which have leapt lightly over rivers many times larger than any in Europe, and crossed mountain barriers which would be in the west described as natural boundaries of independent kingdoms. It is to the commanding influence of thought that China owes her continuous history. It is because mental power is, and has

always been, more highly esteemed than physical force ; because the sage has been incomparably more highly honoured than the warrior, and the scholar has had unquestioned precedence of the soldier, that the Chinese people exists at the present day. Not to speak of other European races, Great Britain, which boasts so much of its civilisation, stands sadly in need of learning this lesson which China has for ages practically enforced ; and it is only when we have learned it that we can be assured of perfect safety. For many centuries the Chinese military officer of the same nominal rank as the civil official, has always been, and still is, far below him in social standing ; and the emperor who, two centuries before Christ, endeavoured to establish a military despotism by destroying all the existing literature of China, overturned his own dynasty, and left such an example that no succeeding emperor, however great his power and ambition, whatever his nationality or origin, ever again attempted to upset the supreme rule of mind in China, or tried to place the military even on a level with the civil.

It is generally believed that the civilisation of China, with its ethical systems, its laws, and its social customs, was somehow produced at a bound long ages ago, and has been preserved intact by the "stupid conservatism" of the Chinese down through all the generations, none adding to or subtracting from the sum total of the social and political conditions introduced ever so many centuries before Confucius. This, however, is a mistake which no one possessing even a superficial acquaintance with Chinese history could commit. Civilisations much less advanced than the Chinese have had to pass through a protracted course of hewing and carving, moulding and polishing, in their development from savage riot to legal order ; and those who sneer at that curious people forget what our forefathers were no more than a century ago. The essential elements of the present social life and political organisation of China can be found in the writings of Confucius, if they cannot be traced to the life of his contemporaries ; but there have been considerable political changes and social developments since his time. China was *old*

six centuries before the Christian era. And the reason why there has been so little change in more modern times, is because the main lessons of an advanced civilisation had been learned so many centuries ago. Even as recently as the introduction of Jesuitism into China, Europe was lagging behind the Chinese in several respects, though rapidly marching ahead of her in others.* Instead of being the stagnant pool which it is often said to be, we find the history of China full of the sound of battle, the shouts of the combatants, the crash of falling thrones, the wails of the vanquished, the pæans of the victors, and the varied and exciting tumult in which consists the "glory" of Europe. The present dynasty has secured the longest period of political tranquility with which China has ever been favoured; and we do not consider it cause for regret that the Chinese peasant has so long eaten in peace the fruit of his toil. Though therefore we earnestly desire the adoption by the Chinese of every modern western improvement, we have no sympathy whatever with those who ever and anon cry out for the unhealthy excitement of war, or with those who long to see in China the hasty, undigested, and frequently rash and unwise legislation of the new Japan.

Chinese civilisation did not spring up in a moment, like the fully-armed Minerva, but was the same slow, gradual process, from savage barbarism to polite civility, as in the west; and the last touches have not yet been given. The Chinese speak freely of the time when their forefathers went about dressed in a fig leaf. From fig leaves to rich silk dresses and magnificent fur robes, from ignorance of fire to French cookery, is not a distance to be taken at one bound. Nor was it one century which, out of rude customs, educed an elaborate though simple system of excellent laws. And it was only the slowly growing wants of a gradually increasing

* When the able Jesuits were professors of astronomy in Peking, and some of them were even permitted to *Kowtow* to his gracious majesty, French writers were in the habit of representing the Chinese as the most peaceable of people, and the most law-abiding of subjects. Chinese history was therefore long, and even still is, ignorantly regarded as a monotone of unexciting events, from the Three Emperors downwards. Hence the well-known lines of Tennyson,—“Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay,”—though the “cycle of Cathay” is only sixty years!

population which evolved, from a few rough signs on slips of bamboo, their highly ornate and beautiful written language, so philosophical in its character, and in its range abundantly adequate to express the most intricate ideas of a high state of intellectual training; though it is indeed, in its present condition, very inadequate fully to represent the more correct sciences of the west;—the reason being that though China has had her Socrates and her Platos, her Aristotle is yet unborn, and there never has been a Chinese Euclid. The fact of that progress is historical; the process, the stages, and ages of it must remain for ever unrevealed.

Socially, China has been the subject of the same slow gradual changes as the west. A similar course of development from barbarism to refinement, which appears in the historical evolution of western society, took place in China also. The point of departure was the same in each. But while the civilisation founded by the ethical systems elaborated in Greece and Rome has been in all cases largely modified, in some cases forestalled, and in others superseded by Christianity,—the general principles out of which Chinese civilisation grew up have continued always the same, and have therefore produced a civilisation very different in form from that existing in the west. But though different from ours, it should not on that account be thoughtlessly set down as barbarism, or ignorantly denounced as necessarily inferior and incapable of heights equal to any attained in the west. The last touches have been by no means given to this development. The Chinese have largely adopted western ideas, and have been apt scholars at the feet of western science, especially in astronomy and geography; and they will readily embrace any western scientific appliances, whose utility commends itself to them as more than counterbalancing any dreaded possible evils. If they do not hastily welcome and gladly amalgamate western civilisation in the wholesale fashion of the less thoughtful and more fickle Japanese, it is not because of their oft-decried “stupid conservatism,” but from a wise caution characteristic of the people. The Chinese are much

more truly national than any other eastern country ; for whatever note-worthy knowledge the Japanese and other nations possess, *they* obtained from China, while *she* has been always self-contained. China will not, therefore, merely append western forms of civilisation, but is sure to gradually assimilate them to her own constitution. Her present suspicions and caution are not of recent growth,—nor was it British war which originated them. And though based on error, the error is one which is very natural to the Chinese people, with their peculiar past and their present limited knowledge. The Chinese are slow in adopting some things, and firm in opposing the introduction of certain changes, because sceptical of our good intentions. They oppose the use of railways, because they are not yet able to cope successfully in the field with the western armies, which, by means of those railways, would speedily overrun the country. Missionaries are disliked, because they are believed to be political agents sent out by their respective governments to create a foreign party, to make ready for the great day when western armies are to struggle for possession of the richest country in the world, and for domination over the patient, tax-paying Chinese. China has gladly adopted our military manœuvres, and is rapidly extending their use. She is purchasing our most approved artillery and our best attainable rifles. She is adding gunboat to gunboat, establishing arsenals and building many powder mills ;—and all in order that she may be able to defend her own borders from foreign attacks, which all the lessons of her venerable history teach her to expect, which the never-ending political action and civic titles of many of the Romish clergy have taught her to regard as probable, and in which our own and Russian political action has not induced her to disbelieve. Chinese opposition to the laying of railways, the institution of the telegraph, the employment of our science and people in her mines, on her canals and rivers, is, like that to Christian missions, wholly and only political. Until, therefore, the Chinese army is thoroughly reorganised, equipped, and officered in such a way as shall warrant the authorities to believe it able to meet and fulfil any demands

upon its services ; or until the Chinese government is convinced that western nations have no serious designs upon their freedom, we do not expect to see railways and other western mechanical and steam-power appliances largely employed. The manner in which some of these improvements have been urged and pressed upon the government, has defeated the benevolent aim of the well-meaning politician. The very earnestness of such recommendations, or the warmth of political fault-finding with such acts as the tearing up of the Shanghai railway, serves to give further ground of suspicion ; for within the circle of Chinese political surroundings, disinterested advice is not believed to exist. The Chinese require to be taught, but their feelings should sometimes be consulted ; nor, if we desire to gain their confidence and introduce reforms, should we always ride rough shod over their prejudices, which, though perhaps ridiculous to us, are sufficiently serious to them. We might sometimes also question the infallibility of our own wisdom, and the adequacy of our own knowledge. It were well for politicians especially to make very sure that they rightly understand the Chinese people. We ourselves are subjected by designing or timid men to a periodical Russian scare ; and surely the Chinese have much more reason to believe in the ability and the desire of western powers to injure her, than we in that of Russia to ruin us.

The intellectual character of the Chinese is of a very high order. In diligence the Chinese peasant probably excels all peasantry ; and we question whether the peasantry of any country equals the Chinese in intelligence. Their merchants are quick to see and ready to seize every opening for trade, while they are bold and skilled speculators in the markets of China. Indeed, the Chinese are almost by birth a trading and commercial people ; and their bent of mind is keenly and coolly practical. This practical nature is characteristic also of their philosophy, which is absolutely free from the dreamy vagaries of every other non-Christian philosophy. Mere speculative ideas have never commanded the attention of any noteworthy men in China ; for

their intellectual life is as practical in its aims and teachings as is their ordinary every-day life.

Yet this matter-of-fact disposition does not exclude the warm appreciation of the beautiful in nature, both animate and inanimate. For this practical people is highly cultured. Poetical pieces are the oldest literary fragments which China now possesses as the legacy of the remotest antiquity; and poetry has commanded a chief place in her literature down to the present day, occupying a prominent part in the public examinations for those literary degrees, which must be attained by any man desiring to occupy the honourable post of magistrate in his native land, and which are sought by all scholars as the easiest way to social distinction. The Chinese were singing some of this poetry when its mixed populations were laying the foundation stones of old Rome. And if love of nature in its various aspects is proof of culture, the Chinese were a cultured people more than twenty centuries before Scott opened our eyes to the grand moods and the gentle soothing voice of nature, and before the lake poets sang its praises to an all but sullen audience. Before the time of Confucius, you find the Chinese observant of and sympathising with the changing moods of the world in which they lived. They chanted the praises of the opening peach, of the pink apricot, and the delicate white blossom of the pear. Chinese poets teem with references to budding trees and bursting blossom; to the brightness and brilliancy of the Chinese sun; to the gentle light of the clear moonbeams nestling on the bosom of the placid lake; to the singing of the birds in the trees, and the rustling of the leaves in the summer wind. Reviving spring commands their chief attention,—but the full-blown glory of summer, their rich-coloured autumn, and the drinking customs of winter, claim their frequent notice. Ordinary human life is not by any means overlooked, but is fairly delineated in its grave and gay, its loving and ridiculous aspects; though the metaphysical, introspective poetry of some modern poets can scarcely be said to be well represented. You will also find Chinese monasteries occupying the most picturesque of scenery, and perched among

splendid old trees in some quiet nook of the grandest mountains. Call the measure of Chinese poetry stilted if you will, the fact remains that these subjects,—the delineation of common life and the description and praise of natural scenery, form, and have always composed, the main body of permanent Chinese poetry ; those pieces written to flatter a patron or to please a friend being of the most short-lived description.

We believe it is now generally acknowledged that the west is indebted to China for the art of printing. The earlier European travellers into China found the Chinese people printing sheets off blocks of hardwood, cut into immovable words and lines. The Chinese printed these for at least five centuries before Gutenberg was born. The first attempts to print in the west were from similar blocks ; and this system has been again reverted to in the modern stereotype. The same early travellers found gunpowder in use in China, though mainly for fire-works, long before it was discovered in the west. And it is not unnatural to suppose with P. Huc, that the accounts of these travellers, of both the article itself and its manufacture, gave that clue to the English monk which introduced gunpowder into modern warfare, and which has contributed largely to the liberty which is now enjoyed by us. Marco Polo was astonished to see the Chinese making their fires by burning a black stone ; and it is probable he had never seen any other fires in the west than those which the forests supplied. The earliest Romish missionaries were surprised at seeing a little box in the stern of every Chinese vessel, containing a piece of iron of unvarying direction, to which the Chinese gave the name by which the compass is still called : “Needle-fix-the-south.” Nor is it at all improbable that we are ourselves indebted to the Chinese for the compass as well as for gunpowder and printing. Playing cards, and spectacles for old and short sight, were in use among the Chinese long before our forefathers knew anything of the science of optics, or could play a rubber at whist. We know not for how many centuries the Chinese were clad in silks and satins before their use was introduced into Europe ; and ages before our forefathers knew

much of the coarsest pottery the Chinese manufactured beautiful porcelain. The Chinese of the present day excel our ladies in embroidery, and at least equal our artistic workmen in ivory. In agriculture and horticulture, the Chinese labourer is second to none, and superior to most of his fellows in Europe. The intellectual superiority of the Chinese over our Indian subjects and their Persian neighbours is so marked,—in the conduct of their public business, in the character of their legal code, and in the practical nature of their sound philosophy,—that such excellent judges as Sir John Davis and Sir George Staunton, do not think it necessary even to discuss the matter. In their codified laws especially, the Chinese can be spoken of by those diplomatists only in contrast to, and not in comparison with, India and Persia.

The Government of China is the authoritative embodiment of Chinese ethical philosophy. Their moral teaching makes the father absolute master in social life. In politics the emperor is the father of the people. Justice and mercy are the guides of a father's conduct; justice and mercy are to regulate every imperial act. The Chinese government is an absolute one. But its absolutism is like that of no other absolute government; for it is *absolute only for the wellbeing of the people*.

The government of China, like its customs, is not the sudden growth of a day; but the gradual and slow evolution of many centuries. When we emerge out of the mythical into the probable in Chinese history, we find the ruler called by the title of *wang* or king. That the ruler had but a small kingdom two thousand years B.C., we must infer from the fact that YÜ WANG is lauded now, as he always has been, because he toiled for years with his own hands to neutralize a great flood and successfully opened up channels which drained the waters to the sea. Between the China whose ruler laboured with his own hands, and the China whose emperor never or rarely leaves the seclusion of his palatial city there is less resemblance than contrast. Yet this present is the gradual evolution out of that past. From the time of Yü Wang, China has been continually growing in

population and always extending her borders. For ten centuries since the twelfth century B.C., the government of China very much resembled the feudal ages of Europe, except that the common people enjoyed more freedom and happiness. There was during that period a central authority, but it was much like the rule of the pope in Europe. If the ruler happened to be a strong one he was able to make his will respected ; but generally speaking, each "duke" was independent, levied armies and made war on other dukes at his pleasure. As there was then no standing armies, war was a pastime to many ; for every soldier owned and cultivated his own property and furnished his own commissariat. He ploughed in spring, weeded in summer, harvested in autumn, and fought in winter. The excitement of war roused and kept in action faculties which produced the ethical philosophers whose teachings have become unquestioningly paramount in China, and have welded its heterogeneous peoples into a homogeneous empire.

Two centuries B.C., the state of Tsin after centuries of warfare swallowed up all the other states and founded an imperialistic China. The ruler changed his title of *wang* into that of *whangdi*, Supreme or Imperial Ruler. He established a standing army ; and finding that the teachings of the revered sages, Confucius and his disciples, were militating against his imperialistic designs, he ordered a general conflagration of all philosophical books. With the sword and the arrow he had fought against and conquered all military opposition. He waged a new war with the torch against ideas ; but though books were consumable, ideas would not burn. The persecution of many literary men who endeavoured to save their treasured volumes, resulted to them in death, but lost the imperialist his throne. And ever since, Confucius has had his reign in China, not only undisturbed, but growing down to the present in lustre and honour, if not in power. Absolute, irresponsible imperialism perished in China in the fires which consumed those books.

The government of China, therefore, though nominally an absolute monarchy, is one whose action is subject to many

modifying external influences. This government is like almost everything Chinese, peculiar to that splendid country and characteristic of that curious people. In the west the principle that "the ruler exists for the people, not the people for the ruler," is but the growth of yesterday; and the lesson is yet to be learned in most continental nations, nor do the British people seem to have mastered it. But in China that has always been the theory of government from the very dawn of the historical period. And it is because this principle is so unmistakably and forcibly inculcated in the classics that the Tsin emperor was so eager to burn them all out of sight.

The Chinese believe in the "divine right of kings." They believe that the ruler is ordained of Heaven, and raised up to do the will of Heaven,—hence he is called the "Son of Heaven." This will of Heaven is the moral and physical well-being of the people, to maintain and extend which is the sole duty of the "Son of Heaven." If the emperor, by the proper combination of justice and mercy, exercised with prudence and wisdom, secures peace, contentment, and plenty for his people, he fulfils his duties. But if he seeks his own pleasure, and pursues his own private advantage and profit, to the neglect of his regal duties, he *ipso facto* ceases to be the Son of Heaven; and the rocking of the land by earthquakes, the rotting of the crops by floods, the barren aridity by droughts, and the destruction of growing grain by locusts, are all so many evidences that Heaven is displeased with the mode of government, and are so many calls to repentance. These calls, if unheeded, give rise to rebellions. And rebellions are not in China the heinous crimes they are considered to be in the west; but are just and laudable efforts to unseat from the throne the man whom Heaven has already declared to be unfit to rule, because he has neglected to care for the people. The successful rebel proves his right to rule; and the right acquired by a success, attainable only by Heaven's decree, is more valid than any quantity of royal blood in the veins of the actual ruler. The valid and incontestable title to the throne of China, is not, therefore, derived from hereditary,

but is the result of the proper and efficient discharge of imperial duties. Hence, famines or rebellions always cause alarm to, and elicit a confession of sin against Heaven from, the reigning monarch; there are promises of amendment on his own part, and exhortations to faithfulness, official purity and honesty to all his ministers. Chinese history is full of such; and this volume will furnish examples enough.

The emperor is bound to preserve and further the well-being of his people, by placing over them ministers and officials of unselfish character, of honourable principles and of good mental capacity. This capacity is ascertained by competitive examinations which test the literary talents of Chinese youth; and administrative capacity is discovered by the manner in which these youths perform the duties of the inferior magistracies to which they may happen to be appointed after attaining their degrees. If the emperor lives a proper life, and appoints officials who lead good lives, the people enjoy the fruits of their own labours in peace and plenty. The manner of the emperor's life is, however, of greater consequence than any forms of law. Force is of little or no use in compelling the obedience of a people to a prince who does not make his own life a good example. A ruler may rule well, happily and prosperously by making mercy or benevolence the guide of his government; or he may be an equally successful ruler if he is strictly and sternly just; but he cannot have other than a troublous reign, and an unsettled, unhappy people, if his own conduct is not what it should be. Prohibitive laws, which he does not himself observe, will not bind his people; if his own life is vicious, mercy constantly extended will not attach them to him. "Example is better than precept," says the western proverb; "Example is stronger than armies, and more authoritative than laws," says the Chinese philosopher. He who would be a strong ruler must regulate his own desires, and watch carefully over his own conduct. When his "heart is straight," and his "conduct correct," he is powerful without armies, and controls all without police. This ruler will not only be supreme over a gladly willing people, but will be

sought after by the "far and near." "The sage will explain to me how to increase my treasury and augment my armies," said a feudal prince, striving for universal empire, to the philosopher Mencius; "Why must the prince speak of profit?" replied the sage, who then expounded that a reign guided by benevolence and justice ensured the greatest profits, the most lasting endurance, and the widest extent. Order and peace secured by justice and goodness, cast a halo of glory round a throne; while the employment of force for its support is its disgrace.

Having illustrated the theoretical foundation of Chinese government, my statement will now be understood when I say that the Chinese is an *absolute government, founded on and guided by democratical principles*. For, inconsistent to our ideas though it may appear, the Chinese people is really one of the most democratic in the world, as their government is nominally one of the most absolute. There is no caste in China. The son of the poorest labourer can freely push his way to the highest posts in the government. The late prime minister Wun Siang was the son of extremely poor parents in Mookden, and his master who saw the talents of the youth and sent him to school at his own expense, was living in Mookden when I left it. A tax-collector may occasionally be found bold enough and bad enough to increase the taxation of the people in some district; but the people can have him degraded and punished. A magistrate may be found more than ordinarily covetous, but he can be removed, punished by degradation, or even by banishment. There are occasional cases of hardship of men who in their litigation are mulcted of their all; or of men who are imprisoned under false charges by some powerful enemies. But these cases are extremely rare in proportion to the great mass of the population; and that mass enjoys personal liberty, lightness of taxation, and freedom from offensive police supervision, such as are enjoyed by no people in Europe. Sir Walter Medhurst, retired from long and good service in China, believes that China is, in the immediate future, to be swallowed up into the Russian power, and that such a fate would be for the good of the

Chinese people. We do not believe that Russia will now be ever able to conquer China; and we are certain that the Chinese people would suffer in most things and benefit in nothing, by transference to Russian rule. The Chinese peasant is infinitely more happy and contented than is the Russian, because he is incomparably less heavily taxed and more free to do his own "sweet will;" and the Russian peasant will not compare with the Chinese in education, in intelligence, and in industry. Sir John Davis, in his excellent work on the Chinese, expresses his surprise at the amount of freedom possessed by the Chinese people in being able to meet together to judge upon, to condemn, and to inform the government of the conduct of magistrates, who have treated them harshly. Sir John Davis would not have been surprised at what occurs almost daily in some part of China, had he fully understood the basis of Chinese government as explained above.

So thoroughly does the form of government educed from the teachings of the old days suit the Chinese people, and upon the whole so equable, simple and just have been the laws founded upon the same principles, that there has not appeared in the Christian era any political reformer enunciating novel ideas of government; for it is always acknowledged that the existing form of government, if pure, and the laws actually on the statute book, if honestly applied, provide for all the needs of, and secure the utmost liberty for, the people. In all revolutionary proceedings therefore, there is an appeal, not to some new principle which will benefit the people; but to the old principles, departure from which has brought misery to the people. Dynasties invariably become corrupt in China, sometimes from wickedness, oftener from weakness. And when rebels rise against a dynasty, they invariably base the justice of their cause upon the ancient laws and rights of the people, which are trampled upon by the reigning emperor.

The safety, or at all events the wellbeing of any country, depends mainly on the character of the man placed in a position which enables him to control that country's interests;

next upon the ministers or officers employed by him to carry out his instructions; and finally upon the soldiers who are the instruments of his ministers. The ministers may save the country in spite of their chief; but if a country is to be saved when the ministers are corrupt or wicked, it must be effected by a change of ministry. This change in an absolute monarchy rests with the ruler, if that ruler is strong enough to make his will felt; but if he is weak, the only means of saving the country is by insurrection and a change of dynasty. In a free country the voice of the people makes itself heard without an appeal to arms and revolution. But better the storm of this revolution, and the loudest crash of arms, than quietude under the blighting cancer festering in the national constitution, and devitalizing the roots of the national life. The worst evil which can befall a nation, is when the ministers are earnest only in picking the national pocket, afraid only of dying without a fortune accumulated or an influence acquired by the most guilty of all guilty means of acquiring wealth,—by the abuse of public confidence, and the misapplication of public power. As the trust reposed in public functionaries is of the most important kind—involving as it does the most sacred interests of the people—so should the abuse of that trust be accompanied by the most severe of human penalties, and branded with the execration of all good men.

Since the establishment in England of the numerous and great legal inequalities, instituted by and preserved since the Norman conquest, every man who intelligently desires the well-being of his country has necessarily pursued a destructive policy; for he demands legal equality and even-handed justice. The sameman in China, and with the same desires, is just as necessarily conservative; for such unjust and compulsory inequalities have not existed. While in England the well-wisher of his countrymen appeals to change in order to remove powerful abuses long established by the sword, in China the same man appeals to the ancient laws and institutions of his country to remove powerful abuses introduced against law. It will be seen in the following history that in

China the men of the most sterling character, of the most refined and cultured nature, of the greatest learning and wisdom, are all but invariably under the influence of conservative principles ; for Chinese conservatism demands, in certain circumstances, the most unselfish conduct and the most self-sacrificing devotion. Though bribed by the party of power with the offers of honours, place, wealth, and authority, the most earnest efforts failed to detach such men from the course to which duty called them, and in which they all from Kofa to Shushu desired to die.

This unselfish conservatism is the necessary outgrowth of the political philosophy above described. That philosophy declares, as already stated, that the ruler is for the people, not the people for the ruler ; and proclaims the certainty of the dethronement by Heaven of that ruler who neglects his duty to his people, and his dethronement by insurrection. Yet this same philosophy commands the minister to support his prince, and to die with him. The change of dynasty must not be made, or in any way assisted by the official who has "eaten of the prince's bread," even though he knows that prince to be unworthy of his post. As official employment is the reward of literary merit, every philosopher is an official. He is free to refuse office ; but after accepting office he is bound to live and die for his prince. Faithfulness to his prince is the absolute guide in life and unto death of the Chinese official. He is bound to point out to the ruler the proper mode of conducting government, so as to secure the greatest well-being of the people ; but he must use all his influence in supporting the reigning monarch, even when that monarch is one of the worst. Every revolutionist in China, and every rebel, is and must be conservative in the sense of appealing to the ancient institutions, laws, and customs of his country ; innovations upon which form the only apology for his rebellion. Every literary man, not an official, is intensely conservative in the same direction. But every official is conservative in the sense of supporting the existing dynasty, not merely when there is hope of successful resistance against rebellion, but after all hope is gone ; for if he can do no more, he can die, and thus gain for himself the proud posthumous

title of Faithful Minister. Hence conservatism in China is necessarily unselfish when it is genuine ; though selfish men are always found on the same side, who can, when it is their supposed interest, change to the other party. This Chinese conservatism, this devotion to anciently established principles, demands not only one's energies, but one's property and life ; and we shall see below that many are true to their profession. This conservatism is founded upon the well-being of the people. Its guiding principle is therefore unlike that of British conservatism, and more closely resembles the spirit of the Whig principles. Even when the Chinese conservative is called upon to uphold a state of matters which he knows to be wrong, and which he has, by constitutional means, tried to correct, he does it by renouncing his own interests, at the certain risk of his own life, and entirely from a sense of duty arising from his philosophical beliefs. We commonly hear Chinese conservatism abused by men who are ignorant of it, and unacquainted with the good at the root of it ; and usually by men who are far from ready to sacrifice their own temporal interests to any call of duty. The Chinese honest conservative, the best and noblest type of Chinese official and literary life, is afraid of being stigmatised as unfaithful ; he is not afraid to die.

The chapter on "Officials" describes the *personnel* of the Chinese government,—the Privy Council, or highest Court of Appeal, and the six Boards or Departments which superintend the multitudinous affairs of the eighteen provinces of China. It shows the inter-relations of ministers, and explains the machinery of government. It also illustrates the duties of the emperor, which consist in a vetoing rather than in an initiating power. Even when edicts are issued of a positive character, they are invariably the result of one or more memorials from the higher officials. P. Huc relates that when the able and discreet M. Ricci became famous in Peking, and after the emperor had begun to honour him, some of the chief ministers memorialised the emperor, asking him to reward M. Ricci for his beautiful presents, and then dismiss him honourably to Canton, whence he

could return to his native land. To this memorial the emperor made no reply ; and another similar memorial was received by him with the same silence. The emperor informed M. Ricci of this desire to have him removed ; but told him that in order not to infringe upon the laws of China, the emperor could not give him special permission to remain in Peking without a formal request to that effect from one of the ministers. That this is a correct representation of the emperor's legal position can be seen in the chapter on the "Imperial Family," where is described the action of the emperor *Yungching* towards his own brothers ; and the chapter on "Officials" gives numerous instances of the same kind.

To China the greatness of the service done her by her excellent education is unquestionable. Indeed, the advantages resulting from education are now generally acknowledged to be very considerable. There are few, if any, who profess to believe that universal education is calculated to directly produce any evil consequences. Education cannot be too widely scattered, nor too thoroughly instilled into the minds of all classes of the community. But there is a tendency among many talented literary men, whose eloquence transcends their knowledge, to over-estimate the potency of educational influences over the moral life. Overlooking or forgetting the past, they profess to believe that education will destroy most of the vices of social life, and extinguish many of the crimes now prevailing. Men avow the same sentiments with more or less bluntness, in a good deal of the popular preaching, and breathe them still more generally in the popular literature of the day. They praise the beauty of virtue, and proclaim the nobility of practising virtue for virtue's sake ; while they hurl their scornful indignation upon those who combine rewards and punishments with virtue and vice. They wax eloquent over the wondrous faculties of man, and their glowing phrases declare their admiration of the powers of the human understanding. In the boldest language, in the most brilliant sentences, they declare that man can, by cultivation of his nature, reach up to the very throne of God. As a theory of

what education should do, and the man of culture should be, all this teaching is very proper and good ; but as a potential rule applied to the guidance of human life, with its varied passions, all the ages and generations proclaim such teaching, notwithstanding its truth and its beauty, but a spider's web in the way of an angry man. All the main elements of our systematic ethical teaching were as eloquently proclaimed, and as fervently belauded in the Porch and the Academy of Greece, as by the most popular teacher of our day ; and the rough tongue of old Rome rang out the same doctrines in the public Forum. To learn the practical outcome of all that eloquent and excellent teaching, examine the history of ancient superstitious, lying, immoral Greece, ransack the records of proud, cruel, unjust, and rapacious Rome.

Contemporaneous with the noblest teachers of Greece, were the moral philosophers of China, who, centuries before the Christian era, left a noble legacy of positivist teaching, which has trained the minds of every succeeding generation of Chinese youth, down to the present day. Communistic teaching by able theorists, and the duty of universal love, have been taught longer in China than Christianity in the west ; and an able philosopher propounded, eight centuries ago, undiluted materialism, which since then has continued to be foisted into, rather than educed from, Confucian positivism. But this positivism, setting forth man's duty to man in all his various relations, has remained unchanged. All the ancient classics of China, some of them older than Socrates, and most of the modern literature of that literary country, are laden with this kind of ethical teaching. In language more pithy and as expressive as that of the best of western philosophers, in phrases shining with the warmth of lively imaginations, in tropes and figures unsurpassed for beauty of expression, for correctness of diction, for appositeness of illustration, for elevation of sentiment,—the Chinese philosophers have been for more than two thousand years inculcating the precepts of a pure and noble morality. And all the mental toil displayed in their curt aphoristic sayings is for the purpose of "illustrating

illustrious virtue"; and all the intellectual labour of their swelling periods is devoted to enforcing the performance of man's duty to man.

With what result? Such teaching and training do certainly impart that literary dilettanteism, they secure that mental culture and give that external polish, which seem to be the aim of modern English popular teaching; and the excellence and advantages of which we would not, for a moment, be supposed to undervalue. This training may, and does, sharpen the intellect and instruct a man how to express his thoughts eloquently or elegantly, or how to hide them under a cloud of misty verbiage. Yet though the beauty of systematic moral teaching gratifies the intellect, as does a difficult mathematical problem when first discovered, it exercises no control over the passions. The philosophy of ethics satisfies the understanding; it has never yet changed the heart. Chinese intellectual life is vigorous. Their mental power is of a high order. Their politeness and etiquette in speech and manner, are all that the apostle of mere culture can desire. And their training has produced the ability to exercise a most wonderful external self-control under the most trying circumstances of fear, or anger, or novelty; so much so that those ignorant of Chinese education proclaim them the most stupid and stolid of peoples. But though they revere their great teachers and honour moral teachings in grandiloquent phrases, they absolutely ignore them in practical life.

The condition of those individuals, who, by study of the beautiful and the good, hope to attain the perfection of their nature, is well expressed in the words, *Knowledge puffeth up*. In China as in Britain we find the same result. Those cultured men dilate on the transcendent greatness of righteousness. They use, as their western brethren use, great swelling words of vanity, whereby they impose upon themselves and dazzle or deceive the giddy crowd, who would fain be considered thinkers. A contemptible pride takes possession of them. And intellectual vanity and literary conceit are invariably connected with spiritual

coldness, and never far removed from moral faults. Admiration for the beautiful sayings of the sages of antiquity may and does often flow from the lips, or fill eloquent pages from the pen of a man whose heart is closed against the appeals of pity but open to foul thoughts, and whose life is distinguished only by selfishness and impurity.

Even in our own country, hedged about as we are with so many fences in social life, we find that nominal Christianity is insufficient to shield from the allurements of vice. Knowledge of arts and sciences will not make or keep a man honest in Christian Britain. Social refinement is known to be consistent with lamentable practices. And mere culture is inadequate always to retain a respectably moral life. Indeed, modern culture can unreservedly adopt the language of the Latin poet, *Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor*. If we follow our countrymen to heathen lands, we see that all the culture of modern and sound education, all the polish derived from good society, the possession of natural talents and almost all gentlemanly qualities are sadly, painfully unable to prevent them from falling into the debasing, unmanly vices of heathenism. And if men fall after receiving the advantages of such training, what can we expect but revolting immoralities among heathen peoples which have not the staying powers of Christianity to sustain and enforce the practice of those moral doctrines which are theoretically admired? As to the practical influence of their high theoretical estimate of truth, we may adopt in full that eloquent description of another nation, *Tribuo illis literas; do multarum artium disciplinam; non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam; denique etiam si qua sibi alia sumunt non repugno; testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit; totiusque hujusce rei quae sit vis, quae auctoritas, quod pondus ignorant*. With many noble characteristics which are certain to gain them a speedy greatness, with much that we must highly commend and heartily admire, the Chinese are a people whose inborn falsehood can be uprooted only by Christianity;

for it alone can enable them to act out their professed belief that truth is most honourable, deceit-ignoble, and meanness in word or deed unworthy of men.

Whatever may be said by men whose ignorance of humanity is equalled only by their self-assertion, who proclaim their sentiments with an assurance of infallibility as if the whole world of fact were enclosed within the four walls of their study, who itch for the praise of a tinsel liberality, who denounce earnestness as bigotry and decry enthusiasm as fanaticism,—whatever may be said by such men in their wilful blindness against the commonly received dogmas of Christian belief, that belief alone is able to subdue the world to righteousness. Explain it as you will, it is a historical fact, and patent to all who really know the world, that truth and purity are general in exact proportion to the intelligent and potential belief in Jesus as the revealer of the Father, and especially as the Saviour from sin. No one can think of questioning the truth of this, who is able to compare, by personal experience, the condition of those peoples raised by Christianity from barbarism with the condition of those nations which have had or do now possess all the moral teaching which human genius can evolve, and which pursue culture with all the eager earnestness and ability of talented natures, but which are destitute of those peculiarly Christian doctrines which the Bible alone proclaims. It was the great Washington who said, that “of all dispositions and habits which lead to prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. *Morality cannot be maintained without religion.* Both reason and experience forbid us to expect national morality can prevail without it, or a state without morality.” We earnestly appeal to our Christian countrymen to awake and bestir themselves to send this Christian religion to China. Send by the hands of your bravest and ablest sons, send in the hearts of the noblest and best of your daughters. Whether we will or not, China is rapidly becoming a great and powerful nation ; but the reception of Christianity alone can make the Chinese a moral people, who will benefit the whole world.



INTRODUCTION.

As soon might we expect the drops of water oozing from a mossy rock to become a mighty river, bearing on its bosom the peaceful fleets of all nations, as the few ignorant descendants of the Tartar Aisin Gioro to become, by their own despicably insignificant resources, the legislators of a fourth of mankind, and the rulers of the most populous empire under the sun.

If it was necessary that the movements of the Manchus should have been regulated by wise bravery, it was even more essential that reckless folly should misguide their no less brave opponents, whether Kin, Liao, Mongol, Corean or Chinese. The slim but well-knit Manchu barque was set afloat in shallows, and had to sail along rapids and among narrow gorges where a touch was destruction, down cataracts and through channels crowded with innumerable rocks, many of them just seen under her prow, where the bystander judges escape impossible. Many a time is the reader of the earlier history of the Manchus tempted to exclaim, that there is here another than a visible hand, which, by what seems the slightest accident, now removes the petty tribe out of a snare; and again averts on their own heads the overwhelming destruction with which her foes were prepared to crush her. Her final triumph is as great and beforehand as improbable; as if a large ship sailed into New York, after running down the rapids and plunging into the cataract of Niagara.

It is true, the wisdom of Taidsoo, by unity of purpose and action, multiplied a hundredfold the courage of his handful of men. But he would have been only knocking his naked fist against granite walls, had he not been opposed by weak and divided counsels, which distracted and alienated the minds of his wise, and blunted the sword of his brave, opponents. All the

wisdom of the Manchus would never have guided them into Mookden, if the gates had not been thrown open by the blind folly of its keepers. Nor could Taidsoo have averted annihilation, had the most ordinary prudence dictated the policy and regulated the movement of the then powerful Ming. We must look therefore no less to the folly of Peking, than to the shrewdness of Hingking, to account for the strange phenomenon, that a few rude barbarians, inhabiting a narrow strip of inhospitable mountains, were able to seize and to hold the dragon throne, which had such tremendous forces at its disposal, and the resources of the richest country under heaven at its command.

This "Rise and Progress" of the Manchus has been compared by Sir John Davis and others, to the growth of British power in India. The parallel is incomplete and unfair to the Manchus. For they and the Chinese faced each other with the same weapons—the bow, the sword, and the spear; the Chinese having the advantage of education, civilization, prestige, and fire-arms such as they were.

British troops started in India a highly educated race, conscious of immense mental, moral, and physical superiority, against opponents equally conscious of their own inferiority. The Manchus began their wars with the Chinese, ignorant of letters, without a written language, scarcely reclaimed from the savage barbarism when they ate raw flesh and dug pits for houses, against a people highly civilized, who, for every brave Manchu, could bring a hundred equally brave Chinese into the field. Indeed we search in vain for a parallel, whether in the well known west or the older east. Alexander started in his victorious career with a compact, well-regulated kingdom, and with an army accustomed to triumph; and his wide, loosely-jointed empire died with the departure of his breath. Rome took seven centuries of endless warfare, from the time when her three cantons formed a city, till she could call herself mistress of the southern half of Europe. The Goths murdered and pillaged, the Huns sent fire before and left a desert behind them; but no trace of an empire was laid by those disciplined hordes of

robbers. Noorhachu, with a hundred followers, dared to shake his sword in the face of the powerful Ming dynasty, when it claimed, by divine right, to rule over the whole earth. His grandson was seated at five years old on the dragon throne in Peking, whilst the officials of Kwangtung and the literates of Yunnan, side by side with the chiefs of Mongolia, bowed before him to the ground, ere his short reign was completed. Some of the sons of Noorhachu, who fought with him in his first battle, lived in regal splendour and stately ease in their Peking palaces, years after the last sword raised in name of the Ming dynasty had been shivered to fragments.

It was no deficiency in natural bravery, which compelled the Chinaman to undergo the, to him, unspeakable degradation of shaving off his long hair; for, man to man, the Chinese were, to say the least, the equals of their foes. It was the politic wisdom of the dwarf, and the senseless stupidity of the giant, which brought the latter to grief and the former to greatness. The cunning Jack always kills the giant. Want of head and heart, not feebleness of arm, terminated the Ming dynasty, and converted the "Flowery Land" into a charnel house for the half of its inhabitants. "Righteousness exalteth a nation: but sin is a reproach to any people." The wise ruler is righteous from choice, as the foolish is unrighteous; the one exalts his people, the other destroys them.

As the lessons of this great revolution are similar to those of western history, and equally valuable in illustrating the facts, that whole nations are improved and benefited under the guidance of a patriotic man, with a head to plan and a hand to execute, and that the greatest nation is strangled by red-tape favouritism and nepotism,—we think no apology is necessary for presenting a more precise account of the rise of the Manchus than has hitherto been given, as far as we know, in any language.

In the year 1559, when Europe was universally excited over the new-found Bible, Noorhachu was born in Hotooala, south-east of Hoolanhada, the southern extremity of the Long White Mountains, at the north side of which had appeared his ancestor,

Aisin Gioro Bookooli Yoongshwun, about two hundred years before.

Noorhachu, like all his successors, gave early indications of his subsequent greatness. He was a thirteen months' child, had the dragon face and the phoenix eye, his chest was enormous, his ears large, and his voice like the tone of the largest bell! He lost his mother when ten years old, and was placed under the second in order of the wives of his father Hüen. When nineteen years of age, his step-mother sent him out with a small pittance to push his way; but afterwards, recognising his extraordinary abilities, she offered an increase to his allowance, which — he declined. He was known as the Wise Beira.* He was the seventh generation born heir to the kingdom of Hotooalá, the town of which name was no more than seven miles distant from the most remote part of the "kingdom."

On one fine day, two centuries before, when three heaven-descended maidens were bathing in the great lake Boorhooli, at the foot of Bookooli, a peak of the White mountains, a spiritual bird (the magpie) dropped a red fruit on the skirt of the dress of Fo Koolun, the youngest, who, before dressing, picked up and ate the fruit,—the result of which was that she bore a son, who was able to speak at his birth, and was otherwise remarkable. When full-grown, his mother told him he was born of Heaven, to set to rights the troubled nations; and having given him the name Bookooli Yoongshwun, and the surname Aisin Gioro,† she ascended into heaven.‡

* Beira, the bird *Minghwang* which flies high;—man of great distinction.

† Gold Dynasty.

‡ A more prosaic account of his earlier years is given by the Chinese of Manchuria, who report that when Chinese go north to serve the Manchus, they are left in charge of house and everything in it, including the females. They say that Wang Gao was a Shantung man, serving in this capacity. Some go so far as to say he was the father of the child; others that he was only a most faithful servant who had care of Fo Koolun and her son. One day he went out as usual to forage for the woman he served so well, but never returned. She longed and longed for his return, but in vain. At last when she could restrain herself no longer, a timely chasm opened in the hill, into which she threw herself, and her son became depen-

Wherever and whatever his origin, it may be true that Aisin Gioro was elected by the hamlet of Wodoli to be head of the village. This "kingdom" rebelled against him, putting himself and all his sons to death, except Fancha, the youngest, who escaped. For when pursued by the murderers of his father's house, a magpie alighted on his head, and as he stood stock-still, he was taken for a piece of dried wood, and the pursuit given up. These two stories, whatever their value, will explain why the magpie is the sacred bird of the present dynasty.

We believe, however, that the Manchus point to Wodoli, or Odoli, as the birth-place of their dynasty, only because that place on the north of the white mountains is in the vicinity of Ninguta, where was the origin of three great and powerful dynasties,—Mogo, Bohai, and Kin (see *Nüjun*, "History of Corea.") But the real source of the Manchus was in the small but beautiful valley of Hotooala, where Hingking now stands, and which is east of Mookden. The Manchus became a powerful kingdom before the region of Odoli became theirs. The story of Fancha is given, apparently, to account for the disappearance of the Manchu founder from Odoli. Fancha is said to have fled across the White mountains to Hotooala,* and founded that kingdom, in a part of which Hingking was afterwards built.

The Emperor Jing-dsoo, grandfather of Noorhachu, was remarkable for the statesmanship he exhibited in ruling the six little hamlets, of probably a dozen or two families each, surrounded by a wall, and called a "city." To the west of him was a man called Shwosaina, who, with his nine powerful lawless sons, was the scourge of the great west between Hotooala and Fooshwun. He was joined by Jiahoo and his seven sons, who,

dent on the villagers; but the village which supported him was blessed with *ginsheng*, which thus originated there. The story is partly corroborated by three proverbs common in Manchuria:—*Pan ni siang pan Wang Gao*, "I long for you, as the longing for Wang Gao;" *Sien ji Wang Gao, how ji Baishan*, "First sacrifice to Wang Gao, then to the White Mountains;" *Sien Wang Gao, how Hwang ling*, "First Wang Gao, next the imperial tombs." Others, again, state that the famous Aisin Gioro was a runaway Mongol.

* See Geographical Notes.

when clad in mail, "could overthrow nine bulls." These men plundered the country round about. But the Emperor Jing-dsoo was wise, and his eldest son, Lidun, was brave. Lidun mustered all the forces of the kingdom, marched against and gained a complete victory over the eighteen robbers. This victory secured them five mountain passes, and two hundred li of territory, up to the very gates of the Chinese Fooshwun; a territory more beautiful than productive, for the close-packed ranges of granite low mountains produce more trees than grain.

This battle, so gravely related by their historians, who trace the rise of their kingdom to it, is the best evidence as to the original size of the Manchu kingdom, and the resources of their six "cities." Another proof is to be found in the fact, that within one hundred square miles of mountainous country, between Ninguta on the north and Hingking on the south, there were eleven independent countries; Manchu being divided into five, and each of the others being considerably larger than the five. Ever since the overthrow of the Kin dynasty, the Nüjun were broken up into many independent parties,* who delighted as much in fighting as in hunting. To imagine that one of the smallest of these would first swallow up all the rest, and that it should, from an army which could afford to boast of defeating eighteen robbers, become the ruler of hundreds of millions of men, was not within the bounds of probability, and certainly did not enter into the day dreams of the Manchus themselves. However, so it turned out; and we shall now relate the cause and trace the progress of the wondrous event.

The title which Noorhachu assumed for his dynasty has been variously transliterated in the west; from the long Mantcheou of the old French writers to the Manchu of the modern English. Yet neither the one nor the other gives to the ordinary English reader the nearest resemblance to the

* Manchu had five independent clans—Soochoho, Hwunho, Wangjia, Doongnua, and Juachun. Changbaishan had two clans—Noyin and Yaloo kiang. Doonghai was a third "kingdom," Holun a fourth, with districts of Woji, Warka, and Koorka. Woola, Hada, Yeho, and Hwifa, each had its own king.

manner in which the people themselves pronounce and spell their own name. The transliteration of the Chinese name for them is Man-jow; but the proper sound, as written and spoken by the rulers of China, is that of the English words,—*Man* and *Jew*,—which we might write Manjoo, as being that form of writing which most nearly represents the sound to English readers; to prevent confusion we retain the writing *Manchu*, drawing attention to the fact that it is pronounced *Manjoo*. Other names are written on this same principle,—the *b*, *d*, *t*, *g*, *k*, *j*, *ch*, of Manjoo, Mongol, and Chinese, being usually represented as not divisible into surd and sonant—which representation we have no hesitation in questioning.

The name *Manjoo* is equivalent to the common Chinese name, Tsing or Ching, the ordinary dynastic title of the Manchus. Both *Manjoo* and *Ching* mean the “clear”-ness of water, and the title is doubtless suggested by that of its predecessor,—the *Ming* or “Bright,”—the “clearness” of the sun. Indeed, the dynastic titles of China seem to have borrowed from each other for several dynasties. The *Liao* or “Iron,” which was “strong,” was followed by the *Kin* or “Gold,” which “never tarnished;” again by the *Munggoo* or “Silver,” which was also called Yuen, or “Original” dynasty. The *Ming* drove out the Yuen,—and the Tsing, Manjoo, or “Clear” dynasty, is its successor.



CHAPTER I.

THE NÜJUN.

IN the year 1583, soon after the discovery of Siberia by the Russians, when Holland was rejoicing in her dear-bought, newly-acquired liberty, when England was trembling at the preparations made by Philip of Spain and the plots against Elizabeth, and when all Europe was agitated by schemes to recover to Rome by shot what she had lost by the Bible, the Chinese set a stone a-rolling, which ultimately turned back upon themselves and crushed them.

There can be little doubt that the quiet Chinese agriculturist at Kaiyuen, Fooshwun, Chingho, Kwandien, and other border lands, was often harassed by the restless, roving bands of Tartar or Dadsu hunters, who preferred to take the grain sown by their neighbours to reaping their own. When, therefore, the ambitious Nikan Wailan of Toolun city, south of Hingking, prayed the Bai or Count of Ningyuen to help him to a kingdom which he could not take for himself, Li Chung-liang, the able but aged Count, readily acceded to the request, and ordered a Fookiang of Liao-yang to attack the city of Koshaji, which was taken, and its "king" slain. Nikan now united his men to the victorious Chinese, and marched against Goolo, the city and kingdom of Uatai Jangjing, who was married to a daughter of Lidun, the Batooroo, and a cousin of Noorhachu. The old chief, Hüen, hastened to the aid of his grand-daughter, taking with him his heir, the father of Noorhachu. They entered the city, and implored her husband to let them remove her in the meantime. He refused, and the two waited on.

When the Fookiang was disappointed in his hope of being able to take the city by storm, at the suggestion of Nikan, he sent a

herald to the foot of the wall, to state that whoever slew the king would himself be made king. The citizens acted on the suggestion, slew their king, and accepting the invitation of the Fookiang, went out to meet him, when they were all slain. Among them were old Hüen and his son.

The sad news threw Noorhachu, then twenty-four years of age, into the wildest grief for his relations, and anger against their murderers. Next day he demanded the two bodies for burial, grants of thirty "letters patent," thirty horses, the title of *loonghoo kiangkun*, or "general of the order of Dragon and Tiger," and the credentials of a *doodoo* or "major-general." It appears that the murder of his father and grandfather was unpremeditated, for the Chinese at once gave up the bodies, the title of "*doodoo*," ten "decess," and thirty horses. Three years after he had the title of "Loonghoo Kiangkun" conferred upon him, with a present of Tls. 800. He asked, besides, for the surrender of Nikan, in order to wreak his vengeance and appease the manes of his ancestors. But instead of handing him over, the Chinese declared that Nikan should be lord of all Manchu, including, of course, Hotooala. This declaration induced most of his men to desert him; and even his relations, living between Hotooala and Ninguta, sought his death, and ranged themselves under the banner of Nikan; and every effort was made to induce or compel himself also to acknowledge Nikan, but he would come to no terms with the murderer of his father. Revenge or death was his motto; and he could say with his grandson, if he had known the ancient classic, "that the same heaven could not continue to cover them both." He sent thirteen mailed * men to kill Nikan by stratagem; but as cunning failed, he, in June of next year, (1584), set out at the head of a hundred soldiers and thirty mailed men to attack Toolun. The size of the city may be inferred from the fact, that Nikan did not dare to wait the attack, but left Toolun in the possession of Noorhachu.

His thoughts by day and his dreams by night seem to have

* From what I can learn, this mail consisted of many folds of cotton sewed one above the other, between ten and twenty folds, making the garment arrow-proof.

been all on revenge, and to attain it, he seems to have given his whole attention to training his men for battle; for we find that his second cousins, fearing his military prowess, combined to take his life. They advanced by night against his city, set a ladder to the wall, scaled it and found him fled; for he had discovered their design. Two months after we find him attacking the refuge of Nikan, who fled from his tormentor. It was while absent on this expedition, that some of his own relations, joining the king of Hada, took and plundered one of his stockades. As they were dividing the spoil in the middle of the road, two of his officers with twelve men suddenly attacked and defeated the spoilers, retook the prey and slew forty men.

Then the five independent districts of Manchu were constantly at war with each other. But Noorhachu, who had the small valley to begin with, seems to have been gradually gathering power; for the Chinese, three years after the murder, handed over Nikan, who was immediately put to death. They also paid him Tls. 800, fifteen *mang* or "dragon-embroidered robes," and made a treaty, by which barter markets were opened at Fooshwun on the west, Chingho on the south-west, Aiyang and Kwandien on the south, where the endless varieties and large quantities of Manchu furs could be exchanged for Chinese cotton, sugar, or grain.

Next year (1587) Noorhachu built Laochung (8 *li* south of Hingking), with a so-called palace in the centre, and a triple wall round about: which done, he paid particular attention to his small state. His few laws were simple, speedy of application and most strictly observed, while no robber dared approach his land. His wise, impartial justice becoming known, people flocked to his standard, and acknowledged him king. His fame as a legislator, combined most probably with a little coercion, soon welded the five districts of Manchus into one complete whole, at the head of which he ventured, in 1591, without any known provocation, to attack Yalookiang province on the east, which he annexed to Manchu.

His continually-increasing power disquieted the neighbouring

kinglets, seven * of whom united their forces with those of two eastern Mongolian chiefs or Beiras, and, in three divisions, marched at the head of thirty thousand men to crush the restless young Beira. Their approach threw the Manchus into a



Bust of Manchu Official.

state of the greatest fear and trembling; but the young chief, stronger in fame than in numbers, drew up his men advantageously at the foot of the hill Goolo, his rear protected by the fort of Heijigo.

* Yeho, Hada, Woola, Hwifa, Jooshuali, and Noyin.

Boojai, chief of Yeho, rode furiously ahead, accompanied by Mingan, chief of the Kortsin Mongols. Boojai, galloping in among the Manchus, came against a piece of wood, was thrown off his horse and slain. Mingan plunged his horse into the mud and lost his saddle, but struggling out and riding without saddle or bridle, he galloped away to the north, followed by some of his men in disorder. Taking advantage of the confusion, Noorhachu at once attacked the foe, and the example of the Kortsin chief became general. Noorhachu pursued the flying enemy northwards, slaying four thousand men, taking three thousand horses and a thousand plaited suits of armour, with Boojantai, younger brother of the chief of Woola. If he slew four thousand men, his own army must have equalled that number,—a rapid improvement on his original army; and this battle which should have broken his power increased it tenfold.

Wanhan was the seventh generation of the chiefs of HADA, and of the surname Nala. His father was murdered; he fled, and his uncle seized the government. This uncle was also slain; and his son having avenged his death, recalled Wan to take possession of his father's inheritance. His exile may have embittered his temper, for when he returned he began to war on his neighbours, and with such success that Yeho, Woola, Hwifa and a considerable part of Manchu were added to his patrimony. But he was a brave robber, not a wise ruler. His temper was ungovernable; and his itchy palm was never satisfied, though he had it always full of bribes and plunder. His men, following his example, waylaid and robbed on every highway. His unwise policy threw away what his bravery had acquired; for before his death all his conquests had slipped out of his hands. Had he acted more prudently, Manchu might never have been heard of.

Munggo Boolso was the third son of Wan, who ruled; all three reigning only a few years. His younger brothers rebelled against him; and Yeho, taking advantage of his weakness, attacked and defeated him. The Chinese refusing his repeated prayers for help, in 1599 he sent his three sons to Noorhachu to plead for urgent aid. Two thousand troops were immediately

despatched to his assistance; but on their arrival he seized their leaders, to hold them as hostages for his sons, and attacked the men who had come to his aid. This breach of faith was at the instigation of his former enemy Yeho, who probably feared that the rider after avenging the horse would not get down again; and he was not desirous to have Noorhachu as his next door neighbour. His treachery turned out badly, for Noorhachu, ostensibly in anger at this bad faith, but really glad to have so good an excuse, marched against Hada, took all the cities and stockades of Munggo, and annexed them to Manchu in spite of the angry remonstrances of the Chinese, who several times attempted in vain again to set up the kingdom of Hada. And by relieving the men of Hada from a famine caused by the frequent inroads of Yeho, Noorhachu secured the affections of the people. This conquest so elated him, that he believed himself strong enough to assert his independence, and ceased paying tribute to the Chinese; but continued to trade with them at the border cities.

On the death of Wangjinoo, chief of HWIFA,* his grandson murdered seven uncles and took possession of the kingdom. He defeated an attack by the Mongols of Chahar, and sent a son to Noorhachu as hostage, arranging a marriage for him. He afterwards recalled the son, threw up the marriage, and cast himself into the arms of Yeho. He built a strong double-walled city, but its increased garrison did not save him; for in 1607 the tail of a comet pointed ominously to Hwifa, and Noorhachu added it to his kingdom.

Boojantai † who was taken prisoner at the battle of Gooloshan,

* The first of these chiefs was Nganggooli Hingjili, from the banks of the Songari, who agreed to combine his surname with that of a Nalasu from Woola. They sacrificed seven oxen to Heaven, and made the new surname Nala Hingjili. The men of Hwifa came originally from Nimacha on the *Wooloo kiang*, which I take to be the *Usuri*. They, therefore, migrated westwards, probably when the Kin dynasty had drained those regions for the purpose of ruling in China. (See "History of Corea.")

† Boojantai was the twelfth generation and thirteenth ruler of the clan Nala in Woola, anciently called Hoolun.

was sent home to succeed his brother as chief of WOOLA. When departing for his kingdom, a relation of Noorhachu's was given him in marriage. But in 1607, a part of Woola revolted to Noorhachu, who sent four thousand men to welcome the new-comers. Boojantai marched with ten thousand men to prevent the rupture of his kingdom; but he was defeated, with the loss of three thousand coats of mail. Another force of five thousand men was sent against Boojantai, but he dared not give battle; and thinking it easier to face a daughter of his able enemy than to face his army, he prayed for peace. Noorhachu, giving him his choice, sent his daughter to Boojantai, and withdrew his five thousand men.

Soon thereafter he was again attacked, for he became suitor for a princess of Yeho, already promised to Noorhachu. In a family quarrel he let fly a whizzing arrow at the head of his young bride, Noorhachu's daughter, thus doubly insulting his father in law. Noorhachu marched against him, took five of his cities, burnt all his stores, and made a new treaty, which did not long remain in force; for Boojantai took the field again with thirty thousand men. A battle ensued, in which Noorhachu ran considerable personal risk; but he finally gained a complete victory. The eyes of the flying Boojantai were greeted by the banners of Manchu waving between him and his own city, for an ambush had been laid there. Boojantai turned his horse's head in the direction of Yeho, and was no more heard of; and Woola became Manchu territory.

In 1613, just thirty years after his whole army amounted to a hundred and thirty men, Noorhachu mustered all his forces, and marched at the head of forty thousand men against Yeho,* the last and most powerful of the southern or "civilized" independent Nūjun principalities. Now that he was ready, he could find *casus belli* sufficient, from the battle of Gooloshan down.

* The founder of the then ruling chiefdom of Yeho was a Mongol, who had assumed the surname Nala, because living among that clan. He afterwards removed westwards and became chief of Yeho; the state being named after the river of that name, flowing westward into the Liao, as does the Hada river on the south; the Hwifa and Woola flow northwards into the Songari.

As soon as the country people of Yeho heard of this invasion, all hurried into the "cities." Messengers were sent with all speed to Kaiyuen to urge the Chinese to come to the rescue, with the argument that if Yeho fell, as it was now the only independent tribe, the Chinese would feel the weight of Noorhachu's arm. The Chinese sent on a Lieut.-Colonel, with a thousand stand of arms, which did not prevent Noorhachu from taking seven cities and nineteen stockades. But his rough wooing lost him his bride, for the princess of Yeho was given to a Mongolian prince. Nor was he able to retain the places taken; but had to retire to plan and prepare for new campaigns.

The name DOONGHAI (East Sea) was given to all the country east of the Hoorha and Hingking, between the Songari, the Amoor, the sea of Japan, and Corea. Several minor expeditions were sent at various times into different portions of this country,—then, nominally, divided into three great provinces. The captives brought back in these expeditions were drilled and scattered among the various Banners to test them, but they were found far inferior to the Manchus in fighting capacity. One of those expeditions, in 1598, was under Chooying, the eldest son of Noorhachu, who, with a thousand men, took twenty hamlets and ten thousand captives. In 1608, the chief of Yowfei city of WARKA, started westwards, at the head of five hundred families, to join the Manchus, but was stopped on the way by the men of Woola, who, however, were defeated by Fei Yingdoong, then on his way with three thousand men to welcome the new arrivals. Warka was the name of that province of Doonghai, lying between the Warka river, which fell into the Yaloo, and the sea skirting the whole north border of Corea. When the various clans of Manchu, Changbaishan, and Hoolun, were welded into a compact kingdom in 1609, a treaty was made with the Chinese, in which they agreed to order Corea to restore the Warkas who had gone thither; and a thousand families were sent back. When, again, the Manchus, in 1627, marched into Corea, two hundred odd families living there revolted to them. In 1635-6, two small expeditions ferried a number of prisoners across the



river, besides innumerable sables, tigers, and *shualis* (lynx?). And yet, once again, several years after, the Coreans went, by Manchu orders, against deserter Warkas, who had taken up their abode on "Bear Island," and stamped out the last of Warka independence. The descendants of Warka men abound among the Manchus of the present day. X

The district of HOORHA is on the Hoorha river, which springs in the borders of Woola of Kirin, passes Ninguta, and enters the Hwuntoong at *Sanhing*. The Tang dynasty called this the *Hooan* river, and its source is the original seat of the Kin dynasty.—(See *Nūjun*, "History of Corea.") The Manchus first marched into Hoorha, two thousand strong, in January, 1612, when the city of Jakoota fell, after a three days' siege, with three thousand men taken or slain. The conquerors brought back to Laochung five hundred families. Four years after, a petty chief went south to cast in his lot with the Manchus, at the head of his hundred families. A body of two hundred men went out to welcome them with a feast. It would appear that some had come with grumbling, for the Manchu officers proclaimed freedom of choice to go or stay. Those who desired to stay, were asked to go to the left hand,—those who sought to return, to the right. To each of the eight of the chief men who went to the left, were granted twenty male and female servants, ten oxen and horses, silks and dragon-embroidered robes, with changes of clothing for the four seasons; fields, houses, utensils, and ready money, were also given them. This unexpected generosity decided the waverers, all of whom went to the left; and the bounty caused them to break out in exclamations of praise at the "goodness" of him who was warring with them, not to annihilate, but to make them his "feathers and his wings." Another expedition, in the following year, brought back two thousand captives, besides a chief who came of his own accord, and was treated in the same hospitable manner as his predecessors. Yet another expedition, in 1643, just before the Manchus entered Peking, was required to complete the annexation of the whole of

Hoorha. This expedition penetrated to the Hwuntoong, or Amoor, and returned with twenty-eight hundred men and women, besides great quantities of sable, tigers, and leopards.

Alei, the ancient Hoorha, is 400 li north-east of Ninguta, and east of it again is WOJI, or "The Forest," a land of forest-covered mountains stretching eastwards to the sea. In 1610, a thousand Manchus made a successful foray, bringing back two thousand captives, and the allegiance of the Hoorha and Hooye districts. This raid would be on the districts north of Warka, for the Hooye river is 910 li south-east of Ninguta, and flows into the Usuri. The districts of Ninguta and Swifun acknowledged Manchu rule without pressure, but they were opposed by the clan of the Yalan, which was, therefore, attacked by one thousand men, who had gone to welcome the submitting clans. The Swifun river is 440 li south-east of Ninguta, and runs directly into the sea to the north-east of Toomun. The Yalan rises in the south-east of Changbaishan, 500 li south-east of Ninguta, and falls into the Toomun. The remaining portions of Woji, Woorgoochun, and Moolin, fell next year, and the small seaboard districts gave in their allegiance without compulsion. The Moolin river is north of the above, 400 li east of Ninguta, flowing into the Usuri. Thus all north of Corea from Ninguta to the sea, acknowledged the supremacy of the Manchu arms.

In 1617, an expedition was sent down the Woolajien river to SAHALIEN, Sahalyan,* "Black," of Doonghai, which took scores of villages. The banks of the Heiloongkiang were reached in September; and though hoar frost had not yet appeared, the Manchus found the river with a frozen bridge 150 feet wide. They crossed, and again the river was open. They came to

* Sahalyan,  "black"; woola,  'kiang," great river;

Sahalyan woola—Black River, in Chinese, Heiloong Kiang; it is the Songari, flowing east. DOONGHAI, or the "Eastern Sea" Province, seems to have included in it all between the Hoorha, Changbaishan, and the sea.

recross, and the ice was again formed. They got to the districts of Nualo and Sila rivers, flowing,—the former into the Hwuntoong, the latter direct to the sea; and the dog-employing districts of Yintahwun and Takoola, all on the south of the Hwuntoong. The tribe on the Sila was called Chiyaka. The result scarcely justified such a miracle, for only eleven villages north of the river fell to the invaders. Next year, a body of four hundred men sufficed to scour all the country of the petty clans on the seaside, and in two hundred small boats left not an island unvisited.

In 1626, all the lands east of the Songari, and south of the Hwuntoong to its entrance into the sea, were Manchu soil; including the dog-using* tribes of Hoju or Hojin, now under Russia, and producing, perhaps, the finest sable in the world; and the deer-using Chilar and Feiyaha, with the island of Kooshan (Saghalien). East to west, this region was “4000 li; north to south, 2000.” The island of Kooshan is peopled by men from Chilar, Feiyaha, and Woolunchwun. Those remote districts did not nominate Dsolings, nor rank in the Manchu Eight Banners. They are now all Russian.

A geographical note in the “Holy Wars,” states that the eastern province from Ninguta is composed of,—first, Nuaiei, or ancient Hoorha district, on both banks of the Hoorha, and 400 li (north) east of Ninguta; second, 1000 li east of Ninguta, on both banks of the Usuri, the district of Shoolun, which, with the district of Chiya Kala, at the sources of the Niman, 200 li further east, constituted the ancient Woji. The south province is Bajirhan Kala, 4000 (?) li from the Usuri, and south-east of Ninguta, whence fur tribute used to come every second year by the Niman river. The north province, or circuit, included Hoju Kala, 1500 li north-east of Ninguta, occupying both banks of the Songari and Hwuntoong; 400 or 500 li still further north-east, where the Usuri falls into the Hwuntoong, and occupying

* The terms Dog-using and Deer-using tribes, are self-explanatory. The former employs teams of dogs, the latter of deer, to draw their *pali* or sledges. On Saghalin and the mainland, are “very hairy” men, who are the Oinos of Japan.

both banks, is the kingdom of the dog-using Hoju; 700 or 800 li further to the north-east, along the Hwuntoong, is Feiyaha, stretching to Chilar, which is 3000 li from Ninguta, and bordering the sea.

In 1603, Noorhachu removed his capital from the centre of the plain of Hotooala, to the southernmost spur of the mountains on the north side of the plain, and called the new city Hingking, or the "Capital of Prosperity." Moukden or Mookden, in Manchu, means the same. Before two years had elapsed, events had so crowded the new city, that it was far too small, and he was compelled to build an outer wall, with a wide sweep all round.* In the year 1606, the Mongol *Beiras* sent him a complimentary embassy, to style him the *Shun-woo*, the "Intelligent and warlike." In 1616, the great ministers called him the "Nourisher of all the kingdoms," and gave him the title of *Ying-ming* emperor, the "brave and illustrious." From this year dates the first of his reign under the style *Tien-ming*, "Decree of Heaven," which we shall see was well bestowed. But the "Holy Wars" date it a year before, and the "Ming History" two years after.

The rapid progress and thoroughness of the conquests of Noorhachu, and the great political power which he had attained, by his rare combination of wisdom in his government, with bravery in the field, alarmed the Chinese officials of Liaotung, who had themselves alone to blame; for it was their tinkering and botching of the affairs of these petty tribes, which broke the shell whence had sprung this scourging cockatrice. They had doubtless brought many a small tyrant to reason before, and believed themselves able to crush this man whenever they had a mind to do so. They had once and again sent a handful of men to assist those who were defending themselves from his attacks; which forces however had been inadequate to serve any other purpose than that of rousing in his mind a bitter enmity against their meddlesomeness. They made no serious effort to confine him within proper bounds, till he had become a mighty

* See Appendix, Geographical Notes.

power, which they could no longer restrain by the means at their disposal. They were not fully alive to the dangerous character of that power, and to the necessity of taking prompt and strong precautionary measures; and they were ready to be satisfied if they could hold their own. Judging properly, they preferred to make the soil of an ally their battle-field, and saw that it was their interest to aid Yeho, which was determined to offer a brave resistance against annexation though all the other independent chieftains had fallen a prey to the revenge or ambition of Noorhachu. To make this resistance effectual, Chinese soldiers and firearms were essential. And a large reinforcement sent to Kaiyuen considerably strengthened their position. It was this move compelled Noorhachu to relinquish the captured cities.

Wisdom could easily defend the Chinese power in Liaotung, and overthrow Noorhachu, who would have been a madman if he even dared to dream of his becoming ruler of Mookden; and wisdom and bravery there were, more than sufficient, at the disposal of the Chinese emperor. But alas for the wisdom which has to serve under eunuchs, whether in China or Europe! Wisdom had to hide its head in the secrecy of private life, whenever it came into collision, as it generally did, with the schemes and interests of the eunuchs.

The defeated battalions of Hada, Hwifa and Woola had learned to become conquerors under the banners of Noorhachu, who was determined to gain Yeho. But the freedom of that state could be wrenched from it only by the defeat of its brave army; which again could be accomplished only by snapping the power of the Chinese in the neighbourhood, or by a decisive and crushing victory over them, which would end at once their arrogance and the obstinacy of Yeho. He therefore spent two years in the preparation of engines of war, and in the active drilling of his troops. He selected with critical eye the best men, and formed them into picked companies; thus to be ready for any emergency, and to seize the first favourable opportunity for hostilities.

In 1617, when he believed everything complete, he drew up a

paper of seven "hates" or grievances, addressed to the emperor but burnt it to inform heaven and earth and the ancestral temple, which was certainly more expeditious, and quite as efficacious as forwarding it to Peking; for though the Ming emperor "Wan-li" was of mature years, his wisdom had yet to grow. Most likely it would never have reached the dragon throne; for it would be consigned to oblivion by the faithful eunuch ministers, who loved truth so much that they wished to keep it all to themselves and give none to the emperor. Vengeance for his father and grandfather, murdered thirty-four years before, was of course the principal reason alleged for his declaration of war against the Chinese! But it is scarcely necessary to say, that, as in almost all wars of conquests, the true reason did not appear on that paper, but was to be learned from the two years' preparations. In his case as in most others, revenge was a good cloak to cover ambition, and Noorhachu knew the state of Liaotung better than the emperor did.

CHAPTER II.

CONQUEST OF LIAOTUNG.

THE Seven Grievances, or "Hates," referred to and on which Noorhachu founded his declaration of war, were as follows:—

"1. Though my ancestors never took a straw from, nor hurt an inch of earth within the Chinese boundary, the Chinese were unceasingly quarrelling, and without just reason, abetting my neighbours to the great injury of my ancestors.

"2. Notwithstanding such injuries it was still my desire to be on friendly terms with the Chinese Emperor, and I therefore set up a stone slab on the border, on which was engraved an oath, that whoever, Manchu or Chinaman, should cross the frontier, must suffer instant death; and that if any man aided in sending back the trespasser, he would himself suffer death instead. This oath was disregarded by the Chinese, whose soldiers crossed to aid Yeho.

"3. At Nankiangan and Beihai on the Ching ho, the Chinese crossed the river every year, plundering all around, regardless of consequences. I carried out my oath to the letter and slew as many as were seen on our side the river. Thereupon the Chinese annulled the treaty between us, reproached me with murdering their people, and at our very border murdered my ambassador to Kwangning, with his nine attendants.

"4. The Chinese crossed the frontier to aid Yeho, and thus compelled men and women who were our subjects to return to Mongol allegiance.

"5. For many generations we have tilled the lands along the Chai river, along the tripartite roads at Foongan mountain pass. The Chinese soldiers came and drove away the reapers when they went to gather in the harvest.

"6. Though Yeho sinned against Heaven, you continued to listen to their deceiving speech; and sent me a messenger with a letter upbraiding me, railing at and abusing me without restraint, causing me unspeakable shame.

"7. Hada of old assisted Yeho in battling against me, who had only my own resources on which to rely. Heaven gave me Hada. You of the Ming* supported them, causing them to return to their own homes. But Hada was afterwards frequently attacked and robbed by this same Yeho. If these small kingdoms had obeyed the will of Heaven, they could not but abide and prosper; disobeying the will of Heaven they must be broken and destroyed. Can you preserve in life those appointed to die? I took Hada men; do you still desire to restore them? You are a prince of Heaven's appointment. You are the sole emperor of all under Heaven, why do you envy me the possession of my small kingdom? When Hoolun kingdoms gathered against me to destroy me, Heaven abandoned them and aided me, because they fought against me without a cause. At that time you aided Yeho against me, and thus ran counter to the will of Heaven; you reversed my right and his wrong, and thus divided an unjust judgment.

"For all these reasons I hate you with an intense hatred and now make war against you."

This paper he solemnly burnt with sacrificial rites to inform Heaven of the justice of his cause, and immediately set his army in motion.

With the bow and arrow as his principal offensive arm, Noorhachu marched westwards with twenty thousand cavalry and infantry, two hundred li against *Fooshwun*, the first Chinese city east of Mookden. Before getting to *Fooshwun*, the cities of Machow, Gunchow, Daichow, and Taipoo, fell. A lieut.-col. sent against him deserted to him, and the commandant of *Fooshwun* committed suicide. The city was taken and garrisoned, and the Manchus retraced their steps. They were

* The *Ming* or Bright Dynasty, established by a monk (see "*History of Corea*"), then ruled over China.

overtaken by a force of ten thousand Chinese from Kwangning, against which they advanced "like the wind," and all but annihilated them. Immense numbers of Chinese, including their general, lieut.-general, and a colonel, were slain. The fact however that half the number of Chinese would undertake to pursue the Manchus, shows that they believed themselves greatly the superior. This will help to explain the battles immediately to be mentioned.

In the autumn of the same year, 1618, he pounced upon and took the city of Chingho in the south-west, defeating the Chinese army there, and slaying the incredible number of ten thousand men with their commander. He was proceeding southwards with his conquests, got to Jienchang, which he took and levelled to the ground, but his army clamoured to be led against Yeho; probably fearing that if they went much further south, the men of Yeho would pour in from the north, sack their city, and destroy their families. This shows the relationship subsisting between commander and soldier; for Noorhachu was compelled to relinquish his pet scheme, and to march northwards against Yeho, to protect his rear. Of all the neighbouring Nujun principalities, Yeho alone offered a brave but now very unequal resistance. Yeho could be successful only by the aid of Chinese assistance, and Chinese officials were now fully alive to the evils brought upon them by their tinkering. They were also well aware that Chinese territory was comparatively safe from molestation while Yeho stood strong and faithful. It was therefore their interest to support Yeho with all their might and do all they could to prevent the Manchus from wrenching victory out of their brave but out-numbered hands. Wisely judging it best to make the soil of an ally rather than their own their battle field, they supported Yeho by throwing a largely increased garrison into Kaiyuen. This did not, however, stop Noorhachu, who marched in, determined to annex Yeho. But he had taken no more than twenty forts and their cattle when he was suddenly summoned to save his capital, around which was converging a force of two hundred thousand Chinese soldiers.

The great preparations of Noorhachu during those two active years, could not be unknown to the Chinese officials. The capture of Fooshwun proved his daring, and the Chinese found it necessary to bestir themselves to preserve their territory in Liaotung. As there were then few pressing calls on the resources of the Chinese government, a force of over two hundred thousand was speedily collected around Peking from all quarters. Yang Hao was nominated commander with the title of *jinglo*, or "generalissimo" of all Liaotung.

In February, 1619, he received orders to march eastwards immediately and destroy the troublesome little neighbour of Hingking. In vain did he expostulate against sending him at the head of a rabble of old men, and with empty coffers; the Board of War declared he must march without delay. In low spirits, he consulted with his fellow-commanders, and on the 1st day of the 2nd moon (middle of March), 1619, the large army struck their tents and followed the standard of Yang Hao. The march was not stopped though the standard-bearer saw some inauspicious omens. On the 20th day they passed through Shanhaigwan.

Arrived in Mookden, they divided into four armies of fifty thousand men each;—one under Doo Soong marched straight east, following the north bank of the Hwun, and entering Fooshwun, which had been captured and abandoned by Noorhachu. Ma Lin marched north to Kaiyuen, with the object probably of encouraging or compelling Yeho to remain loyal. He marched southwards through Yeho, picking up twenty thousand Yeho men, and passed on to Sanchakow, or the Tripartite gully. Li Zoobai marched along the Ching river from the south-west; and Liw Ting advanced from Kwandien, after amalgamating a Corean army of twenty thousand men, who had come thither. Each of the four divisions was accompanied by a eunuch, who was a civilian deputed by the emperor to be a spy and a spur to the commander; just as the French revolutionary republic sent deputies to watch over and report their generals. All this shows that the court at Peking was aware of the danger,

and proves the ample provision they made to make sure of success.

If the Manchu Hannibal had had opposed to him a Chinese Fabius, he could have had no resource but to pack up his valuables and dash with his best men into the eastern wildernesses of Doonghai; his city would have been razed to the ground, and the Tsing never heard of; but he was opposed by eunuchs. When the news of this formidable circle of steel was communicated to the soldier citizens of Hingking, the greatest terror seized all hearts; but Noorhachu did not despair. He beat a hasty retreat from Yeho, emptied every garrison town, drained every stockade, summoned in from every road-side the men able to carry arms, and crowded Hingking with over sixty thousand well-trained soldiers. Here with bated breath but cool head, he waited the approach of what seemed a sure and overwhelming destruction, and was constantly hearing the reports of his numerous scouts, flying in from all directions.

Being himself a man full of stratagem, when a breathless scout informed him that the enemy was approaching by the southern frontier, he believed it was a trick to entice him after that band, while the main army would rush down like a whirlwind from the west, and sack and obliterate his city, when he was fighting in the south. He determined not to be their dupe. Giving them credit for more wisdom than they possessed, he promptly ordered every man to be ready to follow him against the western division; for that once broken, the retreat or more easy defeat of the others was secured. He thus decided to carry out the tactics which gained the victories of Napoleon the first two centuries after, viz., massing his own troops, and charging a section of the enemy before the rest could come up to the rescue; for man to man the Chinese were quite the equals of the Manchus, and the latter had no hope but in generalship. Both sides were determined to conquer or die; but several of the Chinese superior officers caused the red flag of victory to be daily hoisted, for defeat was thought impossible.

Doo Soong, commander of the western army, was a brave

soldier who despised the enemy, and was eager to acquire the glory of finishing the war single-handed. He, therefore, led fifty thousand men east from Fooshwun, travelling thirty-three miles that day. Arrived at the foot of the north bank of the Hwun, along which he had skirted, he found the river much swollen and flowing with a strong and rapid current; for it was the middle of April, and the many mountain affluents of the Hwun were bearing down the thawed ice and snow of the mountains, east of Hingking, half-way to Corea. But so impatient was he to take Hingking, that he would not wait to construct rafts, but flogged his horses into the river, which carried away many of them with their riders. His stores on five hundred carts had to remain on the northern bank. News of this movement reached Noorhachu before a blow could be struck, he being already on the march in that direction. His scouts had given him the most correct information as to the exact position of all the other armies. Their distance, with accurate knowledge of the difficult nature of the mountainous road they had to take, warranted him in drawing off every man from his capital; and he could face Soong's fifty thousand with sixty thousand men. He was not far from Soong when the latter crossed the Hwun on the first of the third moon.

Doo Soong detached thirty thousand men to make an entrenched camp on Sarhoo hill, and marched with twenty thousand to invest Jiefan, a hundred and twenty li (40 miles) north-west of Hingking, and on the north side of the Soodsu, which washed its southern foot, as it swept past the northern foot of Sarhoo hill. Jiefan was a city of fifteen thousand inhabitants, and had then, accidentally, four hundred soldiers, who had been sent to build a palace for the fourth Beira, the favourite son, afterwards the successor, of Noorhachu. The four hundred lay in ambush in the gorge of Sarhoo, through which Doo Soong must pass to Jiefan. They permitted the van of the enemy to pass by, and then suddenly rushed out upon the astonished Chinese, and drove them on to the ford below Jiefan. There the Manchus were speedily surrounded, and would soon have

been annihilated, but just at this juncture the fourth Beiradashed on the scene to relieve his four hundred men, at the head of a thousand picked horsemen, two banners (fifteen thousand men) closely following behind. To this move his father gave a reluctant consent, he being desirous to attack Sarhoo camp with his undivided force; after taking which, the men at Jiefan could not stand out;—but he was thus leaving his four hundred to utter destruction. With the other six banners (forty-five thousand men), Noorhachu came up in the afternoon to the Chinese camp at Sarhoo, where he was received with tremendous volleys of cannon and gingals, which made more noise than damage, for they were of native manufacture.

The night fell in so dark, that one could not see an arm's length before him. Speedily torches twinkled all over the Chinese camp; but thick darkness enveloped the Manchus, who from their dark-shielded position let fly their arrows like showers of rain, every one of which told; for by their own lights were distinctly seen the Chinese soldiers, who fired away most vigorously into the dark, bringing down many a willow tree, but leaving the Manchus without a wounded man. The latter drew nearer and nearer in the dark, till at last they arrived at the palisade, which they attacked with a rush, took it, and leapt over in overwhelming numbers, the Chinese flying in the greatest disorder.

Without a rest, Noorhachu led on his six banners, intoxicated with success, against the investing body at Jiefan. He sent a detachment over the hill, which galloped down, attacking the Chinese in flank and rear. Doo Soong, fighting against such great odds, was killed by an arrow shot. His men, thereupon, broke up in wild confusion, and fled across the Hwun, which they left completely covered with dead bodies, flags and arms. All the principal Chinese officers were slain, and the survivors pursued for seven miles.

Ma Lin at Sanchakow, hearing of the disaster, entrenched himself at the foot of the hill Shangjien, surrounding his camp with a triple fosse. His artillery he set in position outside the fosse, with the cavalry drawn up behind. He issued the strictest

orders against any man straggling away from his post. This was in accordance with a plan of Yang Hao, who, besides, ordered two bodies of ten thousand men each, to occupy two hills, one on each side of the main camp, and a short distance ahead of it, to cover the flanks of Ma Lin. One of these was placed under the eunuch, the other under Nienswi. He also ordered all three to range their wagons outside their respective camps, to prevent the inbreak of cavalry; and to make heavy shields to protect their men from the arrows. They were thus posted for defence and ready for battle at a moment's warning, when the fourth Beira, at the head of his thousand picked horsemen, rushed with resistless vehemence against the flank of Nienswi. His foot seconded his attack, and a corner of the camp was soon taken, the wagons cut down, and the shields destroyed.

The eight Banners were however massed against Ma Lin, two to one. Noorhachu was ordering some of his men to go round the base of the hill, scale it behind, and come down on the rear of Ma Lin, but recalled the orders; for Ma Lin, probably impatient, was seen to move his men out beyond the fosse, to act on the offensive. The Manchus were ordered to dismount and fight on foot; but while Noorhachu and his men were in the act of dismounting, the Chinese were upon him at the run. He was thus suddenly in the most imminent danger, when the first Beira, his eldest son, in great fury, galloped headlong into the midst of the advancing Chinese, closely followed by the second brother, the third hastening on with two Banners just at their heels, and the battle became a *melée*. The other six Banners in their excitement broke their ranks, and each for himself galloped in pell-mell amongst the Chinese. If that eunuch with his 10,000 in good order were only half a general! The noise of their shouts shook the earth, and the Chinese were soon like a tile thrown to the ground, broken into a thousand fragments. The river at the foot of Shangjien ran blood; but the eunuch stirred not. And when he did move, it was to forsake his ten thousand and flee alone. Ma Lin escaped with a handful of men, and made

for Kaiyuen. The Yeho men fled before they got to the battle field; having heard of the defeat on their way.

Yang Hao hearing of this second disaster, sent off an express to the south and south-west armies, ordering them to retreat. Li Zoobai of the south-west received the message, and made off; but Liw Ting in the south pressed further northwards in perfect ignorance of what had taken place, and was then only about 50 li (17 miles) south of Hingking. Noorhachu told off four thousand men to protect his capital, to be ready for the possible rally of the northern army, or the march of that of Chingho, and then went south to reconnoitre Liw Ting's position; who after he had carefully laid out and fortified his camp, had sent out detachments, which took a number of stockades and villages, and five hundred Manchu soldiers. The report of this incensed the Manchus, who began to believe nothing impossible. But the scouts of Noorhachu persisted in proclaiming the impracticability of taking the Chinese camp; for all was in the most complete order, and every possible path was beset with "deer's horns." *

Noorhachu sent some deserters to the camp of Liw Ting, who approached it from the west, pretending to come from Doo Soong, to say that he (Doo Soong) had already taken the city, and to urge Liw Ting to advance with all possible speed. Liw Ting replied that he had heard no firing. The spies hurried back; and the Manchu soldiers were ordered to fire off a number of volleys, which was heard by Liw Ting, who had advanced seven miles to reconnoitre. The noise of the cannon decided him. He hastened back to his camp, gave orders to abandon the "deer's horns," and bewailed his fate that he could not march with sufficient speed; fearing the western army would rob him of all glory. He divided his men into four divisions; the

* "Deer's horns" are pieces of wood forming St. Andrew's crosses, running at right angles through a long heavy cross beam, as close as they can lie,—their lower ends heavy and longer; their upper tapering to a point, half pointing outwards, half inwards. They are sometimes seen surrounding yamens; and being ponderous and difficult of removal, are formidable obstacles to man as well as to beast.

first two of which contained his choicest troops. The first ten thousand men drew up in battle order at Aboodaligang.*

The fourth Beira was waiting on a neighbouring eastern eminence, down which he galloped against them at the head of four Banners forming the right wing. Outnumbered though they were by three to one, the Chinese were bent on fighting to the last man. But while the Manchu right wing was hotly engaging the Chinese, the left wing (the other four Banners) wheeled round the base of the hill from the west, flying the banners, and clad in the armour of the defeated Doo Soong. They got inside the Chinese camp before the trick was discovered, when, with a great shout, they struck out right and left. The suddenness with which the revelation came upon them, when they found that the men they had permitted to enter as their much needed succour were their foes, utterly confounded the Chinese; and it is not surprising that though brave men, they were thrown into the wildest confusion. Liw Ting flew back upon his next division, which was not yet in battle order. Before they were drawn up, the Manchus were upon them. Liw was slain fighting valiantly.

Liw's infantry, under Kan Yingchien, the Taotai of Haichow (Haichung), with the twenty thousand Coreans, was encamped at Chaju desert to the south. They were now attacked in their turn. A terrific north wind blowing at the time drove small gravel, sand, and the smoke of their own guns into their eyes, and completely blinded them. The Manchus, taking advantage of the situation, pushed against and leaped over the palisade. Yingchien was completely defeated, and fled. The Korean commander with five thousand Coreans and Chinese deserted to the Manchus; and Hingking sky was fairer than ever, the terrific thunder clouds disappeared, after harmlessly bursting.

The Ming history relates that three hundred superior officers and forty-five thousand men perished in the five days within which these battles were fought around Hingking. The spoils, —camels, horses, mail armour, weapons of war, native cannon,

* See Geographical Notes.

waggon and army stores of all kinds, were numbered by the million.*


If the men of Manchu were beside themselves with joy at this extraordinary deliverance; so utterly unexpected a defeat threw Peking into the greatest consternation. Noorhachu, instead of annihilation, found himself on the pinnacle of glory. But we think it is absurd for Manchu historians to regard this battle finally decisive, as to the ultimate triumph of the Manchus and the complete overthrow of the Ming. It is easy to prophesy after the event; but the thought of being able to upset the Chinese dynasty, never entered into the head of Noorhachu, and he would have been less wise than he has credit for, had he ever imagined himself equal to the task of overturning the Ming family. Had Hiwng Tingbi, to be mentioned immediately, not been recalled, Noorhachu would never have crossed the Liao. And were it not for the accession of Woo Sangwei, the Manchus could not have gained greater power than, if so much as, the Liao or Kin.† The Ming dynasty committed suicide; just as the Da Tsing will, if they permit lawlessness, licentiousness and corruption to rule their rulers. The rock on which this formidable expedition split was similar to that which brought disaster on the French in their last war. From an arrogant contempt of their foes, they neglected to observe the most ordinary precautions. Liw Ting would never have been so hoodwinked, had he been as vigilant as he was brave. A few scouts could inform him of the position of the enemy, and the fact that he was ignorant of the movements of his next neighbour was unpardonable ignorance. The Yeho men dressed and spoke like the Manchus, and a corps of them could have been attached to each army to act as spies. He may be a brave man, but not a wise one, who shoots Niagara,

* I have carefully compared the long account of these battles engraved on the large slab at Sarhoo, and, though more minute in some unimportant details, the only item of additional interest gleaned thence was that Noorhachu ordered his eldest son to ride swiftly to Hingking to bear the good news to his queen, on the day when Ma Lin fled. He followed himself after he made arrangements for the attack by his sons on Liw Ting. For position of *Sarhoo*, see Appendix I.

† See "History of Corea."

or takes a leap in the dark, or goes with a light heart against an unknown enemy.

The principal blame is certainly attachable to Yang Hao, who divided his army without taking any measures for inter-



Old Style Manchu Robe.

communication, whether for mutual support or information. Hence the brave but blinded Chinese, who, if properly and cautiously led, were four to one, found their enemy in immensely preponderating numbers at every turn. The blame and the

praise are to be allotted to the respective generals, the men on both sides differing but little ; indeed we feel inclined to say, that the Chinese were the better soldiers. It is not true that, given good soldiers, any kind of officer is sufficiently good ; the converse is more like the truth. Nor is it true that the "people" are or shall be the guiding force of the future. The people have and shall rightly retain the power to choose that guiding force, but they themselves will be impelled by the men they choose. A people may, as in 1792, seize and imagine it possesses all power, while it has only changed the name of its guide ; and with its own hands, it will set up and worship the Napoleon who binds its limbs, and does with it what he will. Mind will guide the future as it has guided the past, and the more universal diffusion of education, ensures the more unquestioning submission to mind.

The generalship of Taidsoo * was of the highest order, and can be favourably compared with that of our great western commanders ; and Yang Hao was very properly recalled to Peking, and punished for his abuse of the power he had held. Taidsoo gave his men only one month's rest before he led them, while the terror of the last defeat was yet fresh, against Kaiyuen, the most northerly of the Chinese possessions, which was strongly fortified and garrisoned. There he found Ma Lin, who had fled from Sanchakow, pursuing his old tactics ; for his men, probably survivors of the late battle, were divided into four companies, one outside each gate. Taidsoo sprang with his whole force upon the division outside the east gate, drove it into the city, and followed it, seizing the gate. The rest of the army, which could not push in by the gate, set up the "cloudy ladders," and swarmed up the sides like ants. The men on the wall, too few to resist, scrambled down, and the city was taken. The three divisions of Ma Lin outside their respective gates began to think of flight, but it was too late, for the moat was in possession of Taidsoo. Three days' registration left unfinished the tale of

* *Taidsoo*, The Great Ancestor, is the honourable title given to Noorhachu when his grandson mounted the Dragon Throne in Peking ; and by this title we shall henceforth call him.

the captives; while Ma Lin himself, with a colonel, lieut.-colonel, and major perished in the fight.

Because the heat was great, Taidsoo retired only to Jiefan, the scene of their greatest triumph, where a palace, public offices, and barracks had been erected; and Hingking ceased to be the capital of Manchu. After resting there over a month, Taidsoo marched northwards and took Tieling, the only Chinese city standing north of Mookden, defeating the Mongols of Karka who came to its rescue, and taking their beira captive. From Tieling he marched eastwards on Yeho, which was by this time entirely cowed, and the two separate states into which it was divided fell almost without a blow. Their respective beiras were taken and hung, for men of their rank could not be beheaded. The cities of Yeho opened their gates, and the Chinese soldiers who had been sent thither were all put to the sword.

Thus the original intention of Taidsoo was accomplished; for the principal divisions of the Nūjun, speaking the same language and following the same customs, were united into one unit, for the first time since the Kin dynasty was overthrown. His kingdom now extended northwards to the Songari, east to the sea, west to the territory of Liaoyang, and south to Corea.

In July of the same year, Hiwng Tingbi was nominated *jinglo** or "generalissimo" of Liaotung instead of Yang Hao. By the beginning of winter, he proceeded to Liaoyang, then and formerly the capital of Liaotung: and in spite of a severe shock of earthquake in Liaoyang and Mookden, he took prompt and energetic measures to prevent the further rise of the Manchu tide. In the teeth of a heavy snow storm, he hastened from city to town, from mountain to river, to discover the weak points which might be attacked, and the strong places which could be easily defended. He disposed a hundred and eighty thousand troops with inter-communication, in six different passes, south, south-west, west and north of Hingking, at little over thirty miles distance from the city, with strict orders, that if the enemy attacked any post, the men on the spot were to drive

* An office which was finally abolished.

them back ; but if the enemy was in preponderating numbers, messengers were to be sent immediately to demand the aid of the nearest division, and all were to hold themselves in readiness mutually to assist each other in case of need. He set chains of patrols, to be always on the move, and ever challenging each other. The choicest troops were formed into a roving army, to hover, cloud-like, on the edge of Manchu territory, now here, now there, harassing and threatening them on every possible opportunity, permitting them neither to sow nor to reap, and seizing all comers and goers.

The Hingking country, so mountainous, was unfitted for bolder measures ; especially as the *morale* of the Chinese army had to be restored. City walls which he found in ruins were rebuilt, and forsaken towns again peopled. He found the people dejected, miserable, all panic-stricken. The inhabitants of cities, villages, and country, and even the soldiery, were "hiding away like rats," and none dared travel. For hundreds of li not a traveller was to be seen, and all tremblingly said that the rich and populous Liaotung was lost. But his firmness set them all to work, his energy restored confidence ; and the best proof of his generalship was, that Taidsoo never attempted to break through the living wall on his west, for the two years during which Tingbi was generalissimo. But, unfortunately for his country, this Fabius was not dictator, and the envious eunuchs at court never ceased from accusing him of inaction, till he had at last to resign his command.

The father of one Dsoong Wun, a minister in Peking, died ; and, according to custom, the son had to retire from office to mourn his father. He was, however, eager to be restored to his post before the legal period of three years had expired, and solicited the good offices of Tingbi, who refused to interfere. Dsoong Wun became, therefore, the enemy of Tingbi, and having no public duties to occupy his mind, he journeyed eastwards to examine into the state of the army of Tingbi.

Tingbi had reported at Peking the case of a native of Liaotung, who had lost by desertion half of his division of

seventeen thousand men. The accused became his enemy, and consorted with Dsoong Wun, plotting to ruin Tingbi. Thus seconded, the ex-minister returned to Peking, became the companion of the eunuch clique, and once and again a censor was found to accuse Tingbi of negligence. He had at last to go to Peking, and was sent to his own private house pending investigation. The emperor Tienchi ordered some of the enemies of Tingbi to go to Liaotung to examine and report. Friends of justice, after a great deal of wordy and paper war, got this order cancelled, and a neutral party was despatched eastwards, who returned after an absence of two months, and reported that he had found everything in the most excellent condition, the ruined walls rebuilt, Liaoyang and Shunyang, (Mookden), which had been bare and empty, now completely fortified, and all the people tranquilised; agriculture and merchandise, which had been stopped, were flourishing without fear of interruption; and the officials and soldiers of Liaotung joined the hundreds of thousands of citizens in praying for the restoration of Tingbi, whom they declared to be the only man for the post. He also reported that when Tingbi was urging on the building of walls and the digging of moats, every man, without exception, had to labour; no amount of literary knowledge or talent exempted a man. Hence arose a great outcry against him. Every incompetent official, civil or military, had been removed, all of whom were become his enemies; and he concluded his report by saying that Tingbi was the man to save Liaotung, and should be reappointed without loss of time to the post which he had been compelled so unrighteously to vacate.

While writing, speaking and faction were active in Peking, and hot-tempered parties paralysed the hands of the weak emperor, events of great magnitude were transpiring in Liaotung.

The man who had succeeded Tingbi, was Yooen Yingtai, an excellent minister of state, and a man of great literary abilities, but a poor general. Immediately on his appointment, he had to decide a knotty question. All eastern Mongolia was

the "jungle" of generalissimo of Liaotung
 was appointed (6/50)

threatened with famine. Many crossed the frontier to beg Chinese bread. Yingtai was loth to receive them, but determined not to suffer these scores of thousands of hungry able-bodied men to pass into the hands of Taidsoo. He, therefore, divided them between the two cities, Mookden and Liaoyang, regardless of advice to beware of treachery. But instead of showing gratitude, these men were no sooner safe inside the cities, than they began to take possession of the houses, wives and daughters, of the inhabitants. The recital of their barbarity roused the indignation of all Liaotung, not only against themselves, but against Yingtai. The Chinese civilians now opened communications with Taidsoo, who used them as his "eyes and ears." [city then captured by manchus]

Judging that the time had come when he might safely move, now that Tingbi was a prisoner in his own house and his living wall of a hundred and eighty thousand men withdrawn, and all Liaotung enraged against Yingtai,—Taidsoo set his troops in motion in March 1621, and set out for Mookden. He had the previous autumn taken the small garrison towns of Yiloo and Pooho, a dozen miles north-east of Mookden, and Fungjipoo 20 miles south-east. He had, therefore, no fear of a surprise when he encamped against Mookden seven li to the east of the city. He found the city surrounded by several moats, and outside these a stockade of firmly fixed, sharp pointed stakes. Fire-arms, shields, carts, and seventy thousand troops, with every necessary for a long siege in and outside the city, were in perfect order as left by Tingbi.

The commandant, Shu Hien, was a brave man, but a drunkard. Seeing a reconnoitering party of a few score men, he foolishly gave chase with a thousand horsemen. The spies fled as if panic-stricken, and drew Shu Hien after them, till he suddenly came up to a considerable ambush laid for him. He retreated in good order, constantly wheeling round upon his pursuers. But when he came to the moat he could not recross it, the bridge having been removed by Chinese deserters, who had been sent into the city by Taidsoo to act as his confederates.

A party issuing to his relief was defeated, and its leader slain; and thus easily did that city without a head fall into the hands of Taidsoo. An army, under a major-general at Hwangshan ford of the Hwun, marching to save the city, was cut up, its chief officers slain, and many men drowned in the river in their flight. Yet another detached army, under three major-generals, fell with three thousand slain. The frequency with which weak separate armies were sent forward looks like madness; combined, they might have been able to do something.

General Toong Joongkwei advanced from the south to retake Mookden. He set up his camp of ten thousand men at the south end of the bridge across the Hwun;* and the local magistrate Bang Ping crossed to the north side with three thousand men. But before his earthen rampart was complete, Bang Ping had a whirlwind of Manchus upon him. He was slain fighting. Those of his men who could, recrossed the river and entered the camp of Joongkwei, which was immediately surrounded by many lines deep of Manchus, who had three or four times as many men. Joongkwei's cannon did great execution, but his powder became exhausted, and his men had only side arms to protect themselves. The Manchus who had retreated during the firing, now drew near, and showered their myriad arrows among the defenceless Chinese. Joongkwei and several others dashed outside their camp, and sword in hand killed each his ten men before they were overpowered and slain. The Chinese fought a bloody battle, but had to retire and were pursued southwards, along the level country towards Liaoyang. The Manchus rested at Hoopiyi, as Shiliho was then called.

Yingtai made all expedition to call in his troops from every direction, to save Liaoyang at all costs. He opened the sluices on the east of the city to flood the moats, set his fire-arms, and

* This bridge does not now exist, or only in winter when a temporary one is made of bundles of millet stalk laid across strong wooden beams, which are removed when the ice has all melted away. It is necessary for the large cart traffic when the ice is forming and again when it is breaking up. The bridge of the text may have been of similar construction, for it is never taken away before April.

at the head of a considerable army crossed the Taidu or Teksa and advanced five li north to oppose the march of the Manchus. He had speedily to retire defeated. Taidsoo crossed the river after him, ordered the sluices to be closed up, the moat dyke to be opened, and the bridges to be seized. He got hurdles and waggons arranged in front of his men as a shield against the fire-arms. He camped south-east of the city, which was immediately north of the present. The fourth beira dashed with his usual impetuosity against, and broke up the army which had come to attack them in the act of camping. His right wing speedily formed a dry path of stones and earth over the moat, across which he marched and attacked the Chinese, who were drawn up under the wall. The slain and drowned were incalculable.

The left wing had meantime, by night, seized the moat bridge, and under veil of the smoke of the Chinese cannon, they scaled and took a portion of the wall. They occupied the two west corners of the city, and standing in battle order with lit torches, waited the dawn. All was now confusion in the city. Many officials let themselves down by the wall and fled. Though the Chinese soldiers continued to fight all night by torch-light, they were defeated in the early morning. When the right wing entered the city in the morning, Yingtai said to his second in command, "I alone am responsible for the city. You flee to defend the west of the Liao, and leave me here." He then took his official seal, ascended the tower over the city gate, set it on fire, and perished in the flames. His second in command, instead of fleeing westwards, also committed suicide. Tingkwei, after seeing his two wives and two daughters leap into a well, committed suicide. This example was followed by most of the principal officials. But many shaved their heads, adopted the Manchu "tail," and retained the offices they severally possessed before. The superior officials who would not desert were strangled, this being a more honourable death than beheading.

The Manchus entered the city by the west gate, and were met by many citizens welcoming them with music and holiday attire.

Wives and maidens stood in their doors tricked out in their very best, acting on the suggestion of the deserter confederates of Taidsoo, and probably overjoyed at their deliverance from the savage Mongols. The civilians came to meet the carriage of Taidsoo, burning incense, flying banners, with drums and trumpets, shouting *Wan swi, Wan swi*, "Long live the emperor."

The Manchus were, however, apprehensive of designs by the citizens of Liaoyang upon the life of Taidsoo. He, therefore, ordered all the Chinese to live outside the north gate; he taking up his abode in the palace in the south of the city, surrounded by his princes, ministers, officers, and army. He opened all the prison gates, and reinstated whatever official had been degraded. All the money and valuables taken were distributed among the soldiers according to their rank and valour. He subsequently built an octagonal palace north of Liaoyang, across the Taidu, where was the seat of government, making Liaoyang the capital. The fall of Liaoyang brought all Liaotung to the feet of Taidsoo, for seventy walled cities, large and small, opened their gates to him, as Haichung, Kaichow, Kinchow, Foochow, Junkiang, Yaochow, &c. Thus easily fell the large and strong cities of Mookden and Liaoyang; and Tingbi was revenged.

While his sons were marching at the head of his troops against Doonghai, and establishing his rule in Liaotung, Taidsoo spent his time in his new Liaoyang palace, instructing his daughters in their wifely duties; for it is likely the daughters of Taidsoo considered themselves so much better than their rough warrior husbands. He taught them not to despise their own husbands; and threatened that if they persisted in demanding their will to be law, in their offensive pride laying no bounds to their desires, he must visit their disobedience with deserved punishment!

Frequent expeditions of a few thousand men had been sent against the several petty chiefs of Doonghai, which is now almost all Russian territory. Those expeditions were valuable only for the men taken prisoners, for these were drilled and incorporated in the Manchu army. The country was then as now used only as

hunting grounds, and the Fish-skin Tartars,* whether employers of dog or deer sleighs, were all of a character not much different from the red Indian, though of much superior mental endowments. The same reason is sufficient to account for the Manchu irruptions north and west of Yeho, across the Songari, and up to the Amoor. Large numbers of the descendants of these Fish-skin Tartars exist in Manchuria to this day.

It was easy for a handful of Manchus to take Liaotung from the Chinese; but that wide and thickly peopled country could be retained only by good and politic government. The Chinese then as now despised as savage barbarians all born outside the pale of the Flowery land, and this proud spirit found it hard to endure a barbarian conqueror. Though in the panic on the fall of the capital, Liaoyang, all the cities opened their gates, a few months wrought a change, and the colonel of Junkiang with all his men fled to the afterwards famous Mao Wunloong, and his example was followed by many. Taidsoo did what he could to prevent plots, by changing the abodes of the people, removing the dwellers on the seaboard inland, and the inhabitants of one city to another. Thus in their own land they were strangers among strange people, and being uncertain of each other, it is possible that plots were prevented; while we would be apt to question the policy of tearing people about in this way. Good laws and wisely just administration, served the purpose much better; and Taidsoo felt his power consolidated in Liaotung, and for the first time, the country popularly and erroneously called Manchuria was held, but by no means peopled, by Manchus.

Taidsoo was now sixty-two years of age, and thirty-eight had elapsed since he had fled a fugitive from his own relations because he would not have any terms with the murderer of his father. He was now ruler over a country much more extensive than Great Britain, considerable portions of which too were very thickly populated.

Liaotung was not wholly at peace however; for Mao

* See *Customs*.

Wunloong, an officer whose name was unknown till Liaoyang fell and all Liaotung became Manchu soil, gave a good deal of trouble. In the general desertion, he, though a subordinate officer, adhered to his native dynasty. The colonel of Junkiang, an officer superior to himself, but who had followed the general example of desertion, recovered himself, and with a number of his men fled to Wunloong, who thus became the acknowledged centre, round which gathered all those fighting men in the south of Liaotung who refused to yield obedience to the Manchus. It was probably by means of that desertion he obtained possession of Junkiang city, which was made the nucleus of an army to strike the Manchus in the rear. This Junkiang city is said by the historian of Liaotung to have been built 100 li south-east of Funghwangchung. In that neighbourhood there are several ruins of ancient cities; and Junkiang city was near the coast, for its "people were removed from the coast inland." In December 1621, Mao Wunloong's power had gained such proportions that an army had to be sent against him. This army crossed the "Junkiang," and got to the borders of Corea. It is therefore possible that the mouth of the Yaloo is called Junkiang, for a small river is called *ho*, not *kian*g. Then Junkiang city, the city protecting the river, would be somewhere between Takushan and the newly established Andoong. In such case Wunloong's headquarters would be the narrow strip of land on the west bank of the Yaloo; fenced in by mountains inaccessible to an army, except by the narrow entrances at Andoong and the sea. It is more than likely Wunloong would select that spot, because of its strong position. It has been the haunt of large bands, sometimes of armies, of robbers from the beginning of the present dynasty till within the last few years, when it was cleared; but not before foreign drilled soldiers were brought thither from Tientsin.

The Manchu army which got to the Korean border numbered five thousand men; and before it Wunloong fled. But Junkiang seems not to have been retaken; for in 1622, Wunloong was created a lieut.-general because he had taken that city. And

he determined to prove himself worthy of the promotion. He had apparently provided himself with a number of boats; for in the summer of 1624, he led an army by Changbaishan against the original home of the Manchus. He plundered there till defeated by the officer in charge of the district. He was free to march as he chose in and out of Corea, which was still the faithful ally of the Chinese, though many Mongol tribes had already acknowledged themselves the subjects of their Manchu cousins. He crossed the Yaloo at Yichow, and took possession of the island of Twuntien; possibly the long, beautiful, fertile island in the river opposite Yichow. There he accumulated stores, and apparently gave not a little trouble, for another expedition was sent against him under a *Meirun Jangjing*. In the battle he is said to have lost five hundred men. He was defeated, his stores were burnt, and the Manchus retreated. Next year he sent a band of three hundred men by night to plunder the southern neighbourhood of Yaowchow, then a city, now a village, north of Kaichow, whose lieut.-general drove them off. That so small a band could penetrate so far inland, shows that his strength and daring were not small. Just before that raid, an expedition, under beira Manggoortai, went to the extreme south of the Regent's Sword Peninsula to attack the city of Lüshwunkow, which had probably been built by Wunloong, whose strength was more and more bending in that direction; for the city of Lüshwunkow was at once near Shantung, and within easy sail of all his chief resorts on the coast and islands. The beira was victorious over the army opposing him, and pulled down the city. But if a force under a beira had to go thither, the power of Wunloong was considerable.

In February of 1627, a large army of Manchus was sent eastwards by Funghwangchung against Corea. This army laid siege to and took the beautiful city of Ngaichow or Yichow;* then sent a detachment southwards to Tieshan (Iron mountains), 110 li south of Yichow. These mountains were on the coast, and the head quarters of Wunloong, whose constant depredations

* See "History of Corea"—*Geography*.

were one of the chief reasons for the expedition. On the approach of this overwhelming force, Wunloong fled from the Iron mountain to one of his islands. Henceforth he made Pidao island, south-east of the "Regent's Sword" Promontory, his headquarters. His services seem to have been continuous and effective, for he was made a general. But his end came in an unexpected manner. For in May, 1628, he was secretly put to death by Yuen Choongwhan, who was then gallantly and successfully opposing the Manchus at Ningyuen, and who, as governor of Liaotung, was Wunloong's superior. The *Doonghwaloo* states that this murder was because Wunloong was believed to be secretly attached to the Manchus. The Ming history gives the more likely reason, that Choongwhan was jealous; and the fact that the emperor was extremely angry would warrant the truth of this supposition. At any rate, Wunloong's forces were disbanded. Up till 1633, various expeditions were sent against the old followers of Wunloong, along the south-eastern coast of Liaotung; but if they could report their small victories and a few hundred men slain there, and a few islands taken here, they had no influence upon the main root of what was now simply a series of robbers' nests. It was very likely on account of the incessant raids of those island robbers, that the city of Siwyen was built and fortified. Not, however, that now standing, but another whose site is some miles west of the present. Lanpan and Toongyuenpoo, north-west of Funghwang city, were also built at the same time, as well as Jienchang,—all of which are now in ruins, and called by the natives "Corean cities."

Koong Yoodua was one of the lowest of Wunloong's officers, whom the latter used to call by a name of contempt. On the death of Wunloong, however, he and Gung Joongming were invited across the gulf by the governor of Tungchow in Shantung. He created them both Tsankiangs or colonels. Yoodua was sent at the head of 800 horse to assist the Chinese when the Manchus were pressing the siege of Dalingho against Dashow. But when he got to Woochiaohien he fell in with

colonel Li Jiwchung, and both united in rebelling against their native lord. They were few to begin with, but the example was contagious and the few became thousands, men from all quarters flying to them like birds in those times of anarchy. In a short time they were strong enough to march against and take several district cities, and finally ventured against Tungchow, inside which was Joongming with fifteen accomplices, who opened the gates, and the governor had to flee. They were soon joined by the commandant of Lüshwunkow, who put to death some of the garrison and fled, as did also the colonel on the island of Gwangloo. Yoodua became commander-in-chief, Jiwchung second in command, and Joongming was made a lieutenant-general. They made raids upon all the cities and villages around, and Shantung was a scene of universal disorder. The brave but reckless Dsoo Dabi led a considerable army against Tungchow and was slain in battle. But as Yoodua knew that his fate was sealed if he remained there, he made a dash along the sea-side. He was pursued by the commandant of Lüshwun, and many of his men fell in the battle. A number of Coreans hastened to assist the Chinese army, but just then when Yoodua was nearly lost, Jirhalang and other Manchu officers appeared on the scene, and the Chinese and Coreans fled, while Yoodua with every soul of his family and all his goods were saved by this fortunate intervention. This battle must therefore have taken place after he had crossed the sea and was now on the peninsula of "Regent's Sword." Yoodua was ordered to go to Doongking or the east capital, as the palace at Liaoyang was called, and had 100 horse given him by the Manchu "emperor." Joongming was along with him, and both retained the titles which they had assumed at Pingchow. He was soon after the guide of a considerable Manchu army against Lüshwunkow, where were taken over 5,000 captives, nearly 25,000 oz. of gold, over 21,000 oz. of silver, 3,000 odd webs of satin, 24,000 odd webs of cotton, 8 chests of ginsheng, many hundreds of oxen and horses, besides other spoil. Shang Kosi had been nominated the commandant of Gwangloo after the above desertion, and he now treated the

Manchus in a very friendly manner. He soon after summoned other two islands, with which and his own he joined the Manchus. Yoodua, Joongming and Kosi became famous commanders, and played a leading part in the subsequent history of the Manchu conquests, in which they are always called the Three Princes, Koong, Gung, and Shang. Kosi was meantime elevated only to lieut.-general, and ordered to Haichung, his native place, where there is at this moment a beautiful temple to his memory. By the way, these temples in China take the place of stone or bronze statues in the west; and the worship made there is merely in honour of the illustrious dead, and has not the remotest connection with prayer.

CHAPTER III.

CONQUEST OF LIAOSI.

IN consequence of the fall of Liaoyang, and with it of all the rich country east of the Liao, Wang Hwajun was nominated to succeed Yingtai. The accusers of Tingbi were stripped of all authority, and degraded to rank with the common people. Three months after, Tingbi was reappointed generalissimo of Liaotung, with head-quarters at Shanhai gwan. The weak but well-intentioned *Tienchi* was then reigning in Peking, but the real emperor, the mayor of the palace, was the unscrupulous eunuch Wei Joonghien, who secured the degradation of every minister that did not bow at his feet. The frightful corruption and profligacy of that court could not be surpassed, but it was all unknown to the silly *Tienchi*. We mention this now, in order to make the following history understood, and to show that whoever was not on good terms with Joonghien or his creatures, could not hold office.

In December, Tingbi in vain memorialised the Board of War, that he was generalissimo without a soldier, and that if he went beyond Shanhai gwan without an army, it would raise to absolute terror the fears of the people, whom he would be unable to reassure and calm down; while he would be the laughingstock of the enemy instead of their scourge. He had, however, received his appointment from the emperor,—not from the eunuchs,—and he had to go, but empty-handed. Before he got to Kwangning, Wang Hwajun had posted all his men in six different camps along the west bank of the Liao, and in four other villages, the protection of which he deemed of first importance. Tingbi urged the recall of these men, and their concentration on

Kwangning in one powerful army, within a strong camp, protected by deep moats and high palisades, thus to be ready for any emergency, and to march anywhere. He showed that if one of those scattered divisions should be attacked by the Manchus, who always rode, and who could cross over the frozen river, it would be annihilated before any aid could be brought up; and one destroyed, the other isolated camps would break up in terror. Instead of so many camps, he recommended to have bodies of patrols scouring the neighbourhood of the river, who could see without revealing their own force, while beacons should be at once erected over the three hundred li between the Liao and the concentrated army at Kwangning. He recommended the presence of the marines of Tungchow and Laichow in Shantung, the preparation of war *materiel* in great abundance, the purchase of horses, and immediate attention to the innumerable details necessary for defence. But Hwajun, strong in the favour of the eunuchs, though he should have been superseded by Tingbi, laughed at him and his suggestions, bravely exclaiming that with sixty thousand men he would undertake to recover all the lost ground, and drive the Manchus back to their mountain wilds. After useless expostulation, Tingbi therefore departed for his head-quarters without a soldier, and Hwajun was master of the situation. The president of the Board of War did what he could to have the nominal authority vested in Hwajun, who already held the real power.

Knowing the state of affairs, as they always did, the Manchus crossed the river on the ice west of Liaoyang, and attacked Siping, one of the carefully guarded villages of Hwajun, who sent down two detachments to raise the siege. Duagoong, who led one of these, before engaging with the enemy, shouted,—“We are defeated,” and deserted. Taidsoo sent him on immediately to Kwangning, where he had been the second self, or “heart and bowels” of Hwajun. He got to the city very early in the morning, and proclaimed that the emperor had ordered all the people and soldiers to take care of themselves, and the treasury to be opened, for the Manchus were upon them!

A colonel hastened to Hwajun, who was not yet up, roused him out of sleep and urged him to flee, for he was about to fall into the hands of the Manchus. The boastful Hwajun lost his head and trembled for his life; and while the van of the enemy was yet more than thirty miles off Kwangning, he followed the traitor-colonel to the gate, where a horse was ready prepared. When he got to the gate, the soldiers, more faithful than their officers, attempted to prevent his passing through, but the colonel cut a way for him. He mounted his horse and galloped away, followed by two servants on foot.

The greatest confusion and fear prevailed in the city; and when the Manchus did come up, the gate was opened by the traitor Duagoong. The soldiers, deserted by their officers, fought a vain battle, for the city was easily taken. Some few cut their way through the Manchus, and one military officer performed his ablutions, donned his official hat and dress, made obeisance towards the emperor, and committed suicide. His servant refused to survive him. Many civilians fled, and the country people in hundreds of thousands forsook their homes and possessions, and hurried away to pass within Shanhai gwan; but of every thousand who fled from the neighbourhood of Kwangning, only a few passed through the Great Wall. The weak, the old and the young, men and women, were trampled down, and the road was strewn with the dead.

Hwajun did not stop his flight till he got to Yowtwun, beyond Kingchow, where Tingbi had his camp of five thousand men. When Tingbi saw the tears of Hwajun, he laughed and said, "Had your excellency massed your troops on Kwangning, you would not have been in this plight to-day;" but he was mortified at his own inability to do anything with his five thousand soldiers. He therefore set fire to all the stores which he had collected, and brought up the rear of over a million of fugitives* fleeing beyond the Great Wall.

* This shows how populous must have been that narrow strip of fertile soil from Kwangning, skirting the sea to Shanhaigwan; for only a minority of the people would have fled. The land is now again much more thickly peopled than then.

The court recalled both Tingbi and Hwajun, and ordered them to their homes pending enquiry, which, after great discussion and angry disputation among the Boards, resulted at last in finding both guilty, and recommending that both should be executed. Though the emperor agreed to this unrighteous decision, it was not carried out for some months, nor before censor after censor had handed in his memorial, now recommending this, now recommending that; plot and counter-plot being the daily rule. At last the eunuchs had it their own way, and Tingbi was beheaded as a common criminal, along with Hwajun, whom they could not save.

Two days after the undignified flight of Hwajun, forty fortified cities and towns opened their gates to the conqueror, the largest of which was Kingchow,—the appearance of a few horsemen being sufficient to terrify any garrison into submission, and the Manchus scoured the country from Kwangning to beyond Kingchow, where they secured many fortified cities, now existing only as villages. Though so many Chinese fled for protection within the Great Wall, the large majority still remained in their houses. These were removed to the east of the Liao, with the design, doubtless, of preventing a rising, the homes of those on the east side having been already changed, those on the seaboard inland, and vice-versa; and now the east and west of the Liao were made to change sides.

Wang Dsaijin was made Chinese generalissimo of Liaotung; but he was bent on forsaking the tract of country, still under Chinese rule, between Kingchow and Shanhai gwan, and retiring on a strong camp eight li outside that strong border gate; because, probably, of the ease with which that very mountainous country could be defended, and the difficulty an army advancing from the east would have in marching over those loess hills and narrow glens. On this account Swun Chungdsoong petitioned, and was permitted to take the place of Dsaijin, and retain all the outside country up to Ningyuen, which was just as easily defended; for no army with a great depth of front could march over or along those closely-packed lines of granite mountains

and innumerable loess hills. He was strongly urged, however, to evacuate all the towns and forts between the gate and Ningyuen, probably from the fear that the Mongols, who then inhabited all the towns, villages and country between those two cities, might prove treacherous. But he determined to hold firmly all he could, and sent on a trusty officer, the Taotai Choonghwan, who fortified Ningyuen, and thus secured two hundred li (seventy miles) of road outside the Great Wall. Within the four following years Chungdsoong retook all the cities and country west of the Liao. This we learn only from the fact that they had to be taken again by the Manchus, the time or mode in which the Manchus were defeated being unknown; for unfortunately for the completeness of history, any or all of the books I have examined cast the cloak of silence over whatever might detract from Manchu glory.

He prepared camps and fortified villages and towns, in addition to the repairing and strengthening of the already-fortified places. He collected an army of a hundred and ten thousand men, besides a select band of seventeen thousand. He got ready an immense number of helmets, arms offensive and defensive, including bows and arrows, ballistæ and stones, and hide-covered shields of excellent quality; and his ample protection opened up to cultivation five million mow, or a million acres of land. The best commentary on his military character is, as in the case of Tingbi, that the Manchus occupied themselves during the four years of his rule, in the easy task of removing the capital from Liaoyang to Mookden (Shunyang), and there building those palaces and offices, which remain to this day, with the various additions made in the following reigns. Mookden was the sixth capital of Taidsoo, and occupied by him in 1625, forty-two years after the death of his father and grandfather.

The eunuchs of Peking never desisted from poisoning the mind of the weak emperor against Chungdsoong, till he was at last recalled, and Gao Di sent in his stead. The new man must needs show that he had a policy different from the man

superseded. He therefore loudly protested against holding any ground outside Shanhai gwan, and retreated with the army, leaving behind him the enormous stores of all kinds, piled up by his predecessor. He was followed all the way by wailing cries of despair, wrung from the hearts of the many myriad civilians, who had enjoyed such perfect peace and prosperity under his predecessor, and by their curses which were loud as they were deep. He also ordered every officer to retire inside the Great wall; but Choonghwan swore he would hold out in Ningyuen and neighbourhood to the death. He was then Taotai, and his colleagues were lieut.-general Mangwei and the colonel Dsoo Dashow, whose names will appear again.

Taidsoo received early information of what had occurred, and immediately marched at the head of a hundred and thirty thousand men to seize the prey. He had previously retaken, probably on the departure of Gao Di, the seven cities of Dalingho, Siaolingho, Kingchow, Soongshan, Hingshan, Lienshan, and Tashan,—the officer in command of them having burnt his stores and fled. He passed Ningyuen, and formed his camp five li to the south, right across the high road to the sea, so as effectually to cut off all aid from the besieged Choonghwan; who, nothing daunted, with the other principal defenders of Ningyuen, wrote out an oath with their blood to defend the place to the death. They were “immovable as a rock” in their determination, permitted no man to go or come, searched out all the spies in the city, and slew any soldier leaving his post.

On the next day after their arrival, the Manchus attacked the south side of the city, advancing under cover of their shields to the foot of the wall, boring holes to make a breach, and moved not from their work, though stones and arrows descended upon them like showers. Choonghwan then ordered a Fukien man to fire the “terrific western cannon.”* It was fired, and made a track of blood of several li, killing some hundreds of men. The Manchus retired precipitately. Three

* This is the first time in the history of the wars that the *Si yang pao* (European cannon) is mentioned. They were cast by the Jesuit missionaries.

days after the attack was renewed, they were again driven back; and the siege was raised. Taidsoo took the matter so much to heart, that he became unwell. But some days after (in February), he attacked a camp on the ice, beside a small island near the shore south of Ningyuen, where provisions were stored up. The camp was defended by holes perforated in the ice along the north side for several miles. He ordered his men to skirt the holes, make a circuit, and attack the camp where the ice was whole. After a vigorous struggle the camp was taken, with immense quantities of stores. Gao Di and his general Yang Chi were posted with their army at no great distance, but made no attempt to save the camp. They were recalled and replaced. The Taoti Choonghwan was made governor with the title of Ningyuen. Soon after the office of *jinglo* was abolished, and Choonghwan was gazetted general of the east instead.

Taidsoo never recovered the shock of his repulse before Ningyuen; and becoming seriously unwell, went to the mineral spring at Chingho. Not recovering, he took boat to return to the capital, but died on the way, at a village forty li from Mookden. This was in September, 1626, in the sixty-eighth year of his age, and the 11th of *Tienming*,* but 42nd of his actual rule. His tomb is the *Foo ling* east of Mookden.

Revenge made Noorhachu a soldier, and inspired him with persevering courage when prudence and mere bravery would have despaired. It supported him when his affairs were desperate. Forsaken by all his relations, he still breathed only vengeance. When those relations turned upon him, and sought his life with a tenacity more fierce than that of the sluth hound, he relentlessly pursued the man whom he considered the murderer of his father and grandfather. He lived only to see Nikan Wailan slain. But before his vengeance was slaked in the blood of Nikan, the wonderful success of his unwearying

* There is a discrepancy between my several authorities as to the commencement of *Tienming*; but the *Doonghwa loo* is followed as the most probable, being by imperial authority.

perseverance gave birth to an ambition more insatiable than even revenge. Tribe after tribe, kingdom after kingdom fell before his well trained archers; and the powerful wolf can always find reasons sufficiently satisfactory to himself to pounce upon the weak lamb. His success brought upon him the terrific thunder cloud from Peking, which threatened to blast him with an utter destruction, and for escape from which the most sanguine could scarcely entertain a shred of hope. Flushed with the extraordinary success with which he scattered this great force to the winds, he swept Yeho before him like a feather. To both himself and his successor it was reason sufficient for attacking with arrow and sword every independent clan between Hingking and the Songari, along its whole course, that these clans spoke the same language, and rode and shot the arrow exactly as did the Manchus; thus satisfying themselves with the same reason of "similar race" as does the unscrupulous ambition of modern Europe when shedding seas of blood; so completely identical is humanity, and so ready everywhere to blind its own eyes to the truth, and to lull conscience to sleep by some specious pretence, which is as worthless as it is false. For no race in Asia or in Europe will, in modern times, wage a bloody and costly war merely because of similarity of race or resemblance of creed.

Revenge made him a soldier, abilities a general, the stupidity of his opponents a conqueror, and wisdom a ruler and founder of a dynasty.

The fourth Beira was born on the 25th day of tenth moon (Nov.-Dec.), 1592, and was, therefore, thirty-four when he was enthroned. The Chinese, as usual a year ahead, call his age thirty-five. He had always been the close companion of Daishan, Amin, and Manggoortai, who, with the other Beiras, agreed to make him emperor. A flattering letter of condolence and congratulation was immediately sent on by the chief of the Kortsin Mongols, and a more cautious one by Choonghwan, the Chinese governor of Ningyuen, which was supposed to be forwarded in order that Li Lama, the messenger, might have an

opportunity of spying out the land. Advantage was taken of this circumstance, in thanking governor Choonghwan to make a second attempt at effecting a solid treaty of peace; reference being made to the former overture by the late Taidsoo, whose document was now returned to the Manchus, as Choonghwan was unable to decipher the paper, which was half Chinese, half Manchu !

The epistle from the Kortsin chief was as follows :—" Because you began with strength sufficient to secure prosperity, you have, at the present moment, a Prince given by Heaven. We have heard that the Powerful, the Skilful, the Brave and the Wise Emperor, is now an ascended guest. Yueba, the Taiji, therefore, now presents his humble message, to condole with all the Beiras of all ranks. Of old, Chasirbadunwoo ruled over all the four corners and possessed the seven precious things, yet when his time came he had to die. The white lion of the snow hill, though of enormous strength, must die when his fated time is arrived. In the deep ocean all precious things abound, yet what can save King Loongwang (god of water) from dying? The most precious, firm, and stern body, death will cast aside as a worthless thing. Your Emperor was the ruler of all the great kingdoms. He has now left his beloved wife and dear children. He cannot see them when looking towards him; when they cry out he cannot hear them. Suddenly has he departed. Consider the princes who have departed from of old, and who up to the present has been restored by the grief of weeping friends! Your Emperor has gone; but he has left behind customs, principles of government, and instruction. For the internal administration of your kingdom, it is your duty to hold manfully the possessions left you; for external authority, to marshal well your troops, and to exert all your might in fulfilling the duties of the Solitary One (Emperor), and the utmost care in searching out men of virtue for office. The grief at seeing a young wife made a widow, or the ungratified desire to see able sons grow up, is not to be for a moment compared in

importance to the giving of one's whole heart to establish and put to rights a great kingdom"—i.e., your grief is reasonable, but your duties as rulers demand more attention than your grief.

What the terms were of the condoling letter of Choonghwan the *Doonghwaloo* does not state; but along with Li Lama, on his return journey, Fangjina and Wuntashu were sent with an epistle from Mookden as follows:—"The Emperor of the Great Manchu sends greetings to the Governor of the Great Ming. For the present our wars are ceased, you have sent Li Lama to condole with us on our loss, and to congratulate the young emperor on his accession. Nor have we any underhanded purpose to serve. You came in the spirit of propriety, and in the spirit of propriety we return your visit. We send our messengers at once to return you thanks, and to establish amicable relations between our two kingdoms. When our deceased emperor went to Ningyuen he sent you an official epistle, to which there never has been any reply. If your emperor can reply to that letter in the spirit of peace and harmony, we shall reciprocate that spirit. But whatever is written should be the honest expression of your real desires and feelings, and not merely a number of fine set phrases."

Choonghwan had found it impossible to decipher the letter referred to, as it had been written half in Chinese, half in Manchu; both intermixed! He therefore did not forward it to his emperor, but returned it by Fangjina, without, however, a messenger or a letter of his own. When the army was sent against Corea, Taidsoong sent the above Fangjina and his companion with another curt letter to Choonghwan, recapitulating the "Seven Hates," desiring friendly relations, demanding that the Ming dynasty make "presents" yearly, according to a treaty to be made, that the letter should be at once forwarded to the Chinese emperor; and threatening to regard want of attention to this as a declaration of war.

Doo Mingjoong was sent back with the Manchu messengers, as the bearer of letters from both Choonghwan and Li Lama.

The former wrote thus:—"The Marshal of the Yamun of Liaotung salutes the *Janghia*.* Again I write a letter to your shame, informing the Khan (of Manchu) that you must reverence with devout attention the heaven-appointed dynasty, and then war will necessarily cease. You should carefully govern and nourish your own districts, and cherish only those thoughts which desire to preserve your own people in life. Heaven will see, and then cause you gradually to become great beyond measure. As to the seven causes of Hate, now old, I must listen in silence if you will persist in repeating them. If these causes are investigated to the root, they are found to be that mean people on our border strove 'mouth and tongue' with ill-tempered men on your border. Hence the origin of those calamities. The mistake of the Khan is to have forgotten that if the evildoer escapes the punishment of men, he flees not from the wrath of Heaven. I wish to write explicitly, for it is difficult to understand in the grave. I do not treacherously desire the emperor alone to lay aside thoughts of war, it is my wish that the Khan would do so likewise. For ten years have we already fought, during which time Yi (eastern barbarians) and Chinese have bowed their heads to the ground in sorrow. The blood of the Three Han (Mongol) ran like oil, smeared all the green grass and stained the desert ground. Heaven grieved, the earth mourned. The recital of those sufferings caused the extremity of pity, the acmé of pain of heart. And all this because of those 'Seven.' To be unable to express one's feelings in such case, is it not the greatest eloquence? Is there now a Nangwan and a Beigwan?† Have no more than ten men perished east and west of the river (Liao)? Did no more than one aged man flee from his home? In your borders of Mookden and Liaoyang, men cannot ingather the produce of the fields,—and all because of the hatred of the Khan. Your inclinations have been followed, your desires

* The Tent-dweller; applicable to the commander of an army, and therefore a term of disrespect in contradistinction to *Dienhia* the emperor.

† Two stations on the west of Hada and Yeho.

gratified to the full; but we of the Heaven-ordained dynasty have had a bitter portion and one hard to bear.

"If now your desire is to act a generous part, what hinders your returning to us our cities and our land, restoring our magistrates and people, our men and our women? Thus would appear the benevolence of the Khan; thus would be displayed his compassion, his fear of Heaven, his love to men. The doctrine of Heaven is free from selfishness, the heart of man full of envy. The right, the wrong, the crooked and the straight will of necessity be made manifest. If in your heart arises the one thought of war, a door is opened for countless deaths under heaven. If in your heart dwells the one thought of life, you are able to produce innumerable blessings. And having said so much let me add, that you should recall your soldiers sent to Corea, drop the desire for the interchange of presents, make Li Lama your instructor in Buddhism and stop the raids by your soldiers, whereupon we shall be able to establish the most friendly relations."

Choonghwan had taken two months in considering and framing his fine but irritating composition. But the Manchu court, perhaps as unable as unwilling to produce finished productions, returned the messenger on the next month after his arrival. The tone and the style may be partly accounted for by the fact, that meantime news had come of the conquest of Corea, and the treaty of peace there made, so that the Manchu army was again free.

"The Emperor of the Great Manchu greets Yuen the governor of the Great Ming. Your letter came desiring me to forget my Seven Hates. Our wars arose and have continued because your officials and men have slighted our kingdom, and therefore we desire now to show plainly who of us is right, who wrong. We sent a messenger to conclude a treaty of peace with you. This implied that we desired to forget our Seven Hates. Again, you say that if we desire to be friendly towards you, we must restore your lost cities, lands, magistrates, people, male and female captives. But all we possess has been the gift of heaven,

not gotten by stealth from you. Your desire to have these returned proves that you do not truly wish for peace, but desire to provoke us to fight. Again, you say that such conduct would prove our benevolence, compassion, &c. This needs no reply. Is it possible you can be ignorant of the truth? Again, you say that the articles asked as presents are not in accordance with ancient lists of presents;—the number, more or less, is a matter of indifference to us. Again, you complain that when at present we have a little intercourse, our soldiers march on Corea; and you hint that our words are false. Could we wage a causeless war against Corea? When did we ever say that we would not wage war against you or your allies? What word, then, of ours is it which you call in question? You can speak fair words; but you sent some of your men within our borders to snatch away men fleeing from a deserved death, and to rebuild cities and forts which we had levelled with the ground. It is your words which savour of falsehood; and our men call your words in question very much indeed. Again you say, 'Let the sword and the soldier rest till we deliberate on terms of peace'; and you say what is right. Again: 'Let there be no anger-moving words in the epistles which come and go, lest they be unfit to be laid before the emperor'; and here you are both right and wrong. Better speak out plainly now, and friendship will then be the more lasting. If one's desires are unuttered for fear of writing wrath-moving words, we fear it will be difficult to come to terms of peace. In what does the language of slight and reproach which you yourself have written differ from the slight and reproach formerly used by Liaotung and Kwangning officials? Again, you say that you desire only to serve your emperor, and ask us to strenuously aid you in publishing the holy attainments of your emperor, by assisting you to form a fixed and proper boundary. As to the attainments of your prince, set them forth yourself; what have we, a foreigner, to do with making ourself acquainted with them? As to your frontier, arrange it at your pleasure; what does it concern us what your frontier is? You do not name any terms tending to peace; why is it that,

instead, you write so much to show your light esteem of us? You, governor Yuen, are considered a man of understanding and knowledge; can you not devise some plan which shall tend towards peace, and shall profit your own kingdom? You take advantage of proposals for a treaty to bring out a lot of words; do you think that empty words will gain a victory for you?

"This reply is written in this style, simply because of the disrespectful tone of your epistle. But to speak of friendly relations—you are suspicious of our intentions; we harbour no such suspicion. You say that the mutual presents should be distinctly set forth. Well then, in order to show friendship, you should present us with 50,000 Chinese *liang* or oz. of gold, 500,000 of silver, satin 500,000 pieces, and 5,000,000 webs of cotton. We, on the other hand, shall present you with ten pearls from the eastern ocean, two black fox furs, ten red fox furs, two thousand sables and squirrels, and one thousand catties of ginseng; and yearly afterwards you pay me a tithe of the amounts mentioned, while we give you half of our first present. On these conditions you can easily establish friendly relations.

"In the letter which you, governor Yuen, sent me, you honour your emperor as the equal of Heaven: and in Li Lama's letter our princes are placed below your ministers. This classification is simply what appears good to your mind, not one necessarily demanded by propriety. I will, however, place the matter on a proper footing. Your emperor must be written a grade below Heaven, we a grade below your emperor, and your ministers a grade below us; and according to this style will we write in future. If you write in a similar style we shall reply, but not if otherwise. And as we know your spirit of contempt and falsehood, we shall not send a messenger, nor shall we afterwards pay any attention to any letter in which your ministers write to us as our equals."

This correspondence is worthy of note, principally because of the exception taken by Taidsoong, the new Manchu ruler, to the subordinate position in which he and his ministers were placed,—threatening that, if he were again addressed

in a style which implied his Beiras to be inferior to the Chinese chief ministers, he would take no notice of the paper. Perhaps this might be a hint to foreign diplomatists; for the Manchus were then much inferior in all respects, except generalship, to the Chinese. Though at first Taidsoong was willing to be placed in a position underneath the emperor, he mended his pace, and would ultimately be satisfied with nothing short of equality with the Chinese monarch, an equality which he was not nearly so much warranted in assuming as the sovereigns of our greater western nations. As to the title of Whangdi, emperor, the Manchu sovereign assumed it himself, and granted it to the Ming emperor. From the correspondence can be seen, too, the usual Chinese pride of race and contempt for "outer barbarians," which, in the case of Manchu, was not unwarranted; for the difference in style between the letters of Yuen and the emperor of Manchu is as great as could be. But through the bluntness of the Manchu style can be seen the self-confident assurance of the successful warrior. As to honesty, both sides were as honest as the general run of political papers. But the Chinaman could give a lesson to Talleyrand.

Fine writing began and ended the correspondence,—the Chinese being as blinded as to how, to what extent, and when they should yield, as they were unfit to rule, or to choose generals.

As there was no pressing call on the army to the west of Liaotung, it made a rapid march, in 1627, through Corea,* taking Yichow, Tieshan, Dingchow, and Hanshan. It crossed the Gokshan river, and took Anchow, Pingyang, Hwangchow, and the capital. For this there were several *casus belli*, but the chief was the fact that Corea was a most faithful ally of the Ming dynasty, and a vantage ground for Ming officers and men to harass the east and north-east of Liaotung. A treaty of peace followed, which remained in force a few years, but had to be renewed, at greater expense to Corea; but a third expedition has been unnecessary.

An attempt was made by the Chinese to repossess the soil at

* See "History of Corea."

and beyond Kingchow; but the bands of men who had come to defend the fields fled, and the villages were desolated. Repeated similar attempts compelled the Manchus to erect twenty-one beacons* from Kingchow eastward, as well as to have strong bodies of patrols, who attacked and dispersed every budding colony. Just then several expeditions had to be sent against the men left by Wunloong, from Lüshwunkow and the west, to Tieshan of Corea on the east, and one even into the mountains east of Hingking. Island after island was taken, and Wunloong's lingering name died out.

Choonghwan was anxious to re-establish the old frontiers; and therefore set a great number of men to work on building a fort on the Daliang river beside Kingchow; but in spite of his haste, rumour carried the story to Mookden. The fort was attacked while yet incomplete, and its builders had to flee.

In anger the Manchus again marched on Ningyuen,—the root of the evil,—determined to take it. They tried and failed, tried again and failed,—for Choonghwan was inside. The Beiras besought Taidsoong to retire, but he replied: "If we attack a city and fail to take it, and again madly attack and fail to take it, where is the terror of our name?" He therefore prepared to make a desperate effort at close quarters. The army galloped up to the moat, which was defended by Man Gwei, under the eyes of Choonghwan. With a great shout they pushed in regardless of death, and determined to conquer. Most of the Beiras were wounded,—but Man Gwei stood at his post, though covered with arrow wounds. The Manchus had to retreat,

* Some of these beacons still remain; and over all Liaotung are beacons, or the ruins of beacons;—the coast line from Kinchow, northwards, to Haichung, being full of them. The natives call them "Corean towers,"—as they call every ruin a "Corean" city. Even so intelligent an observer as the late consul Meadows, fell into the mistake of using this phrase. The Coreans were driven out of Liaotung over a thousand years ago; and those brick ruins,—exactly of the size, form, and appearance of the bricks used by the Manchus in the beginning of their reign,—were certainly never made by Corean hands. It is more than likely that the honours showered by the Chinese court on Mao Wunloong, were because of his constantly harassing the Manchus in Liaotung, and that these beacons were erected to give notice of his approach, in order to summon the aid of the army in the north.

leaving the moat full of dead bodies. They returned to attack Kingchow; but the moat was deep, and the June weather hot, and they retreated after having destroyed the ramparts on the Daliang and Siaoliang rivers. Choonghwan was the first Chinaman who taught the Manchus that they were not invincible. But such a character could not be employed in a court where eunuchs ruled, who ceased not accusing him to Tienchi, till at length he was recalled to Peking, in spite of his warmest remonstrances.

His successor had no time to display his powers, for Tienchi lived but for a short time thereafter, the last Ming emperor ascended the throne, beheaded Wei Joonghien, the prince of the eunuchs, and re-established Choonghwan in the east. He was sent, on the understanding that he would "employ Liao men to guard Liao soil, and Liao soil to feed Liao men. He was to employ great cannon in defending his cities; if he retained them he did well; if he obtained a victory he would perform a miracle; and if he made peace, he would be the guardian of the empire." To a missive sent by him, Taidsoong replied that he was ready to make peace, that he was ready to forego the right of coining money, to rank second to the emperor, and to receive from him the title of *khan*,* but that the lands given him by Heaven could not be restored;—and negotiations ceased.

In 1629, Taidsoong, true to his youthful character, determined to make a bold move. He had some months before ordered the Mongol soldiers to be at hand. He now summoned his forces together and marched at the head of over a hundred thousand men, with Mongols as guides. He halted at Ching city in Kortsin, and there revealed his determination to march through Mongol territory to Peking. His elder brothers remained with him all night, arguing and remonstrating on the ground that their retreat would be easily cut off, and their supplies intercepted. But all to no purpose; for he hated Choonghwan, and was determined to be rid of him at all costs.

* The title of Mongol and other Tartar princes owning allegiance to the Chinese in the Ming dynasty; a title descending from centuries before as *kokhan*.

Attan
Peking
using
water

One portion of his army was sent on by Chahar to chastise the people on the way, for their desertion to the Chinese. The other marched up Laoho, or old river. Four Banners were sent to burst through the Pass of Dangan—great peace; the other four with the Mongols, through Loongjing gwan.* Taidsoong, with his portion passed through Dangan like a tornado, taking three forts. Loongjing was also seized, Hwiswi gwan entered and the relieving army scattered. The eight Banners reunited under the walls of Hanurjwang city, where they were joined by several bodies of deserters. Hoongshan kow city was taken on the way, and Tsunhwa was invested, after the defeat of a number of separate detachments, which advanced under cover of forests, but which the blind Chinese generals were throwing away.

The following was the order of investment:—the yellow banner took up its post from north to north-west, the red from west to north-west, bordered red from west to south-west, bordered blue from south to south-west, blue from south to south-east, bordered white from east to south-east, white from east to north-east, and bordered yellow from north to north-east,—thus each banner occupied that part of the camp opposite half of each wall. The city soon opened its gates and the army got to Kichow.

Choonghwan was soon aware that he had been outflanked, and taking Dsoo Dashow with him, he hurriedly marched at the head of his available men through Shanhai gwan, and was at the capital before Taidsoong. The latter sent on three thousand men ahead to find some means of crossing the river above Toongchow, departed from Sanhodien, defeated Man Gwei, who had marched from Tatoong at the head of a relieving army for Shwunyu hien, received the adhesion of the garrison of that city, and took up his quarters at Nanhaidso,† south of Peking, from which he

* Gwan and Kow each represents a pass in the north and north-east of Peking.

† The *Doong hwa loo* very circumstantially mentions the north-east of the north side of the city as his post; but it may have been removed from the one to the other, as it was afterwards removed to the north-west; but the position of Shaho gate should determine the first camp.

frequently attacked but never conquered Choonghwan, who was posted outside the Shaho gate; for no decisive victory was gained, though now one side, now the other, had the advantage. Man Gwei was posted at the Duashung gate.

Two of the palace eunuchs had been apprehended, and a watch set over them, in a room where two officers of Taidsoong's were seated holding a long conversation in a whisper, but loud enough for the eunuchs, who feigned sleep, to hear. The subject of their conversation was, that on that same day the soldiers were to be drawn away as if raising the siege, in order that they might return suddenly, and by this stratagem take the guards at unawares and seize the city. The two men then hastily sprang into their carts as if to drive away to carry out the plan of which they had been speaking, when two others suddenly made their appearance, and looking cautiously around, whispered in the same manner to the former two, stating that Choonghwan had made a secret compact, and the city would be taken without any difficulty. The men departed, the eunuchs were by and bye liberated, and made all haste to the emperor, who sent an order for the immediate apprehension of Choonghwan. He was led into the city, and soon torn to pieces. Taidsoong was thus repaid for his long and difficult march to the capital, and his stratagem was completely successful. Dsoo Dashow, the colleague of Choonghwan, himself a good soldier, hearing what had occurred, started for Kingchow at the head of fifteen thousand men, which city he safely and quickly reached and strengthened.

Man Gwei and Swun Chungdsoong were promoted, but could not fill the place of the murdered man; though at the head of forty-thousand men, two li outside the Yoongding gate, and inside a barrier of piles. For the Manchus, clad in Chinese garments and armour, and flying Chinese flags, advanced by night to that barrier, leaped over it, and furiously attacked the Chinese, many of whom were slain; and among them Man Gwei bravely fighting till he fell. Many prisoners were taken back by the Manchus. But as Taidsoong was not eager for continued warfare, which probably signifies that he could not take the

capital, he sent in two messengers with proposals for peace, which was not made; and the first siege of Peking was raised.

In February, 1630, the Manchus, in their retreat, took Yoongping, Chienngan, and Lanchow, and tried to take Changli hien, where the magistrate showed a bold front, defeating first the Mongols, who should have taken the city, then a Manchu force sent against it by night, and lastly Taidsoong himself, setting fire to his scaling ladders. Thereupon they retired eastwards, leaving the Beira Amin with five thousand men to garrison Yoongping and the other cities taken.

As soon as the Manchu army was gone, a host of two hundred thousand Chinese, under Dsoo Dashow, Dsoo Daloo, Ma Shuloong, Dsoo Kuafa, and others advanced against Lanchow, cut down willow trees and filled the moat, set artillery and tore down the walls; whereupon the garrison thought it best to flee to Yoongping, which Amin believed he could not hold, even if all his men were collected within its walls. He summoned the garrisons of the other few cities into Yoongping, and then deliberately put to death all the men who had deserted from the Chinese. He fled by night and got to Tsunhwa, the garrison of which he took with him. Terror-stricken, he did not protect his rear, and only a remnant of his men saw Mookden again.

Amin, who was a brother of Taidsoo, was imprisoned, examined by his peers, and found guilty of sixteen great crimes worthy of death. The sentence was commuted to perpetual imprisonment, with the confiscation of his family, slaves, and property of all kinds. The next in command was degraded and his family taken from him. The other commanders were punished in proportion to their responsibilities;—a lesson which some of our western civilised nations might learn with advantage to the public service, as the opposite policy ruined the Chinese.

The soldier, Samoochatoo, was the first to scale the wall of Tsunhwa. After the battle, Taidsoong himself poured out a glass of spirits, and handed the golden cup to the soldier to drink, ennobling him and his posterity, and bestowing upon him the honourable title of *batooroo*, which was given only to the

bravest of the "brave," and seems to have been similar to the old order of knighthood, received not in a drawing-room, but on the battle-field. At the attack on the same place, an officer with twenty-four soldiers rushed through the fire on to the city. Taidsoong said afterwards of them, that they were the first among his brave men. They were allowed to company with the Beiras and great ministers, and their superior officers had strict orders not to permit them to expose themselves a second time in the same manner, because he loved them. There were other similar cases. He ordered the Beiras to remember that they had been successful, because they had received the aid of Heaven; they should, therefore, always act justly and uprightly, and never from covetousness, for that thus both Heaven and men were served; then if their men followed them from love, Heaven would bestow still greater prosperity upon them. After Yoongping was taken, and some deserter officers visited Taidsoong, he said,—“I am not like your Ming emperor, who has forgotten to treat his ministers with kindness. All my ministers can sit down by my side, speak out freely what they think, and eat and drink in my company.”

This reveals the true general and conqueror, the leader of men; and was, doubtless, a considerable factor in the formation of the brave Manchu soldier.

In February, 1631, the Manchus cast their first great cannon, and called it the Great General, with the title inscribed on it of “The heaven-aiding, awe-inspiring Great General,” to which was appointed a superior officer. They had field-pieces before, probably those taken from the Chinese, which they called “red-coated cannon,” because painted red; these are now called “horse-cannon.”

While occupied in setting their internal affairs in order, intelligence was brought in August that Dsoo Dashow, after retaking all the cities inside Shanhai gwan, was now employed day and night in building a fort on the banks of the Daliang ho, east of Kingchow, in order to recover the old frontier. As soon as they collected provisions, the Manchus hasted west-

ward from Mookden, and on the other side of the Liao were joined by the Mongol forces who had been summoned thither. The combined army advanced on Daliang ho, to find one line of wall completed and the whole army of Dsoo half finishing a second.

Fearing terrible loss of life from an attack by escalade, Taidsoong prepared for a regular siege. The fort was completely surrounded by a line of Manchus, supported by a second line of reserves, the Mongols forming a third line to support the reserves. The "great general" was planted to command the high road from Kingchow, and every soldier had his post, from which he did not dare to move. In order to make ingress and egress all but impossible, a trench ten feet wide and deep was dug inside the besieging line; outside this ditch a wall ten feet high was built with many towers; and inside the ditch, nearer the city wall, a second ditch was opened, five feet wide and seven feet and a half deep, covered with millet stalks and earth. A few outposts were attacked, taken or surrendered. A body of six thousand Chinese marched eastwards from Soongshan—Pine hill—and Ajigo was told off to oppose them. A thick mist fell on both armies as they approached, which rose first off the Chinese, revealing their position to Ajigo, who, under cover of the mist, drew up in order of battle to receive them. The Chinese were driven back to Kingchow.

A relieving army of forty thousand Chinese, under Soong Wei and Woo Hiang, father of the famous Woo Sangwei, who was doubtless an inferior officer in the army, came from the west and pitched camp at Siaoliang ho, west of Kingchow. Against this army Taidsoong, who had driven back a sally by Dsoo Dashow, led half his army; but seeing the formidable front presented, he dared not attack, but retired to his lines.

Woo and Soong marched that same night, encamped at Changshan kow, within fifteen li of Daliang ho, and beat off Taidsoong, who attacked them with thirty thousand men. As defeat was as likely as victory, able men were sent by the Manchus to ascertain a mode of retreat. Taidsoong then

massed his whole army against the camp of Soong Wei,—his right wing being in the van. The noise of the Chinese artillery shook the heavens, and the right wing made no impression. The left wing next fiercely attacked the same point, but was driven back with great loss; and Taidsoong had to retire, leaving heaps of slain. The left wing then wheeled round and attacked the east side of Woo's camp with their artillery. A thick cloud arose at the time, and a strong west wind blew the smoke and dust into the faces of the Manchus. Woo, who was on the point of fleeing, took advantage of this weather and vigorously attacked the Manchus. Immediately very heavy rain fell and the wind changed to the east; the Manchus had thus the advantage, and Woo fled, his army following. This cleared the way for the right wing to attack Soong's camp in flank, the palisade of which they broke through; and the Chinese, fleeing in confusion, were utterly broken by an ambush which had been previously laid. Their mules, camels, and military equipments, all fell into the hands of the Manchus.

Jang Chwun, who was taken with thirty superior officers, would not kneel to Taidsoong; who was about to order his death, but prevented by his eldest brother, who said that Jang desired nothing else. The prisoner refused food for some days, and though at last hunger gained the mastery, he was obstinate in refusing to accept service, and was sentenced to a temple.

Dsoo Dabi, a younger brother of Dashow, pierced the Manchu camp at Kingchow with five hundred men, missing to cut open the bowels of Taidsoong's horse only by a hair's-breadth. Taidsoong gave the brothers the name of the "two madmen." In the last battle, Dabi, with a hundred and twenty fearless men who could speak Manchu, changed their clothing, plaited a "tail," and by night penetrated to the tent of Taidsoong, to which they were about to set fire with gunpowder, but were prevented by the awakened terror of all the camps. Dabi was fiercely attacked, but retreated only with morning light.

In that battle Dashow had not dared to move out of his fort to attack the rear of the Manchus; for just a few days before, the

Manchus had fired cannons and pretended to be a relieving army; thus enticing him out of his fort, and then attacking him. Fearing that the cannonade of the real battle was also a stratagem, he remained inactive. His provisions were long exhausted. Of the civilians, two-thirds had died of famine; and the soldiers ate human and horse flesh, and burnt their bones for fuel. He was tempted by a letter to revolt, but resisted. In desperation he made an attempt to cut through the enemy's lines, but had to retreat, as on a former occasion, when hoping to find his way out by stealth. But as there was no possibility of escape, he at last sent his son Kuafa to treat. In reply to the Manchus, Kuafa reported that with the example of the massacred deserters of Yoongping and Kwangning before them, they had preferred to hold out in their empty city to the very last. Dashow at length surrendered, after putting to death an inferior officer, who objected to the proposed revolt, and who died with a smile. He pleaded to be sent to Kingchow, where his wife and family were living; and that there he could act in concert with the Manchus. Leave was granted, when he again turned coat and took service under the Chinese. He had stood a siege for two full months in the small fort which he had so quickly and cleverly thrown up, but the evil genius of China fought against him.

After the fall of Daliang ho, Taidsoong attempted in vain to take Hingshan and Joongdso cities. He retired to Mookden with his army, where he superintended wrestling-matches, and gave the title of *bookwei*, wrestler, with other long names, to each of the three Mongols who were of enormous strength and the best wrestlers in Mookden.

A great social measure was proposed by the Beira Yoto, President of the Board of War, and agreed to. It was to the effect, that as the double massacre of Chinese deserters at Kwangning and Yoongping had the injurious result of making the Chinese hesitate whether they could come over, it was necessary to do something to reassure them and recover their confidence in Manchu wisdom and goodness. He proposed that

wives, houses, and land be provided for all the officers who had surrendered at Daling ho ;—for a mandarin of the first rank a Beira's daughter; of the second, a minister's. The public treasury was to furnish the necessary funds, and the Beiras the needful land. Each retainer of these officers was to have a Chinese or Manchu woman; and the merchant class would be provided for after, if any widows or unmarried women remained at the Beira's disposal!

The prisoners taken at Daliang ho were distributed among the Manchu superior officers, from ten to fifty to each officer according to rank. To these slaves a thousand Manchu women were given, and the Beiras were ordered each to provide four or five women, so that each prisoner might have one. This slave question cost a great deal of trouble in after years ;—the runaway slave having been as great a nuisance to the Manchus as to the Americans in later times, notwithstanding the generosity of finding them wives. (See *Slaves*.)

The above will serve to shew the ignominious position which woman held then and holds now in China, and the whole east.



CHAPTER IV.

CONQUEST OF MONGOLIA.

FROM its geographical position, the extent of its country, and the numbers and character of its various peoples, Mongolia would of necessity very materially affect the interests of the Manchus, who could not afford to permit the Mongols to remain foes, and must have contemplated with misgiving the task of compelling them to become allies; for the Mongols were immensely more numerous than, and as fond of the saddle and the bow as the Manchus. But though this connection was one of such vital consequence to the Manchus, a detailed account of even the Manchu expeditions into their country falls beyond our present province.

The name Munggoo, from which we receive the term Mongolia, is a comparatively modern one,—the “wandering kingdom” being known by many and changing names in Chinese history. The first name was the uncomplimentary one of “Gweifang,” or “Demon-quarter”; doubtless from the double reason that the land was in the north, whither all demons fled on departure from the body, and because the people were wholly uncivilised. The Mongols were, however, always even nominally free—or, as the Chinese historians modestly phrase it, in a state of rebellion—till the Tang dynasty conquered the Too-kue, or Turks, situated south and south-west of Gobi. Two cities were then built in this desert of the sandy sea,—this *Han-hai*, which was specially created by Heaven to divide the “Middle Flowery Kingdom” from the rest of the world; these cities being intended to command the conquered district.

The subject Mongols were not long in asserting their freedom,

which they retained till the Nüjun predecessors of the Manchus—the Liao and Kin dynasties—established several earthen walled cities in the south-east of Mongolia, ruling over the peoples then called the Doong Si and the Si Si, but they did not attach the regions north of the Yellow river. In order to have control over the communications between their newly-acquired territory and their original home in northern Manchuria, it was necessary for them to establish and occupy these military posts. The Liao dynasty was overturned by its cousin the Kin, which in its turn fell before the Mongols, at a time when they were the most powerful people in Asia.

These Mongols, who gave China the Yuen dynasty, came from the northern reaches of Mongolia, between the Great Desert and Russia. They asserted their supremacy, first over their neighbours south of Gobi, then westwards to Tatoong, conquering all south and west Mongolia up to the Mohammedan countries of the Si-yu or Turkestan. The whole of Mongolia was then first united to China, but as her conqueror, not her vassal; the accumulated Mongol forces driving out the Kin from the north, and subduing the Soong dynasty in the south of China. The Yuen dynasty retained the old subdivisions in Mongolia, establishing “wangs” and imperial sons-in-law over the various tribes, the descendants of whom, and of members of the Yuen family, being princes in Mongolia to this day.

The Ming dynasty, which overturned the Yuen, pursued them northwards beyond the desert to their old homes, and always maintained a nominal sovereignty over the whole of Mongolia, though they found it easier to do so by subsidies than by the sword; nor did yearly “presents” prevent the Mongols from making many and formidable incursions into Chinese territory.

Mongolia is usually divided into four: the Inner Mongols south of the desert, the Outer north of the desert, Eleuths west of the desert, and the “Chinghai” or Kokonor Mongols west of Kansu and Szchuen. We have, at the present stage of our history, to deal only with the Inner Mongols, divided into forty-eight

Banners, twenty-four families, and six tribes,* in addition to other two Banners and one family occupying the cities of Kweiwha and Toomotei, north of Peking. Four of those tribes border the west of the whole of Manchuria,† from the province of Hei-loong kiang‡ on the north to Shanhai gwan on the south, and extend along the north of Chihli; while the remaining two border Shansi, Shensi, and Kansuh. The nearest Mongol neighbours of the Manchus were the Kortsin, which is one of the largest of the families. It, with Gorlos, Doorbets, and the Jalaits, formed the tribe of Jualimoo. But Kortsin gives its name to the tribe more frequently than not.

From very remote periods, the sword decided the right of the particular family which was to be head of the tribe; and the head of a family frequently not only made himself chief of his tribe, but extended his sway over neighbouring families and clans. It was by means of this perpetual internal discord, that Mongolia fell piecemeal at the feet of the Manchus, who got the "division" ready made, and had only to "reign." But it was also by means of this same incessant internal struggle, that the Mongols made the conquests which agitated the whole world; for they themselves had to be conquered before they marched a foot beyond Mongolia; and their only cohesive power was a master mind, which if removed, caused the breaking up of the compact mass into its original elements, and such a master mind may again make the name of Mongol as terrible as ever was that of Hun given to their ancestors.

* Dividing the Mongols into clans and tribes, it is difficult to distinguish the one from the other; and the word "horde" is inappropriate when applied to a well-established order. I have, therefore, preferred to call *boo*, the smaller, a "family," and *mung*, a "tribe," which is composed of so many *boo*, just like the tribes of Israel.

† *Shing-king* or Fung-tien, by which names alone it is known to the Chinese; Manchuria being a name improperly given by foreigners.

‡ Commonly called Tsitsihar, or Jijihar, which is in reality the name of its capital.

Kortsin,* beyond Sifung kow, is from east to west eight hundred and seventy li; and from north to south, two thousand one hundred li, stretching from Shanhai gwan to Solon, on the Soongwha kiang or Songari, and is still under the rule of the lineal descendant of Hasar, a younger brother of the founder of the Yuen dynasty. In the early days of the Ming dynasty, Wooliangho, chief of Kortsin, was made the principal of the three Mongol chiefs nominated by the Ming to watch the frontier. This supremacy was afterwards destroyed, and the four families of Jualimoo,—all called Kortsin, after the principal one,—were subjected by force of arms to the head of the Chahar family.

Chinese territory extended northwards beyond Mookden like a wedge, till it terminated in a point just outside Kaiyuen, on the east of which city was that portion of the Nüjun, from whom sprang the Kin dynasty, and on the west the family of Kortsin, whose head was chief of the tribe. From its position, Kortsin was the first Mongol family or tribe to come in contact with the Manchus.

If the Eastern Mongols and Nüjun or Manchus are not physiological or philological brothers, they are very near relations; their polysyllabic Turanian languages containing so many similar words, and the many customs they have in common, seem as distinctly to point to a common origin as to their mutually wide separation from the Chinese.

As the old Mongol chiefs loved war and plunder, like our own old barons, tribe against tribe and family against family, so did the Eastern Mongols often measure swords with their neighbours the Nüjun; for they were then under the Ming what they are now under the Manchus, in a state of semi-independence, or rather resembling the attitude, till lately, of Afghanistan to India: permitted to settle their own quarrels among themselves, provided they left the Chinese in quiet. The Mongol and Nüjun chiefs intermarried, and so probably did the neighbouring

* The Chinese call them Kursin; Mongols call their country west of Manchuria, Toornaor, and themselves Harchin.

peoples under them. Thus when the Nüjun, south of Kirin and Ninguta, combined to take and destroy Noorhachu in Laochung, they sent for the aid of the chief of Kortsin, who willingly marched at the head of his troops, was the first in the fray, and the first to flee when the whole allied army was routed below Gooloshan. Afterwards when Woola was attacked, Kortsin marched to the rescue, but was met, and his horse fled back to their own country. As soon as the chief got home, he sent messengers to the Manchus to make a treaty of peace.

In the middle of the fifteenth century, Totoboowha, chief of Chahar, was murdered, the murderer assuming the chieftainship. The son of the murdered man was soon after reinstated in his patrimony, taking the title of Siaowangdsu, the little king, a title handed down to his posterity. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Siaowangdsu made himself master of the Kokonor Mongols, and marched about at the head of a hundred thousand bowmen. After displaying their prowess all round, these gradually broke up, moving eastwards and settling down, except when making inroads on Chinese territory; for China was the Roman empire of these Goths.

When the Manchus began to make themselves felt in eastern Manchuria, the Ming empowered Lindan-khan, the then Siaowangdsu, to raise an army against them. Doubtless Lindan had already proved himself a man of war. His first effort was unsuccessful, for he was driven home. He however raised an army larger than the first, but instead of attacking the Manchus, he devastated his Mongol neighbourhood, spreading the terror of his name in all directions. Many of his neighbours fled towards Kortsin, and, whether from righteous indignation at the atrocities of Lindan, or from the fear of themselves feeling the scourge of his arm, or from both motives,—the Kortsin chief and people bound themselves fast friends to the Manchus, in a friendship which has up to the present day not been broken. For it was their chief Sankolinsin who planned the defences on the Peho and led the army which opposed the march of the allied troops on Peking; and he did only what his predecessors have always

done when any danger threatened the Manchu government. His son, who for the father's sake has high rank though small influence in Peking, is the present chief of the Kortsin, and continues his father's bitter hostility to westerns, being one of the leaders of the anti-foreign party. These chiefs and the imperial family have therefore again and again intermarried.

Lindan continued his course of war, though not without opposition; for he was once defeated at the head of forty thousand men by a combination of Mongol Families. The Mongols however found they were unable to defend themselves from him, and therefore implored the protection of the Manchus, who in 1632 marched against him with their newly-acquired Mongol tributaries. As it was summer, the Liao was unfordable; and the Manchus therefore marched northwards by Hingan ling,* a distance of thirteen hundred li. Lindan desired to make a stand at his capital, but his men broke up, stripped, crossed the river and fled whither and with as much of their live property as they could, most of them finding their way to Kweiwha city. The forsaken chief had to follow perforce, fleeing alone and never resting till he got to the marches of Kokonor, where he died of fatigue; his former ruthless power, doubtless, making an asylum anywhere impossible. The Manchu army then marched on Kweiwha, which they captured with many myriad men. Thus fell into their hands the key of Inner Mongolia north of Peking.

Soon after the accession of the Ming *Tienchi* (1621), two Ming princes, looking after Chinese interests in Mongolia, who were very friendly disposed to the Mongols, and what is just as likely, very much afraid of them, agreed to pay a million taels per annum to the Mongol Shwunyi wang, descendent of one Nanda, to whom that title had been first given; for this Mongol it was who had charge of preventing inroads into Chinese territory. The "present" was handed over at the yearly horse

* There is an outer Hingan ling, two hundred and twenty li north-east of Meirgun, in Hei-loong kiang province, and an Inner Hingan ling, west of Tsitsihar city, which supplies a considerable proportion of the waters of the Amoor. The Manchus would therefore march north-west from Kaiyuen.

fair, when prince Shwunyi presented his tribute of fifty thousand horses, or three hundred and twenty thousand taels, as his tribute. Chahar defeated Shwunyi wang, took his place as border guardian and recipient of the million taels, which he received, doubtless, in order to retain him in Chinese service.

When Taidsoong caused Lindan to flee, and occupied the city of Kweiwha, he thought he had as good a right to the subsidy as his predecessor, and sent letters to that effect to the magistrates of all the border cities, Hüenfoo, Tatoong, Yangho, &c., stating how much better it would be for the Chinese to pay him this sum than hand it to the weak Chahar, whose power was gone with the flight of its chief; for that thus he and they would become good friends. The governor at Tatoong agreed to make a covenant with the Manchus, on the ratification of which, a white horse and a black ox were sacrificed, and arrangements made for an exchange market at Jangjia kow, or Kalgan. But when news of this covenant, made by his unauthorised official, came to the emperor's ears, he was extremely wroth and had the various parties punished. Thereafter no magistrate dared hold any intercourse with the Manchus.

As Ningyuen defied the utmost effort of the Manchus, they made use of Mongolia as a highway into China. In 1626, the First Beira at the head of a considerable army made a successful march into Mongolia, taking fourteen Beiras prisoners, with their men and cattle. In July 1634, Taidsoong advanced from Hüenfoo to reconnoitre Swochow district, and next month the army marched in force on Shansi, against Taichow, Swochow, and other cities; but apparently only Chowei was taken before the army was recalled. Raids were however made on Hei-longkiang to the north and Warka to the east, which were more successful; for these raids on the more thinly populated Nüjun districts, seemed to have served their purpose when a number of captives were brought back, many, possibly most, of whom were soon converted into soldiers.

In 1634 the men of Chahar revolted against Lin Danwoo their chief, and deserted in "countless numbers" to the Manchus,

after seeing the dead body of their former chief. In March of 1635 these men were sent back to their own country along with a picked Manchu army. Three months after, the main army had got to Silajoonga on the way to Chahar, at which place Lin's widow surrendered with one thousand five hundred families. The Yellow river was crossed, and Nguajua, unprepared to fight, surrendered with his mother and over a thousand families. He was created a Chin-wang. The Chahar districts all submitted during this same year, and Inner Mongolia became entirely subjected to the Manchus.

But this expedition was remarkable for a richer conquest than that of men and women. When the last Yuen emperor fled beyond the Great desert, he took with him the imperial jade seal which had been handed down from dynasty to dynasty in China. Somehow it was lost, and was out of sight for two centuries; after which, a certain shepherd was so much disconcerted at seeing his sheep eat no food for three days, that he dug the ground to discover the charm, when he found the long-lost jade seal! It became the property of his chief Lin Danwoo, whose widow handed it to the Manchus. On it are inscribed in ancient characters (jwandsū), the four words,—the “Precious (Agent) of Rule and Command.” It was encased in *fanyü*,* with a clasp in the form of a scaly dragon, all of a dazzling brightness! The possessor of this charmed seal is said to be sure of sovereignty over China, which is probably true as long as he can keep it, and its locality is known. It was, therefore, fortunate for the Manchus that the lucky shepherd was not ambitious. No sooner did the forty-nine Mongol Beiras hear of the news, than they hastened without one exception to acknowledge the sovereignty of the possessor of the seal.

Chahar has not always been so faithful an ally as Kortsin; for when Woo Sangwei revolted in the south-west, Boorni, younger brother and successor of the deceased Nguajua, refused to obey the summons of *Kanghi* for aid; whereupon he himself was immediately attacked by a combined Manchu and Mongol

* Which Dr Williams—transposing—supposes to be a “veined agate.”

force, which got to Chirhatai, where all heavy baggage was left behind, so that the men could ride lightly to Daloo, where Boorni was encamped amid hills and gullies. His ambushes were first driven in, and then his army defeated. He had however another army in readiness, with which he renewed the fight; but in vain, for he had to flee with three thousand horse. He did not flee far, for a Kortsin arrow brought him to the ground. His land was converted into a common, the survivors of the tribe banished to beyond Hüenwha and Tatoong to the south-west of Dooshu kow, where his territory had extended north and north-west of Peking, over a thousand li beyond the outer wall.

We have seen how Kweiwha chung west of the Yellow river was taken. In 1636, a number of Mongols of that district revolted, flying beyond the Great desert. They were pursued by Woobahai, who had been made commandant of Kweiwha. For several scores of days no trace of the rebels was obtainable. One day while some men went to pick up a wild goose which had been shot by them, they suddenly came upon the rebel camp, which broke up immediately, continuing the flight northwards. At Wundo ling pass they were overtaken. Yelei, one of their leaders, raised his bow to shoot his arrow, when a fox which had risen in front ran against him, and his bow was knocked out of his hand. He was taken, and on him was found the seal of Shwunyi wang of Kweiwha. Inner Mongolia however seems to have taken kindly to Manchu rule, for there has been no such serious risings as under the Ming and preceding Chinese dynasties. This fidelity is accounted for partly by consanguinity and intermarriage; but chiefly by the large salaries and presents allowed the Mongol chiefs.

The year 1636 passed over without any important military operations. A raid was made through Mongol territory into Shansi, in the end of the preceding and beginning of this year, which resulted in a total of six thousand Chinese troops slain and seventy-six thousand two hundred head of human and four-footed animals taken. A second in summer was followed by a more serious raid in autumn, when the Manchus, again

marching through Mongol ground, entered Changan, passed Paoting and got to Anchow, reporting successful contests in fifty-six so-called battles, and the plunder of twelve cities with the capture of a hundred and eighty thousand head of men and cattle. But from a military stand-point, all this was mere robbery; for the places taken could not be retained. In the end of the year an expedition against the Coreans ended in subduing that kingdom.

A dream of Taidsoong's is thought worthy of historical record. He dreamed that he was on his way to Hingking to worship Taidsoo, whom he saw riding swiftly. Daishan, son of Taidsoo, laid hold of the bridle, but could not hold in the horse. Then Taidsoong entered the Ming palace. In the palace was a man who held out and handed to him a string of coral. The man seemed to be the emperor *Wanli*,—long dead. His first thought was to refuse the coral, but on closely looking at it he saw on it the images of the Kin dynasty. He accepted it: *Wanli* saying, "This is the history of the Kin dynasty." On waking, the dream was laid before the wise men of the privy council by this Nebuchadnezzar; and they explained, that as he had formerly dreamed of going into the Corean palace, and afterwards took Corea, so now this dreamy entrance into the palace of the Ming signified that he was to gain possession of China, and the coral intimated that he was to be entrusted with the sovereign duty of issuing the imperial yearly book,—as the almanac is called.

North of the Great desert, stretching away to Russian Siberia for three thousand li, and bordering Siberia east to west five thousand li, is Outer Mongolia; at that time under three chiefs, the principal of whom was Karka in the east. When Chahar was annexed, Karka sent messages of concord to the Manchus, who presented the envoys when departing with sable robes, court pearls, bows, swords, gold and silks. The envoys brought as "tribute" in the following year, strange beasts, celebrated horses, armour, sables, the *diao* or "great vulture" (*monachus*), matchlocks made by the Russians, bow-bags from Whiboo, and

saddles and hatchets from Urmasu. Black foxes, white squirrels, and robes were given them in return. They afterwards presented every year a white camel and eight white horses, which was called the "tribute of the nine whites." But they were not always such good friends; for Taidsoong had to march against and defeat them in 1638.

The possession of Mongolia was useful to the Manchus only as the one road open to them into China; for they would never have been able to pass through the fortified Shanhaigwan, however brave they were, or however foolish their opponents. And they were not slow in making use of the circuitous route, for in September, 1638, Dorgun, the Zooi chin-wang, was nominated chief commander and sent with a body of men, while Yoto was at the head of another, both to act against the Chinese. Yoto marched by the valley of Chiangdsu ling, and taking a city of that name, passed on by four different roads. By the way, he came upon a body of six thousand Chinese, under Woo Ahung, governor of Ki and Liao,* who was a confirmed drunkard; and as he was, therefore, wholly unprepared, he was easily defeated in a valley, called by the Mongols Dajiboola. Dorgun broke down a ruined portion of the Great wall east of Doongjia kow and west of Chingwan shan, through which he passed. The two brothers united their armies at Tungchow, below Peking. Arrived at Chochow they separated, and marched by eight roads in as many divisions,—one by the hills, one by the *Ywun-ho*, or "Grand canal," or Transport-river, and six between these two.

The Ming general Loo Siangshung, and the president of the Board of War, were on bad terms; hence, though Loo had the title of commander-in-chief of all the troops, he had under him scarcely twenty thousand men, the bulk of the men of Kwanning being under Gao Chichien. Of his men, Loo Siangshung placed half under Chun Sinjia, and with the remainder he marched on Paoting. He fought a most severe battle against Chinese rebels at Chingtu, where many were slain and wounded on both sides;

* Ki Liao indicated the north-east of Chihli, and what remained of Liaosi.

and then advanced on Yinloo-swo, where he found he had lost half of his divided force. Here, with five thousand men, he had to encounter several score thousand of Manchus, who came upon him after he had driven off his former foes, and surrounded him three deep. He kept the Manchus at bay for two days, though Gao Chichien, at the head of the main army about fifty li distant, would not move to his aid. After his last grain of powder was gone, he threw himself, sword in hand, into their midst, and slew over a dozen men before he was cut down.

Believing that the Chinese would draw men from Ningyuen and Kingchow,* as soon as they knew of the march of the two Manchu armies into the interior of China, Taidsoong resolved to keep those men where they were. He, therefore, sent several detachments of Mongols to occupy the road between Ningyuen and Kingchow, and some of the Manchu rear-guard with Mongols, to that south of Ningyuen and north of Chientwun. He himself led an army by Yichow. The three recent deserters, who had meantime been created wangs, Gung, Koong, and Shang, were entrusted with our old acquaintance the "Great general," which battered down the walls of two fortified villages. Thus the object of the move was thoroughly realised, for the Chinese dared not draw on those garrisons to the north of Shanhaigwan. At the same time the plundering armies, under Dorgwun, reached Linching chow in Shantung, crossed the Grand canal, took Tsinan foo, and captured Dua wang, a near relation of the Ming emperor. They took in all fifty walled cities, besides eight which opened their gates. They seized above four hundred and sixty thousand captives, and carried away over a million taels of silver.

Returning next spring by Tientsin, they found the canal much swollen and unfordable. Some Chinese officials proposed to cut off their retreat, but the Chinese generals dared not act; so that after some days they crossed in safety. Another unsuccessful attempt was then made by Taidsoong to bring

* Pronounced Jinjow or Jinchow by the Chinese; but as the incorrect name Kingchow is given in all maps to that large city of Liaosi, it is retained here.

about a treaty of peace, but no notice was taken of his proposal. His terms were, doubtless, as unreasonable as ever, and they well might be so now. For the hands of the last Ming emperor had been for years becoming more and more paralysed by the gigantic scale to which robbery and rebellion had attained. So that China was now like a water-logged or stranded vessel, surrounded by wreckers. She could not possibly act on the offensive, could not even successfully repel every attack, while every moment made her weaker. The well-meaning, but weak, emperor found all things against him. The Manchus on his east successfully resisted his attempts to keep them within bounds; a hungry populace filled the provinces of his empire with fiendish robbers; a greedy, selfish, blinded ministry, occupied his council chambers, disregarding whatever tended not to their own immediate private advantage; and a famine, almost chronic, over all the northern provinces, not only converted poor men into robber-bands and rebel armies, but disheartened his friends by giving proof that Heaven was wroth with and had forsaken him. The Manchus could, therefore, choose their point, mode, and time, of attack or retreat; and we need not be surprised if Taidsoong's terms for a treaty were exorbitant, nor yet that being exorbitant, they were met with a silent refusal on the part of the Pekinese authorities, who would find it impossible to implement such terms, if they did agree to them.

In the spring of 1639, Taidsoong marched against Hingshan, in Liaosi, which he hotly besieged. The three newly created princes, Shang, Koong, and Gung, with two Manchu officers, had each his special post assigned him, from which he was to pour shot upon the city from his field-pieces—"red-coats," at present called "horse-cannon." The city parapets and much of the wall, were battered down,—the second in command, Jin Gwofung, remaining inside all day. At sunset the Manchus retired to rest, and to prepare for attack through breach and by escalade in the morning. But when daylight appeared, they found the walls as high as ever, the breaches having been repaired with

corded beams protected by earth. The attack of the Manchus was, therefore, easily repulsed, and their "cloudy ladders" helped to raise men to the wall, only to be hurled back to die. Attempts to mine the walls in three different places were discovered and defeated, and the siege had to be raised. Detachments sent against the neighbouring forts of Tashan and Lienshan, were equally unsuccessful. In revenge the country round Kingchow was harried, and the villages utterly destroyed. Several minor expeditions kept Kingchow and Ningyuen occupied all the year. In one of these the brave Jin Gwofung, who had been created lieut.-general of Ningyuen, was slain with two of his sons. When Hoong Chungchow, the governor of Ki and Liao, heard of it, he said: "At first when Jin Gwofung was alone at the head of three thousand men, he successfully defied the Manchu armies. As soon as he was made a great leader with a myriad men, he was defeated; the reason evidently being, that though nominally chief, he was interfered with;" a truth, the many evidences of which had not yet ensured a wiser policy in Peking, for eunuchs ruled in every camp.

In April, 1640, Jirhalang was ordered to restore the ancient city of Yichow, almost direct west of Liaoyang across the Liao, touching the south-east border of Mongolia: this was to prevent the Chinese to the south of him from cultivating the ground. Cavalry were always on the road; and if not successful in preventing the Chinese from sowing in the Kingchow districts, did the reaping themselves, in some cases cutting down the half-grown crops. In July, Dorgwun the Zooi chin-wang was sent to watch Kingchow, and to divide his men into two wings, one to be ready to oppose any movement of the enemy's troops, and open the way for deserters; another to look after all the crops, to have them cut down and carefully stored up, in two strong places, along with the straw and corn already cut. In October, Jirhalang was sent to relieve Dorgwun, who was reproved for his lack of plan. Desultory, frequent, but indecisive engagements had taken place between bodies of his men and the Chinese; and wishing to strike a blow just before leaving, he sent men to

tempt out the garrison of Soongshan, whence a body of cavalry soon issued at great speed only to be driven back. A second and a third time did they charge, when they were pursued up to the very gates, losing many men. The newly-arrived army also laid ambushes, seized night convoys of grain, and kept the enemy on the *qui vive*. And in December, Dorgwun was sent back again to relieve Jirhalang.

Thus were the Chinese forces in Liaosi always kept occupied and harassed, and everything done to shorten the provisions in the Chinese garrisons, when in April, Dorgwun gave home-leave to the mailed soldiers, and moved his camp away from Kingchow thirty li to Gwawang-bei towards the Yichow road. The news of this retrograde move enraged Taidsoong, who had given orders that Kingchow should be gradually approached, for he was determined to take it; and it had now been besieged a whole year. His troops had devastated Shantung and Shansi, taking many cities and could have taken all, but not a foot could he retain, because of the strong post of Shanhai gwan in his rear; and Shanhai gwan could be approached only after the fall of the four strong cities north-east of it, the principal and nearest of which was Kingchow. As he had so frequently been baffled in his designs on those cities, he adopted the plan we have been describing, to keep or make them short of provisions, and prepare for an easier conquest when his plans were completed. He was now enraged because the temporary withdrawal and weakening of the troops, and permitted Kingchow to lay in a stock of provisions. The guilty princes were recalled, and Jirhalang was ordered to press the siege against the southern garrisons. The recalled army was ordered to halt at Shulita,* and no man permitted to enter the capital. Ministers were sent out to examine and punish every man guilty of dismissing as many as five men. The Zooi chin-wang and his subordinate brother Soo chin-wang acknowledged their fault, and were both degraded to kun wangs†

* Now called Tawan, twelve li outside Mookden, on the west road.

† The term *wang* originally signified in Chinese what king did in the west, and there was then of course only one wang. But shortly before the Christian era, the

besides being heavily fined; the inferior officials were punished in proportion to their power and guilt, and then all were permitted to enter the city.

Jirhalang was ordered to surround Kingchow and to keep the road from Soong and Hingshan, to prevent succour thence. In besieging the city, the attacking party set up eight camps, before which a deep trench was dug, and along this ditch side walls were built. Between the camps and nearer the city another trench was dug, beside which watchmen beating gongs kept incessant guard.

Kingchow was a double city. Inside the outer wall was a colony of Mongols, who railed at the watchmen, saying,—“We have provisions inside the city for two or three years; do you think you can take us by sitting before the walls?” The watchmen replied,—“If you have provisions for four years, what will you eat on the fifth?” The reply terrified the Mongols, who learned from it the determination to have the city at all costs, and their allegiance wavered. Two Mongol chiefs sent a secret message, saying that they would surrender the city if soldiers were sent on a certain given night. But commander Dsoo Dashow, whom we have seen turn coat twice, and who was now under his first flag, heard of the proposed treachery three days before the given night. He went out of the inner city to seize the Mongol chiefs, who resisted. The Manchus hastened to the foot of the wall, attracted by a great tumult purposely raised by the Mongol soldiers. There they found ropes dangling from Mongol hands by which they scaled the walls and drove the

successful competitor for the throne of China adopted the term *whangdi* or emperor. Thenceforth *wang*, though still the title of “king,” such as he of Corea, always signified a vassal king. The sons of the emperor and men who made themselves famous warriors, had the title of wang given them. But all could not be equal in rank. Hence Chin and Kun divided them into two great classes, the Chin being Family wang, indicating the rank nearest the emperor; Kun, being Prince wang, denoting an inferior prince. Prince Kung is of course a Chin Wang; so also is Bo wang, Prince of Kortsin, because his father Sankolinsin deserved so well at the hands of the government. But the great majority is kunwang.

Chinese into the inner* city. The outer city was thus taken, and eighty-six Mongol officers and six thousand two hundred men and women joined the Manchus. The news caused the greatest joy in Mookden; Taidsoong inviting the populace to a theatrical performance in the palace.

Intelligence was speedily sent to Peking, and "urgency" declared.† Preparations were forthwith made on both sides for more serious work. The wangs, Koong and Shang, were sent off in May to increase the ranks of Jirhalang, and small bodies of Chinese from Soongshan and Hingshan were met and driven back; but a large force was being collected under the governor of Ki and Liao, Hoong Chungchow, and eight lieut.-generals, of whom Woo Sangwei was one. This force, amounting to a hundred and thirty thousand infantry and forty thousand cavalry, got to Ningyuen with a year's provisions.

Dsoo Dashow sent messengers from Kingchow urging them not to fight blindly, but to rest in fortified camps, and to advance with caution,—advice which coincided perfectly with the judgment of Hoong himself; for as the provisions were so bulky, and the carts so numerous, he resolved first to get them on from Tashan to Soongshan, then from Soongshan to Kingchow, setting up camps at every step to prevent all possibility of surprise. But the president of the Board of War had sent on the vice-president, Jang Yolin,—as usual, to spy the commander,—who acted like a madman, ceasing neither day nor night from reporting fighting ahead. His conduct at length compelled Hoong to abandon his first resolution, and to march ahead with sixty thousand men, leaving the provender at Ningyuen, Tashan, and Bijiagang, just beyond Tashan. The rest of the army followed him. His cavalry surrounded three sides of

* The outer cannot have surrounded the inner city, but must have been on one side, as that of Peking, and similarly situated; for the only traces of an outer enclosure in the present splendid city are on the south side, beside the shallow "river" Siaoling ho.

† It is remarkable to find the exact phrase used in the French convention occurring here, and often subsequently.

Soongshan, the infantry occupied Zoofung gang north of the city, pitching seven camps between the two hills, Soong and Zoofung, before which they dug a deep ditch.

Taidsoong heard of the march of this formidable army in September, and issued orders immediately, commanding every man and every horse in all the Manchu districts to gather at the capital. On the fifteenth day of the eighth moon they started from Mookden, leaving Jirhalang the Jun chin-wang to protect the city. He marched day and night, and in six days his forces occupied the high road from Nanshan to the sea, between Soongshan and Hingshan, thus cutting off communication between the enemy's army and his provisions. A detachment was told off forthwith, which defeated the men left in charge of the provisions at Tashan, and took the stores at Bijia gang, where there were thirteen great heaps of grain. This skilful move dealt a terrible blow to the Chinese commander, who had marched against his own better judgment.

Taidsoong knew that the enemy had small store of provision, and predicted that within five days they would retire. He therefore planted ambushes at Tashan, Hingshan, Siaoling ho, and by other roads wherever the enemy might possibly march. These divided forces were ordered to fight the advancing enemy if of equal numbers; but if superior to let them pass, and strike them in the rear. He also set a strong body over the grain at Bijia shan to prevent its being taken by a dash. He had guessed correctly; for on the second day, soon after nightfall, Woo Sangwei and five other lieut.-generals began their retreat in excellent fighting order. But the men of one of the divisions broke up in disorder and fled. In the darkness it was impossible to re-form, and all made for Tashan. The Manchus pursued, striking down the rear, the ambush doing what they could to put the van into confusion. The Chinese marched slowly, now marching, now fighting; but at last they all broke, and fled into Tashan. Parties of fugitives were met on all the roads; but so panic-stricken were they that the least show of Manchu opposition scattered them into disorderly flight.

Lieut.-general Tsao Bienjiao, with the commander Hoong Chungchow, and about ten thousand men, got into Soongshan. Thence they made five unsuccessful sallies; Bienjiao pushing his way with some of his men to the very gate of the quarters of Taidsoong. As the principal officers were away elsewhere, the greatest terror prevailed inside, lest Taidsoong should be overpowered. But the gate was defended by Balikwun alone till troops came up, when Bienjiao was wounded, and retired.

Taidsoong, believing that the hosts of men shut up in the small fort of Tashan were sure to flee immediately for the large city of Ningyuen, set ambushes at Gaochiao and Sanggarjai. They had not long to wait; for Woo Sangwei and the others marched out; and their men, now thoroughly demoralised, ran and most of them perished in the sea. Sangwei and another general escaped alone. Jang Yolin, the principal cause of that terrible disaster, fled in a boat and proved the man he was by joining the rebels under Li Dsuchung, then so powerful all over China, and again soon after by deserting to the Manchus. He was, doubtless, afraid of facing the emperor again.

Of the Chinese, fifty-three thousand seven hundred and eighty-three then perished, and seven thousand four hundred and forty-four horses, sixty-six camels, and nine thousand three hundred and forty-six coats of mail were taken. Most of the lost were drowned as they had been fleeing by the sea-shore. The sea was covered with the floating bodies, as if with innumerable "wild geese or ducks." The Manchus had ten men wounded that night.

We have seen above (p. 88, 89) how anxiously the Manchus were preventing the ingress of provisions into the fortified cities of Kingchow and neighbourhood. Soongshan, which was therefore short of provisions before, was soon in great straits by the additional men shut up there, while all hope of relief from without was destroyed; for a deep ditch was cut round the city, which was closely invested, Hoong Chungchow not daring to sally. Next month a large force was sent against Kingchow. Taidsoong returned to Mookden, and some provisions were

smuggled into Soongshan, which had come by sea from Tientsin. They were of little service, however; for the second in command sent his second son secretly into the city, who managed to open the gates. Hoong Chungchow was taken alive. Tsao Bienjiao and other officers were slain fighting.

Dsoo Dashow had defied the Manchus in Kingchow ever since his retreat from Peking. Orders were now sent to Jirhalang to closely invest Kingchow,—to cut down even the grass which grew between the wall and the trench. But as soon as the terrible and crushing defeat at Soongshan and the fall of that city, became known in Kingchow, the hearts of all failed them. Dashow, therefore, whose resources had long been exhausted, and who had done all a brave man could, opened his gates to the Manchus, by whom he was well treated. But every Mongol, and the men outside Dsoo's contingent, were put to death. An army sent on to aid Kingchow dared not pass Ningyuen, where Woo Sangwei was governor. He, though he could not save the country around from plunder, kept his city.

In consequence of the terror caused by the fall of the cities, and a succession of terrible losses on the field, Chun, the president of the Chinese Board of War, memorialised the emperor on the matter; but apparently presented an entirely wrong version; for the emperor replying in his own hand, wrote that his memorial stating that "Liaoyang and Mookden were eagerly desirous for peace, had been received;" that the emperor and his family were amenable to reason and were willing to carry out the will of Heaven above in saving life alive; and that peace would be easily granted on the restoration of the lands which "our merciful and righteous forefathers" left; but with this general direction the emperor handed over the matter to the president. Verily, red-tapeism was strangling China, half of which was then in rebel hands, the other half little better; and the cost of the war in Liaosi was in itself reason enough for peace. The Manchu emperor objected to the style of this despatch. If the letter was really intended for him, why was the president "ordered"? and if "ordered," why

employ the imperial official seal, which however was not the true seal? The letter besides treated Manchu with supercilious contempt. He therefore replied to the president that it was evident the Chinese were not in reality desirous of friendship. But as to the mind of the Wangs and Beiras of Manchu it was truly reported of them that they sought peace.

Soongshan and Tashan cities were then levelled with the ground and Hingshan soon followed. Woo Sangwei was the lieut.-general commandant of Ningyuen, and a worthy successor to Choonghwan. Every fortified city to the north of him had fallen, and he was now face to face with the Manchus. Repeated efforts were made by missives from the Manchu "emperor," and by letters from various chief officers lately deserted to the Manchus, all well known to Sangwei. All tempted him to revolt, but though he turned a deaf ear, they familiarised his mind to the idea and bore fruit before long.

Whether or not the Chinese emperor was aware of the whole truth in regard to Liaosi, he knew sufficient to make the thought of peace desirable. He was himself of a gentle, well-disposed character, but unable to govern unruly men, or control the strong-willed but selfish ministers about him. In June however he sent four officials and a retinue to make serious attempts for peace. The Manchu emperor sent a corresponding embassy 20 li outside the city of Mookden to meet and welcome them with a feast. The Chinese messengers performed, "one kneeling and three kowtows," thus acknowledging the power of the Manchus. The epistle which they bore from the Ming emperor as their credentials, was to the effect that as the former epistle directed to the president of the Board of War, referring to the cessation of hostilities and the dismissal to their homes of the soldiers, was yet without any reply, the officials named above were appointed a special mission to ascertain the true position of affairs and to report.

Next month the messengers were sent back with a reply as follows:—"The DACHING emperor (*whangdi*) writes to the Ming emperor (*whangdi*) to say that all the wars have been the

result of causeless injuries inflicted on our ancestors, of despising us and of seeking our lands. It was on these accounts our deceased ancestor Taidsoo informed Heaven and Earth and went in person to attack your kingdom. We afterwards made repeated overtures to come to terms with you, but up to the present there has been only war and confusion.

“By the will of Heaven we succeeded to our father’s position. We started from the shores of the north-east sea” (of Japan) “and have now come to those of the north-west sea” (Salt Lakes of western Mongolia); “within those limits the dog-and-deer-employing kingdoms, the lands of the black Tiger and the black Sable, the tribes who know neither sowing nor reaping but live by the hunt and the fish-net, up to the western Eleuths, have all acknowledged us as their sovereign. The Mongols and Coreans are down on our map. Because we have proclaimed only truth to Heaven and Earth, we had a name* conferred upon us, and have been made honourable. Our kingdom was styled Da Ching, and the style of our reign changed to *Choongdua*—Eminent Virtue. Whenever our men have entered your borders, they took every city attacked, they won every battle fought; yet we have never ceased to seek peace, to preserve in life whom war destroys. If both kingdoms are but sincere in the desire for peace, the old causes of hate will be effaced; and why strive merely to ascertain who is greatest?

“If you are sincere we shall soon come to an understanding; if double-minded, difficulties will arise. If you send a messenger to us we shall see him in person; if we send one, you should see him face to face, lest otherwise there should be any misunderstanding. Thus a lasting peace may be secured. On great occasions of joy or sorrow, messengers of congratulation or condolence should be mutually sent. You shall send us yearly ten thousand oz. of yellow gold, and one million of silver; and we shall send you a thousand catties of ginsheng, and a thousand sable skins. The earth hills between Ningyuen and the village of Shwangshoo shall be the limit of your honourable

* “The most Compassionate, Virtuous, and Wise Emperor.”

kingdom, Tashan that of ours; Lienshan and the space between shall be neutral ground for a barter market. If you desire to conclude peace let a messenger be sent speedily with a letter of peace, and another containing an oath; then we shall return similar letters to you. If you do not accede to terms, you need send no messenger, despatch no letter."

These terms of peace show that the Manchu conqueror, triumphing over his gigantic but now enfeebled foe, was not very anxious to conclude a peace, and also that he was at last aiming, not merely to secure a free and independent kingdom of Mongols and Tunguses, but to strike for the Dragon throne. That soaring ambition was now practicable, for he was strong and Peking weak; and it was manifested in his remarks to his princes, "that Peking was like a large tree, which must be cut all round, when it would fall of itself." This expressed a desire to cut off all external communication from Peking. It was, however, because of the formidable proportions to which Chinese rebellion had attained, that the Manchus were not at all anxious for the peace which they would have welcomed some years before; and the negotiations fell through.

The Chinese contingent of the Manchu army became so numerous by desertions, that they had to be divided into eight Banners. Some of them now urged Taidsoong to march direct on Peking, which in the present state of Chinese terror could not but fall. He, however, thought it was the best policy to harass and plunder the country in the neighbourhood of Peking, which would thus by and by fall of itself, like a tree which has been cut all round the outside. There can be little doubt that he might then easily have taken Peking, which was seized next year by the rebels; after which the chance of the Manchus was hanging in the balance. To carry out his policy an army was again prepared to raid China, which set out in November. The left wing broke down the Great wall at Jieshan, and passed through; and at Taitow ying fought and slew two thousand five hundred men of Tatoong foo. The right wing found the gullies so narrow and the roads so rough, that they had to ride singly. A Chinese

official was seized, who told them that twenty li outside of Whangyen kow was a very narrow road at Yenmun gwan, while the gate was of stone and protected by cannon and powder mines. Men were sent on by night, who seized the cannon, and withdrew the powder charges. The gate, with another further on, was taken. The wing divided into two before Whangyen kow, attacked, took it and passed through *chang-chung* as the "Great wall" is called. The two wings united at Kichow, the inhabitants of which had all fled to the hills, leaving grain and cattle behind. A Chinese detachment coming up to aid the city was broken.

Before starting, Taidsoong had exhorted his men to act as good soldiers, and not as ruffian robbers; telling them that no old man should be killed without grave reasons, no man's wife should be seized, or his property destroyed, and none beaten, as had been done during the last invasion, because they failed to give up their silver. The advice was good, and, apparently, intended to conciliate the conquered people; but we can scarcely hope that any attention was paid it; for in July of next year (1643), the army returned from Shantung, reporting thirty-nine victories, and three *foo*, eighteen *chow*, and sixty-seven *hien* cities taken, besides six which opened their gates. They brought back twelve thousand two hundred and fifty taels of gold, two million two hundred and five thousand two hundred and seventy taels of silver, four thousand four hundred and forty taels of pearls, fifty-three thousand two hundred and thirty pieces of satin, furs and coats of mail in abundance, three hundred and sixty-nine thousand human beings, and over three hundred and twenty-one thousand head of cattle. A number of high Chinese officials concerned committed suicide.

The Yü-kun wang Dodo, probably sick and tired of this carnage and cruelty, began the new year of 1643 by advising that the example of the ancients should be followed,—who fought only when war was unavoidable;—for that Heaven would certainly punish the people who trusted to their own power and acted unrighteously. He recommended that the soldiers should be

disbanded, and that the officials should well regulate their internal affairs, customs, and agriculture which was of prime importance as the source of food and clothing. His advice was not at all likely to be carried into action; though Taidsoong recommended his great ministers to be sure to entrust all important business connected with war to men of wisdom, who, if carrying out successfully whatever task was imposed upon them, would be permitted to send their men to dig ginseng; while those would be forbidden, whose failure proved them incompetent, and it would be criminal for them to be jealous of their betters.

Next month, September 1643, this able son of a more able father died at the age of fifty-two. A long title was given him, and his body rests in the Jaoling, north of Mookden, before which is the finest *pailow* I have seen. But both his tomb and that of his father's are sadly in need of repair.

At the new-year of 1634, Taidsoong seated himself in the "Reception Hall," and ordered the new Chinese adherents Koong Yoodua and Gung Joongming to present themselves, along with the Beiras and high ministers to pay their new-year's compliments. The high place and rich rewards given these men had doubtless a good deal to do with the desertion from the Ming cause of Shang Kosi the major-general of Gwangloo island off Pidsu wo; and paved the way for many similar desertions. After the reception there was a grand wrestling match, at which one Ursalan raised all competitors off the ground and received the name of "Marvellous Strength." The Reception Hall is an octagonal building, handsome even in its old age, and must have been very beautiful when built and when its finely carved wood work was covered with its freshest paint. It stands just outside the east wall of the Palaces, in a large enclosure of its own. It is necessarily at the north end of a long brick paved area, so as to face the south. It is flanked by five fine detached houses on each side of the spacious quadrangle. These houses seem to have been for the use of the princes or guests. The south gate leading into the quadrangle is in a directly east line from the large east gate of the palace wall.

It was possibly the accession of those worthy deserters which elevated the mind of Taidsoong to such a pitch that he called Mookden the "Heaven-aiding capital," and Hotoola, the "Heaven-aided prosperous capital (Hingking)." The word Mukden or Mookden is the Manchu for "prosperity." Then, too, the first examination was held for the degree of M.A., in Manchu, Mongol and Chinese literature. Sixteen candidates passed, who were each presented by the monarch with an embroidered suit, and each had exempted from military service four men of his family subjected thereto; while the Board of Rites feasted the sixteen at a public banquet.

In 1636, Taidsoong assumed a new style for his own reign, and the name of *Ching* or *Tsing*, "clear," for his dynasty. This is the Chinese of *Manjoo*, and by it the Manchu government has been ever since designated. He also adorned the memory of his remotest ancestors, the petty hend-men of Hotoola with grand names, and his deceased father had a long string of magnificent adjectives prefixed to his posthumous title, while his tomb, on the nearest small, beautifully wooded eminence east of Mookden, was called the Foo Ling, or Happy Tomb. The "empress" also lying there had a nearly equal and equally appropriate number of epitaphs. The Beiras, or sons of Taidsoo, were all created wang, a title which could be given then only on the supposition that Taidsoong was a proclaimed competitor for the Dragon Throne.

The Secretariat was divided into three grand divisions, the whole called *Nei San Yuen*, "The Inner Three Halls." There was the *Nei Gwoshu Yuen*, Inner History Hall; the *Nei Mishoo Yuen*, Inner Private Secretariat; and the *Nei Hoongwun Yuen*, Inner Despatch Office. Boards had been established sometime before, and in 1638, each of the six boards had six members, each with his particular duties clearly defined. An additional board was found necessary to look after the interests and affairs of the numerous Chinese Bannermen, in 1644. It consisted of two members. Another, a Board of Works, in connection with the Chinese contingent of the army, was also added and composed

of an officer for each banner. Then, too, an additional *Du Siao Su* or Grand Secretary was added to each of the three secretariats.

The first president of the Board of Rites seems to have been a humane man. He presented a memorial praying that wives or maidens, placed by the fortunes of war within the control of the army, should be preserved from ill-treatment. He was examined and rebuked, because "though his body was with the Manchus, his heart was with the Chinese," and he was told that he was no better than a spy and deserved death,—which however was not inflicted.

Taidsoong issued an order through the Board of Rites, somewhat more conformable to humanity, to the effect that any person found wearing clothes of the Chinese fashion, retaining their hair, and binding the feet of their children, would be severely punished. This was of course directed against all Chinese within the jurisdiction of the Manchus. Several edicts threatening severe penalties were issued against cramping the feet of children, but all in vain. It is a curious fact that of the three customs forbidden, those two belonging to men,—the enormous sleeve whose width nearly touched the ground, and the full crop of hair—were easily abolished; but the one belonging to women, though one would suppose the most serious of all, has been persisted in to this day in spite of the threats and laws of successive Manchu emperors. Is the Chinese woman more obstinate or conservative than her husband?

In the beginning of 1633, Taidsoong had to urge the farmers to be diligent in the cultivation of grain, and be careful to plant trees. The soldiers were also ordered to exercise their archery more assiduously, as it was by it they had obtained their kingdom; while the officers were forbidden to harass the common people, or to employ them on unrequited government labour. The first flush of youthful exuberant activity had gone, and the Manchus were inclined to follow the easy life of their sedate neighbours the Chinese, and were, like every people left to itself, content to let the future look after itself. But had they then permitted

their military harness to rust, they would have, in all probability, been driven back again into their original wilds. The reigning son was, however, worthy of his father, and gave his men employment. One brother he sent to build Siwyen, half way between Newchwang and Funghwangchung; another to build Lanpan, 240 li west of Funghwangchung; a third to build Toongyooen poo, 100 li north-west of Funghwang; and a fourth to restore Jienchang, 120 li south of Hingking. Except the first, since rebuilt, all those "cities" are now in ruins, and called by the natives "Corean" cities.

Again, in 1641, he expressed disapproval at the report handed in with the census. This census had been sometime established to give the numbers of individuals in every *Niroo*, whether Manchu or Mongol, with the number of human beings, and of cattle in each family, and a sort of "income" census, by which rich and poor could be distinguished. On the last score, the census gave him dissatisfaction, and he called before him and reprimanded the *Niroo* chiefs and higher magistrates, whose business it was to look after the poor, charging them with the increased poverty, because of their love of "good food and drink," and consequent neglect of magisterial duties. He blamed the highest of all, the Wangs, Beiras, and chief ministers, because they did not faithfully see for themselves that their men diligently practised archery. He ordered them to set a good example, by teaching their own younger brothers to bend the "ox-horn bow," and fly the winged arrow, and to instruct their boys in the use of the wooden bow and willow arrow; and again, they were reminded that their position was acquired by the bow, neglecting the constant practice of which was criminal.

It would appear that tobacco was introduced about this time, and that penal laws had been issued against its use, as vain as those of king James. For the monarch said to his assembled grandees: "Though we strictly forbade the smoking of tobacco, how could the people be restrained when you smoked in private?" Taidsoong then set the crime of tobacco smoking against that of neglecting archery and husbandry, and declared

that while the former might be condoned, the latter could not be overlooked. Is opium smoking to pass through the same stages as tobacco did, and both under the Manchus, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of their reign? So far the parallel is complete; for both were strictly prohibited, and the laws in each case nullified, because the magistrates and dignitaries set the example of slighting them. In the innermost circle of the palace, and on the highest ministerial benches, the opium pipe is daily lit. Full one half of the male adults are said to smoke, and the evil is deepening and becoming more sad when the vice has taken root in the nervous system of large numbers of the women. Women and children of three years old smoke the long ebony-stemmed tobacco pipe. Fortunately opium is too expensive for such universal use.

In the chapter on the *Customs* of the Manchus, reference will be made to their religion. When they left the eastern hills, their religion was of the crudest and the coarsest. Buddhism seems to have made rapid strides among them; for when, in 1636, Taidsoong had conferred rank, with golden knobs and pearls, to be fixed on the hats of all who had the blood of Taidsoo in their veins, he made a serious attempt to overturn the influence of Buddhism. He proclaimed in public that the "Lamas" confined their food to vegetables, pretending to be holier than ordinary mortals, only the better to be able to impose upon and deceive the people; for that if they regulated their food, they did not restrain their unruly thoughts, but coveted, cheated, and did nothing but deceive. He lamented that the Mongols were such implicit believers in the lama exhortations, and in their doctrine of speedy transmigration, promised to such as perfectly attended to those exhortations. He strictly forbade the use of the "Wheel of Transmigration," and the cloth "Soul-Ladder," used by Lamas and Buddhist priests at funerals. The former is not now in use; it was possibly extinguished then: the latter is still borne by a son before the coffin of his deceased parent. From all this we may infer that Taidsoong was a man of sound judgment, as he was

one of impetuous disposition and dashing bravery. He wisely continued the policy which had retained for his father what the sword had won; and he, therefore, not only extended but consolidated the kingdom of the Manchus, and made their future empire possible.


The child who was elected to succeed Taidsoong was his ninth son. His mother's temple name may be given as a curiosity, along with the distinguishing marks which pointed him out as future emperor. *Jaoshungtsushowgoongjiejunganyijangching-durunwhiwunwangkanghua* empress, before the birth of her child, used to be surrounded by a red flame, and when the terrified servant maids rushed forward to smother it, lo! it disappeared. In addition to other wonders, a lock of hair on the crown of his head was, at his birth, longer and different from the rest. During the day of his birth a red flame surrounded his mother's palace, and a delightful fragrance moved slowly about like the soft flowing of water. His mental capacity was above that of ordinary children from his birth, and daily increased. He was extremely fond of learning at six (five according to our calculation), when he was nominated to the throne by Daishan his oldest uncle, all consenting. All the Wangs, Beiras, and great ministers wrote an oath of allegiance, which was burnt, to inform Heaven and Earth. Jirhalang the Jun chin-wang and Dorgun the Zooli chin-wang were nominated guardians; and another written oath was burnt.

The succession was not established however without some commotion. Adali or Uadali, a kun wang, secretly promised to abet prince Dorgun if he claimed the throne. Shoto, a Gooshan Beidsu, sent Woodan to the same prince to state, that he and a number of ministers were prepared to support him. Adali and Shoto then went with Lolohoong to Li chin-wang Daishan, who was confined with a bad leg, and said that everybody was ready to proclaim Dorgun emperor; and they blamed him (Daishan) for negligence in not taking active steps to prevent such a thing. Daishan saw Dorgun his brother face to face with his accusers. Adali and Shoto were condemned to

death for the crime of instigating civil war, together with the mother of the former and the wife of the latter. The family register of Adali was given* to Daishan, that of Shoto to Dorgun. Because Woodan and Lolohoong knew not what they did, they were forgiven. The grand secretary Ganglin was imprisoned, but his crime pardoned, as he had informed the privy council that he would not be in the plot. Fan Wunchung, another grand secretary was degraded into the Bordered Yellow banner. All this shows the serious nature of the danger then threatening the internal peace of Manchu.

This storm, of whose origin Dorgun doubtless knew more than he cared to say, having blown over, Jirhalang was ordered off to Kingchow and against Ningyuen. Bands of men were sent towards Hei-loong kiang and Koorka to seize men to fill the ranks. And in May, the degraded Fan Wunchung addressed a memorial to the guardian princes, stating that if they wished to establish a reputation and secure an inheritance, the enormous proportions which robbery had assumed all over China made it an easy matter, while delay or inaction now would cause endless regrets hereafter; and recommended that a village be strongly fortified as a halting place for troops passing to and from the Chinese capital. The princes were not more willing than their predecessors to rest satisfied with an empire bounded by Mongolia, therefore Dorgun ordered the march of two thirds of all the Manchu and Mongol soldiers, with the Chinese Han army under the Three Princes to Ningyuen. They got to the Liao river, when they heard that the Ming emperor and empress had hanged themselves, and that Li Dsuchung had proclaimed himself emperor, taking the title of *Dashwun* and for his style *Yoongchang*; and thus Peking was lost to the Manchus and was become the capital of a robber, the founder of a new dynasty.

* Wives, concubines, children, slaves and cattle, were all included; the register being the title-deed to such property.



CHAPTER V.

THE EUNUCHS.

THE wisdom of the monk who became the founder of the Ming, who drove the descendants of Genghis Whan far into their own Mongol deserts, and imposed upon them a Chinese yoke, disappeared from his dynasty soon after himself. The deterioration of imperial families in China is much like the former deterioration of kingdoms further west. For the diligent Chinese being the wealth producers of the east, have been the bone of contention while one dynasty after another rose and fell in China, each on the ruins of its predecessors, each in the same way, and each eager to rule over the tax-paying Chinese. The founder is necessarily and invariably a man of more than ordinary abilities. His son equals if he does not excel him, and both gather about them the ablest men; or, perhaps, the storms of civil war bring the best men to the surface, and their worth is more readily recognised in revolutionary rebellions than in the conservative established government. While these ablest men rule, or live to guide the state by their wisdom, all goes well. Sons or relatives succeed them because of the father's, not of their own talents. And the weak monarch must have, not the men most capable of conducting state affairs, but those who are skilful flatterers and fawning favourites. These gradually secure all the best posts in the government for themselves and their friends; who care not for the duties but for the emoluments of office, and for what they can directly or indirectly squeeze out of it. Rottenness thus begins at the centre, and in a few reigns, sometimes in a few years, it extends to all the provinces. Exorbitant and illegal taxation, unbridled living, and the

shameless and open sale of legal sentences gradually alienate the hearts of the people, till at last some able patriot or ambitious upstart, a Cromwell or a Napoleon, appears in an obscure part of some province, and by stubborn resistance against injustice, or by successful robbery and pillage, increases the number of his followers, and widens the field of his operations, till the reigning dynasty is crushed out of existence, and he founds a new one to carry out the same process, and to perish more or less rapidly in its turn. Although terrific slaughter accompanies all such political volcanoes, the bulk of the Chinese people remain, for they are in reality the prize at stake.

The government of China is a huge machine for grinding out taxes, and the men in charge become fat and flourishing. There has hitherto been in China no revolution for any other object than that of gaining possession of this tax machine. There never has been a change in China for freedom of thought, as in England in 1688; nor an unsettling of the old principles of government by a rising of the people, as in France in 1792. In China "the good old rule, the simple plan," is both ancient and modern; for the only title to the Dragon throne is the ability to keep it. The man who begins his career by robbing his neighbours, and sacking the nearest cities, proves himself the emperor ordained by Heaven if he can unseat the reigning one; and the defeat of the latter is proof that Heaven has forsaken him. Every revolution in China is based, not on some new liberties which the people crave for, but on the desire or professed desire to return to the ancient principles of government, which have been neglected by the reigning house. Any change is therefore backwards and not forwards, it is "Conservative" not "Liberal"; for in China there are no great wrongs imposed on the shoulders of a groaning people by the laws of a military minority. The most ancient principle of government in China is that the ruler is for the people, not the people for the ruler; and though the ruler is absolute, he is real ruler only while he acts out that principle. As soon as he forsakes it, robberies, insurrections, famines, and droughts

proclaim Heaven's anger. If he is wise he repents. If he does not repent Heaven abandons him and his house, and raises up a new David to serve Him by dealing justice to the people. Hence rebellion is not only not criminal, but is proper: for the ruler ceases to be ruler when he oppresses the people; and if the rebel ousts him, it is because Heaven has irremediably condemned him.

This process of corruption had been going on for long in the empire of the Ming, when a series now of floods, now of droughts, and again of locusts, made starvation and famine a chronic condition of the northern provinces of China. And as a bad harvest is always regarded as the sign of the anger of Heaven against the ruler, and not against the people actually suffering, men's minds were more than ripe for a change of dynasty; only the proper man, who by success proved himself the chosen of Heaven, did not seem to be forthcoming. The Manchus, under an excellent and fairly just government and good discipline, had grown up on the north-east into a powerful kingdom; which was knocking with hard blows at the gate of China, and more than willing to change the dynasty. But Chinese pride rebelled against the thought of men ruling over them, who, if not still, were recently but rude savages. Perhaps not one Chinaman in official or private life would willingly exchange the weak, worthless, and corrupt native dynasty of the Ming for the young, vigorous Manchu. But the battering blows of the Manchus on the east much accelerated the rate of weakness of the Ming.

It was in these circumstances that the last Ming emperor ascended the throne, himself an amiable and well meaning young man, reminding one forcibly of Louis XVI. of France,—like whom he would have made a good ruler in quiet times. In 1628, the year of his accession, arose bands of famishing or lawless men, who were plundering a remote district in Shensi, but who exercised a powerful influence on the life and death of this emperor. But before detailing the career of robbers, it is well to glance at another most important factor in the downfall of

the Ming. This was the EUNUCHS, thousands of whom lived in the palace, whilst thousands more swarmed over the provinces, and filled the larger proportion of lucrative offices there. To understand their position, power, and mode of working, we must go back sometime.

The Ming dynasty had reigned over China for two centuries, when by the death of the emperor Moodsoong (1573), the child, afterwards called Shundsoong, the period of whose reign was called *Wanli*, ascended the throne, at the age of nine years. The guardianship of the young emperor and the empire was entrusted by the late emperor to the three ministers of the Privy Council, Jang Jüjung, Gaogoong, and Gaoyi, in conjunction with the chiefs of the eunuchs, and the two empresses.* Jang was eager to seize all power; but this he could not do without first ruining Gaogoong, an honest minister and an able man, with a strong will of his own. Fung Bao, the head of the eunuchs, was just as anxious to hold the reins of power in his own hands.

Soon after the proclamation of the late emperor's will, and the enthronement of the young emperor, an imperial mandate was sent to the Privy Council from the palace by the eunuchs. Gaogoong angrily objected to this procedure, and declared it would not be tolerated; for no such mandate should be issued until all the guardians should have been consulted, as the emperor was too young himself to issue such a paper. He said that this was the work of the eunuchs, whom he would have driven out of the palace. On this speech being reported to Fung Bao, his countenance fell in fear, and he made the determination, if possible, to get rid of Gaogoong. The latter was ostensibly supported by Jang, whose dignity had also been offended, but who was too glad to get Gaogoong out of his way, and therefore

* The Chinese emperor, besides his numerous wives and concubines, has three empresses. The chief one is in the Central Palace; she who is mother of the emperor is in the Left hand, or East Palace; and the third in the Right hand or West Palace. The first is dowager empress, and always in cases of minority is Co-Regent with the emperor's mother.

quietly let Bao know he might be relied on,—thus playing a double game. Gaogoong was afraid that Bao would gradually assume all power, and consulted with his two colleagues as to the possibility of expelling him. But Bao and Jang began to plot against Gaogoong, who soon lost his title of Grand Secretary. About half a month after, Gaogoong was waiting at the door for audience with the emperor, just before daybreak. Jang ordered all the ministers to proceed to the gate Hwiji, he himself to follow after. This concourse of ministers led Gaogoong to believe that he was again in favour, and that Bao was about to be driven out. But Bao soon made his appearance, with a mandate from the empresses and the emperor, stating: “This is to inform you of the Privy Council, of the five *foo* and the six Boards, that the day before the late emperor died, he called the three Privy Councillors into his presence along with us three, to receive his Testament; but now the Grand Secretary, Gaogoong, aspires to all power, assumes an imperial air, and desires to be lord, unwilling that the emperor should rule. Day or night we cannot rest for fear. Let him, therefore, return whence he came, and his office be vacant; let him not remain here.” That same day Gaogoong left the palace, and departed to his own home in an ox-cart. Gaoyi some days after sickened* and died, and Jang was left sole guardian. But Gaogoong, though banished, still haunted him and his friend Bao, who eagerly sought his death, but could form no reasonable plan for accomplishing their desire.

The emperor was one day coming out of the Chienching palace, when a beardless man with naked sword† was seen hurriedly advancing towards him. Bao knew him, and asked: “Southern soldier, Wang Dachun, whence have you come?” “From the soldiers of Chi Jigwang,” was the reply. Bao sent secret information to Jang, who quickly appeared, and said in

* Bao could explain that sickness, which often comes opportunely when a political rival stands in the way and is the weaker party.

† It is criminal to have any arms in palace, from an “inch long-edged weapon” upwards.

Bao's ear: "Duke Chi has lately obtained supreme command of the army; it is dangerous to meddle with him. Let us make use of this man to accuse Gaogoong."

Wang had been a soldier under duke Chi, and placed in a small command; but refusing to serve, he was left behind in the capital. Jang recommended kind treatment, as he seemed a smart man and ready of speech. He instructed him to profess to be a native of Wochin hien, sent by Gaogoong to murder the emperor. To give colour to this story, a chamber-boy was sent by Bao with a dragon-embroidered robe, a spear, a pair of two-edged swords, the handle of each enriched with "cat's eyes" * and other precious stones to Dachun, who, adorned with these, was led as a prisoner into the Chang.† The emperor was then asked to send men to examine him, while Jang wrote a memorial of import similar to that by Bao, but in appearance independently of him.

Bao was commissioned to examine the criminal. But he first sent the chamber boy to tell Wang, that when examined, he should reply:—"Gaogoong is enraged against the emperor, and sent me to kill him," promising Wang that if he thus replied, his real crime would be pardoned, he himself receive office with a thousand taels; but if otherwise he would be beaten to death. The criminal was also instructed to implicate all the relations of Gao as his accomplices. To all of which instigations Wang agreed, and Bao hurriedly sent off five lictors to apprehend Gao's servants.

Formerly Jang made a memorial to the effect, that the speech of the capital was different from that of the provinces, instancing Gao as an example. Fearing that the present plot might be wrecked by that memorial, as the man Wang who was to profess to have come from Gao's place spoke the dialect of the capital, he secretly sounded Yang Bo, president of the Board of Revenue, on the subject. He was answered, "If you persecute this man

* A precious stone, dark with a streak of light, like cat's eyes.

† "Storehouse," "mint," but here apparently the headquarters of the eunuchs.

you may expect great trouble, for the gods above are wise, holy, and righteous. It is true that Gao is of a terribly hasty temper, but heaven and the sun above are witnesses that he is incapable of such crime." Jang went out displeased. The assistant chief censor, Go Showli, said to Bo, "It is your duty, prince, to accuse publicly whoever is guilty of wrong." Bo replied that he had already spoken. Showli said, "You, prince, (by your office) say you neither slay nor flatter, (yet silently permit Jang to murder Gao). Great trouble is sure to arise, and how can you prove that you have acted up to your public duty?"

They then departed both together to call on Jang, to whom they spoke their minds very plainly. Jang boldly replied that Gao had already been accused at the east Chang; and that on the arrival of his accomplices the emperor would be asked to punish him. Showli said, "Had I a hundred heads in my family, I would venture them all as security for the integrity of Gao." Jang was silent, and Bo said, "I am anxious, prince, that you examine this matter in a righteous manner;"—at which remark Jang became angry, went into the palace, whence he returned with a paper containing the accusations from the Chang, put it into Bo's hands and said: "Was this written to me without sufficient grounds?" But he had changed four characters in the paper to, "there is proof for each charge." This change, which he had forgotten, was seen at a glance by Showli, who knew Jang's hand well; he smiled and put the paper up his sleeve. On seeing this Jang suddenly recollected the change and said, "The paper was drawn up by a man ignorant of law and I changed a few characters." Showli replied, "This private change is of the gravest consequence, and should not by any means come to the ears of the emperor, or of the public office. As for us two, we cannot believe that you desire the death of Gao; and that he live is impossible without you, prince." Jang replied with a bow and thanks, and asked, "How can I save him?" Bo replied, "by getting to act as judge a man of unquestioned character and unassailable power, either one of hereditary rank or one related to the emperor."

Jang was probably afraid of that paper, and recommended the

emperor to appoint Fung Bao, Showli, and the *Doodoo* Joo Hihiao, to act together in investigating the matter. From his surname of Joo, the last was of the imperial family. He enquired of Bo how he should act, and was recommended to send privately one of the emperor's messengers, a good detective, to the prison to enquire of the prisoner, "whence those swords, the double edged swords, and his speech? How came he to be mixed up with the servants of Gao, who were so numerous? Whether he could distinguish them? Where he had seen Gao, and where was Gao at present?" A skilful examiner was sent, who soon ascertained that Wang came from Bao, who had dictated all the words he had spoken. The examiner asked, "Were you not aware that the crime of entering the palace to murder the emperor is punished with the extinction of all the relations of the would-be murderer?" But added that he would be pardoned on making a full confession. Wang wept and said: "He who first sent me is guilty of great crime; but how * could I speak the truth, when my head was to be safe and office bestowed on me?"

The servants of Gao arrived in great terror, but Joo had them secretly instructed that they were in no danger, and when they had assumed their natural looks they were placed before Wang, among the emperor's messengers; but the prisoner could not distinguish them. Wang was brought out and beaten before a question was asked. To this he objected, saying bluntly, "you formerly promised me great wealth, why now beat me?" Bao asked who employed him; he replied, "you employed me, why do you ask me?" Bao in great wrath asked, "What was it you formerly said about prince Gao?" to which he replied that he had spoken only what had been dictated to him; for how could he be acquainted with prince Gao? Joo now asked whence those robes and swords? to which he answered that they were given him by the chamber boy. Bao was terrified, closed the examination, sent Wang back to prison, where he caused to be

* This difficulty in speaking truth in such circumstances is characteristic not of Chinese only, but of all nations which have not heard Christianity; and of all who, though they know, do not practise Christianity.

given him the raw juice of the lacker or varnish tree to drink in spirits, which deprived him of the power of speech, and privately informed the emperor that Gao had sent that man to murder him.

An old eunuch of about seventy years of age, said to the emperor that Gao had always been a faithful minister, and could not possibly be guilty of the imputed crime; and turning to Bao said, "Gao the bearded is a most upright man, and Jang is envious of him. Why should we of the eunuch clan aid him?" At which Bao was much displeased. The emperor ordered the Board of Punishments to enquire; and Wang was beheaded.

Five years after, the father of Jang died; but instead of retiring to mourn according to custom, he continued to wear scarlet clothing, and transact business as formerly. Four ministers accused him of lack of filial duty and of covetousness. Others expostulated with him, but he got them off in a comico-tragical way. The four ministers were soon thereafter, contrary to law, severely beaten; two were dismissed the palace, none daring to say "good-bye,"—one man alone expressing his sympathy by appropriate presents and addresses. The other two were fettered, manacled, imprisoned, and after three days banished. An official of the Board of Punishment memorialised that it was illegal to beat officials. A few days after he was himself beaten and banished to Kweichow.

The minister who expressed his sympathy was Hü Wunmoo, who sent the present of a jade cup to one of the dismissed, with a letter as follows:—"We weep not for cracked jade. How excellent and noble was the anger of Lin! This vessel, which has been cut out by my son, I send to you; a mark of esteem for Woo Joonghing." The first sentence expressed his belief in the integrity of the dismissed magistrate, and refers to the following story:—

Two thousand years ago, when China was divided into a number of really independent kingdoms, Hia Ho, a native of the kingdom of Tsu, came upon a stone enclosing a jade. He knew it enclosed the jade, because he had seen a Funghwang

alight on it, and on no other stone will this wonderful bird deign to sit. This stone he presented to Woo Wang of Chao. Woo Wang appointed a jade worker to examine the stone, and the workman pronounced it a common stone. The king believed he was being tricked, and ordered Ho's left foot to be cut off. When Wun Wang ascended the throne, Ho again brought the stone to present it to his majesty, and the subsequent similar examination and decision cost him his right foot. Chung Wang succeeded, and Ho could now only embrace the stone and weep; but he wept tears of blood. He was asked the reason of his bitter grief, and replied that he wept not because he lost his feet, but because his priceless jade was called a stone, and himself, a scholar of reputation, was branded as a deceiver. The new king heard of this, had the stone broken open by a jade-worker, and sure enough there was a very precious jade inside. It was afterwards called the priceless jade of Ho.

In the time of Mencius, Chao Wang of Tsin promised to give up fifteen cities to the king of Chao for the above "Ho gem." The king sent it to the court of Tsin by the hands of Lin Hiangyoo. The king of Tsin took the gem into his hand, but Lin at once discovered that there was no real desire to fulfil the contract by giving up the cities. As soon as he made himself sure of this, he said, "Please your majesty, the gem has one flaw; will you permit me to point it out?" The king handed it him. Lin having seized it in a firm grasp, went and stood beside a pillar, and in a rage which made his hair raise his hat, said, "I perceive you have no intention of restoring us our cities; this I will therefore take home again. If you attempt to take it forcibly, I shall scatter my brains at the foot of this pillar." He thus got back his gem. The application of both stories is evident enough.

To the other official he sent another cup made of rhinoceros' horn with a letter, saying, "This is but as the hollow of a sheep's horn and of a dirty black colour. But it is a token that I am ready to pluck out my heart to prove my love for you; and if it be necessary for your welfare, I shall not refuse to break

my head. I hope you may live a long life to drink out of the cup."

In 1600, Fungchi, a vice-president of the Board of Rites, complained that none informed the emperor of the troubles all over the empire on account of taxation, which was entirely in the hands of eunuchs. In Yunnan the people rebelled against the taxgatherers, the eunuch receiver-general acting with unbounded avarice and cruelty. The governor-general of the Kwangs disembowelled himself because of risings for the same reason. The people of Lianghwai, between the Yellow and Yangtse rivers in Kiangsu and Nganhui, burnt and plundered the Yamens; those west of the Liao cut up into pieces the body of an official, and sacked his house. The wind had torn up a large tree in the grounds of a wealthy man of Yingtien, making a deep hole. Fung Bao accused him of opening silver mines, and though the truth was told his majesty, Bao was permitted to plunder the man.

In 1598, Fung Bao opened silver mines, a proof that the government was short of money, else it would not have permitted the ravaging of the bowels of the earth, which is contrary to Chinese notions of right. In 1604, an order was issued to stop all silver-mining, and liberate all who were in prison for non-payment of taxes for silver-mining. This was the result of another memorial by Fungchi, who declared that the hardships consequent upon the opening of silver mines were greater than those of war; and that the mode and amount of taxation were more terrible than silver-mining. This was only one memorial of many; for year by year the frightful oppression of the people, exercised by the eunuchs in charge of mines which never did anything like pay working expenses, was freely and painfully made known to the emperor, to whom a word from the eunuchs was of more consequence. The mining profits all went into the pockets of the eunuchs. And more mines were opened, resulting in universal restlessness.

There was an earthquake that year in Liaotung; another which sounded like thunder in Kansu; Kiangsi and Fukien

were flooded, and several hundred thousand lives lost; Shansi was scourged with drought, and Shantung with drought and locusts. For over three hundred miles the earth was perfectly bare of every growing thing about Chunting and Paoting. Taxation riots went on, and famine became more prevalent. In 1617 the capital suffered from drought; Chihkiang, Shantung, and Shansi, were afflicted with both drought and locusts. The locusts in Hookwang darkened the sky; in summer there had been drought, and floods in autumn. Kiangsi and Fukien were drowned with floods. Next year two black spots were seen in the sun fighting;—"a dark sun soon after obscured the sun, and there was no light." All this proved the anger of Heaven, and greatly increased the prevailing uneasiness.

In 1615 an unknown man rushed up against the East palace, wielding a huge staff with which he knocked down the door-keeper. He was soon surrounded by other eunuchs of the palace and seized. Memorials daily flooded the emperor from his ministers. Some endeavoured to prove the man mad, others after having made minute enquiries, demanded a public examination of the man who had ventured to take the life of the heir apparent; and the utmost excitement prevailed. Suspicion at last pointed to a brother of one of the inferior wives of the emperor, who was believed to desire the death of the heir apparent, in order to have one of his sister's sons proclaimed; but it was early discovered that the eunuchs were the principal agents, and they fell in all the more readily with the scheme of the secret plotter, because the heir apparent was no friend to them. The excitement was doubtless increased by the knowledge that the emperor had starved to death the empress, mother of this heir, whose life was now threatened, because she had an affection of the eye, which caused him to hate her. Her son loved her dearly and saw her ere she died.

The matter was hushed up in the following remarkable manner. The emperor went to Tsuning Goong (palace), and invited thither all the high officials. They were all thence con-

ducted by the eunuchs to the grave of the emperor's mother, where they performed the "*Yi bai san kow*." *

The emperor sat down in a low seat at the left door pillar, the heir apparent stood at his right, his three grandsons in a line at his left. He then spoke out in a loud voice saying: "Within the court there are many groundless rumours afloat because of the madman who attacked the East palace. You are all fathers, you all have sons; why desire to estrange us and our son? We have seen the result of the examinations by the Board of Punishment, and the men implicated shall be put to death. But no innocent man must suffer, lest the peace of heaven be disturbed, and the ghost of our empress mother tremble with fear." Then taking the hand of the heir apparent, he said; "This son has been most filial, and we love him dearly." He then, stroking his son's body with the other hand, said, "Since you were an infant I brought you up, till now when you are a full grown man. Had I any desire to injure you, I could have done it long ago; why harbour any doubts? Moreover the Foo wang † is now many thousands of li hence; if I summon him not, can he fly hither?" He then ordered the eunuchs to set his three grandsons ‡ on the stone steps in front, so that all could see them distinctly, and said: "These my grandsons have grown up; what need of further talk?" And turning round to the heir apparent he wished him to speak out without reserve if he had anything to say. He said:—"As to this madman, let him be put out of the way; why hunt up others? We father and son mutually love each other. You of the outer court have great discussions, but if you desire to act as unfaithful ministers, do not seek to make me an undutiful son."

Then the emperor led his son to the ministers on the right, and asked if they saw how the matter stood. They thereupon bowed down before the emperor, thanked him and retired. The

* One salutation and three bows to the ground while kneeling.

† Probably him in favour of whom the attack had been made, then at Lo-yang.

‡ Sons of the heir apparent, who would naturally succeed him.

would-be murderer was beheaded on the execution ground; his two uncles, who had urged him on, were banished; the two inferior eunuchs, who had managed the affair, were put to death in the palace; and the principal agents escaped.

In 1619, the large army which fared so disastrously at Hingking was sent eastwards; and next year the emperor died, apparently heart-broken at the calamities of his people, brought on principally by his own foolish weakness, and the bottomless avarice and unscrupulous ambition of the eunuchs.

On the very day of his death, the new emperor, whose life had been threatened, issued an order to cease silver-mining, and recalled all the eunuchs employed. He also sent off to the army all the money in the treasury, amounting to a million taels. But after little more than a month, the emperor took seriously unwell. First one physician then another administered pills. He died in his second month's reign. His death was ascribed to poison, which is probably true; for the eunuchs would not be put down without a blow. This poisoning gave rise to serious strife in the palace, crimination and recrimination being universal. But hotly worded memorials and excited examinations then and after, ended three years later only with banishment of one physician to Nanking, and the other was freed, to the still greater commotion of the patriots.

The successor was sixteen years of age. Questions of etiquette, precedence, women and eunuchs, filled all minds, while the empire was in danger of crumbling away for want of a head,—reminding one forcibly of France before 1788.

In 1621, Hiwng Tingbi, the cautious general of Liaotung, was several times accused of negligence and deception, and at last recalled. This again revived the disputes between the eunuchs and the patriotic party, the latter at last prevailing so far as to get a commission appointed to go to Liaotung and report. The report, in 1622, was highly flattering to Tingbi, but while it was being read and debated, the Manchus had taken advantage of Tingbi's absence and seized all the cities and country of Liaotung.

It is questionable whether much good is derivable from particular reference to the unsavoury details of a court where polygamy reigns; but we have believed it necessary to present at least as many facts as will explain, if they do not fully picture, the inner life of the imperial palace.

The history of the eunuch Wei Joonghien will, better than any number of general details, reveal the condition of the Chinese court at Peking, and show its utter effeminacy and corruption. As a youth, Wei was fearless, daring, and strong. He gambled with youngsters, drank deeply, and delighted in riding fleet horses and in archery; he could hit any desired spot with an arrow. But his native place became too hot for him about 1589, and he fled, became a eunuch, and entered the eunuch service in Peking. He was most attentive and kind to the emperor's grandson, afterwards the emperor *Tienchi*, taking him wherever he wished to go. The boy was therefore very fond of his company.

Wei Chao, another eunuch, introduced Wei into the palace to prepare good food for the mother of Tienchi. In the same palace lived the empress Ko, milk-mother or wet nurse of Tienchi, with whom both these so-called eunuchs were too intimate.

On account of the disturbance consequent on the etiquette of enthroning Tienchi, an order was issued to slay all the eunuchs and servants in the principal palace (Chienching). Among these was Wei, who with tears besought Wangan, another eunuch of good character and great influence, to save him. Wangan did so. Soon thereafter Chao and Wei were struggling and making a noise in Ko's room, both the worse for drink. The emperor heard the disturbance, made enquiry, and was told they were there with Ko waiting his majesty's pleasure; and his majesty was naturally satisfied. But Ko hated Chao and loved the other, and therefore secretly moved the imperial mind, till at last Chao was dismissed, sent to Fungyang and there strangled. There was now no rival to Wei, who ruled Ko, and Ko ruled the emperor, and "misery was at its height." An

attempt was made to break the power of these two. A censor reported that it was illegal to have Ko in the principal palace, petitioning to have her removed to another. The emperor agreed, and also sent Wei to Wangan to be examined. Wangan reproved and dismissed him, exhorting him to act more wisely in future. At night Ko returned to the palace again, and never rested till she got the emperor to remove Wangan from being chief of the eunuchs, the post being given to a friend of Wei's. But not satisfied with having Wangan degraded, Wei got him removed to Nan haidso,* under charge of the Tidoo, or marshal of that place, where Wangan was compelled to commit suicide.

It was illegal to carry arms of any kind inside the palace grounds; but Wei instituted a corps of a "myriad" eunuchs, who drilled daily inside the imperial city, all clad in mail, and the noise of their drums and cymbals filled the "forbidden" city. He seriously reprimanded the censor who opposed this infringement of the law. A eunuch practising with a bomb in the emperor's presence, got his hand badly wounded by the bursting of the bomb, which nearly killed the emperor.

Li Hüen, widow of the late emperor, was not on good terms with Ko and Wei. She was ordered to commit suicide. Arranging in order all the presents by the late emperor, she strangled herself. Jang, an inferior wife of the emperor, conceived, and according to custom the fact was publicly noted. Empress Ko, probably fearing her own term of favour might be shortened, accused her of improper conduct, whereupon she was condemned to be starved to death. She was confined in the "Fasting-room."† Some time after it rained. She crawled out, and holding up her hands caught and drank some mouthfuls of water falling from the eaves, and then died. Fung, a concubine, urged the emperor to stop the drilling of the eunuchs. Ko and Wei hated her. The emperor sentenced her to death. Li, another inferior but favourite wife of the emperor, besought him not to

* A lake immediately south of Peking.

† Probably locked up in her own quarters, as was the mother of the preceding emperor, after entering which not a particle of food was given her.

kill Fung. Ko got her also condemned to starvation. But Li, knowing how Jang had died, had prepared for such a fate, by hiding away every day small portions of food in different parts of her rooms, on which she now lived. Her two enemies were enraged at her living so long and had her degraded to be a menial in the palace. When the emperor was on one occasion gone to sacrifice, they drowned a concubine, the lady Hoo, and on his return reported her to have taken ill and died. One censor, who had dared to remonstrate at an early stage, was reprov'd, another who spoke warmly of danger to the state was degraded. The senior vice-president to the censorate, Yang Lien, was at last constrained publicly to accuse Wei of twenty-four capital crimes,—the murder, degradation, banishment, or dismissal of faithful ministers, and the establishment of his own creatures, his oppression of the people, his assumption of imperial authority and state, his whole conduct opposed to the letter and spirit of all the laws and customs of the Ming, being the principal.*

* As the twenty-four Counts of that memorial give a fair picture of the state of the Chinese court at that time, they are given below. This paper is given in full, as it will illustrate better than any definition the peculiar functions of the censor; whose duty it is to memorialise his majesty on any fault observable in or beyond the court, and of course to make his case as strong as he can:—

“1st. Joonghien was, to begin with, a man of no reputation or sense of shame. When about thirty years of age he became a eunuch, and wormed himself into the palace. Because he was at first found by the emperor faithful in unimportant affairs, he was appointed to high office; from which time he became a most daring conspirator. He upset the ancient customs, and so managed that no minister was appointed, no affair transacted, but according to his pleasure; and all mandates have proceeded from his will,—a crime against the customs of two centuries.

“2nd. He dismissed Liw Yijing and Jow Jiwo, two aged and able ministers; and, according to law, not even the emperor has the power to dismiss the officials appointed by his predecessor.

“3rd. The late emperor was on the throne only one month; and it was well known that when he was taking medicine he hated the administrators. Swun Shun knew how to apply to traitors the doctrines of the ‘Spring and Autumn Annals’; and the censor, Dsow Yuenbiao, could dare to accuse them. Both were by Joonghien dismissed from office. He also protected the man who had beaten the emperor’s mother, and presented him with dragon robes and a jade girdle. He has been the friend of robbers and the enemy of honest and faithful ministers.

“4th. Wang Ji and Joong Yijung were two able ministers, promoted on account of their excellent characters. He got a servant to revile them, and had them dismissed.

Wei was terrified when he heard the memorial read, and went weeping into the presence of the emperor, who, at the instigation

"5th. He slighted the casting of lots, than which the Ming consider nothing of greater importance. He made the lots proclaim whatever he desired.

"6th. When men were appointed to office whose praises were everywhere sounded, he had assistant officials placed at their sides from among men of the most equivocal characters, so that having such colleagues, the good men were compelled to resign.

"7th. When his present majesty ascended the throne, the court was crowded with good men. Immediately after, nine most faithful ministers were dismissed. The emperor, afterwards discovering them to be good men, reappointed them. But Joonghien opposed their entrance on office, and as often as they were nominated, he prevented their entry,—so that Changan said: 'The wrath of the emperor is easily averted, but the wrath of Joonghien is unappeasable.'

"8th. The emperor had a most faithful wife, of whose honesty Joong was afraid. With his accomplices he, therefore, plotted against her, and spread the report that she was dangerously unwell and could not recover. He then had her drowned. And the emperor could not save his own wife.

"9th. One of the emperor's wives was pregnant. This was published, and all rejoiced,—each telling the other. Joong could not get on with her, and again plots were laid, and the emperor could not save his own empress.

"10th. When the son of the chief empress was weaned, amid great rejoicings, Joong consulted with the 'Holy Woman,' and the emperor could not save his own son.

"11th. When the late emperor was forty years of age, but then in Chinggoong palace, he was greatly distressed because of Wangan, striving to save him; but Joong hated him, and had him drowned in Nanhaidso.

"12th. He pulled down men's houses and homes, in order to build a *pai* to his own glory,—building it sky high, with ornamentation of Funghwangs and Dragons. His father's tomb he had enclosed and prepared like that of an emperor.

"13th. To-day he appoints Secretaries to the Boards, with hereditary succession; to-morrow he will do the same with the superior officials. He appoints men to official position who are ignorant of the rudiments of education,—such as his own relations, five of whom are *How* (marquises), and seven, inferior wives of the emperor.

"14th. He caused imperial servants to carry the *Kang*, and threatened to destroy men who were by marriage relations of the emperor. He attempted to overthrow the three empresses,—and though they were supported by all the Privy Council, the greatest disturbance was caused.

"15th. Jang Shikwei, a literary man of *Liang hiang*, near Peking, opened a coal mine, which was supposed injuriously to affect the tombs of Joong's family. The literate was put to death on the false charge of having stolen a handful of earth from Changling Imperial Tombs, and of having opened silver mines. And as no one dared contradict Jao Gao, the eunuch of Han, when he said, while out hunting with his emperor, that the deer he saw was a horse,—so the coal-pit of the literate is made a silver mine, and none dare open his mouth.

"16th. Woo Sujing and Hoo Dsundao cultivated a small portion of the waste

of Ko, paid no attention to the memorial, though the accusations were signed by a hundred great officials. Four months after,

pasture land belonging to Joonghien, and for this trifle were sent to prison and executed, with as little thought as one has in cutting down the heads of grass. Their unburied bodies were covered with blue lights, and all literary men were enraged,—for both were graduates.

“17th. For fear of him the Board of Appointments dared not enquire into the character of those nominated to office, nor had the censorates courage to accuse the criminal.

“18th. Liw Chiao was not one to murder another to please any man, but he never spared the guilty. Joong was determined to get him out of office, because he would not torture a man into confessing an unreal guilt. It was permissible to violate the laws of the Great Ming, but it was not permissible to violate the laws of Joonghien.

“19th. Wei Dajoong was nominated a superior official (Kochun), and arrived at his post after receiving the emperor's mandate. The Banqueting Office, *Hoongloosu*, drew up a paper immediately, giving reasons why he should not be permitted to be a minister. The Board examined into the matter, and all the honorary officials agreed to combine together to oppose his majesty's commands. The words of the emperor, which are bright as the light of Heaven, are thus nullified morning and evening; and what will posterity say of his majesty?

“20th. The East Chang was, when officially employed at all, anciently used to ferret out treachery and to trace up conspiracy. It was never allowed to trample upon the people. But since Joonghien was appointed to be its chief, even dogs and hens are not secure from molestation! The ignorant savage, Foo Yinghing, is always on the move, and his tongue and lips are never done ejecting accusations against people. He lavishly scatters his praises of Joonghien, and pries into what people say of him. Thus was Wang Wunyen, a secretary of one of the Boards, thrown into prison without a warrant, even without the knowledge of the Privy Council. Just thus were the faithful ministers of the Sung Chetsung cast into the Toongwungwan prison, the doors closed, and they crushed to death; and in the time of the Sung Hwitsung, one hundred and twenty faithful ministers, among whom were Su Magwang, Lü Goongjoo, and other famous men, were falsely accused, and the emperor incited to have their names engraved as traitors over the door of the Board of Rites. In the same spirit and manner this Yinghing and his fellows rest not day nor night from accusing the innocent. And Joonghien is even more powerful than was even Wang Ju of the former West Chang, who was all and his emperor nothing.

“21st. The rebel, Han Dsoonggoong, got secret entrance into Changan to spy out its defences and condition. In his goings and comings he put up at Joonghien's house, and he was ordered to hide away elsewhere only when the fact became public.

“22nd. Our ancestors, for excellent reasons, never admitted armed men into the imperial quarters of the capital. Joonghien has been the first to establish an army there and to make the palace a drilling-ground, to be as ‘feathers’ to him and his accomplices. Who was aware of what great crimes these could be guilty? Who could fathom the deep plots that may be laid? The hearts of all men of understanding are cold. There were men would dare death for Joong's friends, and his associates were the intimate fellows of the great ministers.

the censor himself and his friends were all dismissed. Wang Wunyen was degraded to the rank of the common people; for he could not be tortured while an official. He was then imprisoned, and day after day examined under torture, to make him say something by which those officials, and especially Hiwng Tingbi, could be sentenced to death. But "to the death" he remained firm against accusing the innocent. The worthy Wunyen neither saved himself nor his friends, for he and Yang Lien perished in prison. Another censor also perished with several others and Tingbi was beheaded in the place of execution.

This blow silenced the patriots. The Boards and Yamens were remodelled, Wei filling all the posts, his friends displacing his foes. He had a seal given him with the characters, "Defender of the Imperial Mandates;" and his paramour had another, with, of all titles, "Holy woman."

In 1626 the emperor agreed to a proposal made by Wei's flatterers, that a temple be erected on the Siboo lake at

"23rd. When Joonghien went to burn incense at Chochow of Peking, he had the roads levelled for him as if for the emperor. Returning in a chariot with four horses, he ordered his driver to go slowly. He had peacock-tail-feather curtains and an imperial azure banner before him. On each side was a body of guards and a wider circle of guards kept off the people. In all of which he acted as the emperor.

"24th. The greater the favours shown him the more soaring became his pride; the more notable the clemency, the more complete his anger. This spring when riding close to the emperor, his majesty shot his horse dead with an arrow instead of shooting himself. Joonghien was not afraid because of the crime of which he had been guilty, nor did he ask for merited death; but he had anger stamped on his face. When he entered the imperial presence, and when going out, he ceased not from publishing his wrath; morning nor night did he forget his rage because of the insult.

"Of old, when rebellious ministers and sons of robbers manifested themselves, it was by means of some one thing over which they brooded with their unbridled thoughts, till they could no longer contain themselves. Why feed a tiger or a wild bull at your elbow? He should be sliced down to inches. Joonghien is, and never will be satisfied. All these his crimes are seen evident as foot-prints, but there is no voice from right or left. The Outer Court knows them all, but dares not speak. They are well known to all the Inner Court, but there is the 'Holy Woman,' shielding and abetting him. Both inside and outside the palace it is known there is a Joonghien; that there is an emperor nobody knows. Any business to be laid before his majesty, however great its urgency or importance, must wait the leisure and be settled at the pleasure of Joonghien."

Hangchow, in honour of this worthy eunuch, and an official appointed to keep it in good order. From all parts of the empire presents came flooding in to fit up the magnificent temple in a manner worthy of his holiness. The people's lands were taken to endow it, their houses pulled down and their trees destroyed to build it; and there was no one to "peep or mutter." The image of Wei was of fragrant lign-aloes, the head and all the members being fitted on, so as to move as if living; the heart and intestines were made of gold, jade, pearls, and gems,—the clothing of the finest hair. At the special desire of the emperor, a small hole was left in the top of the head to have four kinds of fragrant flowers inserted. The head happened to be too large for the hat, the artist in terror began to pare off part of the head, but the weeping and horrified priest restrained his hand from the sacrilege.

Next year the greatest dread fell upon the palace, and Wei was specially terrified, and ceased not to sway his body to and fro, for the emperor took seriously unwell. The emperor called in his younger brother, Sin Wang, who was to be his successor, advised him to be a good ruler like Yao and Shwun, and in order to be so, to pay particular attention to what Wei Joonghien advised. The Wang went out and the emperor died. He died after his weakness of character had dealt a death blow to his dynasty. He desired to do right, he believed he was doing the right; but he was easily deceived and led by designing people.

Wei was the first to seek out Sin Wang, to inform him he was now emperor, but the Wang avoided him, and, unfortunately for China, it was fear and not manly anger which moved the new emperor. He would taste no food in that palace, nor would he have an audience of the ministers, but kept himself entirele alone, for he feared foul play. Soon after the enthronement, Wei, seeing he had nothing to hope for and much to fear in the palace, besought leave to retire from his public duties into private life. His petition was refused; and Ko was dismissed from the palace. But at the first audience a sad song was heard in thy

heavens—the swan-song over the last of his race. For some time none breathed freely enough to dare to publicly accuse Wei, because of his influence; but two months after he was sent to Fungyang and his estates confiscated, one official accused him of ten crimes. Soon thereafter he and his paramour were put to death, when it was discovered that she was pregnant and the eunuch no eunuch. The emperor, enraged at the discovery, had a general investigation, when a great number of false eunuchs, friends of Wei's, were discovered, and every one of them slain. The head was cut off Wei's dead body; and Ko's dead body was cut to pieces, amid a nation's rejoicing.

The result of another petition was the removal from the Boards of the “five tigers and five leopards,” relations of Wei's, who had been rulers of their respective Boards; their property was also confiscated. Gradually did the weeding process go on, some being slain, some dismissed. The heirs of Yang Lien, Tingbi, and the others slain by Wei, were exempted from the payment of the sums demanded of them in name of payment for misappropriation of imperial monies by their slain fathers. The official in charge of the building of Wei's temple was degraded, the temple levelled with the ground, and one built to Wang An instead.

Thus auspiciously did the last of the Ming emperors begin his reign. It was however an easy matter for this Louis XVI. to dismiss or execute the worthless men whom he found in power, and with whose doings he was intimately familiar before he became a public man; but the man who could weep before his ministers when complaining of their disobedience to him, was not the man for the helm of state when the ship was labouring and straining in every seam, as he found her. When he ascended the throne, he found a people ground down to the dust by the avaricious and heartless eunuchs who swarmed over the land, and filled all the paying offices, or those which by cruel exactions could be made to pay. For notwithstanding the frequent droughts which killed the budding spring, the locusts which devoured the full-grown summer, and the floods which year after year blasted the hopes of autumn, the preceding

emperor was no less wroth than his eunuch master, when any minister proposed a reduction of taxes. No wonder if discontent became universal, and if the bonds of society became loosened in China, where bad years are regarded as the sign of Heaven's anger with their emperor, and desertion of him; and where, if Heaven forsake him, rebellion is no crime.

CHAPTER VI.

LI DSUCHUNG.

THE enormous influence and preponderating power possessed by the eunuchs in the Ming dynasty has been set forth in the last chapter, where can be seen the selfish and unworthy manner in which that power was exercised. Able ministers fell before the undermining of the eunuchs, who always had the private ear of the emperor. Honest ministers and good men were so harassed that they could not remain in office; or if they would still remain, they were driven out. This alienated the literary classes all over the empire, for office could not be, as it should have been, obtained by literary abilities and moral worth. On the other hand, the compulsory working of silver mines, which killed the people to fatten the eunuchs, together with the extortionate taxation ground out of the people by the eunuchs, roused the bitter anger of the common people, who were oppressed more than they could bear. This state of matters, with eunuchs everywhere at the head of affairs, opened the most inviting field for the ambitious man desirous to found a new dynasty. But that man did not appear. The eunuchs were in Peking, therefore, exactly what Romish ecclesiastics are everywhere; men, in general, with ties to nothing beyond self, unless it be to their own order. There have been among both the eastern and western eunuchs worthy exceptions, who did desire the benefit of their country as apart from their order, but the exceptions were not numerous. And both eunuchs and priests have ruined, and will always ruin, those countries which were wholly or mainly under their guidance. But to return from this digression.

An enemy more terrible than even the eunuchs appeared all

over the north of China, where a succession of famines carried off myriads by starvation, and myriads more by a pestilence, the invariable consequent of famine. It was hunger which raised up the Shensi robbers or rebels, who completed the work begun by the eunuchs. But before going into Shensi, we shall notice one insurrection, which however was more the offspring of ambition than of hunger. In the end of 1621, levies were raised throughout the empire to put down the Manchus. Among others forward in collecting troops was Shua Tsoongming, an official of Szchuen, who never failed to perform any duty with which he had been entrusted; but who, though of externally decorous deportment, had the disposition of the bird of prey,—seeking solitude and independence. He memorialised the emperor to the effect that his son was busy levying troops for Liaotung. In addition to those raised by father and son, he sent two officers to the governor for more men. The governor probably distrusted him, or could not easily spare his men; for he handed over only his weak and his old soldiers, without provender or money.

Once collected together, the two officers, who thus had grounds enough to incite the men to rebellion, attacked and murdered the governor, and were speedily joined by Tsoongming and his troops in investing the provincial capital, which was long and bravely defended by a censor. It was reported in the city by men who had been seized by the insurgents and escaped, that the rebels were to attack the city in “dry land boats,” as all their previous attacks had been defeated. Next year, in February, Joo Sieyuen routed the rebels with great slaughter outside the city gates. He was created governor. At length the robbers, many thousand strong, rushed out of the forest with a great shout. Among them appeared an immense thing like a boat, several stories high, and five hundred feet long, both sides of which were hidden from view by a covering of matting. On the level top of it stood a man with his long hair untied floating in the wind, a naked double edged sword in his raised hand, and beside him a waving flag made of feathers. It was

drawn by many hundred oxen, and inside were many hundred men, each with a ballista or bow with which burning material could be thrown all over the city; for the top of this "boat" was higher than the city wall. The appearance of the boat caused great commotion in the city; and Sieyuen seeing it, said it was a *Lügoongchua*,* and could be successfully resisted only by a *Boshu*, which is made of an upright beam of strong wood, in the top of which is inserted a wheel, by means of which a stone of a thousand catties can be raised to the top and let fly as easily as if it were a pebble. These stones falling upon the "boat" would break it to pieces. But before the engine of destruction approached near enough to test his gigantic ballista, he sent out a detachment of his most fearless men with ballistas to hurl great stones to terrify or kill the oxen. So well did these behave that the cattle turned back and fled; and amid the consequent confusion of the robbers, they were fiercely attacked and driven back.

This rebellion extended to Kweichow province, and long continued to tax the energies of the officials of those provinces, now smouldering now blazing; but it never could be said to be extinct, though the principal leaders were slain and the armies scattered in 1629.

In December 1628, Wang Jiayun, a native of the district of Foogoo hien of Yen-an foo of Shensi, began, at the head of a band of men, to rob the neighbourhood rather than perish of a famine, which had become chronic there. He was soon joined by Jang Hienjoong of Yen-an; and if starvation did not originate, it speedily flooded the band into an army. Hienjoong was surnamed the *Ba da Wang*, the Equal of "Eight Great Princes," which shows that he had distinguished himself. He was a Mahomedan, of whom there have always been very large numbers in Shensi, and they have never let slip an opportunity of mingling in the fray when China has been in political disorder. But soon after the head was cut off the eunuch, Wei Joonghien, in the last

* The "Carriage of Duke Lü," probably being the name of the inventor, whom we have not been successful in tracing out.

month of the first year of the last Ming emperor,—our January, 1629,—appeared one of the greatest, if not the chief robber who ever burned Chinese villages.

LI DSUCHUNG was the son of poor parents, and was born in the district of Michih of Yen-an. He was a capital horseman, a good archer, and was employed as a government post runner. So says history ; but romance has woven numerous incredulous stories about him, one of which may be related, as it will help to explain the powerful hold which *Fungshwi*, or Geomancy, has over the Chinese mind.

Young Li, when a child, was one day standing before the house of a wealthy man in the neighbourhood, who had called in a geomantist to discover the best site of a grave by the aid of the Eight Diagrams, the Tiger and the Dragon. The best site was found to lie in a certain room of the rich man's own house ; for, said the geomantist, in the boy's hearing, "the descendants of the man who will be buried in that room are sure to rise to high official rank." Young Li went home and related the story to his father. The boy was ambitious, and the father was willing to sacrifice himself for the future of his son, and to die on the spot ; but he could think of no way, after death, of getting buried in that particular room. The dutiful son proposed that the father should go to the door of that rich man's house, there commit suicide, and leave the rest to him. The affectionate father did what his clever son suggested. Now in China, if a person commits suicide before the house of another, law holds the latter guilty of murder, on the supposition that none could or would commit suicide, unless he had suffered terrible wrongs, which he was unable to avenge or get punished in any other way ;—such suicides do therefore occur in China, where the weak or the poor are unable to get justice through the ordinary channel. As soon therefore as old Li committed suicide, the son, who was in readiness, raised a piercing howl of lamentation. The owner of the house was soon on the spot, and seeing the body of the suicide there, was thrown into the greatest terror ; for he was well aware of the consequences. Young Li accused him of the murder

of his father, and when his wild paroxisms of grief permitted him to speak, he uttered forth the wildest execrations and the most terrible threats against the rich man, whom he would at once accuse to the District Judge,—a pitiless fate in any age of Chinese history for the man who can be squeezed. The rich man offered a sum of money to the apparently poverty-stricken youth before him; but every increasing sum was scornfully rejected. When at last the man was thoroughly frightened into a mood in which he would grant anything, Li mentioned that one thing would satisfy him in revenge for his father; this was to have the dead body buried in a certain spot, inside the house, which he would point out. This was eagerly accepted; old Li was buried there, and young Li went home to wait the time when he should rise to greatness.

Dsuchung became leader of a robber band, but soon after his name became noted, the various robber bands drew together and formed into an army, which was completely defeated by Hoong Chungchow, who was then *Tsanjung*, or Councillor in the Court of Appeals. Dsuchung was seized in the battle, but escaped the death of a robber in the beginning of his career, by slipping away among the mountain defiles. But the losses by the attack of Chungchow were more than compensated to the robber ranks by the famine whose dark shadows thickened in 1630, and largely reinforced the robbers. But they had a more important addition to their numbers, and one calculated to do more damage to imperialism, in the mutiny of a body of ten thousand soldiers, at the head of whom Gung Yooji was marching from Shansi to the capital. Yooji was governor of Shansi and, in response to a summons from Peking, which was then quaking at the approach through Mongolia of the Manchus, got as far as Cholo, when his men mutinied, broke up and scattered among the mountains of Shansi and Shensi, where Dsuchung was then hiding. They were again collected, and nominated Gao Yinghien their commander, under the title of *Chwang Wang* or "Leaping King," which might imply that his attacks were sudden. Dsuchung was elected second and named *Chwang*

Kiang or "Leaping Leader." Seven years thereafter Yinghien was defeated and slain and Dsuchung became chief.

Wang Jiayun was still at the head of his bands, and took several cities in 1630-1, but was then defeated and slain; his army nominated Wang Dsuyang as successor. To cope with these various large and small armies of robbers, Chungchow appears to have been the only able man. His services were so noteworthy, that he was first made governor, and soon after viceroy. But so great was the power of the robbers, and so venal or weak the various judges and magistrates, that these latter gave the chief robbers passports or written engagements, securing them from capital punishment. Robbery had Shansi and Shensi at its feet, and the evil was greatly increased by the rapacity of dishonest magistrates, who demanded taxes equivalent to a third of the remaining wealth of the people, in name of putting down robbery. Thus "for every robber slain, ten honest families were ruined," and the people were driven for sheer protection into the ranks of the robbers. Chungchow was more faithful, however, and checked and defeated the robber armies as much as he could. In the autumn of 1631, he defeated and slew king Can-Fly-to-Heaven, whom king Sweep-the-Earth was unable to save.

The army of the Mahommedan Hienjoong was mainly composed of co-religionists. He several times suffered defeat, and at last thought he would be safer if he surrendered. He therefore joined the imperial ranks; but in 1634 he again united with Dsuchung. The combination was, however, defeated by Chungchow, and the two rebels had to betake themselves to the mountains of Hingping. Dsuchung surrendered himself, but the amount of his sincerity was proved by his sacking the city of Tungchung of Singan foo, the very next month after his submission. The authorities were then so paralysed, that they dared not execute him or his kind. His friend Hienjoong had so many Mahommedans flocking to his standard, that he set up an independent army, and that army defied all efforts to break it up for over twenty years. Hienjoong and his army were

defeated in 1636, and found their way into Honan, where they plundered the villages and sacked the cities, and whither we need not follow them at present. Dsuchung also marched into the same province by a different route; so that Shansi had so many robbers the less in it, but its sufferings were such as scarcely to admit of alleviation. It had not yet gathered a full harvest in any of its districts, and in many not a grain of corn was secured; so that even in 1634 many kept themselves in life by the bodies of those who had died of hunger. It was probably the want of grain which sent the robber armies into Honan; and in 1636 cannibalism went further, and Nanyang mothers killed their daughters, while any stranger caught was sure to be led to the shambles. Human flesh was then, and not infrequently before and since, undisguisedly sold for so much the pound. These horrors are simply beyond the power of pen to describe, or of heart to imagine, and are better left to their own nakedness. They show to what a state human existence had fallen in those famine regions. The love of life apparently increases with the difficulty of living; and though we imagine that human beings should die rather than live by cannibalism, the history of shipwrecks shows what our fellow-countrymen, when famishing, can do. And those wretches in Shansi and neighbouring regions were like the crews of so many myriad wrecked ships; for though large numbers could find their way out of the famine regions, not one in ten could do so except by joining the robbers; but almost no woman was able to move out of the devoted region. The misery was slightly alleviated in the year 1636, by the total overthrow and dispersion of the original robber army, whose leaders, Wang Dsuyang and others, were beheaded, their heads exposed, and their bodies cut to pieces on the execution ground. The fact of the executions shows that the defeat was complete, or the authorities would not have ventured to such extreme measures.

Dsuchung was besieging Kooshu of Yooning foo in Honan, when an officer of Dso Liangyü's came to the rescue. They faced each other for six days, when they fought, and Dsuchung

had to flee towards Tungfung of Honan foo, and Michien of Kaifung. He continued his retreat into Shensi and turned upon his pursuers at Lojiashan, where he completely defeated them. He then marched on Yenswi and besieged Swita. The lieut.-general in charge of Yenswi fell upon him before he attacked the city, but was drawn into an ambush and himself taken. The garrison of Swita joined Dsuchung, who then marched up to and took Michih. The garrison of Swita were all Yenan men, and now clad in rich silk garments, visited their relations. Those same relations were all in want of the commonest food, and it required little persuasion to cause them to swarm to the camp of Dsuchung, where food was abundant.

The south western provinces, though free from famine were overrun with robbers. A few years before Dsuchung got back with such pomp and power to his native place, the five south-western provinces had to unite their armies before they could cope with An Bangyen; but if he was defeated and slain, his scattered forces retained their hold on the country and we shall meet them again years after. Thus with the Manchus in the north-east, Peking must have been at its wit's end, for that would not take it far. One sage minister proposed that only men of sterling character should be employed at Court, and that all mean men should be dismissed the government offices. Who was to be the judge! The silver mines of Pingyang and Fungyang were opened to aid the government; notwithstanding the former experience of their working.

Dsuchung discovered that the mining of city walls produced immensely more silver than the imperial mines, and he advanced as far as Chingyang to pillage. Sanyuen and Singan were thrown into a state of terror; and to add to the confusion, another robber army took the city of Liwho, and besieged Tienchang. So great had now become the fame of Dsuchung, that the scattered bands of robbers of Shensi were attracted to and joined his army. A Disturb-the-Heavens prince also acknowledged Dsuchung as his superior; but he was defeated in spite of his defiant name. But if Dsuchung commanded a host

of men, he soon discovered that he was not invincible; for Chungchow attacked him at Chitoong hien of Paoning, and completely broke up his army, with the exception of a few thousand men, with whom he fled to the neighbourhood of Singan. His old friend Hienjoong had again joined the imperial ranks, and Dsuchung was at so low an ebb of fortune that he proposed to surrender himself into his friend's hand; but he discovered in time that Hienjoong had designs on his life, probably from jealousy of the superior fame of Dsuchung. The latter, therefore, set out for the Mahommedan camp in the district of Chuachuen of Honan. He travelled 600 li without rest; and his exertions brought on a sickness which prostrated him for six months in the Mahommedan camp. When somewhat recovered he left, and with a few hundred men, began his career over again for the third time. His great foe Chungchow was called to save Peking from the Manchus. He marched with fifty thousand men through the famous Toongkwan, and his approach raised the siege of the capital; for the Manchus did not wait to test his strength. He was made viceroy of Liaotung, as we have seen above. One instance of devoted bravery may be here noticed. Swun Chungdsoong, president of the Board of War, was in Kaoyang when the Manchus laid siege to it. The city was entered; and Swun, with ten sons and grandsons, fought together defending the city, and fell one by one in the hopeless fight.

Honan was so much overrun by robbers, that the governor either could not or would not take efficient steps to meet them. He was therefore degraded. The governor of Shantung, because he had not prevented the Manchus from taking so many cities and so much spoil in Shantung, was summoned to the capital, where he was beheaded. And other such instances proved that the government was severe in certain cases. But all this touched not the root of the evil; indeed, that root had gone too deep for any ordinarily remedial measures. Chihli and Shantung were the only northern provinces which were undividedly imperial, and they were stripped of almost all their wealth. The south-

eastern provinces were faithful ; they had not suffered as had the northern and south-western provinces, though many small robber bands infested every province in China, and thus cut off communication between many places ; yet they were so far from the capital that they could not, if they would, render efficient aid. The great Chinese empire, though nominally what it always had been, was then in reality confined to the capital and its province, for the other provinces had enough to do to look after themselves ; and more than half the income of the imperial exchequer was employed in checking the Manchus.

We now turn to Hienjoong whom we have found a second time taking service under the imperial government, and leaving his Mahomedan army to look after itself in Honan. He was stationed in Koochung, and had asked censor Lin Mingchiw to recommend his transference to Hiangyang ; and because the request was refused, he murdered the censor and by this act again cut, and forever, his connection with the imperialists. He then killed the District Judge, fired the city, and departed westwards to join the band of Lo Yootsai. Liangyü, who had gained a decisive victory over the robbers in Honan after the arrival of the new governor, sent a detachment in pursuit of Yootsai. In the eagerness of pursuit this detachment fell into a snare, in Lohowshan of Fanghien ; and though they fought with desperate valour in their attempts to cut through the circle surrounding them, they all perished. Liangyü was degraded in rank, and ordered to recover his honours by renewed and distinguished bravery. It was afterwards found that Liangyü's superior in command was responsible for the disaster. Wunhi, this commander, was ordered into Peking and beheaded. Eunuchs were apparently as responsible for that as for so many military disasters in Liaotung, for they were recalled to Peking from the various military stations in the south. Liangyü's conduct procured him rapid promotion ; for with the support of many revolted robbers, he went from victory to victory.

But Hienjoong had collected a large army among the mountains of Manao of Taiping, a district of Ninggwo. There he was attacked

by Liangyü in February, 1640, completely defeated, ten thousand of his men slain, and he compelled to flee with scarcely one thousand horse. Liangyü occupied the hills in the districts of Hingan and Pingli, his camps stretching over an extent of 100 li. He caused diligent search to be made for Hienjoong, but in vain. And not only was Hienjoong in such good hiding, but he speedily had around him a larger army than ever; so that when he was discovered, the imperialist army sent against him dared not approach. With his large army he marched upon and took the city of Tachang, in Szchuen. He then crossed the river, passed Basi or Paoning, and took Chienchow. He coalesced again with Yootsai at Kaihien, but in February, 1641, general Fierce-as-a-tiger attacked them with fury and broke them up. They fled to Tsorhan and Tachang, but so thorough was their disorder that they had to flee to the hills of Hingfang. Hienjoong continued still to move away and marched towards Yichung, in Hookwang.

By means of spies Hienjoong was made aware that the prefectural city of Hiangyang was badly garrisoned. He sent off twenty well mounted robbers, who approached the city gate at night, under imperialist colours. The weak guard was only too glad to admit even twenty men: but as soon as they were admitted, they fell with a shout upon the gate-keepers and put them all to the sword. They were speedily joined by a hundred robbers who had previously hidden themselves in the city, and rushed to the centre of the city making the greatest noise, to draw attention from the gate through which the main army now came pouring in. The city was in the utmost confusion, and there was no opposition to the robbers, for there was no head to take charge. The prefect cut his way through the robbers and fled. The prince Hiang Wang was seized in his palace, which was then burnt down. Hienjoong was seated in a private dwelling of the prince's when the latter was a prisoner before him. Hienjoong sat over against the prince as his equal, and taunted him with his past conduct. He said, taking a flagon of spirits in his hand, that he had hoped to have taken the head of Suchang, a

president of one of the Peking Boards, but as he had fled far into Choo (Honan), he would have to borrow the head of the prince instead, but would give him a cup of liquor first. It often happened during those wars, as it often occurs now, that the man to be put to death was first rendered insensible by deep potations. The prince did not refuse to drink himself drunk, and was then executed. Hienjoong took possession of all the ladies of the palace; and scattered 150,000 taels among the famishing populace. Though Liangyü was making all speed to save this important city whose weakness he well knew, he was not only too late, but had to learn, when he arrived there, that the robbers had crossed the river and taken Funchung on the Hankiang, after which Kwangchow and Sinye had to open their gates; and the fortune of Hienjoong was in flood. He took Swichow in Hookwang soon after. But at this juncture he and Yoostai quarrelled; the latter moved his division northwards to Tungchow of Nanyang, and put himself into communication with and under the orders of Dsuchung, who had been compelled by Liangyü to move northwards from Nanyang, though he had then half a million of men under his command. Liangyü was thus posted between the two great robbers, and the flank movement of Yoostai passing from Hienjoong to Dsuchung, proved that the two could have coalesced if they had been eager to do so. But it is more than likely that the designs of each prevented such a combination as long as it was not necessary for self defence. But Liangyü, after he pushed Dsuchung northwards, wheeled south and dealt such a blow to Hienjoong, weakened by the defection of Yootsai, that he took 10,000 of his horse, and scores of thousands of the defeated army deserted to him on the battle-field of Sinyang. Hienjoong had to flee with only a few followers to the hills, among which he found his way to the camp of Dsuchung. But his reception was not of the warmest, as he would be satisfied only with a place of equality with his great rival; for his reputation was greatly increased since he had taken Hiangyang, and he had, as we have seen, at one time been Dsuchung's superior.

Dsuchung was angry at the presumption of the man who had come as a fugitive, and determined quietly to get rid of him. Yootsai warned the ambitious fugitive of his danger and gave him 500 horse, with which he escaped eastwards and again joined the old Mahommedan camp.

In June 1642, Hienjoong was on the south of the Yangtsu. Some of his men went into the prefectural city of Loochow, professing to be candidates for literary degrees. They entered the city with books in their hands, and arms under their clothing; others got in as merchants, and all went to live in the inns.* After their plans were completed, they rose one night and set fire to some houses in several parts of the city; and in the consequent confusion, opened the gates to their comrades. Hienjoong cut an arm off every man and woman whom he left alive, and then marched on Liwngan. He defeated Liangyü when marching to the rescue; and the city fell notwithstanding its very high walls and very deep moat. Liangyü had his revenge in November at Nganching, where he took 5000 horse, and freed over a myriad of Mahommedans compulsorily held by Hienjoong. But the defeat was not crushing, for Hienjoong was soon again at his old trick of surprising cities. He rode rapidly towards Hwangchow in a thick fog, and rushed pell mell into the city as the gates† were opened in the uncertain light of the early morning. The assistant censor, Fun Weiching, was seized, and Hienjoong did all in his power to get him to desert. The censor would give no other reply than abusive language; and the anger, which he purposely kindled, raged so much that they pierced his breast, and he died a patriot's death. The palace of Whangchow was repaired and accepted by Hienjoong,

* It is possibly from such tricks that every inn is subject to a nightly visitation by the city guard, which looks in at every room; takes down the name, surname, dwelling-place, and business of every guest; and if there is the least suspicion roused, the guest has to open out and lay before the guard every box and package in his room.

† All Chinese cities are walled; and the strong gates are closed every night at sundown in summer, and never later than eight in the winter. They are opened again at dawn or sunrise.

who assumed the title of *Si Wang*, or "Western Prince." But he had not yet a settled authority over lands sufficient to warrant him to assume such a title, and he took little time in trying to extend his power.

In May, he marched westwards towards Woochang in Hookwang. Choo Wang was then in that city, and was in debt to the city authorities to the amount of over a million taels. The prefect prayed him to distribute a few hundred thousand taels among the troops to raise their spirits and courage. But he was true to the character of all the other princes of his imperial family; and his selfish blindness would not spare or repay a single tael of silver. Hienjoong found therefore no opposition on his way to Hanyang. This city was south of the Han river, and north of the Yangtsu. As he was nearing that city, the prince and many others clamoured to have the forces which were stationed on the Yangtsu at once removed within the city of Woochang. Colonel Wun Yoong declared that it was of far greater consequence to retain command of the Yangtsu than to enter and protect Woochang; and that the best policy of all would be to defend the river Han, and prevent the passage to Hanyang of the robbers. His advice was overruled in all points, and Hanyang had to open its gates. Hienjoong therefore moved down the river towards Woochang. The waters of the river were so shallow that they scarcely reached the horses' belly; yet the army which should have contested the crossing of the river was ordered into Woochang, to the very gates of which Hienjoong marched unopposed. He attacked the gate *Wooshung*, where Wun Yoong made a gallant resistance, cutting down the robbers in great numbers. But the army connected with the palace opened another gate, and went out to invite the robbers in; for the prince was eager only to save his own person and wealth. When Wun Yoong saw this treachery he leaped his horse among the robbers, and killed three of them before he was himself slain. When the grand secretary Fungchung, at his station on the Wooshung gate, found all was lost, he retired to his family, hurried them—twelve persons in all—on board a

boat, after he had clothed himself in his official robes and court hat, and made two profound obeisances towards the imperial palace. He then pushed the boat out into the lake, scuttled it, and with his family died the death which Chinese patriotism demands of its officials. A note to the history states that his body was found one hundred and seventy days after, and bore no trace of decay. One Hiaoyen had his left arm cut off in the fight; but he stood in the gate, and cut down twenty robbers before the exhaustion of his strength made him the prey of the robber's sword. The prince of Choo had the proper reward of his treason; for the robbers seized in his palace the enormous sums of the public money which he had absorbed; and though they impressed several hundred carts to take it away, they could not carry it all.* After they had taken away that for which he had sold his country, the robbers tied up the unworthy prince, and flung him into the Sihoo lake. Many myriads of the people were cut down, and permission was given to as many as would, to depart; but after they had gone, iron-armed horse were sent after to cut them down. What with suicides, and what with those heartless deaths, the river was covered for ever so great a distance with floating dead bodies; and for some time it was impossible to eat the fish of the Yangtsu. Of the people remaining in that enormous city, it is said that there was not one unmaimed: one had a foot, another an arm, cut off; some had the nose sliced off, and some an eye gouged out. And after the city was thus made a desert, Hienjoong made it his capital, established in it Six Boards and Five Palaces, cast cash in the name of Si Wang, and made district judges. This proves that he was now hoping to be able to make a bid for empire, for otherwise he would not have instituted Six Boards.

Whatever opposition, effectual or unavailing, was made to the progress of the rebels, there was not a single instance of a bold resistance by a member of the imperial family, though its wangs or princes were to be found in all the more important

* All money then and now if not of copper cash was of silver ingots; and a million taels meant 100,000 lbs. weight of bullion.

cities of the empire. The interesting and romantic history of Gwei wang, who had greatness thrust upon him, we shall learn at a later date of our history; but he makes his debut at this period by fleeing with his relation, prince Whi, from the prefecture of Hungchow, when Hienjoong advanced against it. He fled to Yoongchow in Hookwang, leaving his palace in the hands of Hienjoong, who had all the materials removed to Changsha, to be used in building his own palace there. Hienjoong then moved on Yoongchow. He was encountered by Liw Hi, the admiral of the fleet there, who had hurried away the two princes, together with the prince of Yoong city, under an escort, to Kwangsi; but his determination never to yield availed him not. The city gates were opened by traitors, and the admiral himself seized. The rebels employed every argument to have him join them; but though they kept him a close prisoner for three days without food, with bandaged eyes, making promises and using threats, he remained unmoved. Three further attempts were made to gain him; but when they held a naked sword to his throat, he only reviled them the more, and he got the death he sought. All the ancient kingdom of Choo was, therefore, now in rebel hands, and Hienjoong attained to the pinnacle of his greatness. But by the end of 1643, Dsuchung had so enormously outgrown him, that Hienjoong acknowledged himself his vassal; and he informed the Mahomedan messengers sent by Dsuchung to Kingchow, that he occupied that city for Dsuchung; he also sent messengers to cultivate the friendship of Dsuchung. This is proof of the greatness to which the latter had grown, and we now retrace our steps to glance at the mode of that progress.

We left Dsuchung starting with a few hundred men from the Mahomedan camp, after his recovery from a severe half-year's illness. His name was a sufficient roll-call, and he was soon surrounded by a considerable band whom he led to plunder and to wealth. But after those men had ravaged to their heart's content, and had by their atrocities made themselves sufficiently formidable to be worth the buying, they deserted in large numbers

to the imperialists, whom they joined in pushing out Dsuchung, who fled to Hanyang, where he was hard pressed by the Shensi army on his north, and found his southern march cut off by Liangyü, who was in Woogwan of Shangchow. He was thus completely shut in, and his provisions began to be scarce. As the easiest way out of his perplexities, he several times attempted to commit suicide, but was always prevented by his adopted son, Li Shwanghi. He therefore gave orders to have every captive put to the sword, and with 50 men made a dash against the southern lines of his besiegers, cut through to Yunyang, among the mountains where he "fed his horses." But this occupation was not for a long term; for the famine which still wasted the north laid its biting hand on Honan, and soon rallied an army of several scores of thousands of hungry men around him.

Just when Hienjoong was taking Tachang and Chienchow, Dsuchung took Yoongning of Honan foo by storm, and put every soul to the sword, including a prince then in the city. He set the city on fire, and afterwards broke down forty forts. The robber chief "One-Measure-Grain" and others joined him, and with these as guides he took the city of Yiyang with a spring. Needy men now swarmed to his banner from all corners, and he was speedily master of several hundreds of thousands, whom he quickly converted into soldiers. This increase was however wholly caused by the famine which continued to rage more or less severely over the provinces of Chihli, Shantung, Shansi, Shensi, Honan, Chihkiang and Kiangsu. Next year (1640), many people in all those provinces lived only because they resorted to cannibalism.

After he got his men converted into an army, Dsuchung marched against the prefecture of Honan in 1641. The siege was desperately pushed, but the defence was for once vigorously sustained, and though after a long siege great cannon were brought against the walls, Dsuchung would have to raise the siege but for the never-failing treachery which everywhere betrayed the Ming cause. Traitors opened the gates, Dsuchung

pushed in, set fire to the palace of Foo Wang and then killed that prince, after upbraiding him with his cruelty and oppression of the people. So bitter was the hatred of the soldiers against him, that they ate his flesh cut into mince. This explains the treachery which opened the gates. A retired president of the Board of War was also slain; but the other officials were saved alive. Such was the condition of the country around, that miserable human wretches preyed upon those fallen in battle; and though the grave-digger had no work, neither the wolf, the dog, nor the raven had any share in the ghastly meals. Dsuchung distributed great quantities of grain and silver, hoarded in the city, among the famishing. He then assumed the title of *Chwang Wang* or "Leaping Prince," and his power thenceforward so rapidly grew, that when Hienjoong was stealthily creeping upon Hiangyang, he was bold enough to attack the large city of Kaifung, the capital of the province. He was repulsed however in that attempt. Yet Honan had now come to such a pass that when Li Hienfung opened the imperial document appointing him governor of that province, he committed suicide. Commander Yang Suchang also committed suicide because he had failed to prevent Dsuchung from taking the city of Kweita. Liangyü had just then come from paying a visit to the capital, and fresh from the presence of the emperor drove Dsuchung northwards, from Nanyang to Looshu of Yoongning. It was while here that Yootsai (p. 142) joined him, and another more important acquisition was made in the person of Niw Jinhing, a Jüyin graduate of Paofung, who, fleeing from the consequences of some crime, found shelter and honour from Dsuchung, who took one of his daughters to wife. His name became more and more prominent in the future history of the rebellion. Another sharp man, three feet high, and skilled in palmistry, saw and studied Dsuchung. He gave his oracular decision that "*Eighteen sons* should become master of the vessels of the gods."* This fortunate utterance so gratified

* The character *Li* is made up of three characters, "ten," "eight" and "son"; the vessels of the gods" are the sacrificial utensils which belong only to the emperor.

the rebel that he made the fortune-teller one of his generals.

Though Liangyü had broken up the army of Hienjoong, and compelled him to seek safety by solitary flight into Dsuchung's camp, he was unable to face the latter, who had half a million men under his orders. The court at Peking was, therefore, in great straits; the Manchus in the east setting all north China at defiance, and Dsuchung to the south laughing to scorn all ordinary means of opposition. To deal satisfactorily with either of these scourges, was equal to the full extent of the resources of the Ming dynasty; and what could they do with both? It was determined to deal with Dsuchung, as his was the most pressing case; for he was already in the heart of China, with increasing numbers of Chinese flocking to his standard, while the Manchus were yet beyond Chinese soil; and when they ravaged it, they failed to gain a single adherent even among the famishing. So far they judged wisely; but their conduct did not savour of equal wisdom. When struggling for life with rebellion, robbery and famine, as they were, they should have made peace with the Manchus at any price, and so tied their hands for a few years. Instead of doing so, they trusted to luck or laziness, and drained the five northern provinces of their armies, over whom they sent Wun Yao, viceroy of Chihli, and Dsoongloong, viceroy of Shensi, to march against and crush Dsuchung. Thus the way was left open for an inroad by the Manchus, if they thought proper. The viceroy of Chihli, in October 1641, crossed the river on a floating bridge and joined the viceroy of Shensi at Hiangchung of Kaifung. Dsuchung also crossed the river higher up, and concealed his men in a pine forest. Past this forest the combined army was loosely marching, entirely ignorant of the whereabouts of Dsuchung; and, as they had no scouts to scour their route, they seemed to have thought him far away. Without a note of premonitory warning the men in the forest rushed out upon the disorderly army. Yinloong and Gwochi, two Shensi generals, led the van, and they with their men fled northwards in the greatest precipitation. The

Paoting army next broke up and fled, and Yaowun retired by night into Hiangchung. Dsoongloong alone stood his ground, and hurriedly built ramparts about his immediate followers, where he defended himself though surrounded by several deep of the robbers. He knew it was hopeless to remain there to renew the struggle on the morrow, and therefore in the second watch, or between nine and ten p.m., he led out his men and burst through the lines of the besiegers. But once beyond the rebels, his men broke loose and scattered "like the stars." He marched on foot with as many of the broken infantry as he could rally around him, fighting as he went. Next day he got to Hiangchung, and so did the robbers, who seized him just outside the gates. They brought him, with his banner flying, to the gate, and cried with great shouting, "I am the viceroy of Shensi, the commander of the army; please open the gate to receive the viceroy." As soon as his voice could be heard, he also spoke out as loudly as he could, and said, "*I am the viceroy of Shensi; and I command you to keep your gates shut. On all sides of me are robbers, whose voice it was which first addressed you.*" He then reviled the robbers bitterly in order to anger them into slaying him; and he had his wish, for he was killed below the city walls. Before the fierce attack of the rebels the city fell almost immediately, and was put to the sword in Dsuchung's usual style. Dsoongloong had the highest honours of *Tai Dsu* and *Tai Bao* conferred posthumously upon him by the emperor; but Yinloong was executed by the next viceroy. Yinloong had been brought to notice by slaying many robbers when in a very subordinate position; and as he was their terror when he served under others, he was greatly feared when he got a command for himself; but surprise cut short his career to the great joy of the rebel army, who drank each other congratulations, now that the "son of the wind was gone."

In the following January, Dsuchung again attacked Kaifung, hoping perhaps that his overwhelming success against the imperialist army would open the gates to him, by terrifying the garrison. But he was mistaken, for lieut.-general Chun Yoong-

foo was both a brave and an energetic opponent. As Dsuchung was pressing the siege, Yoongfoo covered him with his bow, shot an arrow and gouged out his left eye. So great was the pain that the rebel leader ordered his men to draw off from the city; and he camped at Choochien. Yoongfoo determined to do what he could to harass the rebels; and opening the treasury exposed stores of silver to the soldiers and citizens and proclaimed, "One hundred taels for a living robber, fifty taels for a dead one, and fifty taels to the family of the man who dies fighting with the robbers." This produced enormous losses to the robbers, who were compelled to move off; but even in defeat they were successful, for they took Neihiang, Pingtang and Sinye cities. And next month, Dsuchung returned to the siege of Kaifung, determined to take it by breach. When the mine exploded and a breach of only a few feet was made, it was called a "Small discharge;" when of several *jang*,* and with a noise to shake the heavens, it was called a "Large discharge." Dsuchung prepared to make the latter. The pick of his horse covered the workers operating under a large extent of the wall. The powder inserted into the mine amounted to several scores of thousands of catties;† and removed a short distance from the mine were men in complete armour, who were to rush in as soon as the report of the bursting wall was heard. The miners withdrew, the torch was applied, a tremendous explosion followed, and a large piece of the wall was thrown down. It was thrown down; but when the smoke cleared away, it revealed great numbers of the attacking party laid low for ever; for the wall instead of bursting upwards or inwards, fell outwards among the assailants, and left an inner peel as hard as stone, and as unbroken as if there had been no mine and no explosion. The rebels regarded this as a miracle, and raised the siege; but were more successful next month, for they took Chunchow, putting immense numbers as usual to the sword.

They again invested Kaifung, but because of their former

* One *jang* is ten Chinese feet, or about twelve English feet.

† A catty, in Chinese *kin*, is $1\frac{1}{2}$ English lb. avoirdupois.

losses they drew their lines of regular siege at a distance from the city, with the design to starve it into surrender. The city was invested for five months, when a lieut.-general, come to raise the siege, camped over against the rebels. But after fighting with them for three days in succession, he was compelled to retire. Yet though in straits for provisions, the city had no thought of opening its gates. But an unfortunate accident did what the rebel army could not do. The governor of the province had, before the last siege, opened a canal from the Yellow River, ten li north of the city, in order to flood the city moat and to inundate the rebels. Just after the lieut.-general mentioned above had to retire, the Yellow river rose suddenly, a flood of waters rushed down upon the rebel camp, drowning over ten thousand men. The flood then dashed "like a mountain twenty feet high" against the walls of the city, which it flooded. Hundreds of thousands were drowned; and the surviving hundreds of thousands got out of the city in some way. The governor escaped in a small boat, as did many of the chief officers, though some of them too were drowned. The army got to a distance from the city, and camped on high ground. But the rebel army seized all the boats within accessible distance, entered the city and pillaged at their leisure. They then, without obstruction, went to Nanyang, which they retook, and, as in every recapture, they put all to the sword.

When Liangyü's hands were quite full looking after Hienjoong (p. 142), and the Manchus were pouring through Chiangtsu ling passes down upon Kichow, the viceroy of Chihli, Wun Yao, was occupied with a greater danger, for he was opposing Dsuchung, who was pushing in to take Yooning prefecture. The viceroy was posted with Paoting troops west of the city, and Koong Chunhwi, at the head of Szchuen troops, was stationed on the east. Both were attacked by the rebels, who broke up the Szchuen troops; and the Paoting men were unable, therefore, though acting their part bravely, to keep the rebels off the city. They were compelled to enter and join the garrison. The rebels ceased not day nor night from fighting and scaling;

and though enormous numbers of them fell by the stones and arrows showered from above, they persisted in pushing up, and at a hundred points gained the top of the wall. Wun Yao was seized on the wall; he imitated the example of the viceroy of Shensi, his former comrade in arms, and like him fell before the swords of the angry rebels. One officer, who was on the wall, got the name of Wang the Iron-eared, because he would not move, whatever the storm from the assailants. The usual slaughter took place of captured soldiery and civilians.

Just then there arose great disturbances at the centre of government on account of the Jesuits. These had first got into China and had been received with eclat, as long before our story as the Yuen dynasty. There was not a continuous stream however, but some time before this period of our history, they had been received with great honours by the Court in Peking, as men of science and especially as astronomers; a science of which the love of the Chinese has always been greater than their accuracy. Adam Schaal, whom the Chinese call Tang Yowang, had been some time engaged on astronomical duties; and though in a very subordinate position, he came in contact with the emperor. It was doubtless because of the descriptions of western cannon, given by that able Jesuit, that the emperor ordered him to cast some cannon, and to teach their use. We, who know the clamouring rage which employed the leisure of the Court of James I. against the Scotch, and the more or less intermittent irritation against the Germans employed in England since 1688, can understand the opposition which would necessarily arise in the Court of the isolated and conservative Peking, when unknown foreign adventurers, as they would appear to be, received so much imperial favour. When therefore Schaal proved by success that he was able to cast such cannon as China had never before seen, the opposition, which would have silently smiled with satisfaction over failure, now spoke out against success. The censorate is necessarily conservative, and is bound to object to anything which it believes or can profess to believe to be contrary to the ancient law and

usage of China. The censorate therefore approached his majesty on this subject. It was the chief censor, Liw Dsoongjow, who, in a memorial, remonstrated with his majesty against the use of fire-arms which were never heard of before the time of the Tang and Sung dynasties.* The emperor calmly replied that the only hope for China was in fire-arms. He then ordered Dsoongjow to go outside, and spoke warmly to the other ministers. Dsoongjow returned while the emperor was speaking in anger, and again remonstrated against the emperor's habit of always listening to the advice of the eunuchs; adding that if he continued to act by the eunuchs' advice he would have reason to regret it. This roused the emperor's wrath; but to hide his passion, he fixed his eyes on the roof when replying that the emperor should be able to judge what was for the commonweal, and to distinguish between that which was for the public interest and for private profit. Dsoongjow was so persistent in his arguments and so warm in his manner, that a fellow censor found it necessary to explain that Dsoongjow had no other object than the public safety, for the action he had taken. This apology increased the displeasure of the emperor, and Dsoongjow then took off† his hat, made acknowledgment of error and retired. The emperor then sentenced both censors to an inferior post and degraded them several degrees in rank. Against this sentence all the ministers prayed but in vain; and

* In "Chambers's Cyclopædia," under the article "Fire-arms," a British officer, who visited the Great Wall north of Peking, is quoted inferring the existence of fire-arms in China two centuries B.C., because this wall was built then, and because there are loop holes in it. A wall was certainly built then; but any one, and especially a military officer coming from Britain, where solid walls had been built by the Romans not so long ago as two centuries B.C., should know that any wall built twenty centuries ago, could not possibly exist at this date, with its loop-holes and embrasures intact. The Great Wall has been, not so long ago, rebuilt, and has been often repaired. If the loop holes are three centuries old, they have certainly done well; better than any other in China

† In ordinary circumstances it is disrespectful to take off the hat in company in China; but inferior officials are said always to stand bareheaded before the emperor. Dsoongjow was therefore acknowledging himself a small official, instead of a great minister.

as no attention was paid to their entreaties, the president of the Board of Punishment resigned his post. Thus we see that if the new emperor had placed new men in office he had his own difficulties with them. He silenced the opposition against the western cannon-founder however. It is possible that the favours conferred upon Schaal caused envy; but we think the warmth of the discussion between the emperor and the chief censor can be learned from the discussion itself. We know that Schaal then occupied a very subordinate post, and the Jesuit who had the highest post ever attained by that order in Peking occupied but a very secondary official position; hence the rivalry between the ministers and the eunuchs was the real cause of the animosity against the Jesuits; for we learn from the above that the eunuchs were the chief if not the only support of the Jesuits, and they used them and their learning as good pawns in their playing against the ministers. Schaal we shall meet again, but we must leave the wrangling of courts for the crashing of swords.

In January 1643, Hiangyang fell to Dsuchung. The governor fled from Kingchow to Hiangtan of Changsha, taking with him prince Funghwi. The inhabitants opened the gates of Kingchow to Dsuchung as soon as he presented himself; doubtless fearing the massacre always following the capture of a city by storm. The petty robbers, infesting all the districts under Kingchow, rose towards the great rebel like clouds of bees. The governor of Honan was therefore recalled, and censor Wang Han appointed. But Dsuchung shaped his own course as he choose. He directed his army towards Chungtien, now called Anloo Prefecture of Hookwang. Governor Soong got timely warning, and was urged to make his escape, as resistance was hopeless. But if he could not stem the torrent he could perish in it. He resisted therefore with desperation till all his men were killed, fled, or made prisoners; and he continued to fight, surrounded by the rebels, till he was cut down. The prefect opened the city gates, and Dsuchung marched quietly in.

One incident connected with this raid is worthy of attention, as it shows that even Dsuchung's character was not, as no man's

is, utterly bad. Siao Han, the district judge of Choonghien, was seized by Dsuchung's men and brought to the rebel chief. Dsuchung had previously issued a proclamation, that the soldier who would kill that good man would meet an inevitable death, and punishment would follow any insult offered him; such was Han's reputation for justice and uprightness. The prisoner was sent to a Buddhist monastery, where every argument was employed to get him to acknowledge the rebel as his master; and the authorities of the monastery were threatened with death if aught ill befell Han while in their hands. This conduct, so different from the ordinary procedure of the "robber," must have touched Siao Han. But his final answer was, "You have your laws and customs, which are different from mine: I must go to the end of my road;" and he committed suicide,—for such, as we have several times had to say, is the consummation of integrity, or the "end of the road" of the official in China who would be faithful to his trust. But such officials were fewer then than even now. The provincial judge, Li Chunshung, welcomed the rebels, and claimed family relationship with the chief; for they were both of the family "Li."* And his claim was of course gladly reciprocated; he therefore came and went to the robber camp as he chose. The robbers went to the imperial tombs of Hienling to break them open; but so tremendous was the noise, that the hills shook, and the terrified robbers fled and dared not again prosecute the work of desecration.

But it was apparently supernatural agencies alone which could inspire the rebel with any terror; for lieutenant-general Fang Gwongan was compelled to retire on Hankow, and Liangyü retreated to Woohoo. Nor was there a man in all the provinces who would then dare look Dsuchung in the face on the field; all retired on the cities. And many of these latter opened their gates in terror; for Dsuchung invariably massacred the inhabitants of

* If it has not been noted before, it must be understood that the surname comes first in Chinese to honour one's ancestry, the name comes last because it is one's own.

the city which dared to close its gates against him. It was estimated that in the cities of Honan alone he had put to death a full million of the inhabitants. It was possibly the fact that he had now no opponent who could meet him on equal terms, but was able to choose his time and route of march, which influenced him to henceforth adopt the role of a conqueror and not that of the robber. He assumed the title of the Heaven-ordained, Upper Great Chief of Civil and Military authorities. Yotsai was entitled, Vicar of Heaven Aiding the People, Virtuous and Terrible Great Commander. Hiangyang was called the capital; and Dsuchung gave new names to all the cities under his jurisdiction, appointing magistrates and judges over them. He rebuilt the palace of the prince of Hiangyang. The three princes Jaoling Wang,* Paoning Wang, and Siaoning Wang who were in the city, acknowledged Dsuchung, and were named his councillors, but their titles were changed to *Bai* or count. He then marched upon and took Chiswi.

The enormous army under Dsuchung was not wholly collected by himself; there were other leaders who had brought large bands, over which they still commanded under the chief leader. He now divided the army into four great divisions—1st, The Mahommedan army, which he sent to hold Chungtien or Anloo; 2nd, Yotsai, whom he left in Hiangyang; 3rd, Go Gwoyen, whom he sent towards Hwangchow, whither his rival Hienjoong was then marching, unknown to Dsuchung; and 4th, his own tried troops, of which he retained command. With this division he marched against and attacked Chiahien. His appearance before that city was the signal for a desperate fight; for the district judge led out his men, and a fierce encounter took place, which continued for a whole day and night, the rebels losing enormously. The citizens made common cause with the soldiers; but the brave magistrate, Li Jun, was seized as he fought in the thickest of the *melée*. Instead of being put to death he was tied up to a tree by his clothing, with the

* A wang is always called after a prefectural city, as in England a duke is called after a county.

apparent intention of starving him to death. While hanging there he ceased not to address the rebels in a loud voice in language calculated to irritate them, as—"Why put a magistrate to death? All the people are determined to resist to the last man;" or he jibed the aspirant for empire—"The high emperor truly possesses great powers; I shall certainly inform Shangti (God)." His tongue was then cut out, and he died as he desired. His mother and wife perished also for his sake.

Dsuchung had now come to a crisis in his history, and determined upon a thorough change of policy and aim in his warfare. This change it was which Li Jun mockingly referred to; but it was a serious one to Dsuchung and to others, for believing that those who had been his fellow-commanders and almost his equals, might be more troublesome than useful in his future career, he had Yootsai, Gwoyen, and Dso Jinyü, put to death; he himself taking absolute control of all the divisions. This happened just when Hienjoong leaped to his highest in taking Hanyang and Woochang, and instituting his Six Boards. Dsuchung had himself attacked Hanyang, but in vain; jealousy made him, therefore, extremely angry with his rival, and he publicly offered a thousand taels for Hienjoong's head. The fall of Woochang made him more angry than ever, and he said that the "honourable Mahomedan had once already fled to him for refuge; but he must remind him of the fate of Yootsai." This and similar language showed that he considered Hienjoong now as a serious danger in his way. Hienjoong heard of this threatening language, as it was intended he should, and he was afraid; for though he was riding on the crest of the wave, he knew not what might be on the morrow. One thing he determined, to keep as well out of the way of Dsuchung as possible. He also sent a number of messengers with large sums of money, as a solatium to Dsuchung's wounded feelings. The latter took the money and also retained the messengers; and this insult made Hienjoong very wroth. Both the rebels had flattering overtures made to them by the Peking court just then,—Dsuchung would be created a marquis, and have a salary

of ten thousand taels a year, if he ceased from hacking the empire; Hienjoong was offered half that salary and a high office, which would be made hereditary. Neither of them had made any overtures to the Peking court, the Manchus had; and they treated the overtures of the court as it treated those of the Manchus,—with silence. And the weak vanity of the struggling court, like an over-weighted swimmer, splashed wearily in the deep waters, with land invisible.

Dsuchung had large ships of war built at Kingchow and Hiangyang, and sent the Mahommedans against Changta. And here we may give a summary of his laws since he became absolute lord of the army. He had twenty-nine great commanders, each of whom he posted in a place demanding ability, caution, and faithfulness; for on these men he could rely. His own immediate army he divided into five camps of two thousand horse, and fourteen *sao* or companies of foot, each three thousand men; thus each camp had forty-two thousand foot and two thousand horse. Liw Dsoongmin was general of the foot, and Baiwang of the horse, in his own army. In camping, the body of horse connected with one camp kept careful watch, while the other four rested; each taking watch in turn. The watch beat time both day and night. None could possibly desert; for if one attempted to flee, it was impossible to escape, so careful was the watch, which pursued and brought back the deserter, who was immediately beheaded. His rules were of the strictest, and his discipline most severe.

His soldiers were forbidden to possess heavy baggage. Each had a wife or concubine, but if a child was born, it was thrown away, the mother being forbidden to nurture it. Boys above fourteen, or men below forty, were seized and appropriated by the army, each soldier "adopting" one or more as his son. No city fell without the capture of several myriads of such youths, and a soldier could adopt as many as twenty. These did all his menial work for him; and when suitable, were made to fill in gaps in the ranks. In this way his army often numbered over a million of men. His coats of "mail" consisted of numerous

layers of padded silk wadding in folds numbering from a few dozen to as many as a hundred, which rendered a garment impenetrable to arrow or bullet.

His horses received, if possible, greater attention than even the men. The stabling of the west is unknown in China. Horses, mules, and donkeys are exposed to the greatest summer's heat and the depth of winter's cold, and have no protection from the rain or the snow, or at the utmost only a roof above. But in winter Dsuchung had the clothing of the people in his neighbourhood collected and thrown down to keep the horses' feet off the cold ground. Bodies of dead men were scooped out to form troughs for the horses to drink out of; and when the horse was thirsty, a captive was brought to this horrible trough, his ear slit and his blood let drop into the water below the horse's eyes. The horses became so accustomed to this that they whinnied on seeing a man; this practice also inured the horses to blood and wounds, and nothing frightened them. His beasts of burden were mainly camels.

No one in the camp of Dsuchung knew when or in what direction they were to march. Dsuchung himself gave the order to get ready for the march, and at whatever time, whether at cock-crow or day-break, this order was issued: a very few minutes sufficed to allow each man to swallow a piece of meat and leap into the saddle. The direction of march was known only by seeing Dsuchung's horse ahead. Each man had a bag, which when nearing a river he filled with earth and threw into the river, till, however deep, wide, or rapid, the waters were so dispersed that a bridge was made across.

In drawing up for battle, horses with iron breast-plates, three deep, formed the first line. The man who turned his back to the foe was put to death on the spot. If this line was not successful in breaking the enemy, it drew off by the flanks, opening up to let the infantry advance; and as soon as the infantry got to the front, this iron-horse division took up position on each flank of the infantry, and gradually spread out, till by a short circuit they could rush upon the enemy's rear.

These tactics were almost always successful in deciding the battle in the rebel's favour. Though his army, with followers, amounted to a million of men, he would not divide it, but always kept it one army. He never carried any provisions, but made his followers scatter over the neighbourhood and find their meals where they could, in the kitchens of the rich or cottages of the poor; and as a matter of course they always exacted the best of everything, thus carrying out the system pursued in the dragonades of the holy mother church in France and England. But the system, if convenient, often ensured short commons of both food and salt, especially when in a mountainous country or when closely watched by the imperialists. Every cavalry soldier had two or three horses, which he constantly changed when fighting; thus, though the fight lasted a whole day the cavalry always rode fresh horses.—This practice was easy enough when we remember that each soldier had his own personal attendants or “adopted sons.”

When Dsuchung attacked a city, his own dwelling was always a long crooked tent, which from its shape was called *Chiungloo*; he never trusted himself to a house. He divided the day into three portions of eight hours each; during one portion a certain number of men rested, and a certain number were on the watch. Breast-plated horse protected the rear and flanks of the men who were employed in mining the city. Of these sappers, the men nearest the wall had iron helmets and iron mail. Each had a hatchet with which he dug into the wall. When a man got out one brick he retired, and another instantly took his place; the work thus went on in quick relays, so that no man had so much work as to weary him. The same rule was still carried out after a hole was dug large enough to admit a man inside. The mined wall was supported by strong posts at every fourth foot, and to each post a long rope was fastened. When a hundred or more feet were thus cut out, all the men were called off; the ropes were simultaneously pulled at, and down came the wall with a great crash. Dsuchung's law was, that if a city opened its gates at once there was neither burning

nor slaughter; if after one or two days' fighting, thirteen or fourteen were put to death; but if the siege lasted five or six days, the city was put to the sword. Patrols of men were posted along the outside of the moat all round the city, to cut down all who tried to escape by flight over the wall, so that not a soul could evade his fate. The bodies were fired at night to give light instead of lamps, and this was called "The Great Light." When all the inhabitants were put to the sword, the walls were at the same time levelled to the ground.

Horses and mules were considered the best booty; military weapons came next; silks, satins, and valuable pearls followed; and gold and silver were either thrown away or converted into balls or bullets. On the fall of a city, the surrounding towns, villages, and hamlets were summoned to acknowledge the conqueror, however remote from the city. Messengers were hurried round with a *pai*,—a board with a proclamation pasted or written thereon. If the village submitted at once, the *pai* went on to the next village; but if any time was lost, more or less mutilation of a number of persons followed forthwith, and a certain proportion would lose hands, arms, feet, ears, according to the pleasure of the *pai* bearers. It was a daily occurrence to scoop out eyes, chop off fingers, cut out the heart, or cut up the body into fragments.

Niw Jinhing was Strategist. He daily studied one chapter of the *Yi King*, and some book on the strategy of the ancient warriors of China. When some serious action was to be taken, all the chief officers were summoned to a council. Each had to give his judgment on every important point. But Dsuchung spoke not a word either during deliberation or after, but used the plan which best commended itself to him; and his highest officers knew what it was only when he called upon them to execute it. He was called the "Impenetrable." In camp or on the march, his table was of the simplest. He ate the plainest food, and refused all dainties. He had one wife and one concubine, both old. He had no son, nor did he desire any; nor would he have any servants. He adopted Li Shwanghi

("Double happiness"); and this fierce man gloated over more slaughter, and shed more blood than even the great robber himself. Dsuchung made several attempts, in his palace in Hiangyang, to coin cash, but failed in all. He, therefore, put to death the artist into whose hands he had entrusted the work. He then ordered several scholars to consult the Eight Diagrams, and to discover by divination the best way to correct the coining defects. Whether or not they feared a similar fate, their findings were always unpropitious. As this seemed to show that the fates declared him one who was not, and never would be emperor, he nominated Shwanghi heir-apparent, with the title of *Hoongji*, or Flourishing Foundation. But an effort to coin in the new title was as great a failure as the former.

He had to renounce his abortive efforts at coining; for just then the Shensi viceroy was moving towards him with a large army; and the available imperial troops all around were summoned to concentrate against the rebel. The army of Toongkwan was set in motion; and the lieut.-generals, Niw Chunghoo and Gwangdsoo, united below Loyang with the Honan lieut.-generals, Gwa Dsoongji and Chun Yoongfoo. Liangyü advanced from Kiwkiang *via* Yooning. Major-general Gao Lin, from Shanglo, commanded the reserves; Bai Gwangun, lieut.-general of Liaosi, and the lieut.-general of Szchuen, were ordered southwards to move inland, as supporting reserves. The commander-in-chief of the moving hosts was Swun Footing, who commanded the main army from Toongkwan. The rebel leaders, Su Tienjoo (Four lords of Heaven) and Li Yangchwun (Nourisher of Purity), surrendered to Footing without a blow; after which he pushed on to Paofung hien, which he pressed closely with his combined army.

Dsuchung left his family and a strong garrison in Hiangyang, and with his best troops marched to raise the siege. He was encountered, east of the city, by Gwangun, Lin and Gwangdsoo, who drove him back. Next day, with a largely reinforced army, he again moved westwards, but was a second time thrust back.

Footing, fearing that the garrison and the rapidly increasing robber army might be too strong for him, determined to force open the city at all costs and at once. He therefore, at the head of his own division, led the assault in person, attacked with fury, took the city, put Dsuchung's magistrate and several thousand robbers to the sword;* and then pushed on to Tanghien of Nanyang, where all the wives of the rebel army were collected. Though the rebels sent off their choice troops without delay, they were too late; for Tanghien had already fallen and all the wives of the rebel army had been put to the sword. When the army which should have saved the city heard of this disaster, one loud, universal wail of grief escaped them; but this was succeeded by as loud cries of vengeance against the army which had murdered their wives. Whatever we may think of the policy of putting so many harmless women to death, we can explain it by the burning desire of the imperialists to wreak their vengeance against those who had slain such large numbers of inoffensive citizens; and though unutterably cruel to our notions, such has been and is the law of war in China, where the terror inspired by it renders the policy a successful one. Dsuchung was again defeated with great slaughter, in an attempt to raise the siege of Chiahien; and Footing bade fair to checkmate him. At all events, the rebel had to flee back to Hiangyang; with his men somewhat demoralised.

While on his march southwards, Footing fell in with frightfully bad weather, rain falling heavily and without interruption for six days, after which the cart ruts became so muddy and deep that

* It is as uncommon in the east as in the west for the commander to push to the front in this way. The present order of Manchu warfare, which is handed down by the ages in conservative China, is that the commander is located at a very safe distance from the place where the actual fighting is going on. He is in the centre of the three most honourable of the eight banners, bordered yellow, yellow, and bordered white. He is never outside of these; and the post of honour is also the post of safety,—explaining a good deal in Chinese modern warfare. The commander is, however, always expected to support his first lines if they are driven in; and he is highly honoured if he fall sword in hand. His three banners, or life-guards, may therefore be considered a reserve.

the provision carts could move only thirty li per day. The army went therefore far ahead, and men and horses were in want of food. Some general officers advised a march back towards their provisions, but he said, "After advancing so far, why go back? Better take a city." It was then they pounced upon Chiahien; but though they took the city, their food supplies were still inadequate, even with the free-will offerings of the people, which were gladly given to the extent of their poor ability. Shansi was ordered to feed the imperialist army, which was promising so well. Dsuchung appeared with ten thousand horse and foot, but had opposed to him not only the original army but many deserters from himself; for the men of Gwoyen and Jinyü, whom he had put to death, had deserted to the van of Footing's army. He ordered his younger brother Number-One Tiger to begin the attack. Thrice did he fly at the army of Footing, and thrice was he driven back with heavy loss. Dsuchung fled to Hiangching of Kaifung, where he was soon besieged, and the aspect of his men told the besiegers of the hunger which prevailed among the rebels.

Meantime rain continued to fall in torrents, and little comfort had Footing and his men for fully a dozen days. A body of troops which he had left at Yoochow to forward his provisions, deserted to the rebels; a course which one of his generals was secretly inclined to follow. He consulted with Lin and Gwangun as to what should be done. Lin advised an immediate and warm attack, but Gwangun objected that the infantry was already scattered garrisoning important points, and that thus weakened they were not a match for the robbers. Footing, fearing the rebels would escape him, replied, "What kind of plan is this of the general's? Better to adopt the advice of general Gao." Gwangun was therefore angry and drew off his eight thousand men.

The van of the rebels was divided into three divisions, one with a Red Banner, one with a White, and one with a Black; each numbered seven thousand two hundred men. As Footing, acting on Lin's advice, was leading the attack against the van,

he fell into an ambush and was thrown into confusion. The rebels pressed upon him, and Gao Lin, instead of supporting him, began to retreat with his men. His example was followed by the various companies, who slowly retreated westwards. They were warmly pursued by the rebels, and the retreat became a rout. On that one day, they fled 400 li and lost forty thousand men in slain and dispersed; while, in their eager haste, they dropped almost all their fighting gear. They fled to *Mungjin* or the Ford of Munghien of Hwaichung, where Lin collected some thousands of the scattered horse and crossed the river northwards. A division of the rebels took Yoochow. Dsuchung himself made for Toongkwan, but suffered defeat at the hands of Gwangun. Footing was also on the way to Toongkwan, marching his remaining forty thousand men as best he could. Number-One Tiger, whose proper name was Li Gwo, took Funhiang, and pressed hard on the heels of Footing, whom he overtook. He gained possession of the great Imperial standard of Footing, and hoisting it, hastened to Toongkwan, the garrison of which, seeing the imperial standard, opened the gates, and large numbers of the rebels were inside that strong fort before the mistake was discovered. While the garrison was fiercely assailing these, Dsuchung led a body of men by an unused path behind Toongkwan, and furiously attacked the garrison in the rear. This put an end to all resistance, and the important pass and strong fort of Toongkwan was in rebel hands. Number-One Tiger, without resting, marched upon and took Hwayin, compelling Gwangun to retreat on Weinan of Singan. But that city too fell immediately before a force of several hundred thousand of rebels. The gallant Footing fell in the fight, and ended a career which, with greater caution, might have destroyed Dsuchung. Weinan was put to the sword. Dsuchung took Shangchow, and put to death the Taotai, and Lintoong fell after. The commandant of the terrified Singan marched out against the overwhelming forces of Dsuchung, but was defeated, seized, and put to death, because he refused to desert. A considerable proportion of the officials, seeing no hope of successful resistance, jumped into wells or took other modes of suicide. Many more

were put to death by the rebels, because they would not desert ; but the cruel details had better remain untold. The surrounding cities could offer no resistance, and the judge of Poochung took his official seal and with it jumped into a well. This was to prevent the official seal from falling into the hands of rebels.

Footing and his generals, with the large army which they had painfully collected, did not terminate the career of the arch-rebel. Their prudent united action would have utterly defeated him, but they did not even temporarily check his progress, and their disunion had now raised him to a greatness he had never known before. If he had dreamed of an ambitious destiny before, his wildest desires seemed probabilities now. Jinhing had advised a march on Peking instead of one on Singan ; but other generals urged, with more wisdom, that before marching on Peking, they should possess a stronghold to which they could retreat in case of defeat. These urged besides that, if Singan fell, Dsuchung should there assume the imperial title and set up his throne, without waiting to take Peking ; for Shansi, added to what he already held in his hands, would make him master of two-thirds of China. He could then march at his leisure against Peking, without any anxiety as to his rear. The rebel leader wisely followed the latter advice ; wisely, for though he might have fared better at Peking than the Manchus in their two attempts, he was uncertain what might happen there ; and with Shansi in adverse hands, a repulse might be destruction. Jinhing was also an unceasingly warm advocate of more gentleness towards the defeated, and especially of non-interference with those whose occupation it was not to fight. Henceforth, and not too soon, the rebel soldiers passed and repassed through towns and villages without their usual wanton slaughter and unnecessary pillaging, and tried to gain the respect and goodwill of the people by marching without molesting them. The great success of the modern Taiping rebels must have arisen from the strict discipline kept in their ranks ; for, to begin with, and while the followers went from victory to victory under their chiefs, non-combatants never had any cause for fear, as every-

thing was payed for which was asked from them. So the soldiers of Dsuchung were compelled to act as the followers of him who was to be the "father and mother" of the people. He changed the name of Singan to that of Changan, the name of the capital of the numerous kingdoms which had risen and fallen in those regions—(See "History of Corea," *passim*).

When the emperor heard of the fall of Toongkwan, and before any further news had reached him, he ordered Hū Yinggwei, vice-president of Board of War to viceroy the three borders of Shensi, collect all the troops and attack the rebels. Yinggwei wept and prayed to be excused; but was still commanded, as no excuses could be received; and in reply to his question about finances, he had fifty thousand taels handed over to provide for the army. The news awaiting him, on the bank of the Yellow river, and the state of matters around, so terrified him that he dared not cross westwards.

Dsuchung took Yenán in December. Gao Lin was hiding in this city; and when he heard that the rebels were approaching, he fled eastwards without a blow, and crossed the Yellow river into Shansi. It will be remembered that Yenán is the prefecture in which was the district of Michih, Dsuchung's birth-place. As soon as the prefectural city was in his hands, he proudly displayed his immense army over the road towards his native place, where he sacrificed to the manes of his ancestors. He then sent five hundred horse to demand the prefecture of Funghwang to open its gates. But the commandant enticed them inside, and slew every man. This enraged Dsuchung, who marched his army to the city, took it and put all its inhabitants to the sword.

When Yenán was about to be besieged, lieut.-general Wang Ding, then inside, drew off his men to Yülin, which was then a strong fort among the aborigines of Shensi. After Funghwang fell, Dsuchung besieged Yülin; but such was the gallant defence made by the garrison, that over a myriad rebels were slain, and for half a month there was no impression made on the city. Then the rebels collected heavy carts, which they placed all round the walls, and under shelter of those they mined several

hundred feet of the wall. They rushed in at the breach, but not unopposed; for though the commandant and many of the chief officers committed suicide, many more preferred to die sword in hand, and it cost the rebels thousands of men to get into the city. Not a soul in the city joined them, and they had no slaughtering to do; for even the women and girls committed suicide rather than fall into the rebel hands; and not a single soldier was made prisoner. The historian notes that the inhabitants of Yülin are famed as the best soldiers in the Chinese empire. The fall of Yülin, in spite of its desperate defence, induced the lieut.-general of Ninghia to open the gates of that city to the rebels, and to join them himself. Thus fell the last considerable city of Shensi; the Ming had not a foothold left there, and Dsuchung had all danger removed from his rear. He, therefore, could afford to march eastwards. He took the city of Tsingyang, and put the garrison to the sword. In the city he seized Hang Wang. Thus was he carrying all before him, while consternation reigned in Peking. The emperor, not knowing well what to do, permitted grand secretary Jow Yowchow to commit suicide. It is possible the crimes laid to his charge were well founded; but the true cause of so many disasters did not lie entirely on his shoulders.

This was in January 1644; and Dsuchung's name became so great in China, that Hienjoong just then sent messengers acknowledging the one-eyed rebel as his emperor. The latter took Pingyuen; the prefect of which fled into Taiyuen, but the people and magistrates acknowledged the rebel. Gao Lin retired further east; and Dsuchung, in the pride of his heart, sent a proclamation through Shansi of the "most outrageous character," which must mean that he was now demanding all the honours due to the emperor. Had he established a dynasty, such proclamations would have been in every way proper and worthy documents, full of heroism and nobility.

In February began the seventeenth year of the last Ming emperor, and the first of Shwunchih of the Manchus. The year began in Peking with a terrible dust storm; and a diviner by

the eight diagrams said that the wind was from *chien* (i.e., N.W.), and indicated the rise of terrible soldiers to break up the city. An earthquake at Fungyang helped to index the political storm, as if further proofs were necessary. A greater sign of that tempest was that Dsuchung called himself a *Wang** in Singan, and assumed the imperial style of *Joongchang*. He ravaged the districts east of the river, the river-fords (Ho-jin), Kishan, Yoongho, and Kiangchow. The emperor was in the greatest grief, went to court, and, with a heavy sigh, asked if nothing could be done. Grand secretary Li Jientai said that seeing the emperor was in such grief, they could not but exert themselves; he himself was a Shansi man, and had some property, which, with that of his father's family, might support an army for a few months; and if this would suffice, he and his were at the emperor's disposal. This greatly pleased the emperor, who promised to escort the willing minister on his way. But what could this one man, however willing, do against the omens which divination found crowding on the public notice? Astrology had a saying, that "when a star enters† the moon, the middle kingdom is to be broken up, and the prince to perish"; and a star had "entered" the moon. Soon thereafter astrology declared that the Imperial or Polar Star‡ was seen to move downwards; and, worst of all, there was a sound of wailing heard proceeding from the tomb *Hiaoling*, near Nanking, where the founder of the Ming dynasty was buried. All these proclaimed that vain was the help of Jientai. Yet he marched, after the emperor had by sacrifice informed the ancestral temple of the new expedition. After sacrifice, the emperor took a cup of spirits and handed it to Jientai, saying, that according to ancient custom this was as if the emperor went in person. Jientai kowtowed, and started immediately. But a great wind arose, which blew quantities of dust and sand; again the diviner

* He could not assume the style Whangdi till he had been enthroned, and this would be in Peking.

† Crosses in transit.

‡ The representative of the emperor, round which all cluster.

prophecies that the army will effect nothing. The pole of Jientai's chair broke down, and the diviner urged him not to march that day. But Jientai did march, though slowly. He was no sooner beyond the bounds of the capital than he heard that all Shansi was in a blaze of rebellion; for it had been impossible to learn anything inside the capital, now that matters had come to a crisis. He learned too that his own family was broken up and his properties dispersed; hence the source whence he hoped to support his army was gone. He got to Chochow, but, destitute of all resources, he could not hold out.

On the first day of the second moon, the emperor summoned all the officials to a council. In the midst of their early morning's talk,—for deliberation there was not,—a messenger appeared from Dsuchung with a proclamation couched in the most outrageous terms, stating that “Dsuchung would in the fifteenth of third moon appear before his majesty.” As soon as the ministers ascertained the nature of the document, they became pallid with fear, and not a soul of them was brave enough to respond to the questions of his majesty, who asked for a plan of defence. He therefore dismissed the Court, and did not again summon them to his presence, but let things take their course. Weak monarch; if good man! How could an empire be retained now by such an emperor and with such ministers? He soon after issued a manifesto, a “Confession of Sin,” which will be understood when the doctrine already explained is remembered, that the good conduct of the emperor is the cause of good fortune to his people, and their sufferings are the result of his criminality in the sight of Heaven; that the emperor is for the people, not the people for the emperor. The emperor confessed his sins, the source of so much misery to his beloved people. He called to mind the goodness of *Shangti* (God), for the past seventeen years, and recalled the merit of his ancestors. He saw the great miseries around, and was aware of the wicked endeavours of crafty people to alienate the affection of the people from their prince. He was the father and mother of his people,

yet they were not now under the shadow of his wings. His people were his naked infants, yet he was unable to embrace and to cherish them. This unnatural condition was entirely owing to his sins. People died of famine, of water, of fire,—died in ditches and roadsides because of his sin. There was no grain for the people, nor fodder of any kind for animals, on account of his sin. The using of taxes to support the army a year before they were due was his sin. Converting the dwelling houses of the people into barracks, and the wide circle of fire and smoke everywhere ascending was his great sin. The sun and the moon declared his sin, and the drought and the flood published it. The concord between earth and heaven above was broken, and the rampant hate universal among men below was his sin. The great ministers appointed to office heeded not the land; inferior ministers were given over to covetousness; the censors, who should speak out against every form of evil, withdrew their heads like rats into their holes; and in deliberative assemblies no man spoke out his mind undisguisedly; and the men of war were proud, vain, but cowardly and unable to gain a reputation,—and all because of his departure from the doctrine.* Henceforth, therefore, good men only were to be put in office; for it has been always known from ancient times that only when worthy men held office could the country prosper. Proper men were to be placed over the Boards, whose aim would be to nourish and not to prey upon the people; ministers known to be guilty of malpractices would be dismissed, and the honourable, faithful, upright, true, and the able would be set over affairs, whether civil or military. Robbers were to be pursued and destroyed,—the repentant would be pardoned, the hardened punished till all returned to their allegiance; if they all repented and returned to their allegiance, all would be pardoned, but they must atone for past misconduct by delivering up the traitors, Dsuchung and Hienjoong; and the man who should perform that good service would be rewarded by a marquissate. This was to let all the people know the imperial will.

* *Dao—road, path.*

Dsuchung was not so purposeless as the emperor; for when the latter was dismissing his officials in weak and angry vexation at their pusillanimous selfishness, he took Poochow and Funchow, and Foo Wang fled from Whaiching. The governor of Taiyuen, who had but a weak garrison, sent out a band under two officers against the advancing rebel host. One of the two was wounded in the beginning of the action by a cannon ball, the other fell later on in the day. Of the men who went out of the city that morning, not a soul returned; and the weak garrison was greatly weaker. Dsuchung, taking advantage of a great dust storm, pushed on his men to scale the walls. Forty-six of the higher officials committed suicide, and the city was in Dsuchung's hands. The cities of Lichung and Linchin were taken at the run; and when the emperor was publishing his confession, the rebel van was at Tangan ji. It was now become not a question of how much was to be paid for Dsuchung's head, but what possible measures would save the capital. For Dsuchung had almost no serious obstacle opposed to him. He attacked the lieut.-general of Taichow, who had fallen back on the pass of Ningwoogwan. The prefect of Chunting sent his family out of the city for safety, and was therefore imprisoned by viceroy Hii Biao. But a subordinate of the viceroy's murdered him, and liberated the prefect, who opened the city gates to the first small band of rebel horse which appeared at the gates. The rebels were now within 300 li of Peking, where, however, no man knew the position of the rebels or their doings! This shows what the surrounding people thought of the central government, when not a soul was found willing to post in and give information. Many of the higher officials, among them one president of the Boards, found their way out of the capital to Tsining of Shantung, where they hoped to be able to see what took place without suffering in their own persons. The emperor, at this eleventh hour, issued a proclamation, summoning all the soldiers of the empire to march to the defence of the capital. Some of his ministers showed that his stay there, isolated as he was from the greater part of his empire, was conducive of no good, and urged

him to move to Nanking; for the south and east were all his, and he could easily make a stand there, and from that southern capital gradually recover the country again. To his weak mind this looked like cowardly flight from his post, and he angrily asked what the worth was of their universal professions of devotion, if no minister was found willing to prove his faithfulness by dying with his prince for his country. He asked them whether they were not aware that when the *Shuaji** were gone, the prince ceased to exist. One plan was advocated by the senior secretary of the Board of Appointments, for which there was not too much time. This was to summon from Shanhaigwan Woo Sangwei, who was then fully twice, nearly three times, as far from the capital as the rebel host. But as the plan involved the throwing up of all the lands of Liaosi, up to the gate of Shanhaigwan, it fell through. A Highland proverb says, with more truth than grace: "By licking the drops on the bottom, the ladleful is lost."

The plan was not forgotten by the emperor, for he was compelled in desperation to fall back upon it soon after. Dsuchung had besieged Ningwoogwan, and gave notice that if within five days the gates were not opened, every man would be put to the sword. But this threat did not alarm the commandant, Gow Yüji, who fired his great cannon against the robbers for three days, doing terrible execution. When the powder of the garrison failed them, the commandant, in his council, said that if the havoc they had made in three days was so great, what could they not do if every soul was faithful and upright? He therefore ordered a general sally, rushed out upon the rebels, and put several thousands to death with the sword. So great a dread had he thrown over the rebels, that they drew off and were about to raise the siege, when some one said, "Supposing ten of us die for every one of his men, the place must fall within a couple of days." This drove them back to their posts, and when

* *Shuaji*, gods of land and grain or national lares, secondary to the imperial lares, or ancestors of the emperor, but the worship of which is performed by the emperor only; hence to "lose the *Shuaji*," is to lose the empire.

they fought again, the rebels pretended to flee, drawing the garrison after them. Dsuchung threw off his felt hat so that he could not be distinguished. When the warmth of pursuit threw the sallying garrison into disorder, the flying rebels turned round upon them ; at the same time an ambush, which they had passed in the race, rose in their rear, and the garrison was completely defeated. The commandant got into the city, and burnt his house over himself and family. Others ran themselves through, and not an officer survived to acknowledge, or be slain by, the rebels ; but the city was put to the sword. Dsuchung lamented the fate of the commandant, saying truly enough that if all officers and officials had been equally faithful, he himself would not be that day where he was. The fall of Ningwoo brought down Tatoong, where large numbers of officials committed suicide. Peking was now exposed, and Li Jientai wrote urging the emperor to go south to Nanking, and if agreeable, to send the heir apparent as regent before him. A censor objected strongly to this plan ; for a son of a Tang emperor, in similar circumstances, proved false to his father and became emperor himself ! All the ministers now agreed with the censor, probably because they had no course to adopt. The emperor then asked them whether or not they could or would do anything ; whether they would fight or not. They all spoke at once, and in a rambling manner, but not one to the purpose in hand. His majesty sighed and said, " The destruction of the empire lies not on the emperor's shoulders ; the ministers are all guilty of their country's ruin."

He then resolved to summon Sangwei from the east, as his only hope. He conferred upon him the title of *Pingsi Bai*, Count Queller of the west. He created Liangyü, *Ningnan Bai*, Count Pacifier of the south ; Whang Duagoong, *Jingnan Bai*, Count Clearer of the south ; and Tang Toong, *Dingsi Bai*, Count Fixer of the west. He was creating these titles while Dsuchung was moving on Paoting, watched by the new count Toong, who had only eight thousand men under his command. Jientai was in the city with his army, but unwell ; when therefore the robbers came, his men leaped over the wall and joined the rebels ;

Jientai himself was seized. A censor obstinately defended the west gate till he was seized and taken to the Temple of the Three Emperors, where he leaped into a well. His wife followed his example; and a nephew went on the wall and transfixed a number of robbers with his skilful bow, before he was seized, along with a grandson. The censor's mother and his daughter-in-law of seventeen jumped into a well, as did most of his family. Duschung lost no time in marching on Hüenfoo. The commandant of that city had been out on some public business. When he returned the gates were closed, and not a single soldier came forward to acknowledge him. This hurt him exceedingly. Thrice he kowtowed to the ground, asking his people to open the gates, but their only reply was to point a gun at him. He said, "If you use that properly, one fire may kill ever so many rebels, but if you kill me, I do not consider it a matter to call for vengeance." As they would not listen to him, he raised himself over the wall, took a sword from the nearest soldier, cut his own throat and died. The gates, which were closed against him, were opened to the rebels, and the usual suicides followed.

The capital was now within easy reach of the rebels. The imperial exchequer had been drained empty by the extraordinary claims of war and famine for so many years. Shansi and the west and the south-west of China were entirely cut off from Peking. Chihli and Shantung were still free and loyal; but the famine had been so sore there that both places had received large sums from the exchequer. The taxes were eaten up a year before due, and there was no hope of raising finances in the ordinary way. China has only yesterday learned the western art of borrowing money on national securities, and is not yet a forward pupil in the art. Ordinarily when the resources of the revenue fail to meet current expenses, though even of the most extraordinary kind, the dynasty has been easily upset. Extraordinary demands are sometimes met by calls for donations, and by the sale of degrees both literary and magisterial, though both are of course only honorary, and are carefully distinguished from the real degrees. This source is soon dried up, and then

the dynasty can only expire. To such a pass had the Ming dynasty now come, and the emperor nominated the eunuch Hū Gaoyü and count Jiading, collectors, to go round with subscription lists. Some officials gave money, others, the most numerous, refused, and asked, "What could money do in the state of affairs come upon us?" This subscription amounted to ten thousand taels, which the emperor thought very small and wished increased. Two eunuchs made it up to fifty thousand taels; and Wang Jusin, a wealthy man, who the emperor believed would give ten thousand taels, gave a hundred and fifty thousand taels. They collected in all five hundred and twenty thousand taels, or £150,000, with a few hundred thousands in pearls and silks.

Having secured this voluntary contribution, the emperor nominated the eunuch Wang Chungun, marshal of the Inner and Outer Capital, and the eunuch Tsao Hwatswun, commander-in-chief of the city. Garrisons and great cannon were planted at each of the nine gates. Each private had a hundred cash, or about fourpence per day. The emperor was again urged to flee to Nanking; but the advice only made him angry, and he upbraided his ministers with cowardice, for their speech was loud when danger was far, and they were now terrified when it had come near; he urged them to resolve to perish rather than suffer the city to be taken. To the Board of War he said that there was a large supply of officers, and asked whether it was a matter of such difficulty to collect soldiers sufficient to garrison the city so as to make capture impossible. He threatened strict legal punishment against the man found sending his family out of the city.

Such was the mismanagement and abject fear on all hands, that it was the messenger of Dsuchung, with an epistle to the emperor, who informed the court that Changping was in the hands of the rebels. The pass of Liwgow was so strong by nature and art, that a hundred good men could stop it against all odds. But there was no Leonidas to take his post there. Tang Toong and his over-seeing eunuch, who were in charge of the pass, deserted; and lieut.-general Mai Dai killed his wife

and children to keep them out of the robbers' hands, and fled eastwards to Sangwei. After the pass was in possession of the rebels, all heart was taken out of the cities west of Peking, not one of which could muster courage to offer a vigorous resistance; nor was it much wonder, for they had no hope of succour from Peking. Three armies were, however, mustered outside the *Chihwa* gate; but of all the armies, officials, and messengers sent out against Dsuchung, not one attempted resistance; a few officers committed suicide, the great majority deserted to the rebels. And just when Sangwei with his fugitive-encumbered army was entering Shanhaigwan from Ningyuen, Dsuchung was firing the twelve imperial tombs at Changping, and sending a detachment eastwards, which passed Peking and plundered the neighbourhood of Toongchow, which had twice seen Manchu armies. There is a pass about a score of miles west of Peking; but the eunuch in charge had fled, and left it open;—eunuchs, eunuchs, everywhere! Dsuchung had been gradually and slowly moving eastwards, and not a soul, either for shelter or patriotism, made for the capital to give information; and but for the insulting message of Dsuchung, neither the emperor nor his ministers would have known anything of the rebel's whereabouts; and the purport of the last message was inferred by the ministers only from the pallid face of his majesty, who dismissed them without a word. Dsuchung had got to Shaho, whence he set out with his main army after nightfall, and his presence was made known to the Pekinese by the blazing heavens which appeared before dawn over the western suburbs outside Pingdsua Gate; for he had applied the torch freely to give notice of his arrival. (See Map.)

The city of Peking has been for six centuries much what it now is. In the "History of Corea," (*passim*), we said that the city and district of Yowchow have existed for thousands of years. But it was the Kitan, under the name of Liao, who made it first the capital of an extensive empire. Since the time of Liao it has continued, except for a brief period in the beginning of the Ming dynasty, the capital of China; and if all accounts be true, its period of greatest prosperity, population, and wealth, is not

this nineteenth century. The city is now, however, we believe, virtually the same as when Li Dsuchung set its suburbs a-burning; and the accompanying sketch map will show the position of each of the Nine gates,—the number by which the capital is distinguished from all other cities. The suburb which he set on fire was outside the Pingdsua gate, the more southern of the two western gates of the Central or Main city,—what is now called the Tartar city, because occupied by the Manchus. It will be observed that the Imperial city, surrounded by high thick walls and gates of its own, is within this Central city; and that the palaces, enclosed within a third wall, occupy the centre of the Imperial city. As far, therefore, as walls and strong massive gates afford security, Peking should never have been taken, when artillery made more noise than damage. There was an army of one hundred and fifty-four thousand enrolled for the defence of the Nine gates, and the miles upon miles of wall which had to be defended. There was that number of soldiers on paper, and pay was drawn or due for so many able-bodied, well-trained, and reliable men; but instead of that number, there were actually no more than from fifty to sixty thousand, mostly old men, whose soldierly qualities were confined to drawing one hundred cash, or less than sixpence per day. As we might expect where so much money could be stolen from the state under false pretences, an eunuch was at the head of this army. And the grand formalities of a stately etiquette pronounced it entirely beneath the dignity of imperial majesty to search out truth for itself, or busy itself with the petty details of this mortal life; and the weak emperor, and his similarly-minded predecessors, preferred to have red-tape bands tied round their hands, and their feet too; and red-tape had now brought him to this.

The ministers assembled at dawn as usual, to meet his majesty in council. He told them that information had come of the main body of the rebels having passed *Loogwo chiao* bridge: that the van had already attacked the suburbs at the gates Pingdsua and Jangyi; and that the three great camps stationed outside to

check the rebels had broken up and deserted, their cannon being now turned against the city which they should have defended. He had scarcely done speaking when they all had proof enough, for, with the rising sun, the activity of the bombardment shook the "whole earth."

Li Gwojun, count of Hiangchung, rode outside the gate, and at sight of the bold daring bravado on that side, and the cowering, quaking fear paralysing the inside, his heart sunk and he said, "To what a pass have we come! There is now no more to be done than that prince and ministers keep each other countenance and die united." He informed the privy council that the garrison was composed of men so weak that only when the whip was applied would they rise, and they lay down as soon as the whip was off their back; and no wonder. For five months the garrison had been on short commons and in arrears of pay; a state of matters which could be explained by the eunuch commander, and his officers who were now slinking away; most of the officers of even the imperial guard following their example and hiding for safety. The emperor emptied the imperial public and private treasuries and divided two hundred thousand taels among the few thousand troops remaining. As he had no more money to give, he handed away pieces of silk to some of the common people, who were weeping outside his palace gates. Thus, when he should be inspiring his men by his presence, stirring up the lazy, shaming into duty the timid, and directing and encouraging the many men around him who were even yet willing to be active, or summoning courage himself to *act* and move eastwards to the camp of the advancing Sangwei,—his womanish fears and gloomy countenance were infectious and communicated themselves to many who would be men, if he but acted one; and the aimless apathy of his grieving weakness could not but damp the little ardour remaining in the few brave men about him.

Next day the fire against the thick wall was unintermittent, and the rebel arrows shot over like showers of rain. The rebels spoke fiercely to those on the wall, saying that if they did not open the gates every soul of them would be slain; and those

guardians, worthy representatives of their master, instead of replying with eager shot which should make the rebels quake, and open lanes in their thick and near ranks, fired blank charges, and even these only after giving the rebels notice ; thus deluding the people inside into the belief that they were being defended ! The wide moat was rapidly filled in by the compulsory labour of the suburban people, and as soon as a dry path was made, the rebels brought forward and fired the captured cannon "equal to oppose ten thousand men," and the first shot killed or wounded several scores of the defenders of the wall. This was apparently one of the cannon cast by the Jesuits ; at all events that shot extinguished the last little bit of self-command which the garrison possessed. They broke away, many of them sliding down the wall and joining the rebels amid the howling lamentations of the people. With little fear of opposition, ladders were now placed against the gates, *Pingdsua*, *Siju* and *Duashung*. A newly created *Tai chang Shaoching*, hastened to the *Siju* gate, and had it heaped up and filled in with earth on the inside ; he then rode to the *Sian* gate of the imperial city, to report, but he was refused admittance, as the vice-president in charge had orders to "admit no one." He scrambled over the wall, and met one of the chief eunuchs, to whom he said that the defenders on the wall were wholly inadequate and should be increased. He then moved to the *Woo* gate of the palatial city, when he encountered and was stopped by grand secretary *Wei Dsaodua*, who, in reply to his anxious words, said pettishly, that the Board of War was looking after its proper work, that money enough had been expended, and what more could be done ? There was no reason for doubting that he knew what to do. He forbade him to go into the emperor's presence. And this man who tried to act his duty instead of talking about it, suffered himself to be led away by the grand secretary, weeping bitter tears as he went ; for he could see nothing else but ruin for the prince who was served by such men. That prince had an inkling of what he should *do* ; for he, on that same day, created *Lin Dsaiching* the *Doongping* count, and sent him to ascertain if a successful

stand could be made at Linching, as that city was near and Sangwei far. But that move came to nothing. The emperor also appointed a censor to guard the gate *Jungyang*; but when he went to take charge, the officials within refused to admit him. Such was the majesty of the ruler of the universe within the precincts of his own capital and even of his own palace!

Dsuchung was himself posted outside the gate *Jangyi* with Tsin Wang and Tai Wang, one prince at each side of him, seated on a mat, and the chief eunuch, Doo Hün, at his feet. This eunuch cried out to the garrison, "I am Doo Hün; dont fire, but send down a man to parley." The garrison offered to send down a hostage if he came upon the wall. The invitation to go up he accepted; but he would not have a hostage, as the two princes were there already. He was then taken up, went to his majesty, and said that the rebels were in immense numbers, and his majesty should therefore take care of his own safety. The eunuch who had been in charge of the tombs at Changping, and had there deserted to the rebels, had also gone to see the emperor; and addressed him, saying that the robbers had succeeded because his majesty had forsaken *Dao*, or The Path; he should therefore now vacate the throne. The ministers reviled this impertinent eunuch, and urged the emperor to imprison Doo Hün, who quickly replied that the two princes of Shansi and Shensi would suffer if any harm befell him. He was therefore allowed to depart, to prove the utter powerlessness of the "Son of Heaven."

The president of Board of War reported that affairs had fallen into a desperate condition. He had gone to the city walls to see how matters stood, but the eunuch in charge forbade him to go on the walls. When reporting this, he also mentioned a rumour, that the marshal and commandant of the city had gone down the wall to the rebels along with Doo Hün, and he naturally inferred treason. The emperor ordered him on the wall to ascertain the truth of the matter. He went, and was again refused admittance by the eunuchs, until he had convinced them that he was there by his majesty's command. In reply

to his query, he was told that Doo Hün "had come up the wall yesterday, and gone down early this morning." This answer he reported to the emperor, who said that it was of no consequence what Doo Hün did, or where he went; what he wished to know was the place where the Shansi and Shensi princes were, and why they were not returning; and he soon discovered that they too had deserted. Commandant Hwatswun had gone down and returned. He changed his clothing to disguise himself, so that he could hide undiscovered; whereupon his men on the walls became a mere disorderly rabble, fit for nothing but noise and their hundred cash per day. One officer, Wang Jiayen, reported, with flowing tears, that the camp was breaking up, and the men fast joining the rebels; he could scarcely command one man for fifty cubits of wall under his command; and the greater half of Li Hiangchung's men had disappeared. He was apparently reporting to the eunuch Chungun; and while he was yet speaking, a great shouting was heard beneath the wall. Chungun fired a cannon with his own hand, and killed and wounded several men. This one shot stopped the shouting, and proved what an easy matter it would have been to defend that large city with its enormous walls. Jinyen rode to the gate of the imperial city, wishing to consult with the emperor, but was refused admittance. The emperor ordered his son-in-law (*Fooma*) to take his household troops, and march southwards to Nanking with the heir apparent,—a measure we have seen recommended by a faithful minister while Dsuchung was yet far from Peking: but which was then postponed by the indolent emperor, who began to build a dyke only when the flood-tide was already at his knees. The *Fooma* replied that his men had disbanded, except some old and weak men utterly unfitted and incompetent for such a service; that had there been men fit for active service, they would have been out to the front before now. Chungun, *one* faithful eunuch, had been sent by the emperor to prepare the army, for his majesty to lead in person, and lo! there was no army. Thus was discovered that the armies of hundreds of thousands of men for whom the imperial


exchequer was yearly paying large sums of money had melted away; and the collapse of the power of the Ming was unexampled,—a soap bubble pricked by a needle. The few incidents quoted serve to show how complete was the collapse. And it is, as it was in Liaotung, eunuchs, selfish, self-seeking eunuchs, who did not know that the best way to save oneself was to sacrifice one's interest to the public well-being; and that the surest way to lose one's own possession, in a state of affairs such as then existed, was to sacrifice public well-being to private interests. Had those eunuchs behaved like ordinary men, Dsuchung would not be where he was, nor would Mookden then be the capital of the Manchus. The obstacles placed in the way of the few men who tried to right matters were all the work of the eunuchs, who were then already determined on their course; and if no others, emperor or minister, had a plan, they had, and one which they were to execute immediately, in what they conceived to be their own interests. Selfish officials they were, sucking the life-blood of the nation, as has been and is being done by almost every imperialistic power in Europe. Imperialism has always in the past and will inevitably in the future bring calamity and disgrace to the people, out of which it sponges material means and mental energy.

Hwatswun, who had such high command given him, out of which he had tried to make what he could for himself, had already turned traitor, and waited till the *shun* hour, after sunset, when he opened the *Jangyi* gate to Dsuchung, who entered, plundered, and slew on every hand. But what was that to Hwatswun, as long as he believed his treachery would preserve him his ill-gotten gain? News of the entrance reached the emperor immediately, and he asked the ministers if they had heard that the southern city had fallen? They had not. He said: "Now is the crisis come, and what is to be done?" They all replied: "If his majesty is fortunate, well; if not, we shall all die with our emperor."

After the ministers had all retired, the emperor was left alone with his anxiety, and was unable to lie down or to rest. Late

GATES OF PEKING

(pp 178-190)





in the night he heard the noise of the great rushing of men in the Inner or Central city. He went to the door, and asked a man whom he saw there, "Whither Li Gwojun was going with the great camp army?" The reply was of a piece with all the melancholy tragedy everywhere enacting: "The great camp army has been sometime broken up and scattered." The emperor was about to ask some other questions, but this man, too, hurried away from the doomed presence; nor would any calling bring him back. The emperor then summoned Chungun, with whom he went out of the palatial city north to the pavilion-crowned Wanswi or Meishan hill, from whose beautiful summit he had often, with pardonable pride, looked over all his great city, and whence he now beheld the whole heavens lit up with the wide-spread flames of his blazing capital. This sight completely crushed out what little energy he had; and the sufferings of his people paralysed him so, that any action on his part was now impossible. He had discovered, besides, that the "great rushing" was the tread of the myriads of Li Dsuchung, who had entered the Central from the Southern city. He returned to Chienching, or the "Heaven-Clear" palace, the chief of all the palaces, where resides the principal of the three empresses. After writing a letter, ordering duke Chunggwo and all the ministers to muster all the men they possibly could, and to defend the East palace, where the heir-apparent and his empress mother lives, he ordered in liquor to drown his profound sorrow in drink. He drank much and long, continuing to sigh and say, "Alas! for the miseries of my people." The emperor told the empress and the many ladies around, to take care of themselves. They did so by bursting out into a fit of weeping. The empress bowed her head in grief and said very bitterly, that for eighteen years the soldiers had never listened to his commands;—and is this speech of hers, uttered in bitterness against the unfaithful soldiers, not sufficient to show how he had now come to possess not a single soldier? His young daughter, a princess of fourteen years old, was brought to the emperor, who knew too well the fate in store for her within perhaps a

few hours; he, therefore, burst out weeping, and said: "Alas! why wast thou born in my house?" And taking a sword in his right hand, while covering his face with his left, he struck at her with the sword to kill her. It was no wonder that he gave a misdirected blow and cut off her left arm, instead of inflicting a mortal wound, nor could he muster courage to strike again. A favourite wife of the emperor's, the lady Yooen, attempted to strangle herself, but did not succeed. The emperor put an end to her sufferings, as he did to several others of his favourite wives, to prevent them falling into rebel hands. He dismissed all his attendants but Chungun, with whom he again drank deeply. He changed his shoes and every article which might identify him, and went out with Chungun, followed by a few dozen men, each with a hatchet in his hand, and all riding. They went out to the east by the *Doonghwa* or East Flowery gate of the palatial city, intending apparently to attempt flight in the direction of Sangwei. But the guard, afraid of a rising in the city, shot arrows and stones after them. After passing out of the imperial city, the small company made for the *Chihwa* gate in the east wall of the central city, but they found the gate carefully watched and there was no egress that way. He directed his steps to *Anding* gate in the north wall, but it too was as fast as the others. As therefore there was no possibility of passing through in his disguise, the emperor returned to the palace, where, as it was the usual time for his officials to meet at his gate for their sun-rise audience, he had the bell of audience rung to summon them into his presence. But not a soul of those heard, who a few hours before were all to die with him, or if they heard, not one answered that bell. He then, accompanied still by his faithful Chungun, went forth once more, out by the north gate of the palatial city, to his favourite and beautiful resort Wanswi shan, which he ascended. He was clad in tattered garments, his left foot was bare, and his right covered with a red shoe; thus, with dishevelled hair, he entered the newly erected pavilion of Showhwang Ting, and ended his earthly sorrows with his life. Chungun would not outlive his master.

The emperor Kanghi, speaking of taxation, in the year 1709, mentioned that when the capital was besieged there were several scores of thousands of eunuchs in the palaces of the Ming emperor; that the emperor took a few of these with him and fled to the house of count Hiangchung, but as the outer gate was closely barred, the wildest knocking was not heeded, nor the loudest calls answered, and the strong bar still remained unmoved. The emperor then found his way to Wanswi shan, where he proposed and sought plan after plan; but the eunuch Wang Chungun showed him that his only plan of flight was sure to hand him into the power of the rebels and to end in unbearable shame. Suicide was inevitable. Kanghi added, that the greatest fault of the Ming emperor was an irresolution of character, which would not permit him to act, lest people should speak ill of him.

When his body was at last discovered, a document was found upon it stating that, "after he had reigned for seventeen years, rebels took his capital; but though his own worth was small, the fall of the empire was caused, not by him, but by the unwillingness of his ministers, to hear his words; he dies 'without face or eyes,'* so that he cannot look on the face of his departed ancestors, now underneath the ground; he therefore throws away his crown and covers his face with his dishevelled hair; his body may be torn to pieces by the robbers, but he prays that no harm befall even one of his poor people." Another letter stated that he had written an order to the privy council to guard the East palace, had gone into the council chamber to deliver it, but found no man there,—all had fled, even the highest ministers.

Thus miserably perished this monarch of what was then far the largest, most wealthy and most powerful nation on earth. The account given of his suicide by the emperor Kanghi, differs only in slight details from that given above from the Ming history. His judgment of the character of the unfortunate suicide agrees entirely with what we have said of him, and is proved by the study of his life's reign from the first hour when he began it in terror of Joonghien, to the last, when he was not

* "Without face" is Chinese for deepest shame, which makes a man cover his face.

able to summon his own servants to his side, and when suicide, the resort usually of the coward, was his only course out of the difficulties which his weakness had brought upon him. This character was, perhaps unwittingly, explained by the empress in her bitterness when lamenting that his soldiers had never listened to his voice ; it was exhibited in that "confession of sin ;" and the paper found upon his dead body, if it showed his goodness of heart, manifested his weakness of character, and is of a piece with his reign, which was so miserably terminated ; not because he was an evil ruler, but because he was no ruler. If he could not control the ministers always in his presence, much less could he extend his governing arms to the provinces, where every man did that which was right in his own eyes. His ministers who were wont to hasten at the summons of his bell to do him honour and bow their heads to the dust before him, hid away in their holes when that bell was rung for the last time at his command. But they all speedily found their way to the palace when the bell was next sounded by robber Li, welcomed him as their new lord and accepted reinvestment of their former offices at his hands.

But with all due respect to them, we beg to differ from the opinion of the philosophic writers of China, who declare, as explained in the beginning of the last chapter, that a change of dynasty is always the direct punishment of Heaven against the reigning monarch, for grievous sins of his against the will of Heaven. History nowhere gives ground for such an opinion ; for the private, personal character of the man who is thrust off his throne may be, and often is, good enough. History does very largely show that whom *deus vult perdere prius dementat*. How frequently does it happen that the founder of a dynasty is an enormously greater criminal than the loser of it ? It is not the most sinful or criminal man, but the weak one, who loses empire ; though, on the other hand, the weakness of a monarch conjoined with the ability of patriotic ministers never lost a kingdom, certainly not from civil war. It is when an absolute monarch, however amiable and well disposed, is served by self-seeking men

whom he cannot control, that the foundations of his throne are sapped, and he or his successor is thrust off that throne. Turkey has fallen, and the Russian dynasty without reform will as inevitably fall, from the cause which changes dynasties in China, and did change reigning families in England. The strong monarch, though himself a wicked man, is able to check the evils which self-seeking officials always create; but the weak one, though a good man, is not able so to curb strong-minded men, whose patriotism consists in picking the public treasuries, and making large fortunes out of their offices. The weak monarch, not the criminal one, is hurled off his throne. This is doubtless the meaning of the western political axiom that a "blunder is worse than a crime;" for a blunder is the act of a man of inferior intellect who has been overreached; a crime may be committed by the able but unprincipled man, who sees through every political move, and checkmates every political adversary. A blunder proceeds from weakness, a crime often from strength. Might then is again right; and the force of character which, with a wise foresight, ensures success by daring everything for it, proves virtue and goodness! Let men say what they will, nine tenths of the political life of this nineteenth century is just this heathen doctrine, and savours little more of christianity than it did two thousand years ago. If such is the state of politics in Europe after so many centuries of Christian teaching, which goes to show that goodness, even when crushed to the ground and broken in the dust, is grander and better, more noble and more desirable, than the most gaudy conquests of mere might,—need we be astonished that the Chinese people worship success as the mark of Heaven's favour, and consider temporal misfortune as the sure indicator of Heaven's wrath? It is certainly not the Chinese alone who worship the successful man as Heaven's special favourite; nor is the belief that blasting misfortune, and especially deep poverty, warrants us in affecting righteous contempt or indifference, confined to heathen peoples.

We may, before bidding farewell to the last monarch of the Ming dynasty, give an anecdote of him, again quoting Kanghi,

who, in speaking of the enormous personal expenditure of the Ming emperors, mentioned that there was a laughable story of a large piece of stone which, for a certain purpose, was brought to the *Woo* gate, in the south wall of the Palace city. The stone was far too large for the entrance, and the eunuch in charge of the work wrote, saying: "This stone is unwilling to go in by the *Woo* gate;" and the emperor ordered the stone to be bound, and to have sixty blows given it. Speak of Caligula and his horse after that; for the monarch was far too earnest a man to crack such a joke! He gave another story, saying that this same Ming emperor was learning to ride. Two men held his horse's bridle, two men the stirrups, and two held the saddle. Yet after all, the horse seems to have given some trouble to his imperial nerves; for after the ride the emperor ordered the horse to have forty blows, and sentenced him to hard post-labour. "Now supposing," concluded Kanghi, "that the horse had some knowledge, what can be thought of acting to a stone as if it too had 'knowledge;' was it not conduct such as to make all men break out into uncontrollable roars of laughter?"

When the third morning after the rebels had seen Peking dawned, there was some rain, followed suddenly by snow. But this did not stop operations. They had entered the *Doongju* gate on the east, killing the gate-keepers; the vice-president, in charge of the gate, finding refuge in a private house. Crowds of rebels rode in, shouting to the people their orders to "bring out all their mules and horses." But when they were passing the elephant-house bridge, the elephants raised a voice of lamentation, and their tears fell like showers of rain! Another body rode in by *Yoongjung* gate, proclaiming to the people that if they remained in their houses, closed the gates, and wrote the characters, "Obedient People," over their doors, not one would be slain.

Li Dsuchung entered the Imperial city at mid-day, clad in a robe of light-blue silk, and riding a piebald horse. Niw Jinhing was no less proud that day, for, as prime minister, he rode after his master, followed by four presidents of Boards, and other officials,

who were yesterday to die with the emperor. The entrance of a few rebels, walking in with their horse's reins over their arm, threw all the inmates of the palaces into the wildest confusion; and the numbers who were out in the courts, wandering about in their restless fear, fled within doors and shut themselves in. The lady Wei, one of the emperor's wives, saw the robbers, and screaming out, "The robbers have penetrated the innermost courts"; adding that she would carry out the plan she had already formed, she jumped into the Imperial river, where she was drowned. Over two hundred ladies followed her example. But as the successful rebel knew that now all the capital was in his power, none of his men just then entered any of the palaces; for they could do so at their leisure.

Dsuchung was however unaware of what had been going on all morning. The suicide of the emperor he had not discovered, nor was he aware that when a servant from the emperor went to the empresses to give information of the suicide, he found the East and West palace empresses already dead. The chief empress called on both, and finding them already gone, she went on foot to the palace of Duke Chunggwo, disguised by a black robe thrown loosely around her person so as to cover her head and face. On arriving, she discovered the maimed princess lying on the floor. With the aid of the duke's people she had her killed outright. A younger princess said, "My father, the emperor, granted me to die, how dare I live?" But as she was only a child she was led away at once to another palace, for the rebels were already within the buildings of Chunggwo's palace.

When Dsuchung, bow in hand, went in by the west *Changan* gate of the palace, he looked up to the heavens with a great laugh of triumphant pride, and put an arrow on his bow-string. Walking south to the *Chungtien* gate, he saw above it the character *joong*, or "middle." Drawing back his bow-string he said, "If I hit his *joong* in the middle, it is a sign I have gained the whole empire, as the empire is *joong*," the "Middle Kingdom." He let fly, missed the mark, near though it was, and hit below it. He was much surprised, and enquired of Jinhing,

who had just come up, how he could have missed. Jinhing was courtier enough to explain that the incident proved a division of the empire; part of it to be his. The reply pleased Dsuchung, who threw away his bow with a laugh.

Eunuch Wang Duahwa, at the head of three hundred officials, great and small, had met Dsuchung at the Duashung gate. He ordered them to retain their former offices; and to every official who presented himself, Dsuchung made the promise to retain him in his post. He selected a hundred of these officials to accompany him through the palaces, and meantime dismissed the others, who dispersed. When at length he asked for the emperor, whom he believed to be in his power, the strictest search over all the palaces discovered no trace of him. This was very annoying to Dsuchung, who had spent so much time wandering about, doubtless in order mentally to determine how he should act, and what he should say to his illustrious prisoner. One high minister said that the emperor must be hidden away among the common people, and could therefore be found by offers of a handsome reward, and by threats of severest punishment against any one hiding him. A proclamation was at once issued, offering ten thousand taels and a countship to the man who brought forward the emperor; and threatening the utter extermination of the family and relations of the man who would harbour him. But still he came not; and we can well understand the chagrin of Dsuchung, who could not but fear that his majesty had slipped out of his hands, and was hiding safely, or had fled to raise an army and contest the empire elsewhere. The heir apparent was, however, discovered in his hiding-place, and brought to Dsuchung; who spared his life, and made him Soong Wang, appointing him one of the palaces. This prince had fled before sunrise to the palace of prince Jow Kwei, who was unwell and not astir. To the repeated and loud knockings of the early visitor, the gate continued therefore closed up. He then fled to the house of one of his own servants, outside the palace walls, where he took refuge, and where he was discovered.

Greatly annoyed at the escape of the emperor, Dsuchung went

into the *Whangchi Hall*; and Jinhing issued a proclamation, ordering all the officials to present themselves "at court" on the 21st; and not one was absent! Dsuchung, with Jinhing, went into the inner palaces, conducted by Hwatswun and other principal eunuchs. He upbraided them for their desertion, and said they deserved to be beheaded. Hwatswun replied that it was "not they, but Heaven had abandoned him." But Chinaman though he was, Dsuchung sneered at this salve to the uneasy conscience so common in the east and west, and dismissed them with anything but complimentary language.

The concubines of the emperor were given away to the chiefs of Dsuchung's army, thirty to each chief man. One of them, a lady of great beauty and only fifteen years old, jumped into a well; but it contained only mud, whence she was extracted. She cried out that she was the princess, and if her captors did anything that was wrong, she would inform their chief. She was believed, and brought to Dsuchung, who discovered from the eunuch that she was not what she professed to be. He therefore handed her over to his general Jiao Lo, to whom she persisted in saying that she was of a truth of the heavenly yellow; but promised she would be true to him if he acted honourably towards her and made her his wife. Lo was overjoyed, and in his delight drank himself drunk, when she, with a sharp knife she had previously secreted, first cut his and then her own throat. When Dsuchung heard of the tragedy he was terrified, probably fearing a similar fate,—and ordered them both to be buried. Of the immense numbers of suicides, the dramatic manner in which many officials and servants followed their late master by sword, rope, fire and water, with the hundreds or thousands belonging to them who followed their example, it is unnecessary to say more than that they were composed of the most able and most faithful of his majesty's followers, who had strained their energies in fighting against the robbers without, and the more terrible and destructive enemies the eunuchs within. Nearly half a volume is occupied with the names and offices of those who thus committed suicide; but though not of the



highest rank, the story of Li Gwojun, count Hiangchung, is the most interesting. He had been taken by the rebels east of the *Doonghwa* gate, where he was shedding bitter tears, his hat off his head, and his hair covered with mud. He was brought to Dsuchung's presence, where he again wept and lamented, and struck his head against the wall, till the blood began to trickle down his face. He was forcibly held to prevent his injuring himself, and Dsuchung spoke most kindly to gain him over to acknowledge the new ruler. This he at last consented to do on three conditions:—1st, That the imperial tombs at Changping be restored; 2nd, That the emperor should be buried as it became an emperor to be; and 3rd, That the heir-apparent and the prince, his brother, should receive no harm. And so valuable was the acquisition of the count, the friend of the late emperor, that Dsuchung agreed to all the conditions. The count was himself the only mourner at the emperor's funeral. He followed the body to the grave of the honourable queen Tien, wife of the emperor, who had died before him and had received proper burial. At the grave he composed numerous verses to express his grief; and when he had lamented sufficiently, he went back to the empress' palace and there committed suicide.

The discovery of the dead body of the emperor had pacified the uneasy thoughts of Dsuchung, who was now certain of the throne. He ordered the immediate overthrow of the *Tai miao*, or Imperial Ancestral Temple, where the emperor worships his ancestors who died in the imperial yellow. But he was again unsuccessful in his attempt to cast "Yoongchang" cash. He was enthroned emperor in Peking on the ninth day from the fall of Peking, and the twelfth from the day on the night of which he arrived before the West wall of Peking. He reigned one day and then fled westwards, losing, before he passed Loogwochiao bridge, half of the enormous amount of plundered treasure, and half the numbers of captive women in his train.

CHAPTER VII.

INTO PEKING.

WOO SIANG was at one time lieut.-general at Kingchow in Liaosi. He was one of the general officers in charge of the army at Soongshan, which came to such frightful grief. He had altogether acted so badly or unfortunately, that he was degraded and thrown into prison.

He had a son, Sangwei, said to have been born in Kingchow, who from boyhood was so fond of soldiering that he invariably followed his father into his battles, though he had then no commission. He, however, forced himself into recognition, and won position by his bravery. He had so distinguished himself by the time Choonghwan ceased to be commandant of Ningyuen, that he was soon nominated to that vacant but important post. Kingchow was then in Manchu hands, and Ningyuen was the Ming outpost. He was so successful in checking the Manchus there, though his victories are unrecorded by Manchu historians, that he was considered the only man capable of saving the capital from Li Dsuchung. The emperor had been urged again and again to summon him to the defence of Peking, but always delayed, like all men of his character, till it was too late. When Dorgun was marshalling the Manchu troops in order to scour and secure all the lands east and north of Shanhaigwan, and if possible to push through that narrow and formidable gateway into Chihli, the Ming emperor sent Wang Yoongji with power to treat with the Manchus, as the robbers were now drawing near to the capital. Sangwei was created Pingsi Bai, count "Tranquillising the West"; and ordered at once to abandon all the land beyond Shanhaigwan, and to march to the

help of the terrified capital. He marched; but unfortunately for him and his main errand, he marched with a following of over half a million of people who had been protected by him on their estates on the rich loess valleys and hillsides of Ningyuen, and were now clinging to his skirts for shelter. This multitude of fugitives compelled him to move slowly. He took sixteen days to get through the border gate, and it was the twentieth day when he got to Fungyun hien. There he heard that Peking had fallen, the emperor had committed suicide, and Li Dsuchung had been proclaimed emperor. His soldiers were terror stricken, and he stood still to watch events.

When Sangwei was created count, his father, Woo Siang, had been liberated, and nominated marshal of the barracks of the capital. He was no more slow than the other officials in acknowledging Dsuchung as lord. But when this lord heard of the westward march of Sangwei he was afraid; and ordered the father to write a letter to Sangwei, commanding him with a father's authority to acknowledge the new emperor, as the condition of saving that father's life. This proves that had the advice of the censor been acted on when he urged the emperor to summon the hero of Ningyuen, Peking never would have fallen. Dsuchung also sent a messenger with forty thousand taels, and a force of twenty thousand choice men to garrison Shanhaigwan. The money was accepted by Sangwei, who was the only man possessing power who had not acknowledged Dsuchung, and the only man needed to firmly establish the new empire.

Sangwei had scarcely marched out by the South gate of Ningyuen, ere the ever-watchful eyes of the Manchus saw, and their ever-ready arms were stretched out to take for nothing a prize they had so long fought for in vain; and he was scarcely beyond the Great wall before the Manchus were in possession of the evacuated and hitherto impregnable city, and preparing to push further on.

Hoong Chungchow had previously reported to his new master that Li Dsuchung had assumed imperial rank; and knowing well, as an educated Chinaman of rank, what the disgust of his

fellow-countrymen would be at having not merely a new dynasty—for to this they could submit—but one founded in the nefarious manner in which Dsuchung had behaved himself throughout his robber-career; he, therefore, wisely urged the Manchus to appear as the avengers of the murdered emperor, the guardians of law, the protectors of the people, and to issue a proclamation to that effect without delay, inviting the Chinese soldiers to unite with them in rooting out the atrociously wicked robbers. He also mentioned that the number of mules, horses and camels, in Dsuchung's hands, could not be under three million, while the wealth in his possession must be simply incalculable. He advised secrecy and caution in the movement of the troops, so as to keep Dsuchung ignorant of their intentions; for while he was sure to march against, in hopes of crushing, Sangwei, if he heard of a probable combined attack by Manchus and Chinese, he would decamp from the capital after pilfering, and then burning all the palaces, and would leave an empty city to reward the toils of the army. More advice, which was excellent, he gave in the same epistle, but all was rendered unnecessary by the subsequent conduct of Sangwei.

Two days' good marching from the Liao river, west of Mookden, brought the Manchu army under the guardian Zooli Chin wang to the village of Wungchow, memorable as the spot where the following letter of Woo Sangwei's gladdened the heart of the prince and all his followers:—

“Sangwei, weak as a mosquito, is holding Shanhaigwan. He had intended to act as a bulwark to the empire in the far east, and thus fortify the capital. He had not conceived the possibility of a robber entering the palace, nor did he imagine it possible that a host of ministers would turn traitors, and open the city gates. The preceding nine emperors are now in misery, for the temples to their memory are burnt to the ground. At the present Heaven is wroth and men indignant, while the minds of all are unsettled, not knowing whither to look. They wait for deliverance,—for our kingdom has yet stores of brave men and virtuous. Hope is, therefore, not quite extinguished.

Among the governors of provinces there are sure to be men like Jin Wun* and Han Woo,† and some man is certain to appear as deliverer. Sangwei has had exceeding great favours bestowed upon him by his emperor. His mind is bent on revenging his master's death, but his place (means) is narrow and his men few. With tears of blood he, therefore, entreats the prince to aid us, and prays that the upright words of the only remaining faithful servant of the deceased emperor may not be unheeded, when he beseeches the prince to send on his best soldiers. The prince will march with his men, Sangwei with ours. We shall combine, reach the gate of the capital, and exterminate the robbers out of the palace. And if you, the kingdom of the north, aid my kingdom, can we offer you only money and goods? Yea, the very skin of our foreheads we shall be willing to cut off and throw at your feet. We dare not lie."

In reply to this delightful epistle the prince immediately sent off the Han‡ army, with the "Red-Coat" cannon, towards Shanhaigwan, while he next day penned the following from the camp of Silatala:—

"From the beginning, it was my desire to be on good terms with the Ming, and despatches conveying my good intentions were constantly sent to the court at Peking. Had your court addressed us in the friendly terms of your letter just to hand, our soldiers would never have been called out to fight; and our one aim even at the present moment is to restore tranquillity to the empire, to ensure the prosperity of the people and to put an end to war. Since I heard that the robber took possession of the capital and caused the suicide of the emperor, no hair is left

* Jin Wun's father sought his death in Lie gwo. He fled. His brothers, &c., put the father to death. Jin returned and became king.

† The father of Han Woo was murdered by his father-in-law, Wang Mang. Woo fled, but afterwards returned and was made emperor.

‡ That branch of his army, wholly composed of Chinese of Liaotung, who had joined him. Their descendants are distinguished from the ordinary Chinese to this day, and by the same name of *Han*.

on my head nor nails on my fingers, and the men I am now leading in the same spirit are determined to exterminate the robber, and to rescue the people out of the 'water and the fire.' I rejoice exceedingly that the count has sent me this letter, and in response I am now leading on my men. The count is praised as a most faithful and upright minister, and if you, count, desire to revenge the insult to your master, the count must determine not to live under the same heaven* as the robber. Though the count was formerly mine enemy, there is no reason because of bygones to harbour suspicious thoughts. Gwaijoong of old fighting against him, fixed an arrow in the belt of Hwan, who, when he attained the kingdom, afterwards employed Gwai, treating him as a father. If the count join me with his forces, he shall be made *Jinjiao Fan Wang*—vassal king—of his native place. Thus in the first place he can avenge the wrongs of his master, in the second his own, and the rewards of wealth and honour will continue like the mountain and the river."

The latter portion of both letters of course implied that the Manchus were to aim at the throne, which till lately they could not dream of attaining, and which, with the influence and prowess of Sangwei against them, combined with the hordes of the robber, they would find it difficult to seize and impossible to retain. The hearty co-operation of Sangwei was half the battle gained, for the accession of the one man most trusted in the north of China, would make the adherence of the people a matter of certainty; and in such haste were the leaders of the Manchus to strike at once, that they reached Shanhaigwan on the eighth day after their rest on the western bank of the Liao, a distance of 700 li, which ordinarily would take them from ten to twelve days. Sangwei marched out of the impregnable stronghold of Shanhaigwan to meet and welcome them and to make arrangements for action, as not a moment was to be lost; for the huge army of Li was almost within shot,—as eager as the Manchus not to let slip a moment. Li's approach was the greatest boon to the Manchus, for Sangwei was compelled to throw himself into

* An old classical phrase for the extreme of revenge; one of the two must die.

their arms unconditionally, and he had no time to reconsider and resile from his position. It was now impracticable for him to do otherwise than act as the betrayer of his country. He therefore had no alternative but to submit to the Manchu barber, who shaved off the hair of the fore-part of his head, plaiting the hair of the top and back of his head into the Manchu and Mongol queue, or "tail" as it is commonly called; and thus the head of the most important man in the north of China that day received the badge of slavery to a foreign yoke. He was ordered to stitch a piece of white cotton on the shoulder of all his men as a distinctive mark.

The Manchus pitched their camp 10 li east of Shanhaigwan, probably on the hill where the ruins of an enormous fort, embankments, and ditches remain to this day, on the side of the second line of low granite hills, whence they could see, though themselves invisible, from the city. At the very time when the Manchus were pitching their camp, twenty thousand of the choicest cavalry in the van of Dsuchung's army marched past the walls to attack the east gate, and distract the attention of Sangwei, while Li himself drew up a living wall of his two hundred thousand picked troops in a line from the north hill to the sea, passing close by the western gate, and occupying the whole valley between the Great wall and the sea.

Sangwei implored the Manchus to enter the city, but they retained their position. He marched out by the east gate and fell on the twenty thousand men there, speedily drove them back upon their main army, and his rear was clear.

The eastern and the western robbers are now on the point of meeting face to face, both confident of success and flushed with the moral courage of a course of all but uninterrupted victory. Dsuchung especially had latterly seen all opposition melt away before him like snow in May; but he laboured under the disadvantage of ignorance, for he was aware of the presence of only Sangwei, the Manchus having the advantage of full knowledge. The eastern and western robbers have now to decide in one grapple who is henceforth to be called the robber and who the ruler of the world by Divine right; for meantime

the justice and injustice of the respective armies are trembling in the balance, and victory must decide, as in the case of the chivalrous knights of old in the same circumstances, who is right and who wrong; for the strong must needs be right, and the successful cannot be unjust.

Zooichin wang Dorgun was aware that his opponents were not to be despised, and therefore decided to act with the utmost caution, paying no heed to the earnest entreaties of Sangwei for a junction, but ordering him to begin the fight with his own men. Was he thinking of the possibility of defeat, and the desirability of being unshackled in case of flight? At any rate he refused to move into the narrow and long street forming the citadel of four independently defensible cities into which Shanhaigwan is divided. If defeated, he acted wisely; for the army of Li could easily prevent the exit of the Manchu army from the city, and any number of men might be brought from Peking, who could surround the city several deep and starve the combined garrison. Defeat in the city, or to the west of the city, with a line of flight or retreat through the city, would simply be the annihilation of his brave army and the overthrow of his newly acquired kingdom.

Ds chung is also cautious, for he is aware of his bad fame among his fellow countrymen; and this last remnant of the Ming dynasty standing at bay on the last foot of soil still acknowledging that dynasty, will destroy him if it is not broken. For if detained some time before the gates of this city, there would be opportunity for other cities and armies to rise and obliterate him. He has raised a house of cards, and it only wants the last card to complete it; but a shakiness of the hand in placing this last card will throw it all down. Hence he too is cautious, though unaware of the glaring eyes of the lion ready to spring upon the crouching tiger. He therefore has Sangwei's father beside him on the west hill, to work upon the feelings of the son. He has the heir apparent of the late emperor, in order to weaken the hands of those who appear to be fighting against their lawful sovereign, and above all he has Yuenyuen in his train. By these moral restraints he

makes sure of victory, for his army outnumbered the troops of Sangwei by ten to one.

The next morning after the retreat of the twenty thousand, Sangwei received orders to march out by the west gate and strike right before him, into the very centre of the enemy. Zoui Wang, with Ying and Yü Wangs sat on horseback on the east hill, to watch the battle, themselves unseen, while Hoong Chungchow, Dsoo Dashow and the princes Koong and Shang deployed their men westwards and southwards between the city and the sea, so that their right could, when brought into action, touch the left of Sangwei; but both armies would scarcely cover half the opposite line.

Sangwei and his men pushed in with a will, and every man was instantly engaged. A wild Chihli north wind blew dust and small gravel into the faces of all the combatants, while it made a noise like thunder. On till mid-day did Sangwei's band fight fiercely, determined to conquer or die, though surrounded by several lines deep of the foe. They continued to fight and shout so as to shake the earth around, though every man had his wound and showed blood. The unequal contest could end in only one way in spite of valour; for the portion of Dsuchung's men engaged, did not show the least sign of weariness, when at mid-day the Manchus with three great shouts rushed forward by the south of the city, the wind going down at the same time. The two princes Ying and Yü galloped in the van at the head of their twenty thousand iron-breast-plaited horse. The attention of the men of Dsuchung was so rivetted, and their nerves already so tense with excitement by the prolonged fight, that the appearance of an unsuspected foe, the sudden charge, the Manchu breastplates and tails, threw them into complete confusion, and the furious charge broke them to pieces. The fight was now a flight, Dsuchung himself being the first to turn his horse's head. The pursuit was carried on for 40 li not only by the fresh army but by the almost exhausted troops of Sangwei, and the slaughter was awful. The booty in camels, horses and precious articles was immense; Dsuchung's homeless

men, as a matter of course, carrying their valuables with them wherever they happened to go.

As soon as the wearied men returned into Shanhaigwan a proclamation was issued to have every male's head shaved and queued; and the thorough nature of the defeat can be imagined from the fact that Zoot wang ordered Sangwei to pursue the fugitives with twenty thousand horse and foot. Thus fell into the hands of the Manchus the strongly fortified city of Shanhaigwan, which had prevented them retaining a foot of the country trodden or cities taken inside that barrier.

Dsuchung rested first in Yoongping, where he collected the remnant of his fine army and whence he sent our old acquaintance Jang Yolin, his officer and an old friend of Sangwei's, with overtures of peace to the latter, proposing to elevate the heirs of the late emperor to the throne. Sangwei refused to come to any terms, believing that the offer was insincere, or if sincere scarcely to his own advantage, especially hampered as he was by his unconditional submission to the Manchus. Dsuchung therefore hastened to the capital, put all the spoil of the rifled palaces in great waggons, on camel, horse and mule packs, burnt the palaces to the ground, and fled; not however before he executed every person belonging to Sangwei's family, thirty six souls in all, as well as the Ming princes, in the execution grounds. There was one however of Sangwei's connections who escaped the general destruction. This was Chun Yuenyuen, whose romantic history proves that "truth is stranger than fiction."

The last Ming emperor was a good hearted man, extremely anxious to do the right and deeply depressed by the ruinous anarchy which was spread like an uninterrupted cancer over the people he loved. But not among his provinces alone was discord universal. It found its way into the bosom of his family, for his "three palaces," i.e. his three empresses, were not free from jealousy. The "Central palace" or principal empress was at a loss how to gain the heart of her lord from the "Western palace," the third in rank of the empresses, with whom he spent a great part of his time. She hit upon the expedient of searching out

the most beautiful girl procurable and getting her into her own palace at any cost. Search was made by count Jiading, a friend of hers, and the lovely Yuenyuen was discovered, brought to her and bought with the certainty that the emperor would now frequent the secondary palace less than before, and womanly jealousy would be exultant. The emperor saw the beautiful girl of seventeen (eighteen in Chinese), asked who she was, praised her exquisite beauty, and passed on, never more referring to her, his mind being too deeply saddened by the state of his empire. The empress was foiled and disgusted, and therefore re-sold her to count Jiading.

Sangwei had pushed himself on to rank and fortune by sheer bravery, without the aid of all-powerful favouritism, making his way from the lowest offices to that of general; and so conspicuously brave above the brave was he, that the emperor chose him as the only man who could stem the Manchu torrent. He had, in more subordinate positions, kept off or driven back the Manchus before, and he was now elevated general of Shanhaigwan and the east, and was in the front rank of those highly esteemed by the emperor. When he was ordered off to Shanhaigwan, he was of course feted by those who honour prosperity and court the powerful; among others by count Jiading, the friend of the empress, who provided him a splendid feast and an accompaniment of beautiful singing girls. Sangwei carelessly cast his eye over the performers, and his attention suddenly became riveted on one whose beauty was surpassingly enchanting. This was Yuenyuen. He refused to eat any more food and drank no spirits, saying to the count in the most agitated manner, that he must have that girl for his wife; and on learning her situation he prayed the count to give or sell her to him. The count liked beauty himself and refused to part with her; and Sangwei went away more in grief than anger.

As soon as he was gone, the friends of the count advised him to send her to him, stating that as Sangwei was all-powerful at court, and could command what he pleased, it was unwise to rouse an enmity in his bosom which was sure to break out when

he returned from the east. The count therefore sent word to Sangwei that he might have her. Sangwei had a parting audience with the emperor on the following day, when he received a present of three thousand taels. In his gratitude to the count, he sent him a thousand; but as his business demanded haste, he left Peking before the girl was given him. She was therefore sent to the house of Woo Siang, his father, according to Chinese custom.

While Sangwei was successfully defending the east, Dsuchung got possession of the capital. Almost all the ministers joined him rather than die at his hands, and among the rest Woo Siang. A rebel officer who was searching Woo Siang's house was struck by the exceedingly great beauty of Yuenyuen, and took forcible possession of her.

As soon as Dsuchung had time to realise his own greatness, his glory, and his danger, he made Woo Siang write to his son Sangwei, informing him that it was now no use fighting against Dsuchung, especially as the Ming dynasty had proved itself incompetent to keep the power given it by heaven, while the new master of the capital dealt generously by all who acknowledged him, concluding with a prayer that Sangwei should immediately acknowledge the usurper, for otherwise the writer's life was forfeited, as well as the lives of his whole house.

This letter reached Sangwei's hands when he was at Fungyun, half way to Peking on his way to save the capital from this same Dsuchung. Knowing his own inability to cope with the upstart, and probably hoping the new would be quite as generous as his late master, he agreed to save his father's life on the terms proposed. After this agreement, in conversing with the messengers he asked about Yuenyuen; and when he learned that she was in the hands of a robber, whom his father permitted to take her away, his passion knew no bounds. He wrote to his father on the spot, renouncing him for ever. He marched his troops back to Shanhaigwan, and wrote the letter to his old enemies the Manchu princes, which is given above. Love is powerful in China as elsewhere, and this beautiful young Helen was the ruin

of the cause of him who seized her ; for Sangwei could have held the Manchus at bay as he had done before, and his army, with Dsuchung's, would drive them at least across the Liao again. But the seizure of Yuenyuen cost Dsuchung a throne and ultimately his life. When Dsuchung returned from Shanhaigwan, after his terrible defeat, knowing that Sangwei was the sole cause of his ruin, in his rage he executed the father and family of Sangwei, and would have executed Yuenyuen, who calmly said, "You had better not: if you kill me, he will pursue you with all the greater fury. If you send me to him, he may cease pursuing you." She was preserved alive, but not sent to him ; for the robbers took her with them in their retreat from Peking.

Sangwei never wearied in pursuing, fighting, and slaying the robbers of his beloved. He pressed them as hard as they could fly into and out of Shansi, knowing nothing of Yuenyuen till at Kiangchow. When he was about to cross the river, he saw her on the opposite bank, recognised, saved, and married her, and in his joy the robbers had a respite of some days.

Immediately after the decisive battle of Shanhaigwan, which opened the gates and palace doors of Peking with its untenanted throne to the Manchus, Woo Sangwei, the king-maker, was presented with an imperial court-dress, a dragon-embroidered robe, a jade girdle, a sable robe, a magnificent horse with a splendid saddle, a quiver, bow, arrows, and other valuables, with the title of Pingsi Wang, "king pacificator of the west," all of which, however, was but an earnest of good things in store. A proclamation was issued on the spot by the guardian wang—for Zooli wang, the younger, ignored the eldest brother ever since they were both made guardians—stating that his "army was here to exterminate robbers, to sweep away the terrible and to restore perfect peace;" while another to the soldiers "forbade the slaying of any person without arms, the seizure of men's property or the destruction of their houses ; any one disobeying these orders would be treated as a wild beast."

One day's rest after the battle completed the arrangements and plans for pursuing the robbers, and with a stroke of policy

worthy of his great father, the guardian placed the Chinaman Sangwei over the attacking army, for no Chinaman would wish other than well to his fellow-countryman thirsting for vengeance on the murderer of his emperor, and his father, though there was a still more powerful motive appealing to himself. No one would therefore oppose his march; and only the cities where the faithful friends of the rebels held guard would close their gates against him; while the march of an army with a foreign and despised barbarian Manchu at its head might have to work its way through a sulky, disaffected people, and to force open the gates of every city on its march. As the robbers had already fled, and had the advantage of a few days' start, Sangwei did not enter Peking; but passed on in rapid marches, fast gaining upon them; for they were heavily laden with the rich booty of the capital, as well as that of several provinces. He therefore had his van soon up with their rear, and cut them down daily as the one fled and the other pursued. The pursued several times turned round and obstinate fights and stubborn battles took place, but the only thing Dsuchung ever gained was a little time for his baggage to go ahead.

Sangwei and his fellow commanders were in all the greater haste pursuing these five hundred thousand men of Dsuchung's, fearing that he would be able to flee into Toongwan, and have time sufficient to make that all but impregnable pass altogether impregnable and defy them; or that he would take the scarcely less objectionable route to the west, and cross Shansi into Kansu, among whose interminable mountains he could always evade them, and secure the countless treasure now in his possession.

The forces against him had therefore to be divided, Sangwei, with the princes Ajiga and Shang, taking the route westwards to Tatoong, in order there to cross the border, summon all the Mongol troops of that neighbourhood to their standard, prevent Dsuchung's escape into Kansu, and march down through Yülin, Yenán, the west of Shensi, and press him in Toongwan from the north; while the Soo prince Dodo, with prince Koong, advanced into Honan, whence they would attack the Gwan from

the south. The Manchu soldiers had to swear before starting that they would slay no innocent person, burn no man's house, and destroy no man's property. To allay public fear, proclamations were published of a similar import.

On the twelfth moon, Dodo crossed the river at Munghien at the ford of Mungjin, drove off a rebel army at Loyang, took the forts and barricades on the river banks, entered Shenchow, broke up a rebel army at Lingbao, and took up his position some distance south of Toongwan; and as the heavy artillery was not yet arrived, the only movement he was able to make was to force on a body of three thousand men to snatch possession of a village 30 li south of the Gwan, and to camp in its streets. Dsuchung had already posted a strong force on the south side of the hill at no great distance hence. The commander of this force immediately surrounded the village, investing it for three days; but owing to the watchfulness of the men within, he got no opportunity of taking them at unawares, and was not bold enough to attack them openly.

Next month, the main south army arrived, when Dsuchung issued out of his stronghold with his large army, fought valiantly and obstinately, but vainly; for a band of three thousand horse suddenly appeared in his rear,—a move which was always the Manchu tactics,—and galloping in among his men threw them into the greatest disorder. He had therefore to retire, as again, in a night assault. As soon as the heavy artillery arrived, the Manchus pressed in to the very mouth of the pass, where they were opposed by deep ditches; but their cannon fired far. The army in the gorge was so large that there was scarcely room enough to move. They sent some hundreds of fleet horsemen as ambush into a side gully, who attacked the Manchu flank, while another picked infantry force fell upon the rear; both however were broken by the Manchu light horse.

Just at this time Sangwei, who had pursued and had fought conquering battles with the rebels on the way from Peking, came up with his augmented army, having crossed the river on rafts at Paote chow, taken the cities of Yen-an and Linchow,

passing north of Singan, and was now advancing towards the north of the Pass. Dsuchung, seeing himself about to be invested at both ends of the pass, drew off his men to Singan, leaving a strong garrison in the pass. But its commander with his seven thousand men surrendered. Thus Toonggwan fell; and two days' march, after a rest, brought the combined army to the gates of Singan, which they found deserted by the rebel army after the palaces and public buildings had been burnt to the ground. They heard that the rebels had marched into Hookwang, with the reported intention of falling on and seizing Nanking, where Foo Wang, a representative of the late dynasty, had been proclaimed emperor.

From February 1645 till August 1646, Dsuchung, with between two and three hundred thousand men, was pursued by the combined army by land and water. He was hunted up at Tunghow, Chungtien, Tuangan, Woochang, Foochukow, Sangjiakow, Kiwkiang, and defeated in eight great battles. He fled with the greatest precipitation to Kiwgoong shan, difficult mountains 90 li south of Toongshan hien of Woochang. The hills were searched for him in all directions but in vain, till at last a deserter reported that Dsuchung and twenty of his foot followers were surrounded by the villagers, and seeing no way of escape, had strangled himself. When the body was discovered, it was beyond recognition. Thus ignobly as he deserved ended the wonderful career of one of the most remarkable robbers—for to the end he was a robber—which the world has produced. His remaining two hundred thousand men, under Number-One Tiger, crossed the lake and joined Ho Tungjiao, the Ming viceroy.

When Sangwei drove Dsuchung to the border of Shansi he gave up the pursuit at Tutu, after having frequently beaten him. He then returned with his army into Peking for the first time, and the young, newly installed emperor prepared him a feast and made him a present of ten thousand taels. He again, by imperial orders, marched his army into the capital after Dsuchung was found dead, and was there some months, when another present

of twenty thousand taels was made him. Again in 1651, before starting for Yunnan, he was invited to see the emperor, who gave him a gold coat of mail.

After the battle of Shanhaigwan, Dorgun the regent entered Peking, on the 1st of the fifth moon (June), and found the object of his highest ambition within his grasp. He at once decided to remove the capital from Mookden to Peking, and sent high officials to escort his nephew, the child of five years old, who had been selected to succeed his father, and who became the first Manchu emperor of China, though the uncle was the real ruler, and an able one. He also sent swift messengers with despatches to the Mongols and Corea, intimating the change that had taken place. The news of the fall of Peking put into his hands the keys of all the cities north of Paoting, which with Taming and Chunting still acknowledged Dsuchung. Shantung and Honan cities rose upon and murdered the garrisons of Dsuchung, but held the cities for Foo Wang. As soon as Dorgun was in full charge of Peking, he sent out armies in all directions:—Princes Ajiga and Sangwei, by the west route; and prince Dodo by the south, marching through Honan, with secret instructions to cross Yangtsu river and sack Nanking. Both these armies were primarily to pursue and destroy Dsuchung. Yechun was sent through Googwan to restore order in Shansi; and Bahana to recover Shantung.

Because of the universal and destructive anarchy subsequent on the death of the late emperor, Footing, Tatoong, and the west, elected Dsaochiang wang, a relation of the late emperor's, to the vacant throne. He was all the more ready to accept his elevation as he was unaware of what treatment he and the imperial family would receive at the hands of the Manchus. The regent immediately issued two proclamations; a general one to the effect that all who submitted to the newly established regime would retain the rank, influence and emoluments belonging to them under the late dynasty; and another special, announcing the imperial displeasure at the elevation of this wang to be emperor, stating that the rank which he previously

held would still be his; but that to assume the power of conferring new ranks, or of rearranging public matters, civil or military, was an infringement of the law which could not be tolerated.

In six months Yechun could report "tranquillity" in Honan and Shansi, he having driven out the isolated bands of robbers, most of whom joined Dsuchung; and he took or received the keys of nine Foo, twenty-seven Chow, and one hundred and forty-two Hien cities. Paoting and the other cities of Chihli fell before the governor of the province, and the governor of Hüenfoo restored order in his district, defeating the robbers and slaying their apprehended chiefs, as a sacrifice to revenge the late emperor.

The governor-general of Shensi reported to Peking that a crazed or "possessed" man set up a "*joo*,"—a very long slip of wood with a prayer or incantation written upon it, thrown high in the air to ascertain the will of Heaven. He called himself a duke, assumed the title of emperor, and had many myriad men to follow him. The governor first heard of it as he was seated in his office, and on going outside found crowds in the most excited state, and confusedly shouting that ever so many dragons had been seen to come down from heaven. The headman of the village where this was said to have taken place, sent in by order that which had appeared to be a dragon, and it was found to be a volume of incantations.* The duke was, thereupon, apprehended and beheaded, and tranquillity was restored; for the "mesmerised" multitudes quietly dispersed.

Though the Shantung cities declared against the robbers, they were far from desirous to open their gates to the Manchus; and had the emperor south of the Yellow river possessed more sense, he could easily have retained a powerful empire in the south, as

* The most marvellous stories are circulated and universally believed by high and low in China of the power of secret societies, who by their magical incantations can equal the witches' broomstick, and attract at pleasure specie and women from any distance! All the world is kin! They too believe that this sorcery has no power over very good people.

the Sung dynasty did when the Liao and Kin dynasties (see those dynasties in "History of Corea"), also from northern Manchuria, seized the north of the Yellow river. But though the cities asserted their liberty, the country was overrun, and many villages wholly and strongly occupied by the bands of robbers; for the life-blood had been sucked out of the province,—first by the Manchus from Mookden, then by the rebels from the west,—whose occupation caused the people to sink into the most abject misery of absolute poverty. So much so, that when, in the end of 1644, a remission of one-third of the taxation was proclaimed for the empire, the acting governor-general prayed that the two-third tax should be collected only for cultivated ground; for if the tax were imposed on the acreage of the province formerly cultivated, it would imply not a decrease, but an enormous increase; inasmuch as scarcely one acre in ten, certainly not one in five, was now under cultivation; and the families remaining in the country consisted each of only one or two individuals. Though prince Haogo, with Abana, had been there nearly a year, the province was as far from being occupied as when they went. The prince was, therefore, "relieved" by prince Abatai. Hoto, the Meirunjangjing, reported that a band of rebels marched towards Tsingchow, with banners flying and drums beating, to submit to the authorities. The vice-president, Wang Aoyoong, gladly welcomed them; but they were no sooner inside the city than they took possession, slew Aoyoong, and remained masters. Hoto laid siege immediately, took the city, and slew the leader of the robber band.

The governor-general and Taotai of the "River" or "Canal," reported, in 1645, that in a large district of Shantung, occupying the whole territory within the jurisdiction of four Hien cities, covering an area of 200 or 300 li in circumference, there were over a thousand caves, the most noted of which were called Yangshan, Kinshan, Taiyiji, Huajiaji, Sangkwoji, Lokiaji. The whole district was known by the name of "Mankia caves." These were occupied by many poor people during the ceaseless troubles there under the Ming dynasty; and when the robbers,

who were plundering and firing property, were defeated by the governor-general last year, they fled into these caves. On the arrival of Abatai, he directed his whole energies at once, and with success, against those caves, most of which he took and filled up. There were, however, two with several entrances, narrow and protected by many fire-arms. These long defied him, for no man dared approach them. At length he took possession of the path by which the robbers carried their water, cutting off their supplies. Some time after, the inmates were all found strangled. Thus the last resistance to Manchu rule was crushed in Shantung, the cities, unable to make any resistance in favour of the southern emperor, who neglected them,—having all ere now been received under the Manchu banner.

When the regent, now absolute if not nominal master of the Manchus and their power, arrived in Peking, he received the same submissive and universal homage which had been given by the same officials to Dsuchung. Fungchüen, one of the chief members of the Hanlin College, required an invitation before he appeared. The literary officials immediately occupied themselves for some months in writing infallible prescriptions for the recovery of the ruined empire, all of which were good enough. The first advised attention to seven matters: To make a register of all good men known; to search out those good men now hiding in the provinces; to exterminate the robbers; to issue proclamations to allegiance; to establish peace among the people and speedily to disband the army; and to punish the many covetous and extortionate officials. Others followed in constant succession, harping very much upon the same points, and apparently as anxious to display their power of wielding the pencil as their desire of reforming the state. One minister urged the necessity of carrying out the ancient law compelling farmers to plant trees; and to recall those families which had fled from their native place.

Status was another vexed question demanding serious attention; as well as the publication of certain fixed rules laying down the qualifications for office. The governor of Peking,

while urging this latter point, declared that the policy which had guided the past, indiscriminately replacing in their former offices all who had been dismissed by the late government, was neither a safe nor a prudent one; for many had been degraded for malpractices, such as co-partnery with robbers; and because of the action of that policy bad men were fearless.

To all these the regent replied that he had only begun to govern "all under heaven," but his one aim was to protect and cherish the people; that as to the magistrates already invested, it would be improper to investigate into their antecedents, but that any future applicant found guilty of crimes would be beheaded, and that examination and punishment would be according to the laws of the late dynasty. It is possibly because of official action contrary to that statute of forgetfulness, that the emperor agreed in the end of the year to the prayer of a memorial, that if after an amnesty any official should re-accuse a man of a crime perpetrated before that amnesty, he should be declared guilty of rebelling against the emperor.

He thus inaugurated the wise policy which has retained the dynasty so long on the throne of a people a thousand times more numerous than his own. He felt the weakness of his sword if he had to trust to it alone, and therefore went as far as he dared and much further than many of his kinsmen and clansmen desired, in his efforts to reconcile a proud and civilised people to the rule of men just reclaimed by their arms from a semi-savage life; forming in some degree a parallel to the Roman conquest of Greece. The same policy induced him to send Fungchüen to sacrifice at all the tombs of the Ming emperors, ultimately to raise a tomb and make sacrifice to the last of them, and to postpone the shaving of the head and the adoption of the Manchu cap and clothing till a more convenient season. He had to take action of some kind on a memorial sent in by the governor of Shantung, who stated that formerly etiquette and music were cultivated by officials to prove them men of literature; that official hats and raiment discriminated them from the common people. He complained that neither of these was

attended to by those officials recently appointed to Shantung, and prayed that they be ordered to appear in the collarless robe and the two-flapped official cap of the Ming dynasty, for that men's minds were ill at ease, fearing they had been sent as military rather than as civil officials. The regent replied that war was only just over, but that proper attention would be at once given to etiquette, music and the other matters mentioned; and that meantime those officials would be requested to wear Ming costume.

The question of etiquette caused a great sensation on the reception of the child emperor in October, when he arrived from Mookden. The cause of it is thus given by the censor who drew imperial attention to it:

"Of old those who had suffered the unspeakable degradation of having to become eunuchs, were employed to sprinkle water on and to sweep the floor, and were incapable of appearing face to face with, as the equal of, an official. Because of the great love of the Ming emperors for them, they had them set over the stores—*changwei*. That love was rewarded by three of the chief eunuchs opening the gates of Peking and welcoming all the misery inflicted by the rebels. Because our government was grieved at their conduct, the chief of them were beheaded, and the money and grain—*changwei*—handed over to proper custodians, and the far and the near rejoiced. But on the great reception day, when the emperor prepared a feast for all his ministers, men of that sort, eunuchs, rushed forward and were the first to welcome the emperor, thus affronting his majesty and shaming the ministers. I therefore pray the emperor to prevent the entrance of these men in future along with the ministers on reception days." And the emperor granted the prayer of this apparently Manchu minister; and up to the present time the eunuchs have never regained a shadow of their former power.

But most important of all was the act of transforming the late brother and father of the regent into gods (*shun*), and introducing them into the ancestral temple specially devoted to their use and honour. Without this temple, and these ancestral gods, no

emperor can be. Sacrifices were then offered to Heaven and Earth, to each of which there is a magnificent temple and altar without images, enclosed in very extensive grounds to the south of the capital. The former is dedicated to the invisible Heaven, the Supreme Ruler Shangdi, to whom the emperor alone is permitted to sacrifice twice each year—in the beginning of spring and autumn. The visible heavens, or rather the great generator, the sun, has got mixed up in the Chinese mind with the invisible,—the earth being also regarded as a living being, and the mother of all things living. The Chinese notions on this subject are much more pantheistic than materialistic. Besides these there are other gods, also strictly imperial. They are the *Shuaji*, or National Lares, representing the gods of Grain and Fruit. Hence losing the *Shuaji* is synonymous with losing the empire, and acquiring the *Shuaji* is equivalent to gaining the empire; while the importance attached to these gods may be estimated from the saying which frequently occurs in the writings of able men,—that the interests of the people are of main consideration, those of the *Shuaji* of secondary, *i.e.*, the people first, next the emperor.

A successful hunt was made in all the provinces for unearthing every man who had scholastic ability, and lists were presented to the proper authorities, with the caution that there might be some among them with bought titles, who desired to find means to satisfy their covetousness, and some who could use the pen well, but might employ it to extort money by threats of making false accusations. Vice-president Wang Aoyoong had been sent into Shantung to discover the “hiding men of merit.” Like all others engaged in this hunt, he was successful; but though he forwarded a letter from Joo Yooli, a Ming prince, proposing submission, he reported very unpalatable news from the south,—that Foo Wang was declared emperor in Nanjoong (Nanking); that he had assumed the style of *Hoonggwang* for his reign, and had made Shu Kofa privy councillor, while the lieutenant-generals Liw Dsaiching, Liw Liangdso, Hwang Duagoong, and Gao Jie, had been ordered northwards to protect the northern

provinces. He prayed that a high minister should be ordered to examine into and settle this southern difficulty. His memorial was received in Peking in August, 1643; but the regent had already sent the following despatch to Shu Kofa by the hands of a major-general who had joined the Manchus from the south:

“Your son,* while yet at *Shunyang*, was well aware of the condition of Yenking.† After passing through the Barrier, and breaking the power of the Robber, I became acquainted with the literary men, though some of your younger brothers‡ I had known in the ranks of the *Ching*, to whom I committed many important trusts,—among them that of sending letters revealing our entire heart desirous of peace, and I was grieved because there appeared no definite time when we could come to know each other. It is now reported that tattling travellers prattle about the elevation of an emperor in Kinling,—*Golden Tombs* or Nanking. But the enemy (who has murdered one’s prince or father) cannot live with him under the same heaven.§ The teaching of the ‘Spring and Autumn’ Annals is that ‘rebels unpursued prevents the obsequies of the lately deceased prince, or the elevation of a successor.’ The first duty of all, therefore, is to punish the rebelling minister, and crush every robber’s son. The ‘Bolting’ robber Dsuchung, bent on overturning the kingdom, destroyed the prince. China’s ministers and people have not heard of your sending one arrow against him. But Woo Sangwei, on the eastern frontiers, bitterly lamenting the fate of the throne, determined to display his faithfulness and uprightness as an official; which spirit we greatly praised, forgetting the little differences we formerly had. We were therefore ready to summon our men at his entreaty, and take upon us the character of the bitter enemy of this ferocious robber. And on entering the capital, our

* Expression of humility, indicating the writer.

† Ancient name of Peking; Shunyang is the Chinese name of Mookden.

‡ Men of learning inferior to Kofa.

§ Classical quotation—one of the two must die in demanding vengeance.

first care was to bury the emperor and empress in Shanling (mountain tomb) in accordance with the traditional imperial rites. All officials and ministers under the rank of prince and commander were retained in the respective offices and ranks formerly held by them ; while both civil and military officials have been, in many instances, raised in rank. Fear is banished from farmer and merchant ; and there has not been political storm enough to ruffle a harvest feather. Men's minds are now tranquillised to the happy medium of autumn weather.

"A commander has been ordered to the west to restore order there ; but instead of an army, we send an epistle to the south of the Kiang, to summon you to unite your forces to ours at Hoswo,* and there, with one heart, to become the common avengers of prince and kingdom ; and thus shall be demonstrated the virtue occupying our throne. Who knows how brief a space of security you princes of the south can count on ? Your peace may be destroyed any morning or evening. Do you not perceive that the present is your opportunity ? If you consider only those matters important which are at your doors, is not the name of prince an empty title ? This is sleepily to have forgotten real danger. I cannot understand you.

"We came into Yenking, but took it, not from the Ming dynasty, but from a robber who had overthrown the temples of the Ming emperors and put all your ancestors to shame. Our men fear not battle, whether the easy victory or the terrible combat ; and how should the filial son and the man of integrity repay our generosity ? You remained at your ease in the south, while we were slaying and driving out the rebellious robber ; and when we had driven him out, you set up as heroes in Kiangnan, seeking nothing but your own personal gratification.† Consider whether this is correct conduct. In my opinion, you are attempting the impossible ; for you cannot cross the Road of

* Name of the regions bordering the Yellow river in Shensi and Shansi,—the river sources, or its higher reaches.

† Literally, "the fisherman's profit," which is small and uncertain.

Heaven (Milky Way), nor can you stop a river by throwing a whip into it. That robber was but the foe of the Ming family; he had done nothing to cause him to be regarded as the enemy of our people. Your cause of hatred against him is like the Yangtsu: ours is but shallow. We seek only to make our righteousness manifest to all. But if you desire to erect an empire, then 'heaven has two suns,'* and you must be regarded as a hostile nation. Our men may be recalled from the west, and marched towards the east. The robber we may pardon and employ as vanguard and guide against you; and thus surround you, like a pool of water, with all the power of China. Do you really think you can found a kingdom in a little corner† on the left of the Kiang? It requires no calculation to know who shall be victor.

"We have heard that the superior man loves because of virtue, the mean man because of small favours. Every superior man understands the times, and knows from events the decrees of heaven. You should constantly remember your former lord, and love with a deep affection your virtuous (deceased) ruler; and you should exhort your new master to lay aside his title, come to us and receive endless prosperity. The throne is ready to receive him as an honoured guest, to make him liberal gifts and confer upon him both mountains and rivers, and to place him in rank above all the princes and nobles. You will also thus enable the throne to carry out its original design, to crush rebellion, to put all the robbers to the sword, and to restore and put in order what they destroyed. Thus too when we get to Nanking we shall be able to gift lands to your dukes, your marquises and all your nobles according to their rank. You have Pingsi wang as an example, following which you will find the only profitable plan. Those literary men and magistrates who come to us late, love to have their names elevated on high trees as upright men,

* In allusion to the saying of Mencius that "Heaven has not two suns, nor a kingdom two rulers."

† Nanking lies on the south of the Yangtsu in the "corner," after it winds away to the north.

but their thoughts are not all for the welfare of the people. When there is an important national business, each has his own house to build.

“The ancient Soong officials wrangled and debated; but were yet undecided what to do when the enemy* crossed the river. The history of the Yin dynasty, and the part of the various literary actors in it should serve as an example. It is best at an early stage to follow the custom. But whether to sink or swim, to be saved or lost, to obey or oppose, it is well to come to an early and a determinate resolution; for when our soldiers march, it is uncertain whether it shall be for the east or the west. The future peace or danger of the southern kingdom hangs on your present movements. We are anxious that all you princes should march together with us against the robbers; we entertain better hopes of you than this opposition.

“We have heard it said that only the man of virtue can bear extreme words. All our very bowels and heart are laid bare before you, in order to make instruction perfectly intelligible. Our hopes of you are however very great.† We are waiting on the tiptoe of expectation. This epistle falls far short of our intentions to befriend you.”

The regent was perhaps quite correct in his belief that if he gained Shu Kofa, the south of the Kiang would fall to him, at least as easily as the north was being annexed by Sangwei. But Kofa, if not equal to Sangwei as a soldier, was greatly his superior as a man; and while Sangwei threw himself at the feet of the Manchus to gratify private revenge, no consideration of any kind, private or public, would induce Kofa to retreat from a cause of whose stability he must have had grave suspicions at that very moment. In reply, therefore, to the skilful but sophistical letter of the regent, he sent the following epistle, at least as skilful, while more artfully artless in parrying that

* The Yuen or Mongol dynasty, which in Mareo Polo's time took the capital of the Soong dynasty.

† Literally; the “Kiang (Yangtsu) and Heaven are in my hopes.”

sophistry, than the regent was carelessly artless in parading his threats.

"Of the great Ming empire, the commander-in-chief and president of the Board of War, the grand secretary Shu Kofa, kowtowing replies to the great Ching imperial regent, the dweller under the palace. We of Nanjoong have most respectfully received your excellent letter. According to propriety we should have sent a messenger to enquire into the conduct of the great commander Woo;* but we were not so unceremonious as to rush† into your presence, for we could not treat you as we would a country boor. Truly an official is without thought of private gain, according to the teaching of the Annals. We are at present in confusion, and your letter came a glittering precious gem, as if direct from heaven. Several times over have I studied it most carefully, to discover all its meaning.

"That rebellious robber does certainly deserve the extreme vengeance of Heaven; and your honourable kingdom grieves with us. For you I have only gratitude, and for myself shame. I much fear those around me do not investigate the truth of the matter. You state that we princes and people of Nanjoong in desiring to set up an empire on the left of the Kiang forgot our duty to prince and father, and the vengeance demanded at our hands; I will therefore place the matter plainly before your honourable kingdom.

"Our departed great emperor feared Heaven, and revered his ancestors; he carefully attended to his imperial duties, and loved his people. He was indeed a worthy successor of Yao and Shwun.‡ But incapable ministers mismanaged the national business, and hence the affair of the 19th of 3rd moon.§ I was

* Sangwei, probably intimating that he was still regarded as a Ming commander.

† Literally, "Push through the officials on your left and right (hand)."

‡ The two emperors of China first in honour as in time;—who were themselves paragons of virtue and loved to see all virtuous. Yao is said to have begun his reign B.C. 2357; and because his own son was other than virtuous, Yao disinherited him and gave his kingdom to Shwun, along with his two lovely daughters.

§ The death of the emperor.

then in the south because of my sins, and in my endeavour to save the capital got to the river Hwai with my army, when we heard the fiercely cruel news. It was as if the earth was broken up and the heavens rent asunder; the mountains were scorched, and the sea wept. Alas, alas! what man is there without a prince? If it could save the throne I would be cut in pieces on the execution ground; but would my death in the least serve to set forth the excellencies of him who is underneath the sod?

“At that time the officials and people of Nanjoong mourned and lamented as for a father. And there was not a man who did not gnash his teeth and clench his fist and vow vengeance on the murderer, while all demanded that the armies of the south-east should at once be set in motion to destroy the robber. But two or three aged ministers said, ‘The kingdom is broken up; the prince is perished; the ancestral manes are of the first importance. Our chief duty is to consult together to discover a successor. The present emperor is the ‘heart’ of China and the world; and the descendant of no other than the reigning family of China, and was as the elder brother of the departed emperor. His reputation was excellent and his speech correct. Heaven smiled upon him, and men acknowledged him a real ruler. On the 1st of 5th moon his imperial carriage got to *Nandoo*.* The myriad families lined the road, and the shouts of joyful welcome were heard over several li. When all the ministers and officers pressed around urging him to accept the throne, he with an air of sorrow again and again declined, but was at length prevailed upon, and on the 15th day he was enthroned. Just before, a phoenix was seen to alight, and the muddy river became transparently clear. Other auspicious omens occurred very frequently. When he went to the Ancestral Temple a purple cloud hung over his head. When the paper with prayers was burnt it mounted up high into the air, seen by myriad eyes, who rejoiced at the happy omen. The Kiang in a great flood brought down many tens of myriads of pieces of wood to build

* *Nandoo* and *Nanking* mean the same thing, viz., southern capital; contradistinguished from *Peking*, the north capital.

the palaces and imperial residences. Does not all this clearly display the will of Heaven?

"After a few days, I was ordered with the army north of the Kiang to march westwards and give an account of the robbers, when I suddenly heard that our great general Woo Sangwei had asked for the aid of your honourable kingdom, and had broken and was pursuing the rebellious robber; and that our departed emperor and empress had been buried with the proper ceremonies, the palaces swept out, and the people protected; while the law compelling them to shave their heads was repealed, with the evident desire of preventing them from forgetting their native dynasty. All this was of such distinguished excellency that among moralists ancient and modern, not one could do other than praise; and all the Ming ministers kowtowed towards the north. Not only thus, according to the Ming saying, did we 'praise your goodness and wish (you) well;' but in the eighth moon we had come to the conclusion to forward messengers with presents to your army, to consult with you as to the settlement of the empire, and to unite our men with yours in crushing the western robbers. And on our way we got to the Hwai river, where I received your letter severely disapproving of my conduct and applying the teaching of the Annals to reprove me. And how wonderful is the wisdom of the sentiments of that reproof! But setting aside the words, we find the facts of the Liegwo* to have been that on the death of any prince, the heir should at once succeed, and his officials would not voluntarily die while there were unpunished rebels in his territory. But if the emperor should die, and if the heir and his brothers because of their deep grief refuse to have the throne occupied, the great doctrine of propriety is rendered unintelligible.†

* Liegwo, "separate kingdoms," a term given to the small kingdoms of northern China nominally acknowledging the Chow dynasty, which was too weak to make its authority felt beyond the palace, like the Indian Moguls. It is the history of this period which is known as the "Spring and Autumn" (annals) written by Confucius.

† For there must always be an emperor, as the westerns say, "the king never dies;" but there would be no emperor if the throne were vacant during the three years of mourning demanded by Chinese etiquette, when every official mourning his parent is compelled to retire into private life.

"China was like a boiling pot,—fire without and turmoil within; and troops were incessantly on the move. How could men's minds be knit together seeing that of 'faithful and upright,' only one remained? The teaching of the Annals is that though Mang* took possession of the imperial Han incense-tripod, Gwangwoo afterwards regained possession. The emperor Hwai and Min† lost the empire; yet emperor Yuen was proclaimed (A.D. 317) long before he put down the rebels infesting the empire; and the Sung emperor Gao‡ was proclaimed (A.D. 1127) though he never put down the rebels. Though all these took the throne, before they had secured more than a small portion of the empire from the rebels, history does not in the remotest manner hint at any impropriety in their conduct,—while it does always maintain that the dynastic line should be preserved unbroken. While the Yuen emperor Juyooen was still on the throne in his capital, the heir of Szchuen ascended the imperial throne at Lingwoo; and though the officials discussing the matter thought it a mistake, none pronounced it an error; for the light was replaced on the old lamp, founding the Ming dynasty. This our native Ming dynasty had sixteen emperors, each the lineal descendant of his predecessor, or the proper heir of his family. Their benevolence and mercy extended everywhere. Your honourable kingdom in former times was the vassal of our former dynasty and several times received investiture at its hands. Have you not heard of it

* Wang Mang, an able man and father in law of the emperor Ping of the Han dynasty, who began to reign A.D. 1, and was soon afterwards murdered by his father in law, who was a short time regent for the child-brother emperor Ping, but soon became nominal emperor as well as real ruler. A civil war broke out which dethroned and killed him, and Gwangwoo became emperor in A.D. 25,—though the original splendour of the Han was never recovered. The burning of incense, &c., to Heaven, is the peculiar duty of the emperor who is great high priest.

† Tsin dynasty, A.D. 313.

‡ The Sung dynasty which had ruled over all China was driven out of the north by the Kitan who were known as the Liao dynasty; and across the Yangtsu by the Kin dynasty, of the same stock as the Manchus, when the southern Sung dynasty was founded in Nanking by Gao, whose example Shu Kofa and his colleagues were trying to imitate. See "History of Corea."

in the Record-house of Treaties and Covenants? At present you lament over the hardships of the native dynasty, and have driven out the traitorous robber. Your conduct may indeed be called great uprightness, and is worthy of a place in the Spring and Autumn annals.

“Formerly the Kin kingdom was in perfect accord * with the Sung dynasty (A.D. 1120—1234), but was exempt from paying tribute, both exchanging a certain sum of gold. When Hwi Ho assisted the Tang dynasty it was not with the desire of taking possession of their lands.† Your honourable kingdom has certainly been actuated with a sincere desire to do well to the world. Your armies have marched in a just cause, and myriad generations shall look back upon your noble deeds, and criticise the manner in which you will now act. If, taking advantage of our troubles, you, by marching as an enemy against us, throw away the good reputation already secured, you will be judged as having accepted the hem of her garments for the whole of virtue; you will have begun in seeking justice, you will have ended by pursuing profit; and you will thus give the lawless robbers reason to laugh in secret.‡ Is it possible for your honourable country to act so?

“The departed emperors sought always the welfare of the country, and could not utterly destroy even offenders, and we are all spared to the present. Our new emperor, with his heaven-gifted bravery and warlike spirit, is constantly meditating

* There was a good deal of fighting before the Kin dynasty drove the Sung across the Yangtsu, each afterwards ruling over half China; but while the Kin gave the Sung a certain amount of gold, far more than the value of that gold was repaid by the Sung in silks;—a sort of black-mail, which Chinese rulers have always known how to pay. The picture is highly coloured by Kofa, but his object is evident,—there may be now as then two independent empires.

† Hwi Ho, after changing from one Kokhan to another, became one of the most powerful of the Mongols, and the principal rival of Sieli the Kokhan of the eastern Tooküe who made the Tang emperors tremble. He was as often the plunderer of Chinese soil as its friend, but saved the dynasty from destruction by opposing and often defeating the Tooküe or Turks.

‡ Because the “virtuous” indignation which pursued them, was but the cloak of the same principle of plunder which actuated themselves.

revenge, making the ancestral temple his one thought. Our ministers are of one mind in seeking the welfare of the state, and the mail-coats are standing tear in eye and hand on sword,—all, people and soldiers, faithful and true, ready to die for their country. All are of one mind that the Heaven-abandoned, Bolting-robber, should not have lived till the present. There is a saying that, ‘To establish a good reputation, you must strive your best to cherish it; to put away evil, you must exert yourself to end it.’ The rebellious thief has not yet received his reward from heaven. We know only that he is escaped to Shensi. But we are eager to be revenged. Not only have we the hate against him, which will not allow us both to live under the same heaven,—but we know, and depend upon the knowledge, that your honourable kingdom grieves that the evil is not yet obliterated. We, therefore, bowing to the ground, pray for a strongly cemented union with you, so that together we may complete the work you have so nobly begun,—unite our armies, press in, and on Shensi ground judge the guilty of his crime. Let us both unite to cut off the head of the robbers, and appease our common wrath, which has gone up to heaven, thus blazing forth to thousand generations the splendid justice of your honourable kingdom. The native dynasty can no more than put forth its utmost strength to demand vengeance. And ever after, our two kingdoms shall swear eternal friendship. As to the ‘ox-ear’ covenant,* ambassadors have been long since despatched from our court, who should arrive in Peking any day, with whom a treaty of friendship can be made, according to your wishes.

“I look towards the north, to the tombs and the temples of my departed prince. I have no tears left to shed. I feel a criminal who should die, and whose crimes deserve a myriad deaths. But I am compelled to live to have a care for the living dynasty and the national lares. The Chronicles state

* In Liegwō, when a solemn covenant was made by two parties, each took hold of an ear of an ox, placed bound between the two. Thus they swore to the covenant, after which the ox was killed, and his blood sprinkled on the covenant,—intimating that so would Heaven serve the man who infringed on the covenant.

that 'all the vigour of my kingdom is bent in the direction of faithfully performing my duty.' I am ready for my fate,—but till that fate is exhausted, I am a minister bound to repay, with grateful service, the kindnesses of my former master.

"Let the dweller under the palace carefully consider."

Scarcely less interesting than the original letters is the following addendum, also literally translated. The author of *Doonghwaloo* writes:—

"According to strict etiquette, duke Shu's letter should not have appeared on these pages. The original was laid away among the Privy council papers, till the reigning emperor (Kienlung) ordered it to be searched out for examination. On reading it, he wrote comments with his own hand in red characters,—twenty in a line, and four lines on a page,—and stamped at the beginning with an imperial seal. I reverently place below the imperial comments." Then follows this imperial writing:—

"The Ming minister Shu Kofa's reply to Zooichin Wang:— 'When I was a boy, I used to delight in hearing read the letter of our Zooichin Wang to the Ming Shu Kofa; but the letter itself I did not see till yesterday, when I ordered the imperial family to search it out, and then I was able to study it. I discovered that it laid down most righteous judgment; and I saw it was according to the principles of correct doctrine, using the teaching of the Spring and Autumn Annals to expose the error of the secessionists.* I saw that his general scope was right, his style awe-inspiring, and I was delighted. The reply of Kofa was said to be of so stubborn a character, that it could not be placed upon the Records. But Kofa was a Ming minister. If he did not stoop, he was right. If his words fail to be placed on the Records, is not the mind of a faithful minister lost? Moreover if not placed on the Records, men will in future wonder why it is not there; and in ignorance of the facts,

* Power is always right on all continents and kingdoms, whatever the views or desires of those dissenting from the powerful. We find exactly the same sentiments as these in some of our own leading newspapers; and enunciated by powerful officials.

may hate the writer. This is what cannot possibly be permitted.

"I, therefore, command the scribes to record the letter, without change, in a book, and to place it in the Library,—the original to be restored to the safes of the Privy council. It is now, therefore, for the first time made accessible for study.

"How sad to think that Kofa was the only faithful minister; and Foo Wang is an object of compassion, who had such a minister and would not trust him, but permitted a traitor minister to pierce his arm, so that he died. Up to the present his memory has been lost. Had Foo Wang but trusted Kofa he might have retained the Long river (Yangstu) and re-established an empire after the example of the ancient Sung. But it is now difficult to determine. He was, however, but as a swallow in a hall destitute of deep plans and unable to think of the remote, causing his soldiers to run short of provisions and to exhaust their strength. The faithful minister could only weep, let his feet sleep, and sigh, unable to find opportunities of exerting himself. He could but die to show his gratitude to his dynasty. Is his not a most pitiful fate?" Then follow remarks by the historian:—

"Kofa's letter did not, from the very first, contain any exceptionally disrespectful language. Though in his heart he must have been terrified because of Zooiwan, yet in treating with him he ceases not to show a lofty independence. He was in brief a Ming minister, and as such honourably and faithfully true. I have considered his a paper which not only might be published, but which should not be left unpublished. There is besides the imperial command to have it published. He was indeed another Wun Tiensiang,* and it would be entirely wrong to omit his name out of the history. It is said that his mother dreamed she saw Wun Tiensiang just before Kofa's birth.

*The only faithful and able minister of the southern Sung, who preserved his dynasty some years from the Mongols, but was at last defeated and died in captivity, because he would not forsake the cause of his former master to serve a new one.

Though he was like Baidu * grown in the desert, if his example were lost, it would be a loss to all."

If the letter of Kofa seems to us somewhat inflated, we must not forget that in all Chinese historic times it is the duty of a minister in serving his prince to close his eyes to all faults of that prince when speaking of him; and falsehoods in diplomacy are not considered greater crimes in China than elsewhere. Yet Kofa is not to be severely blamed when trying to shield, not his own character, but the fame of the man who was chosen emperor over him, though against his wish. But skilfully parried as were the charges against Kofa, and thoroughly exposed as were the sophisms of the regent, Kofa must present harder arguments than good logic, and heavier metal than noble sentiments and beautiful morality, to keep back the Manchu hosts, who not only ended but began by seeking profit and nothing else. For the naked and savage Manchus began their career and continued its course in pursuance of their own interests, and sent to their graves or to the wolves millions of their fellowmen, whose interests did not coincide with theirs, or who defended their own property and territory against them. Though the Manchus were not hypocritical enough to cloak their ravages under the plea of extending the benefits of civilisation,—a plea reserved for western destroyers. Kofa is *facile princeps* with the pen; he knows, however, that the real issue is to be tried by the sword. Just a year after the date of Kofa's reply, in November 1644, prince Dodo was ordered southwards across the great Kiang, with the title of *Dingwo Da Kiangkun*, "the great commander-in-chief establishing the kingdom." But we shall now look back to what was meantime doing in the southern capital.

* Baidu is a poor variety of small millet, eatable, but chiefly used to feed birds. The meaning here is that Kofa was outside the Manchu cultivated field and of a different kind of grain from the chosen people.

CHAPTER VIII.

FOO WANG.*

THE Manchus found it a comparatively easy matter to crush the robber Li and his predatory bands, as sympathy would accompany them at every step of their way; for once under settled rule, every village would feel secure and every city safe from illegal and cruel exactions. And the way was all the more easily opened up that a Chinaman and not a Manchu was the chief acting commander.


A much more difficult task remained before them of annexing the south and south-east provinces,—a task which could easily have been rendered impossible had a spark of patriotism remained in the breasts of the men then in power in the south. For though the Ming emperor had perished and his capital had become the seat of a barbaric dynasty, his family was still widely spread; and the tenacious conservatism of the Chinese clung to the name of the native dynasty. Had the Joo family only had one able member to take the helm of state, he could have retained at least a large half of the empire in his hands; for not a village would welcome, not a town would open its gates to the Manchus, except by compulsion; while all would rally with enthusiasm around the banner of an able dynastic representative. Though famine had long devastated the northern provinces and

* Many particulars in this and the following two chapters on Tang Wang and Gwei Wang are culled out of the *Ming Mo Ji*, history of the end of the Ming, discovered—like many another book whose author is uncertain of the manner in which the authorities will receive it in Shanghai—in 1862, and it is of course of unknown authorship. It has however an air of truthfulness about it which induces me to use it freely in tracing the action, motives, and character of the Wangs and their retainers and supporters which cannot be gleaned from books under imperial authority

eaten up all the accumulated treasure of generations, the southern provinces were wealthy,—all the more wealthy because of the northern poverty. They could therefore furnish ample means in men and money, and did furnish both in more than sufficient quantity; but what is an army without a general? And what is a state without a head?

When Peking was taken, some officials fled southwards and halted only at Nanking, where Shu Kofa was minister. Shu Kofa became censor with rank of governor of a province under the last Ming emperor, retired from court for the period of mourning for his parents,—strict etiquette demanding a retirement of three years, and from the thoroughly conservative and conscientious character of Kofa he was likely to adhere to the letter of the ancient custom. He returned however, and was made president of one of the Boards in Nanking, where his eminent learning gained him the esteem of all classes, while every one trusted his artless character and his perfectly honest and single desire to serve his prince and his country with all his might. Some from patriotism, some from example, most from self-interest, composed in all a goodly company averse from the change of dynasty which had been made in the north; and not a voice was anywhere heard advocating Manchu rule till Manchu swords prepared a way for the barber, and the long knotted hair of the Chinaman disappeared, leaving a plaited queue behind. It was difficult however from among many aspirants to chose the right man for emperor, and the eyes of the people were directed towards Shu Kofa, the excellent scholar and upright official of Nanking.

The Ming emperor, styled Wanli, had five sons, the eldest of whom succeeded him; the second was made Foo Wang, the third Zoui Wang, the fourth Whi Wang, the fifth Gwei Wang. Foo Wang was sent to rule the ancient Loyang at a very young age and remained there for many years. He was in reality kept there by a court cabal which feared his ability—(see p. 119). In *Tienchi's* reign Foo Wang sent more revenue than any other into the imperial coffers. In 1641 Dsuchung took Loyang





and put this prince to death. His son, however, survived and succeeded him.

When, three years after, Dsuchung was besieging Peking, Kofa led an army to its rescue. While on the march, news arrived of the fall of the capital and the death of the emperor. His officers resolved to march against the rebels. Foo and Loo Wangs, because at hand, took active measures to press the rebels by water at Hwaian. Loo Wang, though the most distantly related to the deceased emperor, was the favourite of the people and the patriots; for Foo Wang, though nearest in blood, had alienated all by his vices.

Ma Shuying had two good friends, Hwang Duagoong and Liw Liangdso. At Kwachow they became acquainted, and soon friendly, with Gao Jie and Liw Dsaiching, who had retired thither from the north; Gao Jie having fled from the rebel army with a beautiful woman, who had been taken by Dsuchung.

Forming his plans in concert with these men, Ma sent a private messenger to Kofa, requesting that there should be no haste in proclaiming an emperor; for he must be selected because of his virtues; while the candidates should be confined to the relations of the late emperor. With this suggestion Kofa agreed all the more readily that the first condition excluded Foo Wang, whose character he denounced in his reply. He was soon thereafter officially informed of the arrival of Foo Wang at Loongkiang gwan, and he discovered that he had been "sold" * by Ma. He was compelled however to go out and hail the man whom he had denounced as unworthy, with "*wan swi, wan swi*;"—"Myriad years, or Long live the emperor."

When news arrived of the total rout of Dsuchung by the Manchus at Shanhaigwan, Kiangnan declared for Foo Wang, who entered his capital of Nanking on the 1st of 5th moon, converting a *foo* into a palace; and it was observed that "two yellow stars fought and disappeared in the heavens." A censor memorialised to the effect that meantime Foo Wang should be made guardian of the kingdom to keep it in name of the son of

* Literal translation, and strange coincidence with English slang.

the Ming emperor, who might possibly appear; but if not, that Foo Wang himself should inherit. A counter memorial was presented, praying for the immediate enthronement of Foo Wang; but the voice of the great majority was with the censor.

The following year was to begin the style *Hoong Gwang*, and Kofa, with two others, were elected privy councillors. Of the three, Kofa was the only pure minister. Other officials were nominated; some by Kofa, some by Ma, who was soon left with the control of all affairs in his hands by the northward march beyond the Yangtsu of Kofa, at his own request. He filled up all the offices; and the character of the men gave the people hope.

Kofa and the other military commanders had already deliberated on the advisability of forming four strong military posts north of the river. Dsaiching was now set over that of Hwaihai, including Hai, Kan, Pei, and other eight chow cities of Kiangsi; besides superintending Shantung, which had declared for Foo Wang as soon as the retreat of Dsuchung westwards incited them to rise upon his garrisons, and put them to death. Gao Jie was set over fourteen chows,—Kai, Kwei, &c., in Honan. Liangdso was general over Chun and Chi, south of Kaifung in Honan; Whang Duagoong over Loochow and other ten cities in Hupeh. Each of these four posts, held by friends of Ma, who was formerly commander-in-chief, was to have two hundred thousand *dan* of rice, four hundred thousand taels per year, and thirty thousand men; and each was to be independent of the other. Duagoong was also made a marquis, the others counts.

Gao Jie, who had fled with his beautiful paramour from Li Dsuchung, afterwards gained a good reputation as a soldier by defeating the rebels. The old roving spirit not having quite died, he determined to abandon Toongguan, where he had been located; and with twelve lieut.-generals under him, and four hundred thousand men who had crowded round him—probably most of them refugees from Li Dsuchung's oft-defeated bands—he moved southwards across the river. One officer dared in vain

to resist his progress; and Wan Yooenji, a Board secretary, was bold enough to go in about his quarters, and, while professedly bringing some presents, to expostulate with the men because forsaking their post, which was tantamount to insurrection. Gao Jie replied that the north of the river was poverty-stricken, while Yangchow, both the old and new cities, revelled in plenty.

As soon as the men of Yangchow heard that Gao was making for them, general terror seized them. A graduate went alone to discover the real intentions of Gao; who was glad to see him, feasted him with meat and drink, and sent him away loaded with presents of gold and silks, with the message to the men of Yang that he had come to protect and not to injure them. When the graduate displayed the presents given him as proofs of the pacific disposition of Gao, the populace roared out that he had "sold" them, and that the city could stand only by the fall of his head; and he was murdered accordingly. Gao hearing of this occurrence was angry in the extreme, and determined now to march on Yangchow.

Kofa had already been alienated from the chiefs of the four military posts, the friends of Ma, and had retired to Yangchow. Hearing of Gao's approach, and of the ravages accompanying his march, Kofa went out to meet him at the head of three thousand horse; and along with the officials of the city, gave Gao the most hearty welcome, as if his southward march had been under orders. Gao demanded that the leader of the men who put the graduate to death should be beheaded, and the city gates thrown open to his troops; to which, however, Kofa objected, and the discussion became so warm that Kofa was confined in a temple, and his retinue dispersed among Gao's men. Friends of Gao's were constantly beside Kofa drawing swords, and thrusting at, as if to murder him; but he only smiled, showing not the slightest indication of fear. He wrote out a document, however, stating that Gao might make his headquarters at Kwachow; then changing his clothing, managed to escape. Gao had to be contented with Kwachow, and professed the warmest friendship for his recent prisoner.

A lieut.-general of Lanchow and Tungchow in Shantung, desired to visit Yangchow, but fearing to be waylaid by Gao, sent on a message to Duagoong, to send an escort of soldiers to meet him. Duagoong went with three hundred men. Gao, hearing of this, was very angry, believing a plot laid against himself; for he and Duagoong were not on good terms, while their armies were "like water and fire," ready to destroy each other. He, therefore, commanded one thousand men to seize Duagoong, but gave them orders to take him alive. Duagoong happened to be off his horse and away from his men, when the ambush came upon him. He mounted amid a shower of arrows and galloped off. Seventeen of the pursuers overtook him. He had seven arrows, with each of which he killed a man; and cutting his way through the rest with his sword, he got up to his own three hundred, most of whom must have fallen at Toochiao, where this adventure occurred; for it is related that afterwards Gao agreed to replace three hundred horses.

Matters having assumed this aspect, all looked for internal war. Ma Dai drew up his troops, and laid his cannon in order before the city of Yangchow, which when Gao saw he dared not approach. Duagoong was furious on account of this affront at Toochiao, and getting Liangdso to side with him, he declared that Gao or he must fall. Another officer, to prevent the total ruin of the cause, drew up his men between the two armies, while attempts were made at reconciliation.

Duagoong's mother died just then. Kofa went to condole with him, and urged him to forbearance and to pardon the insult of Toochiao, and the loss of his three hundred horse. Kofa sent a messenger to Gao saying, "Why should a great cause be lost for three hundred horses? You send as many to Duagoong." These were sent, but old and sick, most of which died. Kofa winked at the character of the horses and sent a present of three thousand taels to Gao, ordering him to send one thousand to Duagoong for mourning expenses. There was thus a peace patched up between the two; which, however, left them no better friends than they had been before.

Gao had some faith in priests, if in no other; for coming in contact with a Buddhist priest, he asked him as to whether misery or prosperity awaited him. He was told that meantime he was in open rebellion, for it seemed insufficient to him to have been from a flying rebel made a Chinese prince; if he would act according to what Kofa called the Holy Doctrine—of Confucius—or what the priest calls “Poosa” (Buddhism), he would be sure of prosperity; but of misery if otherwise. Hing, his beautiful eloped wife, also urged Gao to pay particular attention to the instructions of Kofa, who when he heard there was a woman in the camp endeavouring to influence Gao, was glad and had hopes of a safe settlement. He now proposed to Gao to make some changes in his staff and that then he might remain on the south of the river. Gao determined to have a footing in the city, said all he wanted was to have a home for his wife. The citizens were however still afraid that if he once got any place inside, his men would find their way in; and they therefore persistently objected to give a house. The local magistrates sent Gao word that no palace was yet finished, and it was impossible to find a suitable house inside. Kofa, however, said there was a *foo* outside the city on the east which might be had. Hing ordered her soldier attendants to go thither.

If the bellicose commanders were so much inclined to cut each others' throats, and were with difficulty prevented from scuttling a cause which required union alone to easily ensure complete success, it is not to be wondered at that a less bloody but more disastrous strife threatened to extinguish the cabinet. The elements of strife were latent from the very first; for there was a patriotic and a selfish party, and the selfish party ruled in cabinet and court.

Shunyen, president of Board of Appointments, nominated three men to office, whom the hereditary Bai or count Liw Koongjao declared to be unworthy of any situation; and he at the same time called in question the integrity of Shunyen to his very face. A censor warmly replied. Gao Hoongtoo vainly endeavoured to cast oil on these troubled waters; and next

day Koongjao sent in a memorial, the kernel of which was that Shunyen must be dismissed or he relieved of office. He was supported by other ministers, who urged that Koongjao was indispensable. The mutual charges and recriminations became so general and bitter that Hoongtoo, who advocated attention to his own business by each minister, gave notice that as it was impossible to carry on government under such conditions, he begged leave to retire from office. From that day forward no effort was made by the ministers to seek out and punish the rebels; for their own dissention paralysed them, dispelled the energy which union would have concentrated and invigorated, and compelled a negative and a halting policy, instead of a positive and aggressive one.

After a gold seal had been made for the new government, both Ma and Kofa recommended that Woo Sangwei should be created Jigwo Goong,* and that the title be hereditary because of his exploits against the rebels, whom he was mercilessly pursuing. There were forwarded to him one hundred thousand *dan* of rice, and five hundred thousand taels for the use of his army, as they were avenging the death of the Ming emperor. A vice-president of Board of War was at the same time sent to Peking with very friendly letters from the government of Foo Wang.

About the same time an effort was made by the guardian prince in Peking to detach Kofa from Foo Wang's side; for all reposed the utmost confidence in that upright man and splendid scholar. The two letters are given above in their entirety at the end of the preceding chapter. The letter of Kofa, besides being beautifully simple in style, was modest in a remarkable degree; but declared with such firmness as to need no repetition that his choice was made; that he will live with the prince of his native dynasty, or die for him.

It was then also that Shantung and many other northern places rose against the magistrates appointed by the now defeated rebels, putting them all to death; but these places all declared for the representative of their native dynasty, and not

* Duke of the kingdom of Ji or Ki north-east of Chihli, where he gained his first victory over the robber chief.

for the party by which they were freed from the robbers. Though Kofa had more of the patriot and of the scholar than Woo Sangwei, he had not the force of character which made the latter the conquering soldier, else he could have made it impossible for the Manchus to march southwards,—the people of all the provinces being eager to establish their own native dynasty. But Kofa laboured under the disadvantage of serving a prince who did not value or understand him, who perhaps feared his honesty and hated his good character, and had to work with ministers who envied his reputation and thwarted his plans; while Woo Sangwei had the full confidence of a court ready to strain all its energies to support him, and which incited his valour by showering rewards and heaping honours upon him. The circumstances of the two men were so essentially different, that it is difficult to make any fair comparison between them.

The southern people, seeing such dissensions among generals and ministers, and a policy of inactivity reigning in the court instead of one of energy, feared the total and speedy ruin of all, and therefore rose to arms themselves and equipped an army of one or two hundred thousand men of undoubted courage, who could be relied on, and whose fame soon spread everywhere.

It is believed that Ma Shuying aimed at acting the faithful minister, but the manner in which he had deceived Kofa in the matter of proclaiming an emperor caused him to be regarded with universal suspicion. As soon therefore as Kofa went north at the head of his troops, both people and ministers began openly to abuse and oppose Ma. As his bad luck would have it, Ma just at this time nominated a Yooen Dachung to Foo Wang as an excellent soldier. Yooen was known to the other ministers, who declared him a thoroughly incapable man. Notwithstanding their opposition, Foo Wang conferred a "hat and a girdle" upon the nominee of his favourite. Hereupon arose the greatest confusion, begun by the apparently honest Hoongtoo, who had not been permitted to retire. He complained in a reasonable manner that the name of Yooen was not first sent to the nine "ching,"—the various boards of government, according to

accustomed form. When Ma could not see the necessity for such formality, Hoongtoo urged that he objected, not from any desire on his part to exclude Yooen from office, but to comply with invariable custom; for that if worthy of his post, his character would be all the more illustrious by receiving the general consensus of all the Boards. Ma could see no reason to question the illustrious character of his nominee; and as Hoongtoo saw no way of properly performing his duties as a minister under so high-handed a chief, he formally prayed for liberty to retire. Memorial now began to crowd on the heels of memorial, till almost all the principal ministers delivered their minds as against the admission of Yooen, and by implication against the absolute conduct of Ma. It was all waste paper, however, for though supported only by Ma, Yooen was made vice-president of Board of War. But the strife did not end; for Yooen complained that though he desired to act as a faithful minister, his fellow ministers would not give him the opportunity,—and Jang Shunyen followed Hoongtoo into private life.

Dsoongjow, a nominee of Kofa, declined the office of censor, naming himself the orphan or solitary minister. He presented a memorial strongly worded to the effect that the weal or woe of the state depended on the dismissal or retention of Yooen. He advised that Foo Wang should himself take the head of the armies. He saw no way at present for preventing Dsuchung from over-running the southern capital and its neighbourhood, and was preparing for flight, by sending his family away further south. He soon again presented an energetic memorial stating that the rebels were being pursued from the north into Shansi and the north of Honan, and were certain to march on the south-east, and complained that he had not heard of preparations to send a single man or horse against them;—the ministers were careless and should be put to death; the army was motionless; the border-officers supine, and should be slain. He mentioned in all four-fold causes of death in the ministers, advising that Chun Juloong be ordered north from the eastern sea; for he was then and long after at or about Formosa or Fukien. It

appears from this memorial also that there had been no mourning for the late emperor. Such plain speech could not be tolerated by the guilty or negligent parties concerned, and the four military outposts combined against it; while a memorial by Duagoong for concord was retained by Ma on its way to the prince.

Though almost solitary, and all but powerless, Kofa's voice was raised in behalf of his friend by praying Foo Wang to employ all the ministers only to discuss the "outs and ins" of questions, and to order the border officers to prove their merit or faults by their deeds. And thus quiet of a kind was again brought about by the efforts of this noble man. But rottenness was in the camp, and the council chamber was crumbling to pieces; at a time too when unity was indispensable for the continued existence of both. Some urged, but in vain, that action should be taken from the south against the rebels, while Sangwei was crushing them in the north. All were not equally dead to approaching danger; for some wealthy men bared themselves of everything to help to save their country. And their uneasiness was not causeless, for Dsuchung had at one time come to the resolution to escape from Sangwei by crossing the Kiang and taking Nanking.

In the general uneasiness, Ma continued an object of hate, and two officials from Hookwang presented memorials purposely to be able to have an opportunity of declaring their mind about him. So bitter were they that he dared not show himself, but pretended to be unwell. They declared so vehemently that the safety of the state depended on Ma's dismissal, that in fear he brought a eunuch to go and praise him to Foo Wang, who ended by saying, "Who is able to take Ma's place?" And the prince agreed with him. One of these two memorialised the prince on ten subjects, amongst which was an earnest advice to strictly search out and discover those who were guilty of crime deserving death; for that if they were punished, it would be an easy matter to put or keep down the rebels; but that meantime the people suffered so much from the soldiery, that they would continue to swell the ranks of the rebels as soon as these appeared. He was quietly ordered back to Hookwang.

In July the Manchu government forwarded despatches to all the principal officials in Shantung, ordering them to open their gates, when Woo Sangwei would be sent to establish order; and threatening that if they refused, the great army which was being prepared to march against the south, would go through Shantung. A month after, replies were forwarded intimating acquiescence in the government demands. But the intimation was worth no more than idle breath to gain time; for the commander-in-chief sent from Nanking was gladly received, and had those in office in Nanking been worthy the name of ministers, the inevitable conflict with the Manchus could have been fought in Shantung.

The soldiers of Chihkiang rose upon and slew their officers, believing they had as good a right as the armies of the four outposts to plunder the people. Kofa was sent to restore order. Just then Gao reported that the river should be crossed and the north of the Kiang defended; but he was addressing madmen, who paid more heed to their own petty squabbles than to the fact that the Manchus were moving down on the Yangtsu with a large force carefully selected, well equipped, and prepared for the conquest of the southern provinces. Liangyü in his district had a brush with, and defeated, a band of rebels driven south by Sangwei; while a Board secretary collected men in Szchuen and scattered another rebel band there, taking and slaying a leader. As Yunnan was also threatened, a censor was sent thither with an army and fire-arms.

The rebels in their retreat had got to Szchuen and Kweichow, and had taken Peichow, Loochow, Choongching, and the capital of the province. They cut off the nose and ears of the strongest men taken, setting them free afterwards and proclaiming that every official who did not open his gates would be similarly served. They made rapid progress. Many of the principal officials and two princes were slain by them. One general saved himself by joining the rebels, notwithstanding which Ma continued to praise him as a most worthy man.

A secretary of Appointments complained that he saw many men receiving honours, though the deeds warranting such

honour were invisible; that he heard of general officers fighting for private ends, but of none who fought a battle for his country; that there were many refusing their official appointments to the field, while none was found volunteering. To remedy the existing chaos and prevent utter ruin, he advised the emperor to go to the front himself and take charge of his armies; a step which implied no personal risk, for he need not be in the fight; yet a step which would restore discipline and increase a hundred-fold the courage of the men. No advice could be more unsavoury to the sottish Foo Wang, who much preferred to receive, whether he read or not, a ceaseless shower of memorials on all subjects. The purists were meantime becoming weaker and weaker, though many of the new nominees were as unwilling as the men dismissed to carry out all the pleasure of Ma. Jiao Yuegwang was accused and dismissed, because Ma was his enemy. When taking his leave of his sovereign, he urged public business as demanding the first and best thoughts of the emperor; to which sentiment the latter agreed, but which irritated Ma, who asked whether he was acting the rebel? The response was not flattering; and when Jiao left the imperial presence, he was followed by Ma into the court, where the succeeding brawl disturbed the whole palace.

Gao Jie reported the approach of the rebels on their southern march; but the court was too much occupied in memorial writing, reading and deliberating, to pay any attention. The rebels came upon and defeated Jang Jinyen, viceroy of Honan, who attempted to commit suicide. He was unsuccessful however and therefore fled. But when the rebels heard of his flight, he was pursued and overtaken. There were two faithful attendants who would not part from him. He was imprisoned in Sinhiang. Taking advantage of the absence of the commandant out of town, and fearing foul play, he gave orders to Yifang, one of his attendants, who slew a robber and took his horse. He was immediately joined by others: and his following increased so rapidly that all the leaders of the rebels in the town fell into his hands.

General Liangyü was not on good terms with Ma, but found it now expedient to come to terms; for Ma was all-powerful. His lieutenant, Dachung, had been busily employed abusing all ministers not well disposed towards Ma; and the faithful Biaoja, bitterly hated by Ma, was accused of treachery and had to resign. Liangyü presented Ma with three thousand taels (ounces) of gold and twelve singing girls, on receipt of which Ma smiled, saying, Liang might now be made "Si Bai."* But Ma was not the only man who needed gold. The army expenditure in the south-east amounted to five hundred thousand taels; and for the camps north of the river, it was three million six hundred thousand taels, or one and a half million sterling. Partly to meet this great drain, but chiefly to meet more personal wants, Ma provided that the preliminary examination for degrees in the *chow* and *hien* cities might be dispensed with, on payment of from three to six taels; while any scholastic appointment, and any degree the possession of which ensured a yearly grant, could be had for sums of from three hundred taels for the lowest, up to ten thousand for the highest. A corollary was practically attached, by which any honour could be had for money, so that rhymes and puns on the subject became universal, such as that *doodoos* filled the streets, *Jienjis* were numerous as sheep, *Jufang* common as dogs, &c.; and all the silver of the kingdom went into the horse's† mouth. Another vigorous rhyme terminated with the information that the emperor could do nothing but drink wine. A private person more seriously disposed prayed for the beheading of Ma and Koongjoo on the public execution grounds.

Meantime portents sufficient occurred to rouse the sleepers, if anything could. A great "western" cannon burst without apparent cause; stars with four horns, five horns, like knives and swords, appeared in the east; an astrologer predicted to his private friends that from the position which the constellation,

* Chow Wang imprisoned Wun Wang. The ministers of Wun forwarded presents of beautiful women and horses to Chow, who liberated "Si Bai."

† *Ma* means "horse."

Taiyi, would occupy next year in relation to *Jiaokung* in the east, great calamities, which he dared not fully reveal, were sure to happen; and to sum up, while brass was being melted to make "Hoogwang" cash, a temple gate caught fire and was burnt down. Fungyang, the tomb of Hoongwoo, one of the first Ming emperors, was thrice shaken by an earthquake in one day,—the sun was like fire and the earth all blood-red.

Foo Wang's thoughts were on other matters, for he spent his whole time with women and wine; sometimes dining his ministers, and entertaining them with low street ballad singers. He was one evening very sad. A eunuch endeavoured to comfort him; and, after doing so in vain, thinking the mournful state of affairs was beginning to tell upon him, he asked the cause of grief, when Foo wang sadly replied that there was now no good theatrical performer! All his ministers gave him the title of the "reverend spiritual genius!" Such things, however, are not confined to China, nor need England and perhaps other countries go far back in history to find parallels. But this "father and mother" of his people gave no heed to the loud and constant complaints he was daily hearing of the increasing oppression by Gao Jie and his brother generals, and of the consequent general dissatisfaction; and he was unmoved even by the wholesale resignation of his most worthy ministers.

Foo Wang was married in early life,—to a wife who died. He married a second time,—the second also died. He was sometime living with another man's wife, who bore him a son, now six years old. She sought out the father of this child, who refused to see or acknowledge her; and she was imprisoned. She drew up a paper, giving the most circumstantial history of their connection,—he threw it from him without looking at it. Many of the officials were delighted at the discovery of this son; and all the people began to have hopes of him. Therefore memorials, begun by his favourite, the all-powerful Ma, began to pour upon him, to none of which he paid the least attention. And the lady sickened and died in prison.

The fate of a man like this, with an irresponsible minister like Ma, could lead only to one result; when unity and energy were combined against him. For the Manchu troops were now at last approaching, and all eyes were directed to Kofa as the only man on whom any reliance could be placed, whether for war or for treaty. This man, who had to depend on his own resources, advanced to Baiyangho as soon as he heard of the approach of the Manchus, who were marching on Hühien; but his move caused them to retreat.

This happened on the twelfth day of eleventh moon; and two days after Gao Jie, now roused to action, marched across the river north to Hühow, against which city a division of the Manchu army was on the march. Gao found the Manchus, nominally two hundred thousand, really seven or eight thousand men. But few or many, he was determined to show he was not an ungrateful recipient of imperial favours. The Manchus crossed the Yellow river in January 1645, and were received with open arms by all the villages. Major-general Hü Dinggwo, wishing to be sure of a safe retreat, sent messengers to secretly inform the Manchus of his good will. He was then holding Chüchow in Honan south of the Yellow river. He and another Shantung worthy had been stimulated into levying bands and opposing the rebels by the successful example of Jinyen (p. 243). They had at first refused the honours offered from Nanking; but Dinggwo seems to have become less enthusiastic after his promotion. Ma laughed when he heard the Manchus were to cross the river, saying that if they did they would be looked after. Gao forwarded a letter to the Manchu Soo Wang praising their bravery against the rebels, stating that his one aim was to fight by their side till every rebel was destroyed, when he would be willing to shave his head and retire as a monk to the hills. Soo Wang declined him as an ally, but would be glad to present the brave Gao to his emperor in Peking. Gao however had no inclination to desert. He had indeed already declined to be tempted by an officer, who had himself deserted, and urged Gao to forsake a course which all were leaving to its fate.

Chung Siaoyü had been a man of great ability, and much feared about Hühchow. He was accused as a robber to the army officials by whom he had been seized and was to have been "sacrificed" by Ma, who was the commander, when news came of the fall of Peking. Siaoyü escaped, and in self protection took to the hills of Wootoongshan, where he collected a band of men about him; but though compelled to be a robber, he would not join the rebels. Gao Jie was now ordered to Hühchow, where Siaoyü surrendered to him and was put to death; his men being incorporated with Gao's. The Manchus had by this time got to Hiachun, marched south by Chining, and passing by Loyang attacked Haichow and surrounded Peichow. A few days after, the messengers who had been sent to Peking from the Nanking court returned, but to their urgent prayer that men should be sent north of the river to meet the approaching Manchus, the brave Ma angrily replied that there were four outposts; and when the commandants of those outposts prayed for reinforcements they were not listened to. The spring of 1645 found no improvement in Nanking affairs, though the rapid progress and increasing power of the new Manchu government should have roused the most inert, especially as the Manchus did not in the least degree attempt to conceal their design of annexing province after province till all the south should be reduced to them, as formerly to the Yuen dynasty.

The Manchus without were even yet further away than the rebels within, and Gao went with twenty thousand against some of his old comrades; while Dinggwo was raising himself to fame by his slaughter of robbers in his native place. He had formerly been imprisoned for some reason after he had been made lieutenant-general. He was liberated, gathered an army about him, and was sent to hold Swichow.* His ambition to receive an honorary

*The annals state that Dinggwo sent his son from Yüchow (south of Yellow river) to Haogo, urging the Manchus to aid him as the robber Gao Jie was advancing against him with five thousand men. But Haogo refused as his commission did not extend so far. Dinggwo was therefore quite ripe for treason by that time, while the former message sent by him proved that his present conduct was not from the impulse of the moment.

degree like the other great commanders was not gratified, and to relieve his spleen, he accused by memorial Gao Jie, who was Hingping *Bai* or count, of being a rebel and a robber. Gao therefore became his sworn foe and declared he would have Ding's life; yet he had sometime before sent Dinggwo a thousand taels and a hundred pieces of satin because he was so good a soldier.

After this incident, Kofa ordered Gao, who had already prayed for the main army, to Kweite, under whose prefectural jurisdiction was Swichow. Gao was to look after the border, and prepare for the Manchus. Gao's approach terrified Dinggwo, who wrote to Kofa remonstrating. His messenger brought back the reply that it was the necessities of the government, not love to Gao, which led to this movement; and that Dinggwo should save himself by flight.

The troops of Gao soon made their appearance, and instead of fleeing, Dinggwo went 10 li outside the city to meet his foe, and welcomed him kneeling. This humility quite won Gao's heart, and he expostulated with him, a lieut.-general, for kneeling. Seeing Dingwo's men, Gao expressed his ironical surprise that Dinggwo was not made a *wang*. Next day he met Dinggwo again and asked how it was he didn't flee, for he must know his life was not safe there. Bowing low, he said he knew of Gao's wrath, but was ignorant of a fault to incur such displeasure. Gao asked whether calling him a robber was not fault sufficient? Dinggwo replied that he could not write a character, that he had employed a man to write, but was ignorant of all the man had written; that the writer had fled when he heard of Gao's anger and that he should scarcely be made responsible for that writer's fault. The explanation was apparently satisfactory. Gao expressed his pleasure, and his desire was to treat Dinggwo as a brother, for he is said to have been a "guileless man," and if so, there are few Gao Jies in China. Some one told Gao to beware of Ding; but Gao was indignant, ordered the man to have sixty blows before the army, and to be sent to Ding to be put to death. A beautiful woman sent him by Ding was however sent back,

with the message that times of war were not times for pleasure, with the hope that Ding would take good care of her till his return as a conqueror.

Gao's army was posted 20 li east of Tsuchow; but wherever he went he had three hundred men at his heels. These accompanied him to a feast which Dinggwo had provided in his honour. Ding was himself in another room entertaining a number of guests with wine and women, while his younger brother acted host to Gao. One of the guests whispered in Gao's ear, that he feared, from the excited manner of this brother, that all was not right. With a motion for silence, Gao replied, "he dare not," and all, including the three hundred men, drank themselves drunk.

Gao was aroused from his subsequent slumber by a noise as if on the roof. He got up, opened his door, and found some scores of men under arms. Guessing their object, he went to where he had left his iron staff, but it was not there; he felt for his sword, but it was gone; and he was forthwith surrounded and seized. His three hundred men had been murdered in their drunken sleep, with the exception of one who had been sleeping under a bed. Ding soon made his appearance, his shoes clotted with blood. He sat looking south,* and said, "for three days I have had to submit to your insults, which are now at an end. What would you?" Gao laughed and said, "Have you got any liquor?" He drank himself drunk, and was murdered.†

Next day the city gates were not open at mid-day. Li Bunshun and other of Gao's generals broke open the east gate, and discovered the murder; but could not find Dinggwo, who had early fled across the river, and had joined the Manchus on the north side. As many of Swichow people as found it possible, also fled; but the rest, as well as all within a large radius, were

* The position of the emperor.

† When killing enemies who were prisoners of war, it was quite a common custom to give them spirits with which to drink themselves drunk. This is very frequently done now to criminals of all kinds who are to be beheaded,—all receive more or less spirits by imperial orders.

all ruthlessly murdered by the maddened soldiery of Gao. Dingwo meantime boasted of his deed, and urged the Manchus to send their army across at once.

Kofa, the best, most able, and least influential of all the principal men of the southern court, had long and bitterly mourned over the petty personal feuds of the army leaders, and their cruel treatment of the people; yet long and painfully saw that the hope of his sovereign's establishment rested on that same passionate, reckless, but brave Gao, perhaps the most unprincipled of the lot. For he was a brave officer, and had the largest army, which was deeply attached to him; all the more perhaps, because he took good care that they should have every necessity, though the country protected by them should be made a desert. Kofa therefore, with great lamentation, cried out, that now Gao was gone, there was no hope of re-establishing the throne. But the people of Yangchow, who could not forget their former great danger, out of which Kofa alone could have saved them, were overjoyed, and drank to each other in mutual congratulations.

Hing, the able and beautiful dame whom Gao had made his wife, was nominated by Foo Wang to take charge of Gao's army. Kofa petitioned that Bunshun, who had burst open the gate of Swichow, should be appointed commander, but Foo Wang objected, stating that Gao had a son who would succeed him. To this son the Wang presented a satin dress and other things. But Kofa did not need this new proof to shew him that his influence had vanished.

Whang Duagoong, with a whip in his hand, went at one time to Shantung as a merchant. He came across a band of robbers there; and also a pair of donkey's legs with the hoofs on. Seizing one of these in each hand, somewhat unlike Samson, he stood alone, opposed the band, and defeated them. His fame was at once made and his name given him by the people.* He was afterwards made Jingnan Bai (count Pacifying-the-south), and one of the four chief commanders of the forces north of the river.

* Duagoong, "achieved merit."

At Fangling of Chienshan he encountered and defeated Jang Hienjoong, taking him prisoner, and slaying over ten thousand of his troops. He was of a simple and upright character, and had about thirty thousand troops under him. He was always first in every fight, pressing with all his might into the thickest of the foe.

He had one young officer of his own spirit whom he greatly loved. That officer, Lin Baogwo, was beset when passing by an ambush of robbers, who, after a struggle, slew him and sent his head to Duagoong, who was deeply grieved. In his rage he mounted his horse, galloped to the very centre of the rebel camp, slaying on both hands as he went. He then struck down and slew the "tiger" commander of the rebels to avenge his friend. But as his blows fell thick and heavy the enemy began to move uneasily; many flying just as the Russians did under the charge of the "six hundred." The confusion was becoming general before the irresistible blows of this unassailable single foe, when a brave young leader cried out, "Stop your flight, and look on while I fight." He advanced to meet Duagoong, who rushed upon and seized him with one hand, dragged him upon his horse, held him on by one hand, while guiding his horse with the other.

When he and Gao were on inimical terms, and when the latter sought to enter Yangchow, he happened one day to be drinking with his officers. It was common then, as at the same time in christian England, to test a man's ability by his capacity for holding liquor. But Duagoong and his officers ate as well as drank; for quantities of raw pork were eaten along with their potations, which would cook the meat in the internal kitchen. At length a young officer declared his inability to quaff another cup. Such weakness enraged his chief, who ordered him out to be beaten. An older officer burst out a-laughing; and replied as to its cause: "Dont you see the youth's legs are less substantial than a walking-stick, and you would beat him because he can drink no more!" Duagoong also laughed; and the youth escaped his bambooning. The cup went round merrily, and mirth was

uproarious, when a scout reported Gao's army 10 li off. Duagoong said, "What about that?" and the drinking went on. A similar reply was given when the army was 5 li, and again when 3 li; though Duagoong knew well Gao's intention to storm the city. But when he was told that the enemy was under the walls, he left his cups and got on his horse. A soldier handed him a bow, which he held in one hand; another, a lance, which he fixed to his arm; a third, an iron bludgeon, which he bound under his left foot; and a fourth, a triangular truncheon, which he tied under his right foot; while behind him came five horses, each with a quiver, and in each quiver a hundred arrows. Thus prepared he departed, let fly his arrows like a shower of rain till they were exhausted, when he threw away his bow, and attacked with his lance, overthrowing four horsemen before the lance broke. Seizing his iron bludgeon and his truncheon—probably one in each hand, like his donkey legs—he belaboured all around him, till their flesh was sodden and he was triumphant. He then returned into the city, and sat down to his cups as if nothing had happened.

Now that his rival, Gao Jie, was gone, he demanded to be made first commander; moved his troops away from the "begging" country, where he was quartered, to the richer pasturage occupied by Gao's army; saying that he saw no reason why Gao should have been so honoured. Kofa, as usual, interfered in the interests of his country; and said that Gao had been mildly treated from necessity, for otherwise he would have rebelled and ruined the country; besides, his army was the largest, and therefore demanded some consideration. The Wang this time interfered in support of Kofa's advice; saying that if Duagoong did advance against and drive Gao's army across the river, he would be fighting for the enemies of his country; that he should consider first the public welfare, and afterwards his private quarrels. He therefore retreated to his former quarters.

A crazy priest, Dabei, knocked at one of the palace-doors one night, in a loud voice demanding admittance, for that he was the emperor. He was seized, and found crazed. But Yoon

Dachung, who had been made President of War, thought this a good opportunity for beheading the few remaining patriots, and accused them of endeavouring to raise an insurrection by the aid of this priest. But Ma, the Robespierre of this Marat, though not squeamish in taking life, objected to wholesale murder;—even when, at a solemn sacrifice to the late emperor, Dachung again furiously demanded their death as the only gratifying sacrifice to the emperor. Already so many officials had been put to death, that the people said there were eighteen Lohans, fifty-three Tsan,* and seventy-two Poosas. Dabei, however, was put to death.

The Manchu regent had long been aware of the state of matters south of the Yellow river. He had early laid his schemes for taking advantage of that anarchy, and making a great effort to combine all China under the Manchu sway. When therefore he ordered Sangwei against the robbers of the west and south-west, he sent a large and well-furnished army under Yüchin wang to Honan, nominally to co-operate with Sangwei and Ying chin wang, but really with secret instructions to make all possible speed to Nanking. We find him severely censuring this commander for whiling away his time in Honan, and openly ordered his march on the southern capital. His orders were the more imperative that Ying chin wang was now perfectly capable of looking after the safety of the rear of the Nanking army, as Shensi was all but completely conquered. This was in March 1645, after Sangwei had entered Singan, and Manchu officials could move freely throughout Shensi.

During the second month after, Ying chin wang could report the march southwards through Honan of his army in three great divisions,—one under his own eyes, through the Pass of Hoolaogwan; another under the Banner Chief (Goosa ujun), Baiyintoo, through Loongmungwan Pass; and the third under president Handai, *via* Nanyang,—all to reunite at Kweite foo on the south bank of the Yellow river. The unprincipled

* No significant translation in Williams of *tsan*, for that it must be a kind of divinity is evident from its connection; the other two being titles of divinities.

selfishness of Ma and his dishonest or blind colleagues made it the easiest conceivable matter for these divisions to cross the Yellow river.

But by the time the Manchus got to the Yellow river, over a hundred inter-communicating stockades were thrown up by the people between Kaifung and Yooning, of which Liw Hoongchi was commander. Siao Yinghün was over some scores of similar forts around Nanyang, and Li Jiyü over as many more at Loyang. Each of these commanders had from forty to fifty thousand men under arms. Hoongchi was the bravest and most faithful of the three, and had repeatedly done good service in cutting down robber bands. Chun Chinfoo, the governor of Honan province, warmly commended Hoongchi to Foo wang; and recommended to bestow on him the title and authority of *Kiangkun* (commander), and to assign to him the north of Honan as his station. Foo Wang was, however, bent on refusing to accept the hand of those who could save him, and he declined. We thus infer that those were volunteer armies raised for self-protection; but such proof was scarcely requisite to show the deep dislike of the people to rank themselves under the Manchus.

Liw Joong, a junior secretary of Board of War, raised a volunteer force of his own, with which he retook Lintsing and Tsining in Shantung, and then united with the various bands collected by literary men around Techow. He also formed a naval force at Miaowan of Chiao Chow, and petitioned to be officially permitted to retain that country for the Ming. Thus actively was effective volunteering going on, but without the recognition of a smile or a kind word from the court, in whose interest they acted. The four great camps so frequently referred to, of Whingan, Kwachow, Yichung, and Showchwun, had sometime formed the resolution, that by retaining what they held, they would have well performed their duty; and they were down protecting the Yangtsu, nor did they consider it proper to move further north.

A former president of Board of War in Peking, who had fled south to Nanking, was made viceroy of Shantung; and

Chun was replaced by a relative of the new viceroy, as governor of Honan. This one act disorganised the volunteers who were ready to lay down their lives to keep the Manchus on the north side of the Yellow river. Just then the main army of the Manchus got to the neighbourhood of Swichow, Dinggwo murdered Gao Jie, fled across the river, and joined the Manchus, from whom he had a big title, and by whom he was employed as guide to the army. Li Jiyü deserted at the same time, and the example was widely followed. The murder of Gao Jie hopelessly paralysed the body politic, which was gone out of joint far enough before that event. Every city, therefore, large and small, by which the Manchus marched in Honan, opened its gates, for the incurable anarchy within, manifested at last in so many desertions of men who should have been a bulwark against the foe, made any attempt at resistance appear as hopeless as it seemed useless. Hoongchi alone remained faithful; and though alone, he defied the foe up till August, when he was defeated and slain at Yooning. It is hard to say what would have been the fate of that campaign, had this solitary faithful volunteer been properly supported.

There was now no obstacle worthy of the name between the southern capital and the Manchu army, save the four great camps. Of these Duagoong was far the ablest general, the bravest soldier, and the most loyal citizen; but his army was much inferior to that of either Gao Jie or Liangyü. But each of the four was independent, and jealous of the other; and no commander-in-chief, with proper authority, controlled them; for Kofa's authority was wholly a moral one, as he had no support from court. On account of the gradual weeding out by resignation, dismissal, or execution of the ministers who sought the safety of their country; and by the usurpation of all power by Ma, through means of his lieutenant, the four camps became worse than ever. There was not only no unity of purpose, but the men of Liangyü and Duagoong had come to hard blows in the west, and the armies of Gao Jie and Dinggwo were at bitter feud in the north.



The Manchu army therefore went forward as if parading on their own grounds, one great division marching on the south side of the Hwai, another on the north. The latter had marched through Shantung and was under general Jwunta. In June they got to the advanced post of Gao Jie's army, under the afterwards famous Li Chungdoong at Hühchow. Instead of opposing, he deserted to them. They defeated and pushed in a portion of Liw Dsaiching's men at Hühien, and then marched on Tsing ho, at the junction of which with the rivers Whai and Whang, Dsaiching had his headquarters with over a thousand vessels and forty thousand men. The most of his vessels were sunk by a heavy cannonade, and a body of Manchus crossed the river higher up, attacking his cavalry and infantry in the rear, and he had to retreat. The Manchus again united and pursued him to Hwaingan. He collected as many of his men as he could and sailed to the open sea, whereupon Toongchow and Taichow fell. Yu Wang led in person the division on the north of the Whai river, marching from Kweite to Suchow. On his arrival at the river bridge, the Ming officer in charge set it on fire and fled. The Manchus crossed that night.

Kofa had thirty thousand men under his command at Yangchow, the gate to Nanking. He had sent out detachments to points which he deemed of importance; and when the Manchus approached, he marched out with the main portion of his army against them. But just at that juncture Gao Jie was murdered; and the news compelled Kofa to retire, receiving a hundred thousand of Gao's men into his army. He heard immediately of the siege of Suchow and was at Chungü on the way to raise the siege when he heard of its fall. Whaiyang now prayed for help, which he was willing to give; but when preparing to send relief, there came the orders of Foo Wang to make all speed to the capital to save it from Liangyü, who had marched upon it;—for what reason will be explained below. Obedient to orders which should never have been given, he had got to Pookow when the order was countermanded, and he sent back to Yangchow. His plans were thus all broken through, and he saw himself in the coils of the

Manchu boa. He issued instant orders to recall and concentrate the various detachments, for the limbs were of little account when the heart was threatened. Only a small proportion joined him, as the summons came too late. Kofa had complete control over the minds of the army of Gao, but Ma, fearing the influence of the commander if such a number of men were directly under his orders, induced Foo Wang to reject the brave Bunshun as commander of the remaining hundred thousand men, for he was the nominee of Kofa. The infant son of Gao was nominated commander instead, the real command being meantime entrusted to the brave widow of Gao. But this army heard a baseless rumour that Dinggwo, who had murdered their chief, was bent on further vengeance and was leading the unbroken force of the Manchus against them. A panic was the consequence. Some fled north, some south; but the army melted away, for it hated Ma. Its flight was accelerated by the attack of Hoongkwei, and most of the fragments found their way to the Manchu ranks.

When Kofa found that his march to relieve Suchow was ineffectual, he hastily retreated on Yangchow, leaving great quantities of mail, armour, powder, and immense stores of grain under a guard. He now sent on twenty thousand men under Liw Jowyi, to protect those stores. He thus considerably weakened himself at the moment when Yü Wang was concentrating all his forces around Yangchow, marching by land and water from Tienchang, and pitching his camp 20 li from the city; for his heavy artillery had not yet arrived. Kofa was advised to open a canal from the river, which would swamp the Manchu camp. He refused, on the ground that more civilians would perish than Manchus, and "first the people, next the dynasty." * He held his post during a fight of seven days and nights, cutting short the career of many hundred Manchus with his heavy artillery. Yü Wang was enraged both at the obstinacy

* The sentiment that the ruler is for the people, not the people for the ruler, was in Kofa's time scarcely breathed in Europe, but was two thousand years old in China.

of the defence, and the great mortality of the attack. He ordered off, therefore, the picked cannoneers of the camp to break down the north-west corner of the city, which they brought down with a crash which sounded like thunder. But the detachment in charge of that portion stood like a living wall within, and no efforts of the frantic besiegers could move them. The mortality of the Manchus can be estimated from the fact that the survivors piled up the bodies of their dead comrades against the wall; and by this ghastly ladder, scaled the wall and entered the city. The resistance was desperate; but though every inch of street had to be fought for, the defence was inadequate in numbers, and Yangchow fell. For ten days the infuriated Manchus wreaked their vengeance on the innocent civilians, who a short month before drank to the death of Gao Jie; and after the city was swept clear, the Manchus marched southwards, reaching the banks of the Yangtsu kiang on the fifth day of the fifth moon (June), exactly one month after their start from Kweite, on the Yellow river.

The greatest loss suffered by the capture of Yangchow, was that Kofa perished in the unequal fight. From the beginning he had no chance, for his opinions were always thrust aside when not in unison with those of Ma, whom the brainless Foo Wang retained as his master, to do his thinking and ruling for him. Kofa was a man as superior to Sangwei in moral character as he was in literary attainments; but it is questionable whether he was a match in the field for the most prominent Chinese subject and the ablest general of the northern court. The two fought under exactly opposite circumstances. The northern Chinaman was loaded with favours, and honours came crowding upon him from his grateful sovereign. The southern Chinaman was stinted in his very necessities, and thwarted in almost all his plans by the hating fear and trembling jealousy of his principal colleague, who detested the greatest reputation for talent and integrity existing in the southern court; and he was betrayed and sacrificed by an ignoble master, whose beastly nature was incapable of appreciating the faithfulness and utter self-forgetting

devotion of his best minister. Hence the ranks of Kofa were allowed to thin away without an effort to stop their gaps ; and his provisions were allowed to run short, though he was standing as the bulwark of the capital. No wonder that Li Chungdoong moved away southwards to save himself, and listened not to the entreaties of Kofa when Suchow fell, and Yangchow must stand the brunt of war. He was greatly undermanned when the Manchus drew up before Yangchow ; but his frequent and earnest prayers for adequate support might as well have been addressed to the street swine as to his prince. Even had he attempted to cross the river and successfully thrown himself within the walls of Nanking, he could not have saved the capital ; and Ma would much rather sink throne and nation, than retire from the post which he filled so badly. Kofa was an infinitely better man than Sangwei. He was possessed of a much more elevated mind. He was as brave a soldier. But he never had the opportunity of testing whether he was as good a general. Our impression is that he was not possessed of that quickness of perception and promptitude to order others to carry out his rapidly formed military judgment, which would make him, *ceteris paribus*, the equal of Sangwei in the field. His intense conservatism, which made him the noble character he was, was a dead weight in the way of his instantaneously forming new plans in unheard of circumstances, which ability always distinguishes the military genius from the military doctrinaire. He would fight as obstinately as Sangwei at Shanhaigwan, but his character would scarcely lead us to infer that he could move as skilfully. It is one thing to be a good soldier and die at one's post ; it is a very different thing to be a good leader and a skilful general. But of all the men who perished in a deservedly unlucky cause, his fate is most to be pitied, as his character stands forth the brightest.

The heartless rapacity, the unblushing corruption, the undiluted selfishness, the fierce and bloody cruelty exercised against the patriot ministers by Ma and his willing subordinates, excited the fears of all the people, and roused the wrath of the

Girondist old leaders of the armies, which were once willing to do anything for him. And as matters became daily worse, Dso Liangyü could no longer restrain himself, but declared he must march into the capital to purge the ministry. Ma was terrified, declared Liangyü a rebel, and endeavoured, though unsuccessfully, to rouse the wrath of Foo Wang against him; for in the paper setting forth Liangyü's grievances and intentions, Foo Wang saw nothing so very terrible. But Ma had already ordered southwards the northern army under Kofa; using the name of Foo Wang therefor. Foo Wang was opposed to that movement, as the State had much less to fear from Liangyü than from the Manchus. He therefore opposed the withdrawal of the northern army, and Kofa had written to the same effect; for all in and outside the capital knew that only Ma and his corrupt clique were aimed at. But after his sovereign had expressed his will, Ma, whose head was in danger, cried out angrily, that "Whoever is heard again to object to the southward march of the army shall be instantly put to death." His sovereign ceased to object, and betook himself to his favourite occupation, that of hunting out fair women.

Liangyü had meantime marched to below Anching, and Kofa was sent back notwithstanding the wrath of Ma. Liangyü went on ahead of his troops, and found the city with its gates closed, its guns pointed, and its troops all under arms. He enquired against what enemy these preparations had been made; and his mortification was so great when he heard it was against himself as a rebel, that he burst a blood vessel, and died vomiting blood. His army marched up to the capital, and took it with little trouble; and the measure of their wrath can be gauged by the fact, that they put to death only the family of the wicked and cruel Dachung, who wished he could have acted as guide to the Manchus to introduce them into the capital, and murder the family of Liangyü. The army then retreated to their post; and hearing that Yangchow had fallen, became an easy conquest to the army of Duagoong, who had wisely joined the Manchus; for there was now not a single man in the southern court capable

of supporting the throne. Duagoong was created duke Jinggwo, which proved the gratitude of the Manchus for that he did not compel them to conquer him.

Ma, now freed from fear of his own dastard life, urged his sovereign to flee to Kweichow; but that sovereign knew neither how to fight nor flee. He sent men out everywhere to search for *hiama*,—a kind of small frog, an infallible remedy for women's illness; and he was henceforth called the Hiama emperor. His antecedents prevent us from the charitable inference that he was acting a part to blind Ma and the other ministers.

When the Manchus touched the northern bank of perhaps the richest river in the world, they found the southern bank occupied by Jung Hoongkwei, cousin of the famous Jung Juloo, father of "Coxinga." He was a lieut.-general, and had a fleet under him; but of what utility may be judged from the fact that parties of Manchus crossed where, when, and how they pleased. Kinshan or Gold island was recently fortified and mounted with heavy guns; a vice-president being commandant. It was just then Gao's army broke loose from its brave female leader; and in its southward movement was, perhaps properly, driven back by Hoongkwei, who slew ten thousand of them, and drove most of the rest to take service in the Manchu ranks.

For three days these armies confronted each other, one on each side of the river, at the very gates of Nanking. Both were watchful, knowing the importance of the stake to be ventured for by the one and defended by the other. On the fourth night the Manchus prepared a number of rafts and floats, letting them drift in the centre of the river, each with a few lamps lit on it. Believing this an attempt to cross *en masse*, the soldiers of Hoongkwei opened a furious cannonade about midnight, which they continued till the morning sun revealed that a hoax had been played upon them. That day and the following night they had no other disturbance than the sound of their own dancing and merry making. But in the darkness of a thick mist two hundred Manchus landed on the shores of Kinshan, without

lanterns, and suddenly appeared in the temple. The main army crossed further up; the boats being under command of the Meirunujun Li Shwaitai. Day had not dawned before the left wing drew up 15 li from Kwachow, the headquarters of Hoongkwei. The headless soldiers opposed to them fled at sight of the Manchu banner displayed at their side by the rising sun, and Chinkiang gates tremblingly opened to the sound of the Manchu horn. Hoongkwei drew off eastwards without striking a blow; and the Manchus marched from Tanyang and Gowyoong, and set up their camp on the north side of the Temple of Heaven.

This was on the 10th of the 5th moon, and they heard that Foo Wang had fled with some eunuchs and women, departing three days before by the Toongchi gate for Woohoo. In the history of the Three Ming Wangs we find it stated that early on the 10th* the city gates were ordered to be kept closed. There was then a great wind and frightful rain. Foo Wang had theatricals in the palace in the afternoon, with which and drinking he occupied the time till 9.30 p.m., when, with two eunuchs and no attendants, he slipped out into the camp of Whang Duagoong set up to defend the city, and moved off immediately for Woohoo. Ma was unaware of this until he presented himself to make his obeysance to his protégé at sunrise next morning, when lo! there was no emperor to be found. The truth was at once known. The emperor had fled. Ma was not to remain to be taken a prisoner by the Manchus or to be murdered by infuriated citizens; but made his escape at once to a general Fang Gwongun, who, with twenty thousand men, fled into Chihkiang. Those ministers who did not wish to submit to the Manchus fled their several ways, and Hoongkwei found his way by sea to Tang Wang in Fukien.

Jao Julooong put to death all those who had been the instruments and subordinates of Ma; but the two chief male-factors, Ma and Dachung had escaped. Jao then opened the gates and went out to welcome the Manchus when they came up to

* There is a discrepancy in the dates, and the 10th should be the 8th; for we imagine that in the matter of dates the annals should rule.

the city two days after (10th). He was created a duke and received valuable presents. Gao Yooenjao, son of Gao Jie, surrendered with over a hundred and twenty thousand men, showing that the enormous army of Gao Jie was not yet all melted away. Liangdso and his army of over a hundred thousand men also laid their arms at the feet of Yü Wang; the two forming a body of two hundred and thirty-eight thousand three hundred cavalry and infantry, which, in the hands of Kofa, or any other worthy the name of general, would have kept the Manchu banners north of the Yellow river, or on its southern side, would have crushed to atoms the army of Yü Wang.

Yü Wang kept his army outside the city for ten days. And of some soldiers who began to pillage, he put ten men to death to ensure the good will of the people. It was with the same design he at once ordered the erection of a temple in honour of Shu Kofa. This indeed has been Manchu policy from the dawn of its history in China; hence it has continued so long to act a historic part. When the army did move in, it occupied the east and north cities as quarters, the central, west and south cities not having been vacated by the people. Hence Nanking was then divided into five independent cities.

Foo Wang made for the city of Taiping foo to make a stand there; but the inhabitants wisely shut their gates on the unworthy fugitive. He made for Woohoo, pursued by Nikan the Dodo Beira, while Toolai was hurried off to the river mouth, lest an attempt should be made to escape to sea. Foo Wang had not sufficient energy for such a step, and his own lieut.-generals deserted to the pursuers at Woohoo, handing over the dregs of an emperor; but Whang Duagoong was shot in the throat with an arrow and committed suicide. Yü Wang insulted Foo Wang, upbraiding him for his coarse drunkenness and bestial sensuality; but he answered not a word. He was sent a prisoner to Kiangning hien. Officials not a few committed suicide rather than acknowledge the Manchus, and great numbers of the people drowned themselves in the river; but most of the officials, great and small, marched out in full court dress to meet Yü Wang,

who received them facing south. Some however refused to adopt the Manchu queue and were put to death.

While the superlative fatuity of Foo Wang made the fighting of Yü Wang a triumphal march, Ying Wang was equally successful in the west, though with much harder fighting. For, if the robber Dsuchung was an infinitely abler ruler than Foo Wang, he was opposed by Sangwei. When Yü Wang was receiving the keys of Nanking, Ying Wang was at the district city of Tungliw of Kiwkiang (the "Nine Rivers"). There he received the submission of Munggung, son of Dso Liangyü, with a hundred thousand men. But the commandant of Kiwkiang was put to death as he would not consent to wear a "tail." Ying Wang sent Jang Tienyu with the deserted general Ji Shunghung to annex Kiangsi, detachments to hold Kingchow and Woochang, and after annexing the whole of Hoope, he marched his main army back to Peking.

The cities all around him were meantime sending their keys to Yü Wang, who, not perfectly sure of the commandants, sent garrisons into them all. He sent Wang Yang, formerly a censor in the court of Foo Wang, with several other officials, each with three thousand men, to take a correct census of the cities submitting,—Anching, Ningkwo, Chang, Soo, Soong kiang,—all *foo* cities. When Jiating got to Soochow, he was slain by Wundsoong, the vice-president commandant of Gold island, who then moved into Chihkiang.

Chang Fang, the Loo Wang whom Kofa had desired to see emperor, was in Hangchow; and on the fall of Foo Wang, agreed to accept the responsibilities of empire. But on the third day of his majestyship, the Manchus, after a rest at Nanking, knocked at his doors. The various cities which had been passed on the route needed no siege to open their gates; and a division sent in the direction of Soongkiang and Taichang, came up with the infamous Ma, who was as dastardly on the field as he had been vicious in the cabinet. He fled across the Chientang kiang. The Manchus camped on the river bank, and,—to the great jubilation of the Hangchow folks,—below high water

mark. But when flood came, instead of drowning them, to the utter bewilderment of the good people, the water refused to rise so high as the Manchu camp; and when this happened for three days running, the people said that it was the evident design of Heaven that the Manchus should rule. Loo Wang, doubtless nothing loath, permitted the gates to be opened, and the Manchus were masters of the city, by the special interposition of the gods! This incident is from the "Holy Wars." Chang Ching, the Hwai Wang, submitted at the same time, and the family of Jow Wang was taken with Hoochow; throwing all western Chihkiang into Manchu hands. Maodi, one of Foo Wang's ministers, was taken in Hangchow, and had his head off because he would keep on his hair. His was not a solitary case. And very many committed suicide, rather than submit to the degradation of head shaving. So much for the power of custom, and the supposed callous indifference to all things of the Chinese race; indeed, only ignorance of the people can charge them with want of feeling.

Yü Wang changed the name of Nanking to Kiangnan Province, its ancient title. He retained in their respective posts all the officials of the cities which had opened their gates, including all under governor in Kiangning (Nanking) and Anching. These were in all three hundred and seventy-three officials. He was then relieved of his task, recalled to the capital, and the Beira Luakudukwun, as Great commander Leveller-of-the-South, with general Yechun, was ordered to replace him, while Grand secretary Hoong Chungchow was sent as viceroy over all the south to pacify men's minds; and more important still, a garrison of men from one or other of the Eight Manchu Banners, was sent to garrison Shwunte, Tsinan, Techow, Lintsing, Hüchow, Loongan, Pingyang, and Poochow, forming a continuous line of communication with the north.

Aspirants to the vacant Ming throne were not wanting; but never again was there such an opportunity as that which Foo Wang, more sottishly than madly, threw away. For his native land it has been perhaps as well that he was unfit to make a

profitable stand ; for China's history, written with gore on every page at its best, is many times more bloody when there is more than one ruler among the black-haired race ; and upon the whole, from first to last, the Manchus will bear favourable comparison with any former Chinese dynasty of whatever nationality or origin.

CHAPTER IX.

TANG WANG.

THOUGH the residue of the Ming imperial family turned out but miserable shadows of rulers, the Manchus could gain or retain possession of only as much land as was under the tread of their horses' hoofs, and in which was heard the defiant tones of their military horns. Though Foo Wang was a prisoner, and Nanking a Manchu city, the Chinese, beyond the immediate sweep of their arm, were as averse as ever from acknowledging the Manchus their superiors; and they clung with the tenacity of the proverbial drowning man to the feeble straw, which now one and now another of the Ming family held out to their eager grasp. A large proportion, perhaps the majority, of the widely extended descendants of the imperial Ming was already in Manchu hands, but the south of China contained many still; and if the greater portion of Chihkiang had opened its doors to the Manchu barber and taxgatherer, Fukien was yet virgin soil; the Kwangs had not seen the Manchu tail, and Yunnan rested securely in its distance. Those provinces were swarming with men, and well stocked with money and grain; and both the one and the other were thrown at the feet of some man with Ming blood flowing in his veins, with the hope that imperial blood was too precious to be overcome ultimately by the plebeian, or rather the savage, blood of the Manchus. But the Chinese made the same mistake which England made a thousand times, is making now, and will make again: they forgot that it is brain and not blood which counts when great issues are at stake. Though hands were numbered by the million, money by the trillion, and exhaustless stores of grain could be counted on, the Ming was vanishing, spectre like, for want of a head.

Tang Wang therefore began with a good heart, and all that is necessary for the establishment of his empire is a strong will to carry out, in spite of selfish ministerial opposition, the dictates of his nature. But two rivals made empire a difficult acquisition for him; the chief of these, GWEI WANG, in the west, we shall meantime leave out of count. But of great influence over the destinies of Tang Wang was his rival in Chihkiang.

When Hangchow fell and Loo Wang surrendered, Jang Gwawei, formerly president of Board of War, with Joo Dadien, raised an army in Kinhwa; secretary Hiwng Yoolin and Swun Jiaoji collected a band at Shaohing, and Chien Sialo, an inferior member of Board of Appointments with the adventurer Jang Whangyen and a Siwtsai Wang Yu, occupied the neighbourhood of Ningpo. The naval forces under lieut.-general Wang Juyin and the captain of Shupoo Jang Mingchun, united with the former bands. They put to death every Manchu official sent to those districts, proclaimed another Loo Wang Regent of the empire, and moved off all the ships and boats from the west to the east bank of the Tsientang (Chientang) river, along which they distributed their armies. They strongly fortified Fooyang, where they massed large numbers of men to watch the Manchus, and they set a strict guard on the road from *Taihoo* lake to the sea. They thus possessed themselves, in the name of Loo Wang, of all eastern Chihkiang. Various Ming officials, great and small, raised larger or smaller bands on the Soongkiang, at Wookiang, Yihing, Taihoo, Chungming, Kwunshan, Kiating, Kiahing, Kiangyin, Hwichow, and Ningko, mostly in name of Tang Wang, from whom those who had elected him emperor received commissions. The fact seems to have been, however, that those nearest Loo Wang applied to him for the authority which was necessary legally to plunder the country;—for the utter want of unity and of purpose would favour the hypothesis that these men levied armies for themselves and their own purposes, and convenience decided the master under whom they chose nominally to serve; though, at the same time, they were all united in detestation of the northern intruder. They could muster a

hundred thousand men along the Soongkiang. They might be termed volunteers, for they were not included in the regular army of Tang Wang. But we can readily understand the moral effect upon the people, whose energies should have been united, when Loo Wang in Chihkiang and Tang Wang in Fukien, regarded each the other as a usurper. It was that division made it possible for the governor of Soochow, the marshal of Soongkiang and the lieut.-general of Woosoong, each to set up for himself, with the army under his control. And besides other difficulties, there was a formidable power to be crushed in the bands of robbers who delighted in, and considerably increased, the troubles of the peace-loving citizens. The city of Wooping fell before an army of robbers from Kwangtung, and immense numbers were put to the sword.

These then were the circumstances under which Tang Wang had to build up his throne;—difficult, perhaps, but not by any means insuperable; for the Manchus were compelled to act on the defensive now. All that is wanted is the clear head and the determined will;—exactly the qualities in which the excellent Tang Wang was lacking. Perhaps from this same reason has arisen that maxim of statesmen in the west, which is extremely questionable to the moralist,—that “a blunder is worse than a crime;” for a blunder is the result of want of head, which want, in perilous times like those which originated the maxim, leads to national ruin,—whereas a crime arises from want of heart, and is in statesmen most generally associated with a head which can plan, and a hand which can execute.

If Tang Wang nobly waived his right to a grand palace, and preferred to want gold and silver plate and jade vessels, rather than impose those taxes upon the people,—all his subordinates were not actuated by the same delicacy; and though they all could desire heartily that the Manchu kingdom would be overturned, and the Ming restored to original splendour, their mental condition much resembled that of him whose goodness the Bible displays as consisting in warm wishes that the hungry should be fed, and the shivering clothed,—but not at his expense.

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He showed his good feeling at a later stage, by refusing to adopt the suggestion of his officials that ten cleanly maidens should be brought for hire, not by force, into his kitchen. He refused on the ground that the joy and the grief of his people were his.

He had a hundred thousand men in garrison, and as many in the field, to meet the daily necessities of which hosts, the ordinary taxation of Fukien and the two Kwangs was inadequate. To meet the deficiency, Jung Juloong* recommended an appeal for voluntary subscriptions,—the Chinese for which is *yi*, also meaning “Faithful, upright.” He recommended that an official be appointed to look after those subscriptions, and that over the door of every man who failed to contribute, should be written the two characters, *Boo yi*, “not contributing.” But when the “not” stands before *yi*, it means “unfaithful,” and is one of the ten unpardonable crimes of which a citizen of China can be guilty. Legally it means mutiny and the murder of his officer by a soldier; or sedition, combined with the murder of his magistrate by a civilian. The object of Juloong was, of course, to terrify every man into giving something by hanging the menace of this disgraceful *Boo yi* over his head. But instead of causing terror, it roused a storm of indignation over all the south-east of China, and alienated at a blow the hearts of the people. Nor can we be surprised. Another proposal of his, that every criminal should be allowed to redeem his crime with silver, was rejected by Tang Wang; but the man who made it, was supreme chief of the new court, and the people knew and felt it. So great was the power of Juloong, and so well was he aware of his importance, that he would not rise to receive the body of ministers who went to consult him, nor see them to the door when they went away. His conduct so affected the people that they who but a brief month before regarded the Manchus with the greatest detestation, ceased to fear them as enemies, and began to wish for their appearance as deliverers.

Tang Wang, with righteous abhorrence, had refused even to see the man who brought disgrace on the reign of Foo Wang; but

* For whose antecedents see “Formosa.”

he welcomed another Ma, under another surname, to his own court, and made him Mayor of the Palace. Probably, inasmuch as he did not possess the mental power necessary, he could not help himself; nor perhaps could he at first detect the true nature of the man; but he should have thrust him out,—if he could,—when he did discover him. He prepared a feast for his ministers; and Juloong, as a marquis, demanded precedence of the grand secretary and prime minister, Daojow. This was strenuously opposed by the other ministers, for it was never heard of in China that the minister of War, or any other official directly connected with the military affairs of the empire, should have precedence of the civil minister. Juloong was very wroth; and some friends of the powerful man formally accused Daojow of incapacity, and therefore unworthy of the precedence demanded for him. Tang Wang, doubtless afraid of offending his powerful minister, referred the matter for discussion to the proper Boards; which could, however, decide only against Juloong. Had he the requisite learning, as he had not, he would doubtless throw up his office, and compel Tang Wang to give him the portfolio of the prime minister, for he already wielded the power. His brother Hoongkwei was one day fluttering his fan in the palace before the emperor's face. He was reprimanded for this breach of etiquette by Ho Jie; and both he and Juloong were extremely angry at the interference. So much so that Ho found they could not all remain in the same court, and felt compelled to tender his resignation. A vain attempt was made to reconcile the parties; but the "emperor" had to accept the resignation, saying to Ho that as soon as the regions south of the Yangtsu were recovered he would be again summoned to court. He was scarcely a dozen miles beyond the city, on his way home, when men of Juloong's fell upon him, and cut off one of his ears!

Losing all hope of energetic efforts on their behalf by their native prince, the cities of the west were one after another opening their gates to the Manchus, who were enabled to act on the offensive because of the weakness of Tang Wang. Kanchow alone stood out; its commandant, Wan Yuenji, having had

orders to hold out at all costs. Gwanshung therefore urged Tang Wang to move to the border, and to take command in person of the army to defend Kanchow, whose position made it a point of the last consequence, as the key into various provinces; for its west was towards the two Hoo provinces, its east opened into Fukien and Chihkiang, while south of it stood the Kwang province. An energetic defence of Kanchow would also serve to show the people that Tang Wang had a plan of operations, which he was to try to carry out, and would inspire all with the hope that they would be sustained in their resistance, and would warrant them to energetically rally round and support him. He acknowledged the force of this reasoning, and was all eagerness to at once carry it out, but he was not his own master, and had to consult his court. Juloong however emphatically objected on the ostensible ground that there was not sufficient provision for the army. The true reason, doubtless, was his fear that Tang Wang once gone, his own power would crumble to dust; whereas in Tang Wang's palace he was all powerful. Tang Wang was therefore compelled to decline taking that action which on his accession to the throne he believed essential, and which he was now again earnestly told was essential to the salvation of the country. Gwanshung therefore retired discomfited, and doubtless disheartened, and Tang Wang saw him to the door. About the same time the commandant of Nanchang had to flee from the city alone, after ordering the literates and people to make peace with the Manchu army which appeared before the city; for spite of his prayers he was left wholly without adequate measures of defence. Thus Juloong bade fair to tread in the footsteps of the infamous wretch Ma.

As Tang Wang could not himself move to the front, he ordered Daojow to go with the army. Daojow expressed his readiness to go where and do what he was ordered even single handed; but warmly urged the emperor to lead a second army by another route towards Kanchow; for while it stood the Manchus would not dare move south of it. Juloong however objected to Daojow as commander, and refused to provide any

funds. Daojow supplied a month's rations and pay out of his own property; but Juloonng continued to keep closed the public purse strings. One minister, who was an astrologist, endeavoured to rouse Tang Wang to make the resolution to go to the front, arguing sagely—whether sincerely is questionable,—that the various positions and relations of certain stars and constellations augured most favourably for the presence of the sovereign at the head of the army. But the voice of Juloonng was more potent than that of the stars.

The son of Juloonng by his Japanese wife was called *Chunggoong*, "Acquired Merit," by Tang Wang, who had made him commandant of the city troops and commander of the guard. Chunggoong, the *Coxinga* of the Dutch, therefore knew, and informed his father of everything done or to be done by the "emperor." And no minister could raise his voice, for Daojow was another Kofa in the field; and the difference between Juloonng and Ma, was that the former did not put any of the ministers to death. He was too powerful to require it. Whang Fei, count Jing, was more worthy of his title, for he repeatedly defeated the enemy in Chihkiang, and received a silver seal as reward.

In the period *Tienchi* of the Ming, one Hung Lai assumed the title of Wang or prince of Kwangsi. Several men went to Peking to accuse him. But as he was early informed of the opposition, he had powerful friends made in Peking by a free distribution of silver; and when after a length of time the case came off, it was to find him a true Wang, and the title of *Jingjiang* was given him, while his accusers were thrown into prison for their pains. The three *chow* cities of Chüen, Yung and Lien, were then in the hands of the robbers, but neither governor nor prince dared to inform the emperor. On the fall of Nanking, prince Jingjiang took steps to ascend the throne, making lieutenant-general Yang Gwoweï commander of his forces. Tang Wang lost no time, however, in summoning him to support the throne at Foochow; but as he was bent on raising one at Kweilin, he paid of course no attention.

Chü Shushu was then governor in Woochow, whither Jingjiang

found it necessary to direct the movements of his army. But Shushu was long aware of the prince's intention, and early sent trusty friends to Kweilin to do all in their power to dissuade him from taking the irrevocable step. He had been opposed to the elevation of Tang Wang, as Kofa formerly to that of Foo Wang; but the deed being done, he urged the most energetic support of the Fukien prince; for that with all their united and earnest efforts they would have quite enough to do to hold their own, while division was the inevitable wrecking of all. When therefore the wang with his army got to Woochow, Shushu still deprecated division, and urged him to abstain from the step he meditated, as it would simply ruin the common cause. The wang in reply ordered Shushu to Kweilin, but he refused to move. To the order to meet the wang in court dress, he replied that it was unnecessary to appear in court dress in the presence of a wang; and do what the wang could, Shushu would never acknowledge him as any other than Jingjiang Wang. He refused to hand over the governor's seal; and when a sword was thrust to his throat he smiled and said, "Think you that with a naked sword you can force from me what the emperor gave." In this position a man threw his arm around Shushu's neck to protect him, and a squabble ensued,—some desiring to slay, some to save him. But he was impassive, and conquered; for they dared not kill him, as he was a universal favourite. The prince then sent for the seal to Shushu's house,* the messenger informing the wife of the latter that he had been sent by her husband. The messenger doubtless wore the official Yamun clothing; the seal was handed over, and it and Shushu were brought to Kweilin,—the latter a prisoner.

* A remarkable circumstance is that the seal of the magistrate is always in the hands of his chief wife, who hands it over to the messenger from her husband when he wants it to seal any official document. We know that it is so in Mookden from the governor down to the district magistrate, and an important document could not be got stamped on one occasion, because the chief wife was confined, and the seal was under her mattress. Probably this is for greater safety, as the women's quarters are sacred from visitors; and the magistrate's family usually lives on the official premises.

He was confined in the palace, but refused to eat or speak with the people.

His wife was weeping day and night, probably sorrowing most for her mistake ; but she was not content with mere grief. She sent messengers both to the viceroy at Kwangtung and to Tang Wang, both of whom had been already apprised by Shushu of Jingjiang's intentions. She explained that matters were in an extremely critical condition ; the city of Choohiwng was in a state of complete lawlessness ; and she knew that if Shushu were put to death, Kwangsi would be hurled upon Kwangtung. The viceroy Ding Kweishoo was therefore in readiness when Jingjiang marched eastwards to the frontier, and drove him back with an impetus which compelled him to flee to Kweilin. The supporters of the prince were now afraid that Kwangtung would march west against them while they were yet unprepared. They at one time coaxed, at another threatened Shushu, to have him order out the " Wolf " troops, whom he had already forbidden to support the wang. His sole reply to all their importunity was that he could easily starve himself to death. But this was a consummation which terrified them still more. They therefore changed his quarters to the outside of the city walls, and returned to him his official seal. They also prayed him to go back to his capital and office ; but he asked how one guilty of crime as he was, could return ? When he was left at perfect liberty he fled to another city, where he staid some time, and whence he was again prayed to go to his own city. This was doubtless because of disorder arising on his account in Woochow ; for that the city was in a great ferment is known from the fact, that after he entered it by night tranquillity was at once restored. He was joined immediately by Jia Lien, one of Gwoweï's officers, who began to see that he was in an evil, i.e., a losing cause. This man was made commander of an army with which to march against Jingjiang. He got to the walls of Kweilin, managed to get ropes thrown down the wall, his men up, and Gwoweï apprehended that night. With dawn he marched on the palace, giving out everywhere that in order to

restore peace no more was wanted than the possession of the person of the prince. He thus easily secured the wang and his chief instigators, some of whom were put to death. This prepared the way for the proclamation of Tang Wang as emperor, which ceremony took place in the end of the year.

Thus the Kwangs were secured; but a more difficult task was to bring the insane or the selfish of Chihkiang to task. Loo Wang had his headquarters at Taichow, with an independent sovereignty. Against him an army was despatched under Whang Binching, *via* Fooning, Ningshao, and Kinchü. He was a Footien man, who had made his fame as a naval officer; probably as a pirate. Jia Yü was the name of a youth who had raised a band to oppose the robbers when Peking was sacked. He was defeated and captured; but, contrary to their wont, saved alive by the robbers. He managed to escape; and was presented to Tang Wang by Hoongkwei, who was a friend of his. He, however, took an independent position at court; and endeavoured to move Tang Wang to go at the head of an army to prepare the way for viceroy Ho Tungjiao, who, from his Hoo provinces, was moving down at the head of an army said to number three hundred thousand men, but who was meantime intercepted by the Manchus.

The main army had been ordered to advance by Sangwan to save Ying and Chien cities, and to support Binching. This movement necessitated a sacrifice to heaven and earth and the imperial ancestors. To do proper honour to the ceremony, the Board of Works was ordered to get made four silver hatchets, each like a dragon; the head to represent the dragon's head, and the handle its body and tail; and on the handle was carved another small dragon in gold. In the open mouth of each dragon was a pearl. This dragon was five feet long. Along with them were tablets proper to the occasion presented and exhibited on the platform of the altar. Hoongkwei was commander-in-chief, and Jung Tsai his second; the emperor himself marching at the head of the army clothed in mail. When they passed over Hoongshan chiao bridge the emperor

returned; and he had not finished doffing his coat of mail before a tremendous storm of wind and rain beat down the tablets and the dragon hatchets, breaking the latter in two. The fall of the tablets representing the two founders of the Ming dynasty caused the greatest consternation, which was still further increased by the fall of a horse in the first ranks. For omens were and are of great account in the east as they have been in the west.

Tang Wang was not idle, for he sent censor Lin Lanyow into Kiangsi to secure the people there, and Hū Jow, a Szchuen man, was to summon Szchuen to his standard. In the despatch sent by the latter, Shan Jiechwun was nominated governor of Szchuen, on account of his bravery in taking the capital from the rebels. When this messenger arrived at his destination, the people, guessing that the despatches would contain an order for the arrest of their governor, whom they greatly loved, refused to permit the opening of the despatches. But the governor, a faithful and law-abiding subject, informed the messengers that he was ready to go with them. They set off at night; and when outside the city opened their commission to arrest him, and bring him to Foochow; whither he was brought a prisoner, and there put to death. Of this measure Tang Wang afterwards expressed his disapproval, saying to the Board of Appointments that ex-governor Show should not have been put to death. He presented the son with three thousand taels to perform the necessary funeral honours to his father, and appointed him to a magistracy to atone for the governor's death.

Finding that military affairs were not prosperous, notwithstanding the popular feeling everywhere in favour of his reign, Tang Wang at last resolved to go in person to the army which he had sent away. His brothers he nominated guardians of the empire, and left Juloon to look after and provide supplies. And here we leave him to ascertain what the Manchus were doing in the face of this Ming revival. But we may first glance at the condition of Yunnan in the far west.

We saw Kwangsi taken from the prince who desired there to

set up a throne, and handed over to the Tang Wang. Szchuen was saved from the rebels, and acknowledged the same master. Yunnan was still in the background; for it had been really, if not nominally, under the control of rebels for several years. Sha Dingjow was then the rebel chief in Yunnan. He was at one time a district magistrate at Linngan, and rose as follows to his high pre-eminence. He had been employed formerly under Soo Shungming and Woo Pikwei to subdue the robbers of Kiangsi. Shungming was so successful that his ambition became too great for his office, and he was utterly dissatisfied with his minor post; nor was he willing again to return to routine magisterial duties. When, in 1632, the sub-governor, Jao Hoongfan, arrived at his destination, Shungming received and welcomed him in such a haughty manner that he made Hoongfan his enemy. He had orders sent him, but regarded them with contempt. Imperial authority was at last under the necessity to order troops of three provinces against him. He was defeated, and pretended repentance and submission. He petitioned for the post of governor of Kwangsi; which post was, however, given to Jang Jimung, whom from that day Shungming sought to destroy. The new governor was aware of the designs on his life; and when Shungming appeared with a few men, apparently to establish a nominal friendship, Jimung was overjoyed, and prepared tea to welcome his guest. But the guest very politely, and according to strict etiquette in China, where the superior drinks first, refused to taste till the host had first tasted. The host tasted, and while moving the cup from his lips let drop into it some poison out of his hand, unnoticed by Shungming, who drank and died. His beautiful widow had no son, and took command of the army herself. She was a Shayuen lady, and was very intimate with several of her officers, Shayuen men. Dingjow was one of the youngest of these; and the others were one by one got rid of, and he reigned supreme. This "army" was then in Kweichow.

In December 1645, Dingjow moved into Yunnan; the capital of which fell into his hands by means of confederates within.

Tienbo, the duke of Yunnan, whom he wished to displace, fled; but his mother, with others of his family, burnt themselves to death, and two of his brothers were slain. Tienbo fled to Choochiwng, whither Dingjow pursued him. He thence fled further west to Yoongchang; his friends urging him to go rather than make a stand which would unite all the robbers against and overwhelm him. But Choochiwng would not open its gates to Dingjow. This civil war was that referred to above by Shushu's wife, as the state of matters to be dreaded in Kwangsi.

In the beginning of 1646, Dingjow again marched against Woochiwng; whose commandant, Yang Weiju, sat on the tower over the gate,—a good mark for Dingjow's muskets. But when the smoke of their shots cleared away, there the rebels saw Weiju sitting exactly as before; and suddenly, believing him a god, they moved away in fear, when he descended, ordered out the garrison, and did great execution on their rear. Dingjow next attacked Shiping; also in vain. He then marched against Ningchow, which fell; and his success inspired him again to try Woochiwng. Meantime Loong Dsaitien fled with his detachment from Shiping to Talifoo. But though Dingjow divided his men into seventy-two camps around the devoted city, dug a trench, and built a strong rampart, determined to take it by a regular siege, Weiju was too obstinate, and he had to raise the siege to encounter the four lieut.-generals, Swun Kowang, Li Dinggwo, and two others, who completely defeated him. Tang Wang was utterly unacquainted with the state of Yunnan; and those four men had acted on their own responsibility, marching from Kweichow determined to end the career of the robber. Dingjow was so closely pressed that he fled by night after putting to death a grand secretary. Thus Yunnan and Kweichow were meantime paralysed, and counted nothing in the game of war which Tang Wang had, *volens volens*, to play.

When the main armies of the Manchus returned to Peking (p. 264) all Kiangsi had not fallen into their hands. The Ming Yi Wang occupied Chienchang, the Yoongming Wang (of whom more anon) held Foochow, and Kanchow was under Yang

Yenlin,* formerly a vice-president of Board of War. Each of these summoned to his standard several myriad *Man* savages from the *Wooling* (five passes) caves; and Kiangsi was commanded by them. Jin Shunghwan, who lately deserted from the Ming, was ordered by the Manchus against Kiangsi, to restore it to order; and he did so by scattering destruction on all hands of him and leaving a desert behind his track.

The forces at the disposal of the Manchus were a few myriad men in Nanking, and a few myriad more in Hwaingan, with over one hundred thousand men, retained by them of the deserters from the armies of Foo Wang. These too had their heads shaved in conformity with the recent proclamation;—which proclamation, we have said elsewhere, had a very great deal to do with the rising in favour of Tang Wang, when Juloong had driven the people into disaffection. This rising was entirely a popular movement, led by the conservative literates, at the head of untrained volunteers, who rose up in all quarters, cut off Manchu communications every where and isolated every post. But for the possession of the left bank of the Ching Kiang river, not a step could have been taken southwards by a Manchu soldier into Chihkiang or Fukien. But those multitudes were collected without discipline or rules, without mailed armour, weapons, provisions or money. And we have already seen what Tang Wang's court and cabinet could do. Half of the Manchu army was in Nanking under the *Jinglo*, generallissimo or dictator, Hoong Chungchow; vice-president Bashan being commandant. The other half was under the orders of the Beira in Hangchow; Li Yenling was sent to garrison Soochow; Woo Jaoshung and deserter Li Chungdoong to look after the coast.

In July, Woo Jukwei sailed with his naval force, from Yanghoo against Soochow, seconded by Hwang Fei from Taihoo. Soochow garrison consisted then of one thousand cavalry soldiers of desperate valour. Yenling and Gwobao had their head quarters in Foohiao palace. As soon as they heard of the

* There is no discrepancy between this and the above account from the "Ming Mo Ji"; for, as will appear below, Wun Yuenji was also a commander here.

arrival of the armies against them, they ascended a gate tower to reconnoiter, ordering out a hundred good horsemen, each with a flag, to march at a little distance from each other on the road from Nanking, to pretend to be a Manchu army coming thence. A few hundred of Jukwei's van pushed in by the Sü gate, penetrated from four to five li into the city without meeting a single soldier, when they were suddenly surrounded and attacked from all sides,—not a man escaping. The besiegers, though ignorant of that disaster, retreated to a distance, the city gates were closed, and a proclamation was immediately posted in all quarters of the city, intimating that the man who refused to have his head shaved would have it cut off. In a few days there was not a living unshaved male head in the enormous city of Soochow,—and the executioner seems to have been as busy as the barber; for it is related that all the accomplices of the enemy were beheaded. This put an end to the siege of Soochow, for the enemy withdrew before the terrible thousand.

In August the Beira marched south from Nanking, detaching Ma Lasi and Ungutoo with their divisions against Hwang Fei, whom they defeated at Changchow, and then broke up the army of Dsotsai at Kwunshan; Yihing and Changshoo cities fell as the result. Liw Liangdso was sent against Kiangyin, and Chungdoong burst into Tsoongming, put to the sword every soul in Kiating, and then united with Yaoshung to attack the army of Fei and Jukwei on the Woosong river. They attacked on one side, while the Soochow contingent seconded from the other. Fei's fleet was then at Chunshun poo; and as the tide was low and the vessels large, and fast in the mud, they were burnt down. Both Fei and Jukwei were seized, and the victorious army at once rushed to the siege of Soongkiang. Chungdoong hoisted the Banners of Fei, at sight of which the gates were opened, Chungdoong entered, and the city was his.

In the same month a counter move was made by Siangggwan, who, with twenty thousand Yihing and Liyang men, penetrated to the neighbourhood of Nanking. Chungchow at once seized all suspected persons, and put to death those known to be

dangerous. He discovered that these had agreed on a signal, at sight of which the enemy was to enter by a gate to be opened for them. This was a fire by night over the Shunchu gate. The signal blazed forth as was agreed upon; but large bodies of Manchus had been sent out by Taiping and Chaoyang gates to march towards the blaze, while a third body was lying in wait inside the Shunchu gate. The sudden and unexpected attack of these three divisions staggered, bewildered, and routed the besiegers, and the prince of Yooichang was seized at Maoshan. Siangggwan withdrew with the few who held together, and entered Taihoo, where he joined with Golin and Chishung, camping on Sishan hills. Here Chishung's men behaved so cruelly to the people around, that they acted as guides to the Manchu admiral Jaoshung, who came suddenly upon him and burnt his vessels. Chishung fled to Fukien, where he was welcomed by Tang Wang; but was degraded as soon as the truth was known. A fleet appeared to assist the remaining portion of Sishan camp, but the vessels of Siangggwan and Golin shared the fate of those of Chishung.

Wooyi commanded on Taihoo with a disciplined body of men, and Yingyuen held Kiangyin with another. After the fall of Sishan, Wooyi defeated the Manchu lieut.-general of Kiating, who had fifty-four ships at Pingwang. He defeated Jaoshung, taking twenty of his ships at Loongan, and thus effected a junction with the troops of East Chihkiang. Yingyuen defied Chung-doong's impetuosity for two months.

Just then the Beira Boto, leaving Luakuduahwun to look after the border of Chihkiang and Fukien, and viceroy Jang Dsunyin to hold Hangchow, marched northwards, taking Kiahing foo. Dividing his army, he retook Kiashan and Pinghoo, marched on to Wookiang, united with Jaoshung, and occupied all the routes to the ports. Then taking advantage of a heavy rain, the combined army annihilated Wooyi, and immediately pressed the siege of Kiangyin, keeping up a heavy cannonade unremittingly by day and night. Another heavy rain brought down the riddled walls, and the city was all put to the sword.

Chungchow sent Yechun, and lieut.-general Jang Tienloo, to attack Hwichow and Ningko, defended by Jin Shung, who had so planted thirteen camps under thirteen major-generals along the sloping sides of the difficult mountains surrounding the cities on all sides, that attack there was hopeless. There was one side less difficult of access,—that of Chisi, whence it was possible to attack, and there Jin himself defended with the main portion of his army. His men were all volunteers, drawn by himself to the hills of Anhwi. He was posted at the pass of Tsoongshan gwan, and for two months received the attacks of the Manchu arms without the least impression, while he was deaf to the many efforts made to induce him to desert. But in all parts of China there are always men enough ready to do anything for a consideration; and bribery induced some natives to show the Manchu troops a way, by unfrequented and unsuspected paths on Jingduasinling Pass. This gave them easy access to some of Jin's thirteen forts, ten of which fell before they got to Chisi, where Jin himself defended, and which they could not take; for though he had to fight night and day, he was obstinate as the hills around. But in October, one Whang Shoo, who had deserted to the Manchus, but had not yet shaved his head, put on his former old-fashioned Chinese clothing, and at the head of a body of troops went to the gates, pretending to have come to aid in the defence. He was welcomed by the gallant Jin, who found he had received a Greek horse. The gates were instantly opened, and the Manchus poured in and seized the gallant Jin.

Because Jin refused to shave his head, Chungchow ordered his execution; and thus he died. Ten persons of his family committed suicide. When Chungchow went into his Yamun, there was Jin before him, sitting and staring him in the face. And he rushed terrified into his house, and dared not go outside for days after.*

* "Well done, old Mr Jin," cried an enthusiastic and fine old Chinese Jüyin, who read this passage with me; and added, "He was a first-class scholar, and we read his Treatises to this day." This is the mind of all literary China, which is intensely conservative, forgets all the evils belonging to native dynasties, and sees only degradation in the compulsory presence of foreigners, whether Manchus or British.

The progress of the Manchu army was rapid; and it was of such a nature that the "Holy Wars" refuses to record it further than to make the remark that the armies, whithersoever they went, "left not a hair" remaining,—the country in their track being as if "washed out"; and the sufferings of the people consequently beyond description. Jang Tienloo, a former officer of Kofa's, but now in Manchu service, was the only general officer who manifested any concern for the people. He camped on the hills around Hwichow, and issued the most peremptory orders, forbidding any of his men to enter the city. Even though it rained in spring for scores of days together, and the older men of the city entreated him to enter the gates, he would neither go himself nor permit his men to move. The citizens shed tears of joy in gratitude for his care; and a grateful government, hearing of his humanity, made him a commander.

Chinese military officers are as often as not illiterate, coarse men; and the sight of blood does not tend to refine them. The sentiments expressed by the civil magistrate are such as imply the utmost humanity. Sometimes also military officers are men of thorough education and of refined sentiment; and sometimes men of warm, soft hearts, who have risen from the ranks though without education, would be an ornament to the official military of any country, as far as their conduct to the people is concerned. But as a rule military officers act towards the civilian population among whom they happen to be quartered, or through whom they have to march, as if they were conquerors passing through a people overcome with arms in their hands; and the cruelty of these officers to vanquished foes can be compared to nothing but the ferocious delight of a tiger over its bleeding victim. And the worst relic of savagery in China is the almost constant massacre of all the inhabitants of a city which has defended itself from the Chinese army. And if any Chinaman reads this book, we earnestly beseech him to do all in his power to remove this foul blot on his country's fame; and to endeavour to bring about a public feeling which shall never rest till those soldiers, guilty of these fiendish deeds, be cashiered from the army, and

their names branded with infamy. China is perhaps the only great nation under the sun which practices the Roman Catholic dogma, that faith need not to be kept with enemies. But the company in which she finds herself does not make her conduct in this respect the less infamous; and she should by this time have learned what she must learn before she can be really great, that honesty is the best policy. Colonel Gordon, to whom China owes so much, could tell a tale the reverse of honourable, of one who now stands out as one of the most prominent men in China. This should not be. And men guilty of bad faith and of unnecessary cruelty should be dealt with according to Chinese law and not according to Chinese custom. With the education and philosophy so common in China, such a thing as a razed city, or the slaughter of any person without arms in his hands, should not have been heard of; and such wicked cruelties are the more inexcusable, that they are at utter variance with such education and with the sentiments of the philosophy most highly honoured in China. The story of Robespierre has been age after age repeated in China; but the squeamishness which led to his retirement from the bar was not a healthy, manly principle, which would dare danger and death in enforcing it, but a sentimental egoism which gave way at the first approach of personal danger. And it is for want of this deep principle that China is what she is, that her history is stained with great blots of unnecessary bloodshed; and not till she has learned what one of her own philosophers has beautifully taught her—to fear to do wrong rather than fear to die—can China be what she should be among the nations. But she will not in the future more than in the past be able to practice this principle, by leaning on her own systems of philosophy; nor can she acquire it from the sentimental, unpractical humanitarianism of Rousseau and his followers, nor from the shallow humanity of the loud-tongued and empty-handed modern Secularism. She can learn it only where the few truly noble statesmen among British and other nations of the west learned it,—at the feet of the Man who laid down His life for the well-being of others.

Chungchow ordered Ma Jingoong against Chang Tsai the Fanshan prince, whom he seized at Chienshan, and Chang Chi made prisoner Gaorgan prince at Wooyuen. Shunghwun sent Wang Tijoong, who took Tsienchang; and Wang Duayin retook Foochow,—the Yi Wang being so completely defeated that he fled to hide himself. The other cities did not stand a siege and the whole course of the Yangtsu was again entirely under Manchu rule. But so bitter was the hostility of the conservative peasantry to the change in their head and neck dress, and so dangerous the hatred roused by cruelties and exactions of the soldiery, that the viceroy of Chihkiang found it necessary to petition for a reduction of taxation to restore the goodwill of the people lost by the proclamation of the edict about hair-shaving. He also condemned in strong language the cruelties of Chungdoong and Jaoshung, who should be brought to examination for the riotously wicked character of their armies. But what could be expected of men fighting only for the money it brought? They differed from the professional robber in that the latter robbed in defiance to the law, and they in support of the law,—but each with equally contemptuous indifference to all personal, family or social rights.

Immediately after the Chinese new-year of 1646, Haogo the Manchu Soo Chin Wang was ordered to snatch Szchuen out of the hands of Jang Hienjoong, who had risen to greatness on the ruins of Dsuchung, at first his friend afterwards his rival and superior. Boto was sent back to take East Chihkiang; along with general Toolai and the Beidsu Tunchi.

Soo Wang arrived before Singan in April and found that fighting had been going on before. Former lieut.-generals of the Ming, had raised forces at Hingan and Hanchung, with which they frequently defeated the robbers. They took Fungyang and besieged Singan, receiving honorary titles from Tang Wang, in whose name they fought, and in whose cause they had the universal sympathy of the people. But though many of these joined, it did not avail them, for the Manchu viceroy several times defeated them and retook from them the cities Weinan, Poochung,

Woogoong, Toongchow, which they had just taken from the robbers. Thus the Manchus fought a double fight,—one against the robbers in possession, another against the Ming striving for possession; but as the same was true of both the robbers and the Ming, the double contest was after all but a single one, for each of the three had two foes. When Soo Wang arrived at the scene of action, he pressed in with even greater vigour, pushing before him, slaying or scattering all the robber armies of Funchow, Chingyang, Yen-an. In June he broke up Ho Jun's army at Kitow gwan on the way to Hanchung, and raised the siege of Hanchung and Hingan. He then marched the greater portion of his army into Szchuen, leaving the Beidsu Manda to protect Hanchung against the Ming. Hienjoong was completely defeated in winter at Singan. And this great robber, second only to Dsuchung, was taken and beheaded. Over one hundred and thirty robber forts and camps were taken; and Szchuen was included in the Manchu provinces. But in this recital, Sangwei the real conqueror is not even once mentioned, and we are left to discover elsewhere that it was he who subdued Hienjoong and annexed Szchuen, as it was he who had hunted down Dsuchung and covered Shensi with the Manchu tail.

We now return to the court of Tang Wang, who was emperor of so wide a region, which he managed so inefficiently to rule. We find that meantime his best minister, Daojow, had been entirely neglected and no money or provisions sent to his army. He was under the necessity,—which he lamented,—of giving notes of hand to the people instead of money for the where-withal to feed his army; and it is said of him that the people gave more readily than they would have given to Tang Wang. He was then at Hwi and Chü chows, “pressing for soldiers who were not sent, praying for provisions which were never given.” In his weakness the Manchus had pounced upon him at Woo-yuen, seized him and sent him to Nanking, “rejoicing over the capture of this one upright man more than at the fall of ten Prefectures.” He and Chungchow were natives of the same village, and the Dictator was afraid to go into his prisoner's

presence lest the latter should upbraid him as a traitor to his native people. He therefore sent a subordinate, but Daojow refused to speak. Thus the western Foochow army was gone, and the army which went north, after their terror at the fall of the horse, marched 400 li, and returned;—the commanders giving as their reason the want of provisions. Tang Wang was therefore in despair. He saw no hope from his own men and his own armies. He sent messengers south to Annam to bring soldiers thence. It is stated that when the men of Annam brought tribute to Peking during the Ming period, they dressed exactly like the Chinese; a statement most likely to be true; for Annam and all the nations surrounding China had borrowed civilisation from her.

At the new-year 1646, Tang Wang accused himself of Three Crimes against Heaven, ate coarse food and clothed in cotton (sack-cloth), ordering his ministers to do the same. A more statesmanlike act was sentencing Hia Shangjin, a commissariat commissioner, to pay a fine of ten thousand taels;—which could be only for malversation. For fortunes have always been made in all countries by starving the soldiers and stuffing the pockets of the commissariat officials.

Ma Shuying was at last successful in getting an asylum. He had again and again knocked at the doors of Tang Wang's palace, and had made overtures of friendship and support to Loo Wang, but neither the one nor the other would have anything to do with him; even though Juloong and general Fang Gwongan, whom he claimed as former dependants, were willing to be bail for his good conduct. Perhaps Tang Wang felt that it would be satisfactory if their own conduct was such as it should be. Gwongan gave him an asylum in his army, however, and he remained there, Tang Wang replying to his too-powerful officials, that Ma would have office when Hangchow was taken. Tungjiao was also promised great things. He would become a count when he took Kiang, a marquis when Nanking fell, and created a wang when Peking was occupied. So that hope was not yet extinct. He was also urged to refrain from countenancing

any other claimant to the throne, for the cause was that of all the wangs or princes of the Ming family, who were all one flesh and bone. Tungjiao soon after received an enormous increase to his army. Li Dsuchung had met the fate he deserved; and his nephew, Li Jin, was commander of the nominal three hundred thousand men remaining. He too was harassed by styled Sangwei, and moved southwards as best he could. He was "Number One Tiger." He found himself so straitened between Sangwei on the north, and Tungjiao on the south, that he considered it best to chose to serve Tungjiao. He crossed the Tungting Lake, and united his troops to those of Tungjiao. He was created a marquis and a Dragon-tiger commander. Tungjiao also received the degree of marquis, though Nanking had not fallen.

Tang Wang was then crowded with memorials;—one censor so warmly and pathetically arguing the expediency of the "emperor's" presence at the head of his army immediately, that the wang was quite melted by the good-will displayed to his family. But while agreeing that the course recommended was the best, he continued stationary. Memorial followed memorial,—which we will not quote,—all harping on the same string; and at last Tang Wang decided to go, and the Kiangsi officials at once and in joy got ready to welcome him. But trifling had not yet ended. Still memorials poured in, some upbraiding and accusing certain ministers who were obstacles,—others calling upon the wang to go as the last hope. But if he did not yet bestir himself, he sent fifty thousand taels to Tungjiao, to help him to retake Kiang and Peking. The "rebel" wang of Yunnan was with Gwwei brought a prisoner to him at Kienning, whither he had at last moved. Jingjiang Wang was sentenced to be a common subject, and to be severely punished by the district magistrate if he became troublesome. But a few days after he "sickened and died." Gwwei was executed; Kweichoo was made count Pingyooe; and Shushu vice-president of the Board of War, in spite of his refusal.

Tang Wang got to Yenping, whither Kwangtung sent one

hundred thousand taels for his army. Loo Wang, now seeing the political sky brewing dark thunder, made overtures of peace to Tang Wang; and just then a priest, pretending to be Foo Wang, was put to death after trial. Ma also made another unsuccessful attempt to be received by Tang Wang, whose power was by no means a shadow; for the king of the Loochoos sent messengers with tribute to beg a treaty, which he would scarcely think of doing if Tang Wang were weak enough to be contemptible.

Boto reached Hangchow in April, and found that Fang Gwongan had fled in the most disorderly manner across the river. Ma with his shadow, the vicious Dachun, had crept into the camp of Gwongan, his former dependant; and was smarting under the repeated and recent insult offered him by Tang Wang in refusing to see him, and in giving the border sentries orders to forbid his entry. He therefore instigated Gwongan to put to death a messenger from Tang Wang. Besides the regular armies, the enthusiasm of the Fukien men found expression in large bodies of volunteers and voluntary subscriptions to support them; so earnest was their objection to shaving their head. All the legal taxation of the three eastern Fukien prefectures went direct and without abatement to the support of the two armies of Gwongan and Juyin. Under Ma's advice, not only was all this money expended on these armies, but Gwongan took charge of all the voluntary contributions raised in those districts for the volunteers, and used it up for his own purposes. Thus Ma caused the volunteers to regard the regulars with detestation; and Boto found the work of destruction going on in Fukien by internal combustion. The volunteers had been started by two graduates, ignorant of the art of war; who had, when they had raised scarcely one thousand agriculturists and beggars, placed themselves under the orders of Gwongan and Juyin; and they continued subject to them after their numbers had greatly increased. Neither the regulars nor volunteers were located with a view to efficient drill, nor in strategical points; but were centred in cities where provisions were easily obtained. The

two commanders discussed the question of provisions; but could agree only in deciding that the volunteers should be dependent on voluntary contributions. These, however, were found by a junior secretary of Board of War to be very uncertain and wholly inadequate, because there was no proper mode of collecting them. His proposal that voluntary contributions should, with the regular taxes, go into the Board of Revenue to support both regulars and volunteers, was objected to by the two commanders. And all the arrangements of every department of Government were entirely at the mercy of Juloong; into whose hands the taxes of the Kwangs passed, as well as those of Fukien. The same mistake was again made here which Kofa had lived to regret,—each army was permitted to command and to utilise the taxes of the lands placed under its protection.

Boto sent his army by the Tsientang river, but Jang Gwowej and Wang Juyin took advantage of a south-east wind, bore down upon and defeated them, sinking many of the Manchu vessels. Following up his victory, Gwowej pressed in to the gates of Hangchow, but retreated after an unsuccessful attack. The Manchus however retrieved their name by land; for next month they battered down the camp of Gwongan with heavy cannon, and compelled him to flee with a few myrid men. Loo Wang had therefore to retire from Shaohing to Taichow. The Manchu army was at the river bank, and distressed because they could not cross, for the river was over 10 li wide. But as the summer had been a dry one, the water was shallow and many sand banks appeared. The stream was also sluggish, and as there was no tide, trial was made, and the water found to reach only to the horses' belly. In the beginning of the hot July weather, the soldiers on the south bank were bathing in the shallow water, and wandering hither and thither in aimless disorder, which was seen by the ever-watchful Manchus. Some scores of thousands both of infantry and cavalry marched up the river some distance and crossed, wading with their clothes on. The rambling army fled as soon as ever the Manchu banners appeared on the south side, without even an attempt at rallying or fighting; and Ma, the

Ming evil genius, with his sub Yuen, argued Gwongan into agreeing to hand over Loo Wang to the Manchus as a propitiatory offering. But Loo Wang was wiser than Foo Wang, and escaped in time to sea. Juyin was drowned, and his family perished after they got to Nanking. The result of this blow was the fall of Shaohing, Ningpo, Wunchow and Taichow.

Joo Dadien still held out in Kinhwa; and Gwoweï in Yiwoo, which was immediately attacked, taken, and Gwoweï slain. Kinhwa was not so easily captured, but the scoundrelly traitor Yuen Dachun, who knew that the south-east corner of the ramparts were but recently thrown up and not very strong, hoping to receive a proper acknowledgment, offered to be guide to the Manchus. The city fell, was razed to the ground and every soul slain. The perfect of Kùchow had refused to acknowledge Loo Wang; but the higher degree of merit from Tang Wang was no defence against the Manchus, who took his city, and in it both Soo Wang and Longan Wang. With it the whole of Chihkiang was under Manchu colours. And the army was free to march into Fukien.

In the west affairs were of a mottled character. Tang Wang's plans were by his officials prevented from attaining any good result. Daojow was lost and fell for want of support. And as is usual elsewhere, Juloong now petitioned to have posthumous honours paid him. A temple was erected to his name in his native village, and another in Foochow with the title of *Minjoong*, "Merciful and Faithful." And the power of Tang Wang in Kiangsi, was acknowledged only inside the walls of Kanchow, where Wun Yuenji was determined to stand.

Between Tingchow and Shaochow are the mountains of Damaoshan, in the caves of which live many of the Man tribes. The Ming troops had often attacked them but in vain, till prince Yoongning induced them to submit. He summoned them to his standard after the Manchus took Foochow, and with their aid he recovered the city. The Manchus besieged it in the spring, but were compelled to raise the siege by three divisions from the camp of Jung Tsai at Kwangsin. When these withdrew,

the Manchus again formed siege, and as Jung Tsai remained still, the city fell, Yoongning Wang was slain and his Man soldiers scattered. Tsai was degraded and sentenced to do penance. In May the Manchus took Chang. Just when the Manchus were got to Dsaokow in the vicinity of Sinchung, Juloong gave out that the three provinces could not possibly raise the million and half of taels necessary to support the army; and pronounced affairs to be desperate. The movement of the Manchus compelled Yuenji to enter the walls of Kanchow, whose inhabitants in their terror sought safety in sudden flight; a week after Knachow was invested. Yunnan sent a body of troops to aid Kanchow, but after reaching Nankang they came to a halt and staid there. Yang Yenlin marched from Yütoo with forty thousand men who got to Kanchow, but only to increase the bulk of the garrison; for he did not dare to face the Manchus. Kanchow was therefore isolated, and in it were twenty thousand volunteers from the neighbourhood, forty thousand of the Cave Man, and several thousands from Kwangtung. And though the Yunnan army did not press in, they to the number of five thousand men frequently defeated the Manchus of Nanchang, took and occupied Kingan, where they greatly increased in numbers. The two Jung commanders, Tsai and Hoongkwei, withdrew to the mountains when Yenlin and Yuenji fell back on Kanchow. Yuenji at that time received the title of *Shookien*, "The superior man," from Tang Wang, who degraded Liw Gwangyin, governor of Kiang, for retreating. Kwangsin was uncovered by the hasty flight of Jung Tsai without a battle, and was immediately invested by the Manchus. An army sent to raise the siege kept at a safe distance, and the city fell.

Changsha was then occupied by Tungjiao with thirty thousand men, and communicated with the former quarters of Liangyü. Yochow was defended by Ma Jinjoong and Wang Jiaochung with several myriads of men. Li Jin and other officers formerly under Dsuchung had one hundred thousand men of Dsuchung's in Changte. Others of Dsuchung's officers joined Tungjiao, raising his forces to one hundred thousand men.

It was immediately after this that the fate of Dsuchung was known over the south. Tang Wang in his joy over the death of the rebel who overturned the Ming dynasty, offered sacrifices to make known to his deceased ancestors the glad news. Tungjiao was crowned with the honours of a count and soon after of a marquis. Li Jin was named *Chusin* or the "single-minded," and Gao Yidoong was named *Bijung*, "certain-to-be upright." They with others not necessary to be named were made lieut.-generals, each with a station, forming in all thirteen *jun* or military outposts in Hoonan and Hoope, over against the central armies of the Manchus stationed in Woochang and Kingchow. But here again there was the same difficulty which made East Chihkiang so easy a prey,—jealousies and strugglings over the commissariat; for the elements of these thirteen armies were even more heterogeneous than those of Chihkiang had been.

Thus notwithstanding the extent of country calling Tang Wang emperor, he was compelled to rely on Fukien resources to meet the crowding and increasing united Manchu troops. He had been pressed by Tungjiao to go to Hoonan, and there establish his capital; and the commandant of Kanchow invited him to Kiangsi, while central Chihkiang prayed him to make Kùchow his headquarters. He had long discovered that Juloong was not capable of supporting the weight of empire, and was desirous to get to Tungjiao by way of Kanchow. But Juloong feared the "emperor's" removal, and got a lot of soldiers and civilians to surround Tang Wang, and cry out that he must not leave them. But if Juloong was eager that Tang Wang should remain in Foochow for his sake, he was by no means ready to lay down his life for Tang Wang; and with the fall of East Chihkiang and the flight of Loo Wang, the Manchu chiefs received the secret adhesion of Juloong in answer to their flattering overtures. On pretence of putting down piracy, he removed all the troops stationed in the land and river posts commanding the entrance into Fukien at the Hienhialing Pass, leaving the pass without a single defender. News had meantime arrived of the recovery in Szchuen of the two prefectures

of Choongching and Kweichow, with three sub-prefectures and twenty-three district cities, and of the utter rout of several myriads of Manchus in Hoonan and Hoope by the Taotai Jang Kwang, after a terribly bloody fight; though Li Chusin had not dared to face them.

The brothers Jung were made dukes, though for what reason it is difficult to say, unless with the hope that it might stimulate them to patriotism and bravery. But the hope was not well grounded, for Hoongkwei soon after, in tones of terror, reported the approach of the Manchus to the frontier, which he was defending, after they had taken the Chihkiang cities bordering Fukien. There was a useless diversion made in Leichow, where the Manchu prefect was murdered,—and in Kaochow, where the soldiers put their officers to the sword, and declared for Tang Wang. The commandant of Kùchow, Mingjun, flew through Hienhiagwan Pass. The prince was very angry, ordered the imprisonment of his son, a government official, and the apprehension of Mingjun in Kienning foo. This terrified the coward, and he kept his promise to return to his post. Juloong was now eager to have Tang Wang back again in Foochow, promising a sum of four million taels for the army, if Tang Wang desisted from his project of going into the Kwangs. The “emperor,” once rid of Juloong, was unmovable however, and would not turn back, though the Manchus were threatening Kwanmun of Fukien, and though Juloong sent his mother to Tang Wang’s queen to prevail with her to turn her husband back.

The Manchus had meantime started in two divisions from Kwangsin and Kùchow, and got easily and without resistance over the undefended mountain passes,—avoiding Hienhialing, where an army had been again posted to receive them. Jung Weihoong, a doctor graduate, or Jinsu of Yangchow, commanded in Poochung hien, and though the people prayed to have the gates opened to the Manchus, he refused their repeated entreaties and held out, but in vain, for the city soon fell. He was taken, brought before the Beira, who, recognising more than ordinary ability in the man, was anxious to gain him over to the

Manchu side ; but emphatically, though quietly, he objected to have his hair off. A sum of money was demanded of him as ransom. He had none. The people to whose prayers he had not listened, honoured him so greatly that they offered to ransom him. He refused to accept the money from the poor ; and to put an end to the play, he reviled the Beira to his face to such a degree, that the proud Manchu could endure it no longer, and ordered his execution. Mingjun also met a similar fate in this city, whither he had fled from his post. When Poochung fell, Yenping was attacked, standing but a brief siege. Tang Wang fled with a few followers, several of whom, however, found it convenient to fly each his own way ; and thus his ministers became scattered. An army was raised by some graduates, but the raw volunteers were soon cut to pieces. A band, under a Yoongfoo deserter, cut their way through the mountains, and laid themselves at the feet of the Beira. And the march of the Manchus caused two parties to form ; the one for, the other against them. It was then the saying originated in Fukien, that the man who saved his hair lost his head ; and a coffin retained in the house, ensured its downfall. This latter is worthy of note, to show the state of society then on the matter of burial, for every house had its one or more coffins, which the relations affectionately retained in the house, but which the Manchus ordered out to burial, as inducing bad health. The coffins were, of course, as now over all China, air-tight ; yet, doubtless, they were in many instances only nominally so. It is recorded that "all the cities of the province removed their coffins outside the city gates," according to order ; but the inhabitants followed them, and the "cities were as if they had been washed !"

On the twenty-eighth of eighth moon (September, October), Tang Wang, under the escort of five thousand men from Tungjiao, got into Tingchow, the Manchus in pursuit being at Kienning, whose prefect, with the Taotai of Yenping, submitted. Wang Gwohan, the commandant of Tingchow, was terrified, and his lord had him beaten ; with the result however that the "emperor" was left without an attendant ! He refused

to rest at Shaochow when passing, and he was hard pressed by the Manchu pursuers who hoisted Ming banners. They pursued seven days and nights, overtaking and defeating his lieut-general, who had twenty thousand men. A dozen men knocked at the gate of Tingchow, demanding admittance as the body guard of Tang Wang. And so they were to be; for on entering they made prisoner Tang Wang, who, a month before, commanded over half a million of soldiers. The fact shows how completely cowed were the Chinese supporters of Tang Wang, when a miserable handful of men could seize and carry him off out of a large city. They brought him prisoner to Nanking, and gave out that he refused to eat and thus died. It was afterwards found to be a false report, at least when first proclaimed; but it had the desired effect, for all the defenders of his throne were paralyzed and their arms fell out of their hands. The body of his adherents fell to pieces, and some literary men formed the usual posthumous title for him.

Chüenchow was taken immediately after Tingchow, and Foochow was entered by the north gate a fortnight after. It was found to contain scarcely a tithe of its inhabitants, so thoroughly adverse to the Manchu rule were they. All the chief literary men and officials who could, fled to the hills. One solitary president, whose name was not worth recording, remained behind, and presented himself to the Beira on his knees, in which posture he was allowed to remain most of the day and then dismissed with contempt. A proclamation was immediately posted ordering all to shave. Jao Mao, a man of thirty-six, and who had three sons, provided fish and liquor to feast his old father and mother, when he revered them in the usual manner. After they slept, he ordered his sons to be diligent with their studies. He then got a pen with which he wrote that he was unwilling to cut off his hair, but was willing to die; and having written it, he strangled himself in his own hall. Tsao Siao-chuen was a Juyin at the early age of seventeen, and a Jinsu at twenty. He shaved off *all* his hair and retired as a monk to a mountain monastery. An aged official of seventy-

three strangled himself in his hall; and the example thus set was followed by crowds upon crowds; for nowhere was the proclamation commanding the wearing of the Manchu queue received with such determination of hatred as in Fukien; and the last to receive the Manchu cut were Fukien men. Changchow opened its gates, and its officials were therefore allowed to retain their posts. As soon as the Manchu army had gone, the civilians rose upon and murdered the "traitor" officials. And though the Manchus entered Chüenchow, they found it empty of valuable plunder; for it had been harried by Jung Jubao, who took possession of all the silver and hired five hundred men to burn down the palace. He retired only when the Manchus appeared at the gate, retreating to Anping, where his brother Julong had a large army and five hundred to six hundred large ships, and which was almost impregably fortified with large cannon whose never ceasing echoes shook the "heaven and the earth." Thither the Manchus did not think it convenient meantime to go.

We left Yuenji besieged in Kanchow by Shunghwan, ever since he took Kingan in May. A body of five thousand men marched from Kwangtung, which compelled the Manchus to raise the siege to give them battle. They were, however, defeated at Lijia shan, and the siege again pressed. Yuenji depended mainly on the Man soldiers, who however latterly behaved in a brutal manner in their murder and extortion of the people; and as he treated the levies from Yunnan and the Kwangs with sternness, they became demoralised. In August a force of forty thousand men from the Kwangs marched to the relief of Kanchow, and demanded to be led against the Manchus. There were some seamen available, but Yuenji declared he could not attack without the four thousand seamen left in Nangan. But as the river was shallow the Manchus burnt the vessels and those seamen never appeared. After news of the loss of the Ming fleet, the Manchus forced the camp of the Kwang men, and next day took the Yunnan camp; and Kanchow was left naked, besieged by a large army and defended

by a few thousands. When the over worked garrison heard that Tang Wang was captured they lost the only inducement they had to fight, and their arms fell listless to their sides. But so strong were the natural defences of the place, that it was all but impossible to take it, till, in November, a man let himself down by a rope from the wall to escape, was apprehended by the Manchus, compelled to act as guide, and led them in by the small east gate, and the city was theirs. To save his own life he guided the Manchus, who left not a soul alive in the city. Yuenji drowned himself, and many officials committed suicide rather than fall into Manchu hands.

In June 1647, Li Dingwo marched on Linngan of Yunnan and took it, calling it Amichow, after a deceased robber. He was declared a robber and a traitor by the good governor Weiju, who shortly afterwards defeated the four generals, taking Dingwo. His three brother generals interceded for him, praying for his release on the ground that they were all working in the same cause, that of extirpating robbery under Dingjow. Weiju agreed to their proposal to become his allies, on these conditions:—First, That no false (private) colours be displayed; second, That none of the civilian people should be slain; and third, That women should be sacred. In October the four generals marched to Haoching and Likiang, whose prefect did not wish to resist them; but Tienbo, who was there, though possessing the letter of Weiju ensuring his safety, could not trust himself to them. He therefore sent his son to their camp to ascertain their object, and to say that he desired only to be left unmolested in Yoongchang. General Liw Wunsiw said: “This is the duke’s heir, and his coming serves the same purpose as if it had been his father.” He was therefore well treated, and sent back with an escort of twenty men, and taking with him all the family valuables which had been plundered by the army under Dingjow. The duke was delighted at this unlooked-for good luck, and immediately set out with the generals to the capital of Yunnan. Wunsiw marched against the remains of Dingjow’s old army, in which was the notable

Black Tiger, who fought with a double-edged sword in his mouth, and an enormous one in his hand. He was of the Man tribe, as were his followers. Wunsiw failed to defeat him; and only on arrival of Dinggwo was Black Tiger conquered and slain. Dingjow's men had betaken themselves to the caves and mountains of the Man after their great defeat. Linngan had fallen to Dinggwo with great difficulty, and only after serious trouble. Even after the guns had shattered the walls to pieces, Dingjow made a desperate resistance within. Dinggwo was so roused to fury, that he put to death every soul he met in the city; and seventy thousand fell before him, besides those who committed suicide. The cities of Kwunyang, Kinning, Chunkung, Kweihwa, suffered in the same terrible manner, and hundreds of thousands were put to the sword, though all fled who could. Only those cities under the care of Wei ju escaped the general ruin, as Talifoo, &c.; and the gratitude of those regions was so great, that the people worshipped him, and have continued to the present day to worship him as a god. So fierce was the attack of Dinggwo and his colleagues, that all in the caves and mountain defiles at last surrendered, and among them were Dingjow and the lovely widow of Shungming, who was the inciting cause of all this bloodshed; as Dingjow, but for her, would have yielded long before. Great therefore was the curiosity to see the beautiful cause of all this desperate fighting and slaying; and when a black, ugly hag appeared, those who saw and heard roared with laughter!

Yü Ngao was the fourth younger brother of Tang Wang, whom the latter created Tang Wang, when he himself was elected Emperor. When Tang Wang was captured the men of Yü Ngao fled; and he and Whi Wang made their way by sea to Kwangchow or Canton, accompanied by the grand secretary Soo Gwanshung. Bangyen and Gwanshung had consulted together as to the course proper to be pursued. Bangyen had been at Chaoching and seen Gwei Wang, and to Gwanshung he said that as all the people were in favour of making a stand and of electing Gwei Wang to be emperor, the sooner the Wang

was enthroned the better; and Gwanshung agreed with him. Bangyen went to Gwei Wang, who was enthroned in Chaoching a fortnight after. He was then sent as a senior secretary to Canton to proclaim the enthronement of the new emperor, but when he approached Canton he found that Yü Ngao had already been proclaimed emperor. He dared not go within the city, but sent a message to Gwanshung, urging him to unite with viceroy Kweichoo, and not ruin the weak cause by civil war. But the double election was in reality the result of the unfriendly terms existing between Kweichoo and Gwanshung, and he would not now resile from his new emperor. Yü Ngao had been enthroned in December 1646, in his capital of Canton, assuming the style of *Shaowoo* for his reign. Gwanshung was nominated commander-in-chief, besides being, with the other principals concerned in the election, made grand secretary. After the return of Bangyen, Gwanshung received a letter from Shushu, demanding his aid in establishing the new kingdom, as it would be a ruinous policy to divide into two parties at the moment when Fukien was lost on the east, and the Manchus were pouring in on the west. He concluded by asking if the cause were shipwrecked what would posterity say of Gwanshung? Gwanshung was so angry on receipt of this letter that he put the messenger to death and prepared to march against Chaoching; thus warranting the question of Shushu. Gwai Wang to prevent surprise, ordered viceroy Lin Jiading to Sanshwi, and Chun Jitai marched from Canton against him, but soon marched back again completely defeated. Lin pursued Chun's men who were crossing in boats at Haikow. Chun fell in with a band of pirates which he engaged to fight for him. They got to windward of Lin's fleet, he sailing on ignorant of the change in the character of the vessels, till a number of fire ships was sent off among his vessels by the pirates, which caused the greatest consternation on board his fleet. Men and horses jumped out of the vessels into the river and became fast in three feet of mud. They were attacked in this defenceless condition and all but annihilated.

Li Chungdoong was then on his way from Fukien. He reported the victory at Canton and gave in his submission to the new emperor, and Gwaishung was overjoyed at both events. Canton and its neighbourhood were then overrun with bands or armies of robbers by land and fleets of pirates by sea. Wha Shenyen was the chief robber; and the principal pirates were the heads of the houses, Hü, Shu, Ma and Jung, all of whom gave in their allegiance to the new emperor; for of course they could still carry on their former trade. One Jie Ngao refused to submit, and murdered citizens at mid-day in the streets, the authorities not daring to interfere! It was in these circumstances that Li Chungdoong made his submission to the emperor, who cordially welcomed him in court dress. While the imposing ceremony was being enacted, a breathless messenger informed Gwanshung that the Manchus were come. "It's a lie," shouted the grand secretary, ordering the messenger's head off. This was no sooner done, than a sound as of rushing waters was heard, and the word went abroad that Hwashan robbers had come. Still the red flags continued to pour into the city; for not a soldier was armed. The emperor laid aside his imperial robes, and the audience was over. But Chungdoong still remained with the emperor, who sent out a messenger to learn the true cause of the street noises. The messenger returned. Chungdoong smilingly offered his majesty, now his prisoner, some food, which however his majesty refused to accept, saying that if he lived, he could not face his ancestors when he "went below." He strangled himself. The conceited Gwanshung was at last aware of the truth of the information given by the breathless messenger. He wrote nine characters, to say that the "Great Ming faithful ministers and upright soldiers, must all die;" and then strangled himself. His body was cut to pieces, and sixteen of Yü Ngao's men put to death. Most of the chief officials acknowledged the Manchus. Jao Wang, in Hoochow, preferred to shave off all his hair to wearing a queue, and retired to a monastery. The prefect submitted to the Manchus. And thus ended Gwanshung's

attempt at making an empire, leaving the Manchus masters of Canton.

We have more frequently than once come across Loo Wang, who had most unwisely set up an opposition "empire" in East Chihkiang, instead of supporting Tang Wang. He was the tenth generation from the first Ming emperor. His father had committed suicide in Yenchow of Shantung, where he was prince, when the Manchus poured in their plundering hosts from Mookden and took Yenchow and many another Shantung city. The son succeeded to the wangship, but fled south when Peking fell. He was ordered by Foo Wang from Kiang and Kwang to take up his official abode in Taichow. When Nanking fell, Ma fled with the mother of Foo Wang to Hangchow, where the first Loo Wang soon surrendered to the Manchus. Chi Biaoja drowned himself; and a censor, who had petitioned meantime to pass the crimes of Ma in silence, starved himself rather than obey the "shaving" proclamation. Foo Wang's mother ordered Ma into Shaochow, where the fate of Foo Wang was unknown.

As soon as Loo Wang was proclaimed regent of the empire in East Chihkiang, he proclaimed ten crimes of Ma's, who therefore dared not present himself. But Gwongan was made a marquis, as well as Juyin. Others received high sounding titles, and were posted for defence along the river and elsewhere, and East Chihkiang contributed six hundred thousand taels for the commissariat. But the army of Sinngan Wang disbanded itself, and the viceroy's camp contained only a few hundred men. So that Loo Wang was thrown on the support of volunteers and voluntary subscriptions to garrison the cities. Gwongan defended Yenchow with spirit from the Manchu attack, till Gwoweï came up, defeated the Manchus, and compelled them to withdraw. In November a terrific storm of wind and rain stopped pursuit and flight, and the Manchus entered a wooden city on the river bank. It was then Ma and Yuen (p. 292) stole into Gwongan's camp. Internal division arose on account of an attack by Wang Jungjoong on lieut.-general Chun Woo, who, when defeated by the Manchus, crossed the sea and plundered his own people.

Chun was slain, and two hot parties arose,—the one accusing, the other defending Wang's attack.

Juyin was eager to assume the offensive, saying he was willing to die fighting, while soon he would have to die unable to fight. Immediately after, he defeated the Manchus on the Tsientang. It was then that Ma urged Gwongan to murder the messenger of Tang Wang. The Manchus then crossed sea, took Hanpoo, and attacked Hangchow, but were repulsed. But Gwongan, after an attack on their camp, declared it was vain to attempt to fight against them, and advised flight into Kweichow. They therefore moved southwards and the Manchus entered Hangchow on a bright moonlight night. Juyin took to sea; Gwoweï alone wishing to stay and fight it out. Juyin however told him, weeping, that he had no ships; that had Gwongan remained they could keep the Manchus at bay, but that his departure had wrecked the "Empire." Gwoweï therefore retreated after Loo Wang. We have already (p. 293) described the dispersal of this army on the river bank.

Gwongan and Ma united their remaining men and fled to Tientai. They were ahead of their men among the mountains at Whangshuyen, and finding their way by enquiries directed to the villagers. They came to a stone bridge, where they halted for the arrival of their men; but fearing the Manchus might come upon them, they broke down the bridge, underneath one of the slabs of which they saw written "When the armies of Fang and Ma reach this spot, all is over." They were terrified at the fate thus written of them! And while pondering over it, Gwoweï overtook them. But those two were not inclined further to fight against fate, and therefore stayed where they were and sent their faithful Yuen Dachun to the Manchus, to make terms. The Beira received him gladly, sent a kind message which delighted the two worthies, who, not to go empty handed, sent on an express to the commander of Loo Wang's body guard, desiring him to prevent the escape of the prince. Fortunately for the prince he was acting commander himself, for his officer was unwell. He therefore escaped by boat to sea, entrusting to Gwoweï the

defence of the four cities still his. But Gwoweï could only die, which he did at Chilishu after the fall of Yiwoo, and after he urged his second in command to flee, as he had parents depending upon him.

Ma, foiled by Loo Wang's escape, did not think it wise just then to surrender to the Manchus. And as Tang Wang would have nothing to do with him, he cropped his hair and entered a monastery in the neighbourhood of Taichow! He was, however, afterwards captured and brought to Hangchow along with Gwoweï, and treated liberally by the Manchus; and they deserved well at the Manchu hands, having been better to them than a couple of hundred thousand men. We have seen Yuen acting as guide to Kinhwa. He was afterwards sent to attack Fukien, and when passing Hienhialing, his horse stumbled and the wretch got his neck broken, only a great deal too late.

A vice-president of one of the Boards was a relative of Ma's. He got 200,000 taels out of the treasury at Soochow, with which he hoped to spend an agreeable life with the Manchus. One Tien Yang also made for the Manchus, sending privately several carts' load of satin as presents for the Beira. Those two went together with four hundred men each in their train. When they got to the camp, the Beira ordered the two several parties to be separated, after commanding them to disarm. On the morrow Yang and every one of his men were put to death.

Jang Mingjun fled to join Loo Wang at sea and made for Chowshan, the head quarters of Whang Binching. This island was anciently called Yoonggowdoong, and the Manchus changed its name later on to Tinghai. Binching was created a count and commandant of Chowshan by Tang Wang, who sent Jow Chiaoju to support him. Jow was at one time a pirate, had visited all the "thirty-six" Japanese islands and was acquainted with almost all their princes. He was nominated general by Tang Wang, and went to Japan to the commander-in-chief, with whom he was acquainted, to ask for the loan of an army. He was promised thirty thousand men and went back delighted. Not so Binching, who believed Jow was acting the part of

Sangwei, in inviting the Japanese, who would come, but would not go away again. Jow, in his anger, went away to Juloong, and discovered him making overtures to the Manchus. Jow was very indignant, saying that a small officer like himself might possibly be pardoned for submitting,—but a great official like Juloong! It was the extreme of disgrace; and even he could not bring himself to imitate the baseness. He therefore cut his throat in the presence of Juloong, who moved away. The cut-throat got better again and made for Chowshan. One officer was defeated by the Manchus and took to plundering the people as his easiest work; but he was defeated by Binching who was the people's friend. The Manchus sent a fleet against Chowshan with five hundred capital archers on board. For three days the fight went on without advantage gained by either side, till Mingjun, who was acquainted with the pirate Yuen Jin, got four large vessels from the pirate, pierced through the Manchu fleet and broke down a number of their vessels with the pirate's heavy guns.

Loo Wang fell in with Jung Tsai on the high seas, and was by him brought, first to Chowshan, then to the mainland of Fukien, just when Juloong was joining the Manchus. Juloong sent a message, sincere or otherwise, to press his brother and relations to join the Manchus; but not one would do so. His son Chung-goong took charge of fleet and army, and a formidable war was waged, all the east of Fukien falling into the hands of the Jung family, in name of the Ming dynasty. Jung Tsai was urged to offer Loo Wang to the Manchus, but instead of doing so he got a south barbarian (Annamite?), resembling Loo Wang in feature and person, to clothe in the prince's garments, to represent, and if need be to die for him. Loo Wang was hidden away for fear of danger. But the Manchus marched north with their prize Juloong, believing him more valuable than Loo Wang, and the "barbarian" was not called upon to die.

Among the numerous minor events of cities taken and re-taken, of jealousies and strifes and meannesses, it may be mentioned that Binching, now under Loo Wang, for Tang Wang was gone,

commanded every youth above fourteen to enroll into the army; every widow was compelled to marry again, and her former husband's property was seized in behalf of the army; and every man above sixty had to give up his property to the "state," which fed him in return. Thus two-thirds of the property under his protection belonged to the army and one third to the civilians.

By April 1648, Loo Wang was master of all Fukien except Ninghai and Foongan, and the Manchus were compelled to mass their troops from Kiang, Kwang and Chihkiang to save the province. They were at first defeated, and it took a full year for all the forces they could muster to drive the pirates out of the Fukien cities into their stronghold of Jientiaoswo, where they were so hard and long pressed by the Manchus that the garrison was famishing. Yuenjin, who was commander, sent to Binching a pressing message for immediate help; but he would not move a man, and Yuenjin had himself to compel the Manchus to raise the siege. Loo Wang therefore ordered an attack on Binching, because he was nothing but a pirate. He was defeated by Yuenjin, acknowledged his crime and prayed forgiveness, which was granted only to be again attacked, defeated and drowned. His two wives drowned themselves to follow him. After this Loo Wang made Chowshan his headquarters. Here he was attacked in 1650 by the Manchus, but drove them off. A more powerful enemy was Mingjun, who at length saw the folly of dividing the energies of those who were fighting against the Manchus, and recommended Jung Tsai to join him in overtures of friendship to Chunggoong (Coxinga), who held office under Gwei Wang. Tsai refused, and his reserves were scattered by the combined forces of Chunggoong and Mingjun. Chowshan commandant would not join Mingjun, who therefore attacked and slew him when unprepared to defend himself. In October 1651, the Manchus at last gained possession of the island, when the slain and suicides were numerous as usual. It was snatched from them in 1654, and a year after they took it again, converting it into a desert, when enormous numbers were drowned. It was thus they were gaining their naval experience. After this

capture in 1651, Loo Wang fled to Kinmun—Gold Gate—or Amoy, where in 1653 he renounced the title of guardian of the empire. He then summoned Chunggoong to Kinmun; but Chunggoong hated him too intensely, and instead of welcoming, sent a band of men who seized and drowned him.

There is one remarkable link between this Fukien war and the western world. We mentioned above the attempt of Jow to get allies from Japan. In 1648, another attempt was made to borrow Japanese troops, when the messengers were informed by the weeping Japanese ministers, that they were then unable to send a single man. In November they heard that the Roman Catholics, for political reasons, were massacred in enormous numbers in Japan. Their ships were burnt at *Junjiaho*. Their "brass-plate engravings of the Lord of Heaven" were all trampled under foot; and every Japanese possessing any foreign article was put to death. Foreign vessels of war (Dutch?) then opened their terrible guns, and the Japanese were compelled to make a treaty; since which the Japanese were in constant terror lest the westerns should come in greater force. They were, therefore, unable to send a single soldier. Japan had then no mint of its own, but used the cash of the Ming first emperor, which accounted for the enormous proportion of the cash of that reign in Chowshan.

A priest, Jun Wei, came at that time from Japan; and in reply to the anxious queries of Yuenji regarding the long-hoped-for troops, said that neither silver nor silk would move the Japanese to send aid; but if the Japanese king would but receive the Tibetan Chants and Litanies given to Pootoshan monastery by the merciful empress (of the Ming), an army would be gladly sent. Having secured the litanic treasure, the priest and Yuenji's officer sailed ten days to Woodaoshan island, where they saw two miraculous red fishes; and other twelve days brought them to Shanto on the Korean border, whence they turned south and soon touched the Japanese island of Yesso. They were boarded by the customs officers, who sent information to the king that here were ships asking for an army. The king

was glad of the approach of the ships, but could not understand how Jun Wei was on board.

Jun Wei was a Chinaman and a man of some culture, because of which the king was very fond of him. He was one of the three principal priests in Japan, and his was the "North" Temple. Just because of his learning, and because of the favour shown him by their king, the people feared him; feared lest he should become like the Roman Catholics, and grasp at civil power. They therefore sought his death. To gain the good will of the people, he went in search of the famous Litany. But the king of Japan informed the commander of the expedition that he had not authorised the priest to go in search of the Litany, which was handed back to the Chinese commander, who had to return crest-fallen, feeling he had been "sold" by the priest; for he returned with the litany instead of an army.

CHAPTER X.

GWEI WANG.

YOWLANG, the Yoongming Wang, was the fourth son of a grandson of Wanli, and therefore not very distantly related to the last Ming emperor. He was stationed in Chüchow when it fell in 1643 into the hands of robbers, who were then far more powerful than the regular armies and constituted authorities. He, with Choo (Tsu) Wang, fled thence into Kwangsi, where he took or received the title of Gwei Wang in Kweilin in September 1646, two months after Tang Wang was proclaimed emperor in Fukien. When it was known that Foochow could not stand, Ding Kweichoo, viceroy of the Kwangs, sent secret messages to Ho Tungjiao, the viceroy of Hookwang, Shushu governor of Kwangtung, and others, to meet together to nominate Gwei Wang as Regent of the empire. He was proclaimed in Chaoching, in December 1646 ; and in spite of the remonstrances of those who raised him, now a strong party, Gwanshung had Yü Ngao nominated in Canton a few days after. We have already seen with what result his efforts were attended. Kweichoo was made president of the Board of War, and Shushu of that of Appointments. And the almost immediate disaster which befell their army at the hands of the pirates threw all the Court into a state of terror.

The clever capture of Canton by Chungdoong frightened Chaoching still more, and in spite of the remonstrances of Shushu, who urged the protection of the difficult mountain passes from Kwangtung, Gwei Wang fled westwards to Woochow, leaving Joo Jutien to hold Chaoching. Chungdoong was knocking at the gate of Chaoching as soon as he settled Canton, and took

and plundered Kaoleilien. Gwei Wang hastened away from Toongchow to Pinglo; Jutien retired and Chaoching was in Chungdoong's hands. He did not rest there, but pressed on to Woochow, Gwei Wang retiring on Kweilin notwithstanding the warmly worded warnings of Shushu, who condemned this flying from place to place, when there was little room to fly in. But Gwei Wang was under the influence of a eunuch who guided his steps and now recommended him to go to Hookwang to Tungjiao. This step was strenuously opposed by Shushu, who showed that Yunnan and those western regions were already depopulated and waste, by the fearful carnage which had been going on for years, while Kwangsi was still powerful. But if Gwei Wang would go, Shushu prayed to be permitted to remain in Kweilin and keep the city or die. This latter prayer was granted!

This was in the spring of 1647, and Kweichoo had by that time forsaken Gwei Wang. With forty vessels heavily laden with his immense treasure* he submitted to Chungdoong, who, however, loving plunder wherever or however obtained, saw no reason why he should save this one life, when by taking it he could secure so much booty, and Kweichoo breathed his last. The commandant of Woochow, whence Kweichoo escaped, submitted to Chungdoong. Indeed it was no common bravery which could withstand the contemptible example set by each pretender to the Ming throne. The bluest blood is apt to be coldest. Yet Gwei Wang was extremely wroth when Chun Bangchwen forsook Pinglo, leaving it to the Manchus. Surely the man on account of whom others are called upon to spend money and lay down their lives, should be at least above the charge of cowardice, for shame if for no other reason. He retired to Wookang however; but Shushu was left in Kweilin, before whose gates appeared the impetuous Chungdoong in April. A few score Manchus rushed in by the open Wungchang gate, and

* This amounted to 200,000 Chinese ounces (liang) of gold and two and a half million of silver. Twelve of these ounces are equal to one lb. avoirdupois; and the value of the whole would be about two millions sterling.

climbed on to the tower over the gate. Shushu happened to be below, and shouted for lieut.-general Jiao Lien who was commandant. Hastily replying to the summons, with some men who were rapidly increasing in numbers, he went to meet the Manchus running in by the gate. He stopped the tide, shut the gate and then turned on those who had already got into the tower; they leaped down and fell back on the main body. Jiao then with three hundred men, all who had as yet collected, opened the gate, and with a shout galloped towards the Manchu camp. His men quickly increased to tenfold, and so fierce was their charge that several thousand Manchus were slain. They had by that time formed in battle order, but with a shout he pushed into their very centre. Shushu was not idle, for he collected and led out to second the gallant commandant every soldier and civilian capable of carrying arms, and the Manchus were driven away in the greatest confusion for several li, and great numbers of them slain. This desperate sally was sufficient; and the Manchus retreated on the cities already in their hands. But a larger army now appeared before Kweilin from Honan; and under the famous three princes Koong, Gung and Shang. But Jiao prepared western* muskets, opened his gates and sallied out boldly against the formidable Wangs. The fight raged from early dawn till mid-day,—the Manchu troops not being able to understand that they should now retreat, after an uninterrupted course of victories; while the zeal of Shushu and the fire of Jiao made their soldiers enthusiastic in their determined attack. When the wearied soldiers at last retired within the city, they found hot steamed rice ready for them by the forethought of Shushu, who himself distributed it. No wonder if the troops began to feel like soldiers. Next day another sally was made with equal spirit, Shushu having previously prepared an ambush, and the Manchu army, attacked in front and flank,—their own old tactics,—gave way

*There were Roman Catholic priests then on both sides, forging cannon and muskets; some in Peking for the Manchus, some in Kwangsi for Gwei Wang, whom they represented as actually, or about to be, the founder of a "Christian" kingdom.

in disorder and was pursued and cut down for 20 li. The result of this victory was that Pinglo fell, and Shushu stimulated the soldiers by sharing all their hardships.

Just then censor Loo Kojia took west Foochow, and communicated with Jiao, which compelled the Manchus to fall back on Canton, when with the fall of Woochow all Kwangsi was again waving the banners of Gwei Wang. Shushu was created *Taidsu tai shwai*, and Jiao nominated a count. But Kwangsi was so easily and speedily recovered, not merely because Shushu converted the army into real soldiers, but because of events which had transpired at Canton. Jin Loong, formerly a pirate, had gone with over a myriad men to aid Kanchow. When it fell, his occupation was gone and his men scattered. When Chungdoong marched westwards against Shushu, graduates of Kwangtung raised parties of men, and Jin Loong followed their example. These, though not strong to begin with, were so vexatious, that Kweilin was left in peace. In August, a former grand secretary, Chun Dsujwang, raised an army at Kiwkiangtwun of Twanchow; Chun Bangyen, formerly senior secretary, collected another at Kaochow; Jang Jiayü, formerly vice-president of War, a third at Tungwan. These plotted to take Canton. They secured some officials of the city as accomplices; they got three thousand of Whashan robbers to go into Canton, feigning submission to the Manchus; and with these holding the East gate, the combined armies were to march in at the third watch of the seventh of seventh moon (August). But Toong Yangjia, the Manchu commandant and recently created viceroy, discovered the plot, executed the official accomplices, put the three thousand to the sword, and then, as the garrison was anything but strong, mounted the gate tower to see such hosts of foes assembled as made him cry out, "Our last day has come!" But his men around said, "Better die fighting than sitting." Thereupon he led out his garrison, battered the vessels of Dsujwang, whose early arrival on the fifth led to the discovery of the plot, and compelled him to retreat. With a north wind he pressed after the retreating foe, completely defeating him at

Bainguatan. Chungdoong, who had driven Jang Jiayü from Sinngan on Bolo, now came up at the summons of Yangjia, and Bangyen had to retreat. Chungdoong soon after employed the pirates, Jung, &c., as guides, and took Kaoming, and in it the unfortunate Dsujwang, who was sent to Canton and executed, calling upon the two first emperors of the Ming. He then attacked Bolo, which had been taken by Jiayü, when he ceased to fly. He excavated earth, raised mounds, set his cannon, and Bolo was again under Chungdoong. Jiayü was from boyhood an excellent swordsman, and now cut his way out to the hills, where his scattered men soon gathered around him. He attacked and took Tsungchung, but was dogged by Chungdoong, who told off two officers against the three detached camps of Jiayü outside the city, where he was well protected, as the mountains were steep and the waters deep. But his ten thousand men were attacked by a force several times as numerous, and his men were surrounded by several lines deep. Jiayü pushed through the line of siege, and a fierce and bloody contest took place, neither being inclined to yield. Thousands fell on both sides, till Jiayü saw his men become quite feeble, and crying out "lost," dropped into a well, on the tenth day of the fight. Chungdoong, then at the head of twenty thousand seamen, took Tsingyuen city, put Bangyen to death; and all Kwangtung was again quiet under his sharp piercing sword and swift footstep.

We left Lokuduakwun at Nanking, whence in January of this same year he proceeded by ship into Hookwang. In February he got to Woochang, whence he had to send a division against lieut.-generals Ma and Wang, who were proceeding from Yaochow to assist Tungjiao. He defeated them; but heard that Kingchow was besieged by the army of Li Jin from across the river. He attacked the besiegers by night, defeated, and divided into several divisions to pursue them. Li Dsu, a younger brother of Dsuchung, submitted with five thousand cavalry and infantry. But though successful, he was not perfect; and was recalled to Peking, probably to answer for dilatoriness, and the pursuit of the fugitives was entrusted to the Three

Princes. They got to Yaochow in April, defeated Jin Tsai at Changsha, and Whang Chihüen at Hiangtan. Tungjiao had to retreat to cover Hungchow. Prince Koong took and beheaded Chihüen, and sent Joongming back to Changsha by water. He defeated the enemy outside the city and drove Jang Gwangli into Paoching. With another division he compelled Doo Yinsi to flee into Yoongting Wei, while Li Jin was broken up and fled to Kweiwoo; Jinjoong and Yootsai retreating into Woosi. Thus the thirteen outposts were driven in. The Three Princes united again in September, besieged and took Paoching, where Joo Ding, another Loo Wang, was taken and slain. They pressed in upon Wookang, whence their approach drove the hunted Gwei Wang. They took the city; and Lin Chungyin, after his defeat, submitted with seventeen lieut.-generals and twenty-eight thousand men. Joongming took Chiyang, putting to the sword a lieut.-general and seven thousand men.

From Wookang, Ma Jisiang followed Gwei Wang, who fled with his three "empresses." They put to the sword the men who kept the custom's barrier (gwan), and hurried through. Two of Gwei Wang's sons were thrown from their horses, and such was the haste, that their followers did not know of it. Jisiang followed on foot for three days without a morsel of food, till they came to the house of a literary man, who was then employed in worshipping the image of an ancestor, whose features exactly resembled those of Gwei Wang. The literate had a dream the night before that a "god" and two grand secretaries came from heaven to visit him. He welcomed Gwei Wang, fed the party, and the village provided carts, provisions, and a convoy of armed men, money and arms,—all in consequence of the scholar's dream, for Gwei Wang took the utmost care not to reveal himself!

Chungyin, who had surrendered to the Manchus, was meantime sent to pursue the fugitive in hot haste, and when he was only 3 li distant, or one English mile, his attendants urged Gwei Wang to flee alone. They stood still for the pursuers, and fought till the last man fell dead. Even thus he could not feel

safe, and he fled on foot for 30 li, not daring to wait so long as to take some food. He was all but dead with fatigue when How Hing came up to meet him with a few men. Day nor night would the fugitive eat, but pressed on till at Lokiadien, when danger was over, he made How a *How* (marquis). He entered Kwangsi on horseback, and was apparently so overcome with terror, that he would flee beyond Kwangsi! For Shushu is again found earnestly reasoning against going into the ravaged provinces of Yunnan or Kweichow.

Chungyin who was pursuing repented of his apostacy, and next year again attempted to reach Gwei Wang to support him, but the Manchus overtook and beheaded him. If Chungyin had pursued Gwei Wang rapidly, prince Shang marched on more leisurely with his army. He took Kweiyang, went by Taochow defeating Gwangbi, took Chingyuen, then Liping foo, where Min Wang, Jwan Wang and others to the number of over twenty of the imperial Ming family fell into his hands. They got to Kweilin again, after Shushu and Jiao with the other principal men made an oath before the gods to fight to the death. They found that the army which had driven them off before was gone, but Shushu was left behind and Tungjiao had replaced the army with men of his. The princes therefore made certain of seizing Kweilin. After the oath of Jiao and Shushu they marched out against the advancing Manchus, came up with them at Chüenchow and completely routed them, slaying large numbers, taking celebrated horses, with camels, mules and other booty in great quantity; then returned to Kweilin, whence they were moved away in February 1648, three months after they drove the Manchus back into Hoonan. As soon as the Manchus heard of the departure of the Kweilin troops they advanced against the city, against three gates of which they posted strong detachments. Jiao, on seeing the enemy outside, gathered his few men, passed out by the Wunchang gate, and with a shout set upon the besiegers, who however speedily surrounded him, several deep. Tungjiao was at the head of his men who had replaced the former army. He had taken a different route from Jiao, but

seeing his danger, sped to the rescue. The sally became a general battle, and was most stubbornly contested on both sides, till the Manchus again gave way and were pursued northwards for 20 li. Shushu was again highly complimented; for it was by his stubborn will alone that Kweilin had been left properly garrisoned. Gwei Wang was not there, apparently terrified at the distant echo of a battle-field. He was in Nanning. Shushu, Tingjiao and Jiao, with Jao Yinhüen and Hoo Yiching, spread their men in thirteen main divisions, over a continuous intercommunicating line of 200 or 300 li. They took the offensive, and as Shushu paid particular attention to have always on hand an adequate supply of provisions, the Manchus were driven far back, and Gwei Wang could again breathe freely in Kweilin, whither Shushu introduced him in the following January.


Before describing an entirely new phase of the war south of the Yangtsu, arising from a thorough shuffling of the military cards, we may glance at the north of the main battlefields.

In December 1646, an army had to be despatched into Mongolia, which was threatening to take advantage of the manifold troubles of the Manchus. In Shensi, Haogo's army was so active during that year in taking cities, defeating, pursuing, slaying and capturing the robbers, that the regent ordered them to be handsomely rewarded. Hanchung had been besieged by the "rebel" Hwojun, who had already taken the suburb of Kitoogwan when Nikan hurriedly marched upon him from Singan, defeated and pursued him so as to change the flight to a disorganised rout. Number-two Tiger, Swun Showfa, had attacked Hingan, but moved off when the army approached.

In January of 1647, Joo Changhiao, the Gweisi Wang, headed a formidable rising in Hoonan, which compelled the Three Princes to exert themselves. It was summer before they could report satisfactory progress and cities taken. We have seen above that they were latterly completely successful in subjugating the whole of the province, though they took a year to finish their work.

In February the viceroy of Hookwang reported that there was anciently a man, Chun Yowliang, with a set of sons who turned out badly. Their descendants were divided into the two family surnames or clans of Ko and Chun. They lived in Kiangsi chiefly in the neighbourhood of Wooning, in Hookwang in the neighbourhood of Hingkwo, giving great trouble in both places. Elsewhere they were early got rid of; but in Hoogwang their dominancy of three centuries was still an active scourge. One of these styled himself a Wang. He made Chun Whangyü his commander in chief and attacked Hingkwo, and put the district magistrate of Woochang to death. The viceroy was now however able to declare his power at an end, the army broken and the two men slain. But in summer Gwangdai Wang of Hookwang assumed imperial style, though the army sent to Yunyang, his head quarters, could find no trace of him. They came upon him in November however, drove him out of Yunyang, pursued him to Fanghien, slaying over ten thousand of his men in the pursuit. He fled into Szchuen, when the army returned and rooted out his accomplices in Yunyang. Just before the flight of this "emperor," a bandit chief acted as guide to Hie Yü, who took Tsuchuen of Shantung, and in it Jusie, president of the Board of War, whom they cut in pieces. Indeed there was no province without its troubles, for Kansu governor was murdered by rebels, who, however, were soon scattered; and the marshal of Szchuen fell in battle with his foes at Yunyang, and his death implies the victory of the "robbers."

Though the emperor offered sacrifice at the tombs Fooling and Jaoling at Mookden, to inform his ancestors of the annexation of Fukien and Gwangtung, a few months later saw most of Fukien again in the hands of Loo Wang. Some Manchu officers fled panic-stricken out of the cities held by them, and they were degraded and sent to Peking for "examination." There was also a clever trick attempted to bring Chungchow's aged head to the grave. A spy was sent from an old Ming marquis, offering to make terms with Loo Wang, and on the person of the spy, who was intended to be seized, was a paper stating that Chungchow was



about to join the Ming cause. But he was above suspicion in the Manchu court; and the trick failed.

While the few able men about Gwei Wang were beating back the Manchu floods from east and north, with headquarters at Chüenchow, an officer rebelled in Kweilin, and began robbing the citizens, compelling Tungjiao to retreat from Chüenchow to save the capital. The three princes, formerly held in check by Chüenchow, now prepared to take advantage of the Ming internal discord to crush the cause at one blow; but were interrupted by the first serious revolt of their own men which had yet taken place, and which restored both Kwangtung and Kiangsi to the rule of Gwei Wang.

Jin Shunghwan, like so many of the principal actors in the bloody drama now performing in every portion of China, was a Liaotung man. He was originally under Liangyü, and deserted to the Manchus at Kiwkiang. He rapidly rose to fame in Fukien in 1646 and subsequently, till he was made a marshal. Another officer, Wang Duayin, who had been under Dsuchung, never lost a battle, and was eager to obtain the rank of lieutenant-general, which Jin refused to give; and the two were on bad terms. But towards the end of 1647 Duayin was progressing towards Kienchang, when Jin gave him the coveted rank. Whang Yinloo was commander under Jin of the division composed of Honan, Szchuen, Shensi and Shantung soldiers. Jin was himself at the head of the Kiangsi army, and the whole province was under his control. We have already seen Jin and Chungdoong constantly mentioned together. They were repeatedly accused at Peking of fierce cruelty towards the people; and at last the old Liaotung officers, Jang Tienyü and Toong Yangjia, were sent to supersede them in rank, while they were still left general officers. Tienyü was made governor of Kiangsi, and Yangjia viceroy of the Kwangs. Jin and Chungdoong were naturally disappointed, for they had taken those provinces. They were placed under these two men, and left with their old rank; the one a marshal, the other a lieutenant-general. The two, who were as excellent as soldiers as they were merciless as robbers, were extremely disgusted; and

the indignation of Jin reached its height when the worthless deputy-governor was nominated superintendent of military affairs. This was more than he could bear; and he therefore murdered the superintendent in spring, seized the new governor, and, with his second in command, Wang Duayin, declared for the Ming, taking all Kiangsi with him. Kanchow however, under Gao Jinkoo, nephew of Gao Jie, held out for the Manchus, as it had formerly done for the Ming. It was immediately attacked by Jin. Three of its sides are inaccessible, the south being of a great perpendicular height; but it had provisions for only ten days. The commandant sent to Chungdoong for urgent aid, and especially for provisions; urging that if Kanchow stood Canton was safe, while Canton could not stand after the fall of Kanchow. And how was the message answered by the hot-tempered Chungdoong,—the Taker of Cities?

He was, as we have said, discontented at the elevation over his head, and over the country he himself conquered, of Yangjia, who was no equal for dash or force of will of the brilliant but heartless lieut.-general. Yangjia was therefore doubtless jealous of his subordinate, as he would naturally feel a little in awe of him. It was probably on account of this jealousy that he almost invariably changed the officials left by Chungdoong in the cities taken by the latter. This was another sore added to the previous one, and Chungdoong was in a dangerous mood when he heard of Jin's desertion. He said to the viceroy that they too should save themselves in time by pretending to join the Ming, for they could not oppose the large army of Jin. But the viceroy did not relish the suggestion. Soon thereafter there was a theatrical performance, at which both the military officer and the viceroy were present. Chungdoong praised the Ming fashions as presented on the stage, and saying he would follow those fashions, he cut off his Manchu queue with his sword, and invited the viceroy to do the same. The great official refused meantime, but in his fear at the manner of his subordinate, he said he would "think about it." But the hour of sweet revenge had struck for Chungdoong, who would have no

thinking, and the viceroy had to follow the example. The "tail" of the soldiers and their clothing followed. They too were dressed according to the Ming fashion; and Chungdoong laid Kwangtung at the feet of Gwei Wang, soon after Kiangsi had joined him. He had taken many an official seal in the numerous cities he had captured, and among them one of a viceroy, which he adhibited to a proclamation tending to pacify the excited and fearing minds of the people. The grateful Gwei Wang made him a marquis and the viceroy a count. Each of the revolted generals had fully a hundred thousand men under his command. They prepared to battle down the Manchu power with the same energy which they had displayed in propping it up. And Nanking was, as well it might be, in the greatest dread.

Meantime Tantai, a Goosa, was marching to relieve Kanchow. But instead of going direct to that city, he turned aside and besieged Nanchang, which was poorly defended, as Jin had all the best men with him. Jin had not pressed the siege, hoping that Gao, whose abilities he admired, would yield to his representations and join him. Though therefore he kept the closest watch to prevent any ingress or egress, he did not take active measures to pull down the city. But his hopes of capitulation were vain; and when he heard of the attack on Nanchang, he at once raised the siege as the Goosa had calculated. He defeated the latter, compelling him to withdraw; but the Kanchow garrison attacked his rear, slaying several thousands of his men. His younger brother had entered Kanchow a few days before, pretending to desert, but was put to death by Gao's orders. Jin turned again, defeated the Manchus at Pesha, taking three "western" cannon; but he had to enter the city as his opponents became too numerous. The Goosa had his camp formerly in that neighbourhood. He had a ditch dug, and an earthen wall built round about. He sent the natives to the mountains to cut down the old trees there and pulled down many houses in order to form a bridge across the Changkiang river and the bad ground. The holes and mud in the road had to be filled in with stones, over which the piles of the bridge were laid. Many myriads of the country people

died of fatigue under the great heat, myriads more perished by the hands of the soldiers, and were swept away by the rapid current; and over a myriad soldiers died in camp of their insatiable libertinism, the fuel for which had to be supplied by the wretched families of the neighbourhood: and this is stated by the history of Gwei Wang to have been the cause of the revolt of Jin.

Wang Duayin was also a Liaotung man, and formerly one of Liangyü's army along with Jin and Gao Jinkoo. His hair was of "five colours," or variegated, and all at his birth foretold that he would yet become a wang. When Jin determined to march to the aid of Nanchang, Kanchow was at its last gasp, as it had been surrounded for one hundred days. Duayin strenuously advocated the stay of the army before Kanchow, which must fall within three days; and that thus the Manchus would be compelled to raise the siege of Nanchang, and come to the aid of Kanchow. But Jin's wife was in Nanchang and he would listen to no argument, but at once left Kanchow. He cut through the besieging army and got inside the city. Duayin with Jin had just before taken Kiwkiang, and their siege of Kanchow was preparatory to their proposed march on Nanking; but their plan was frustrated by the obstinate defence of Kanchow, and the march of the Nanking army on Nanchang, which in spite of Duayin's counsel had the effect the Manchus desired. Duayin broke off his division from Jin, and persisted in carrying out his own plan of cutting the Manchu communications by occupying Kiwkiang, the "throat," as he called it, of the "Long river"; his design being to compel the retreat of the Manchu army of two hundred thousand men. He was on the way, when he came across the Manchus at Chilikiaï, where he defeated them with great slaughter. He was always feared by them, even when he was defeated. Though he was summoned back to the aid of Nanchang by Jiang Yuegwang, he persisted in his own plan, saying that his was but a small army (twenty thousand) and would count nothing against the huge Manchu host, while Kiwkiang was not only of immense strategical importance,

commanding the provision route of those hosts, but was a small city, and just the place for a small army like his which was quite sufficient to protect it against any attack. But spite of his reasonings and his opposition, no less than fifteen messengers reached him in twenty-four hours, and he at last yielded, saying, "It is only to die with them." He had to fight every yard of his way to Nanchang, and just before he got to the city he came across the main army, which he attacked with fury, and being seconded by the garrison, he easily cut his way into the city. A few days after, Kiwkiang was laid waste by the Manchus, Nankang and Yochow, attacked by land and water, fell, and the garrison of Kanchow in their jubilant liberty sallied out, attacked and took Kingan; Yuegwang's vessels were at the same time destroyed by Lohwi, who looked after the river ports. And Nanchang stood alone, all the deserted armies being within, and hedged around by enormously disproportionate odds.

The city had six gates, three towards the hills and three on the river bank. The Manchus built a long wall along the hills, and crowded their ships along the river bank, leaving no loophole of exit or entrance, and rice sold by and by in the city for tls. 80 or over £20 per peck. The plan of the Manchus was therefore completely successful, and the love of Jin made all the armies of Kiangsi prisoners where they were unable to fight. Duayin, who was there so much against his will, behaved most riotously and set an example only too universally followed by the garrison. He would not sally out, but day and night feasted, danced and made merry, marrying a daughter of one of the people. Jin was in deep grief, for no one listened to him, every one following the example of Duayin. He wrote a formal letter to Yuegwang, upbraiding him, a president, with following the evil example instead of setting a good one, so that now the people prayed for the speedy destruction of the garrison, instead of supporting them with their good wishes. Rice then sold at six shillings per peck. One subordinate officer, whether truly or with design, reported that he had dreamed in the temple of the god of war, that a horse had been given him on which he rode out and

defeated the enemy ; but whatever his object, the leaders said it was impossible to do anything without the support of an army from without. Rice rose rapidly, and many starved who had money enough, but could buy nothing eatable. All the rats in the city were eaten, and the roots of grass and trees. The soldiers began to kill the citizens for food, and the citizens acted similarly towards the soldiers and to each other ; parents killing their sons, sons their parents, husbands their wives and wives their husbands, in the agony of their hunger. And no great wonder if the citizens became disaffected and wished for the entry of the Manchus, to whom they at last became as "eyes and ears." The Manchus knew of the extremity of the distress and sent 20 pecks of rice beneath the wall, probably in mockery, but Jin exchanged one hundred catties of silver for it, hoping possibly that the enormous sum would tempt further exchanges ; but the Manchus were pretty sure of the silver without the bargaining, for there was not a hand in all Kiangsi raised to relieve the city in which grim famine ruled so terribly.

We may now again glance at the situation from the Manchu side. Soo Chin Wang returned to Peking in 1648, after he had overrun the west and then the north of Szchuen, and taken the south and east by a subordinate officer and a detachment of his army. Lieut.-general Li Gwoying he left to act as governor, and as Chungtu was in a frightfully damaged condition, and incapable of defence, the seat of government was moved to Paoning. Sangwei and general Li Gwohan were stationed in Hanchung, communicating with northern Szchuen ; but they had soon to move into Shensi, where one Jiang Hiang was fighting among the mountains so furiously and successfully, that a number of old Ming officers raised troops, in the east and south of Szchuen, and declared for the Ming dynasty. Gwei Wang commissioned Chien Bangchi as governor, and Lü Dachi as commander-in-chief, of Szchuen. And he whom we found lately fleeing in such haste as to have failed to miss his own two sons, was now lord of seven provinces,—Yunnan, the two Kwang, Kiangsi, Hoonan, Hwchow, Szchuen, to which Fukien might be

added. But if his empire was an extensive one, it was not like that under the Manchus, welded into one; but was composed of heterogeneous elements; nor was his the mind and the will to fuse into a compact whole the many hot-headed patriots and zealous self-seekers who led the movement. He was no more than the sign on their banners. But having such a territory, Gwei Wang drew his snail head out of his Yunnan shell and crept to Chaoching, where he began his reign, though against the advice of Shushu to make Kweilin his permanent capital.

Shensi was kept alive by the fierce fighting of Hiang among the mountains. Shantung was not wholly free from excitement, for bands of robbers combined to be powerful enough to take Tungping chow, putting its prefect to the sword. Tsingyun was taken by local bandits, and the magistrate murdered; and Pachow was so harassed by robbers, that an army had to be sent under a Meirunjanyin. The governor of Fungyang seized a "rebel" viceroy, Whang Yüchi, on whose person he found an official seal and a volume of "seditious" odes. The prisoner confessed he was on his way to join the "rebels" north of the Yangtsu under Hüe Jijow, to second those on the south of the Yangtsu; and he disclosed the names of a number of officers then in Manchu service, who were pledged to rise at a given date. These were all apprehended before they knew of the revelation of the plot. The governor was ordered from Peking to put to death all those named and to thoroughly investigate the ramifications of the plot and to punish the guilty.

Fukien, long under the control of Chunggoong, was beginning to waver towards the Manchus, and the career of the pirate chiefs had passed its meridian before the siege of Kanchow was raised or that of Nanchang began. Nor were the chiefs of the movement in favour of Gwei Wang disposed anywhere to march beyond their own province, Shushu and Tungjiao being the only really patriotic men of note under Gwei Wang's banner.

The Manchus had however to strain every nerve; and but for the manner in which Chinese armies generally live, it would have

been difficult to feed the large bodies of men they had to move in all directions. Tan Tai was commissioned to march with general Ho Lohwi from Nanking on Kiwkiang to unite with the princes Gung and Shang against Kiangsi and Kwangtung. Prince Jirhalang, with Lokuduahwun, was commanded to join prince Koong against Hoonan and Kwangsi. Bolo and Nikan, two princes, were sent against Hiang to Tatung of Shansi, Sangwei and Gwohan into Shensi; and Chungchow was ordered to remain still in Nanking to look after the sea coast provinces.

Just then the affairs of the Manchus looked desperate enough. Excitement reigned everywhere, and no province was free from commotion. The governor of Chihli reported that the bandits of Tungming numbered hundreds of thousands under a man who assumed the imperial style of Tienjung; but the multitude was dispersed by the provincial military. In Tientsin a "crazed" woman gave herself out to be the widow of the second last Ming emperor, and with a male accomplice got a jade imperial seal cut, made an imperial "Flag of Fate," the possessor of which has power of life and death. She was seized and put to death; but Ying Wang had to go into Tientsin in autumn to smother the local rising and fermentation there. Another large force had to be sent to Hokien to put down a rising there, and a vice-president of Revenue was degraded, because, pretending to be a herald, he went to the rebel camp and drank with them.

Besides the officers mentioned above as stimulated by the revolt of Hiang, the Mahommedans rose in Shansi and Kansu and took several cities. Mung Chiaofang the viceroy defeated them however at Koongchang, and retook several of their cities—Lintao, Lanchow, &c. They then placed themselves under the leadership of prince Yenchang of the Ming family; but in July 1649, he was defeated, taken and beheaded, like so many of his doomed family. In this month a great pitched battle was fought at Lanchow, which broke their power; but they kept the viceroy employed till the end of 1650. Kansu Mahommedans gave up the struggle in March 1650.

As early as the summer of 1645, one Liw Baisu, while digging

came across a stone box * containing a volume of odes, which none could read, which enabled the possessor to become a god or *shun*; and a jar containing the seal of a commander-in-chief. The emperor is considered the pole star and the ministers some greater or lesser star surrounding him. The finder of this treasure assumed the modest title of Ursa Major, but was seized by the governor of Hüenfoo and put to death, ere he was able to make good his right to the title.

In December 1649, the Ying Chin Wang was sent with a large army to the neighbourhood of Tatung, in the north of Shansi; for Kochoooor of Karka was reported to have come to that neighbourhood to hunt, and in the disturbed state of the Manchu empire, he was believed to have other game in view than the deer, wolves, and foxes of the Mongol plains. Jiang Hiang, the lieutenant-general of Tatung referred to above, closed his gates, and the prince hearing of it besieged him two days after. At his request Bayen was marched westwards with the "red-coat cannon." Hiang gave out that he believed the prince had come to seize the city, and put himself to death; and the regent believing the statement to be a sincere one, wrote him an autograph letter to allay his fears. The letter stated that "because the emperor had business with the northern Mongol was the army sent, having no concern whatever with the affairs of the lieutenant-general. If the emperor did seek the life of his officers, as 'all under heaven' belonged to the emperor, no one could ever credit him with attempting to gain an object by trickery, even if he really did practice deceit; and the statement of Hiang must surely have been caused by the words of some lying traitor. If however he repented the insult offered to his majesty's representative he would be forgiven as if it had not happened." But the "emperor" had to forward other proclamations in February, both to Tatung and to the people and officials of Shansi generally, to contradict the reports set afloat

* The trick of the founder of the Mormons is a very ancient one in China, and practised to this day; one of our authorities in this work, "The history of the End of the Ming," being thus found.

by Hiang that the emperor was to put all the officials to death, declaring that such language was but a fabrication of Hiang's to induce a general rebellion.

Hiang's plans must have been previously well laid; and the appearance of Ying Wang was doubtless only provocative of an earlier rising to prevent a collapse by discovery, if the Manchus entered the city. While he was besieged in January by the "Red-coat" cannon and the men of Ying Wang, he despatched detachments of his men, who took Tsinchow and Sochow. Wan Lien, a Ming old officer, collected an army on the borders, took Ningwoo, Chilan, and Paote, uniting with Hiang. Liw Chien raised a force with which he marched through Yenmun-gwan, took Taichow, and camped at Wootai shan to support Hiang. Taiyuen in terror cried out for help. Yoongchiang, a Ming officer, seized Yenan; Liw Dunglow deserted from the Manchus and occupied Yülin; Ding Gwodoong, the leader of the Mahommedan rebels in Kansu, with the cities of Hosi, Chao Min, &c., sub-prefectures and districts, declared for Hiang. The Mahommedans threw Singan into hysterical cries for aid. Other old officers seized Pingyang, cutting off Manchu communications with Toonggwan, and a recent deserter occupied Taiping. Thus there was a chain of rebellion from Tatung to Tsailoo; and the whole north was in a blaze of insurrection.

This serious rising, as we have seen, compelled Nikan to move into Taiyuen; and affairs looked altogether so ominously black, as if the whole land were rising to vomit forth the northern barbarians, that the regent made a long statement to the Board of War, after his return from a hunt at *Chadao*, whither he had doubtless gone to ascertain the truth about the Mongols, and whence he had sent detachments from each of the Eight Banners to the aid of Ying Wang. "My one desire," he says in name of the emperor, "is to see perfect peace established within the bounds of the empire. This is my day's thought and my evening prayer; and to attain this object my labours are endless. Robbers have all these years created much disturbance. Murder and oppression carried away the magistrate and weighed down the people. When we

came within Chinese borders, it was to extirpate robbers, and to save the people out of 'fire and flood.' Who could have thought that for these years so many of this people would refuse to adhere to us? And not only so, but that some could be found preaching groundless charges against us, causing doubt and perplexity to fill the minds of the people, so that they know not whither to look nor whom to trust! This perplexing doubt can exist only because the people are even yet ignorant of the truth; their ignorance making them the dupes of the malicious, who urge them into rebellion. And no sooner is one such set put down than another springs up. If the ignorant people are always to harbour this doubting spirit, when can peace be secured?

"We have heard it said that, 'Not the man delighting in bloodshed can rule all under heaven.' The 'Historical Classic' says that, 'If men have no ruler, how can they exist? If the minds of the people are not with the ruler, how can he reign?' The ruler is the father, the people his children. That father does not exist who has pleasure in oppressing his children. If men now suffer death, it is only because they are criminals. How can it be conceived that we desire to slay the guiltless? From the first day of our reign to this moment, the line of malicious slanderers has continued,—yet during all those six years, where is the blameless man who has been injured? If the people are but willing to consider this one fact, their minds will become clear as ice and their doubts disappear.

"We have long believed that though the speech of Han and Man (Chinese and Manchus) is unlike, their hearts do not differ. And in this world there is no man—peaceably disposed in his own house, and loving his own occupation—who can ever become a robber, or delight in oppressing the people to the death. Underneath all this restlessness, therefore, there must be some unlawful desires. To my mind the thought sometimes presents itself, that the various viceroys, governors, treasurers, deputy-governors, may not have been the proper men, and that the subordinate officials may be such as prefer 'fish and flesh' to the proper performance of their duties, thus causing discontent

among the people, difficult to be restrained from breaking out into breaches of the peace. Or is this fermentation occasioned by the tax-gatherers cruelly exacting the old amount of taxation in spite of our proclamations of abatement? These possible reasons we hint at ; but we believe the causes of trouble are not thus exhausted. The officials and magistrates of the capital are bound to deliberate together, to carefully investigate whether there are malpractices among them, and to discover the surest modes of ensuring prosperity to the people, and an increase to their comforts. When this advice is thoroughly carried out, we shall know how to address the people."

It is not at all impossible that the Manchu regent, like the International, and every other society which aims at power, was blinded to the fact, that on the principles so truthfully and naively set forth, he should be hunting the deer and the wild boar on the mountains of Hingking, instead of commanding hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers, with millions of Chinese money. Every man thinks it wrong for any other than himself to possess or strive for what he has himself acquired by striving and force ; and every man striving for it, thinks it wrong in that man to possess it ! The Manchus cut their way into Peking, over millions of dead men,—but Gwei Wang was a robber for aspiring to the same distinction ! And is not might the only rule of right in England now as in Peking then ?

Again in June the regent had to make a somewhat similar address to the Board of War, saying that Man and Han are equally his people ; nor did he make any difference in his treatment of them from the beginning : they had always been equal in law. Nor was the present war of his seeking, for he desired nothing less than to harass the blameless people. He ordered the Board to determine how much and what kind of grain and provisions each marching army was to have ; and to see that the pots, pans, straw-knives,* and horse-troughs, used by the army

* There is no hay in China ; the succulent straw of the Yellow Millet being used instead. But this straw is stout, as that of wheat, and tough. It has, therefore, to be cut into very small pieces, in a machine composed of a heavy piece of hard wood,

on their march, be restored to their proper owners, whenever the feeding was over; and the Goosa and Jangjings were commanded strictly to look after this matter. It was also ordered that if a soldier took away forcibly any one article he should be executed and the head of his family and his next superior officer punished, as they should have prevented him. Beheading was to be the fate of the soldier who went in his armour beyond his ranks to plunder, making no distinction between friend and foe. The Board was ordered to publish this abroad. It was inevitable that marching armies, so large and so frequent, should cause grievous suffering to the people; and the only safe policy for the Manchus was that proclaimed by the regent, which, however, if fully carried out, would have considerably diminished the number of the living heads in the armies.

It was then he agreed to the suggestion of the Board of Revenue, which had its hands full in trying to make ends meet. This was to sell several literary and magisterial titles, as also the titles of Abbot in Buddhist and Taoist monasteries or temples, both in the capital and the provinces; to convert sentence of banishment into a fine; to abolish the office of governor of Tientsin, of Fungyang, of Nganhwi, and the censorate of Hünkiang, with the military cashier Taotai of Tientsin,—the surplus from which increased revenue and decreased expenditure might suffice to meet the additional drain caused by the immense armies. But the selling of “abbot” or any title to a priest or monk was, on the death of the regent, decreed to be disgraceful. So simony finds no countenance in China!

After the speeches of the regent he went westwards in person and occupied Yoong gwan, entered Yuenchow, thence threatening Tatung, but offering pardon on its submission. Nikan was

in the end of which is fixed the point of a long, heavy steel blade, moved up and down by hand. The tough straw is placed by an attendant on the hard wood, and the sharp edge of the knife cuts right through; for there is a narrow groove running the whole length of the wood, into which the knife is imbedded, without bringing the edge into contact with the wood.

more active from the south; for he marched from Taiyuen and took Chinchow. Bolo also defeated an army of six thousand men, one thousand of whom were the men of Hiang and all under his orders. This took place immediately north of Tatung. But though thus threatened on all sides, though his formidable friends the Mahommedans of Kansu were broken up and their leaders slain and those of Shansi rendered harmless, the leader of that revolt was as proudly defiant as ever, and again the regent marched westwards to crush him. But when he got to Goorban Kow,* he was compelled to march north by Jangjiakow (Kalgan), and summon all the "inner Mongols" to his standard, as Showlei, the Khan of Karka, was reported only ten days' march from Peking, at the head of a large army of infantry and cavalry. When he got to Chasirtoo on Chahan naor, both men and horses were worn out with fatigue, and weak from loss of flesh; so he turned again towards Tatung, in April took Yuenchow, whence he again sent messengers to Hiang offering him pardon on condition of submission. This was certainly not a very dignified course of action, when Hiang knew as well as the regent that it proceeded from weakness; and it deserved the reply it got in the form of a letter stating that both soldiers and people under Hiang were in a desperate fury against the Manchus and their minds as fixed, straight and inflexible as an arrow, determined to die rather than yield; and concluding with a prayer that the regent might cease any further allusion to submission and might kindly point out some other *modus vivendi*, else Hiang had no alternative but to meet him outside the city walls at the head of his army. This insulting reply naturally irritated the proud regent into a state of fury; but he was unable to reply, for already his army had wheeled round towards Peking, where the regent's full brother, Yü Wang, was suffering from small-pox. This prince, whose name was Dodo, was the fifteenth

* Goorban is *three*, so that it is the "Third Pass." Jangjiakow or Kalgan Pass, 200 li north of Peking, may be the first, south of it is Sifunkow, 100 li or more; and south of that Heifunkow, which may be the same as Goorban. These gates are all in the Great wall—Chahan, white, naor, lake, probably because it produces salt.

son of Noorhachu, and was but lately nominated Assistant Guardian Uncle. He was 35 years of age when he took ill, and before the regent got into the city he died. The regent heard of the death while at Küyoong, and hurried into the capital to mourn. In May, Ying Wang reported the capture of Tsowei, but he too had to make all speed to the capital, leaving his troops in the hands of Woobahai, Tunchiha and Babootai. Bolo was nominated commander-in-chief, and Nikan his second. The regent then again wrote to Hiang, saying that he did not reply to the letter received, because its language was so rebellious, but that Ying Wang on his return reported repentance; and as the regent was anxious to save the lives of the people, Hiang would still be pardoned if he submitted; but it would be wise in him to repent from afar (and not wait the despatch of an army to the neighbourhood).

In June and July, Bolo reported the capture of Tsingyuen, Kiaochung, Wunshwi, Hükow, Chihien, Pingyang, Funchow, and Siaoyi of Shansi. But Tatung continued deaf to the dove voice of the regent, who therefore again donned his mail and marched westwards in August, sending Mandahai and Wakda, two princes, against Sochow and Ningwoo. He reached Uloosibartai, and again changed his mind,—ordered his men back to the capital, which he re-entered in September. As will appear elsewhere (see *Imperial Family*), his mind was busy with higher objects than Hiang; but he set his generals a bad example by this dilly-dallying. He again marched against Karka, and got to Chooshoo. Mandahai was more attentive to business, taking Sochow, Mayi, and other cities. He was soon rejoined by Ying Wang, and Tatung was again pressed. In August the besieged city suffered from famine, and was in great straits. As there was only one possible termination to the siege, lieut.-general Yang Junwei plotted with other twenty-two officers, and put Hiang and two of his brothers to death, going with the three heads into the Manchu camp. The Manchus moved into the city without opposition. The regent, on hearing the news, sent orders to preserve alive all those concerned in

the death of Hiang, with their families ; but every other officer, soldier and civilian, was ordered to the sword, and he commanded Ying Wang to break down the city wall by five feet all round.

This virtually terminated the Shansi revolt, for Mandahai soon took Funchow, putting to death the governor appointed by Hiang. Pingyao, Taiku and Miliaochow, fell in rapid succession ; and Tunliw, Hiangyuen, Yülin, and Woohiang opened their gates. His success was so complete, that he was ordered into Peking ; Wakda being left to smother the embers of the Shansi rebellion.

It was just before the fall of Tatung that the regent informed the Board of War of the rumours that robbery was so rampant and still growing, because the civilians were forbidden to carry arms. They were now permitted to use the three-barrelled gun,—which was of iron, scarcely a foot long, and useful only to make noise,—fowling-pieces, bow and arrow, spear and sword, with the use of a horse ; but they were still forbidden to possess or use cannon. The arms which had been already confiscated on entering Peking, were therefore now all handed back to their original owners.

In March 1649, Sangwei saved alive some prisoners taken in battle, and the fact was reported to Peking. The emperor said that “where peace was secured every man giving in his allegiance must be preserved alive to show the imperial clemency ; but the obstinate must be put to death to show our justice, causing all men who fear death to yield. But those preserved by Pingsi Wang were taken in battle, and while the war is still raging, leading the enemy to infer that even the obstinate rebel may be saved after he is taken. This will tend to prolong the war ; for no one will feel any necessity to lay down his arms. This clemency is ill-timed, and is inconsistent with correct principles of government. The Board of Punishment is ordered to transmit to our Pingsi Wang and to Morgunhia the imperial sentiments.” Alas therefore for prisoners of war ! In that same month Sangwei defeated and slew the prince Joo Sunfoo. But Yoongchiang had successfully attacked and taken nineteen cities, Tingan, Yülin, &c. He attacked Toongguan and Tingpien ; the army at

Hwamashu joining him, and his ranks being swollen by numbers of the people goaded into fury by the conduct of the imperial soldiers. In reference to this oppression, Nikan reported that the soldiers of Kolami stole boys, girls, and cattle from the people. Orders were sent down to have the matter thoroughly investigated, the guilty punished, and the property restored. Nikan also seized and put to death the governor Jiahwi sent by Gwei Wang; while Yoongchiang put to death Li Jungju the Manchu governor with the intendant. The magistrate of Kikun hien locked his doors and hanged himself.

But in the end of April, Sangwei reported the capture of Yikun and Toongkwan hien cities; and more important still, the complete defeat of Yoongchiang, who lost fully seven thousand men. In June he took Yenngan foo, Yenswi and Chunchung in August; and Yülin and surrounding cities fell after severe fighting. Mandahai and Wakda cleared the regions of Loongan and Tsaichow, beheading Li Jientai at Taiping, completing the conquest of both Shansi and Shensi; and the north of the river left the Manchus again free to march southwards. Bolo and Nikan were created Chin or Family Wang. Sangwei was ordered back to Hanchung, whence to operate against Szchuen. Princes Shang and Gung were sent from Kiangsi against Kwangtung. Some *Chin* and *Kun* Wangs of the old Ming, apprehended, were sent into Peking, where they were supported by the government. Officials under commander were made superintendents of customs, while the openly and persistently rebellious were ordered to be mercilessly executed. Fear was now giving way to the anger of thwarted power and returning authority.

Whether Jiang Hiang hoped to become an emperor himself, or whether he intended to support Gwei Wang, his revolt had removed the terrible pressure on the Kwangsi forces, and Tungjiao had not been slow to take advantage of the change and to press into Hoonan. Li Jin had so powerful an army, that he believed he had as good a title to the imperial title as any man. He proclaimed his deceased uncle Dsuchung an emperor, and himself

the successor. He nominated the proper officials and created ten counts; after which he advanced on and took Kiangtan, putting the city to the sword. Changsha was terrified, but successfully resisted his immediate attack. Hui Nan had three thousand men in Changsha. He cut a road under ground, came upon the enemy, and slew over a thousand men. He built high towers whence "flying" arrows and stones flew incessantly. He sent a large number of his men, each to raise a flag on a small vessel; and when Jin's men saw the enormous fleet coming to raise the siege, they fled in terror.

Tungjiao attacked Yoongchow, which was under command of a *Jinsu* Shaodsoo, who defied Tungjiao. But a son of his fell into Tungjiao's hands, was spared, and the grateful father opened his gates. He was upbraided by Shushu, who attained his *Jinsu* degree in the same year as Shaodsoo,—with having forsaken his native dynasty; and his reply was that when all were submitting, what could he a solitary man do? Tungjiao then marched against Changsha, which he was besieging, when the pacification of the two northern provinces set free the Three Princes to march south again. Jirhalang and Koong entered Hoonan in March 1649. They attacked Jinjoong in Changte. He set fire to the city and fled to Wookang. Li Jin had to follow on his rear going westwards. Doo Yinsi and all the other commanders and officers in charge of the district and other cities followed Jinjoong's example; burning, flying, plundering and laying waste as they retreated, leaving a desert in their track and making for Kweilin. Tungjiao marched in to hold the empty city of Hiangtan. A division of the Manchu army marched from Nganloo, and crossed the Changsha Kiang by night under Hui Yoong. When Tungjiao awoke in the morning he found his camp empty: his generals, Ma Jinjoong, &c., had marched all their men out by night and joined the Manchus. Tungjiao was completely stunned at this reward of his faithful services, and it was an easy matter to seize him. The Manchu commanders did all in their power to detach him from the Ming cause. But he terminated the trial by refusing to eat any food, and

died on the seventh day. His wife and children were slain.

We must now return to Chungdoong and his besieged friends of Nanchang. In August 1648, Shushu memorialised his emperor to move into Kweilin, but met with no response. A few days after Gwei Wang was on the way from Nanning to Chaoching, where he was welcomed by Chungdoong, who presented his lord with ten thousand taels, and was in return made viceroy of seven provinces! Chungdoong was alarmed at the fate impending over Nanchang, and advanced to attack Kanchow, whose brave commandant Gao was an old comrade. He hoped, but in vain, that Gao would submit to him; but his hope, like the similar one of Jin, induced him to besiege without assaulting. While lying before the city, his men apprehended a spy who was sent from his former chief Yangjia, and on whom was found a letter to Gao urging him to hold out. Chungdoong was not slow in returning with the letter, and he secretly accused the writer of treason to Gwei Wang. Yangjia was examined, found guilty and beheaded. His submission, as we have seen, was not a voluntary one. Suspecting him from the very first of no very friendly intentions, his three thousand men were sent to Woochow on pretence of garrisoning the place. Their food was daily distributed to them in front of a large temple, and within its compound. They went in singly by one door, and out singly by another in the opposite wall. One day, when going out as usual, they were one by one seized and put to death,—reminding one of the similar “freedom” given to prisoners by the French Revolutionists. It was in revenge he sent the letter to Gao; which resulted in his own death at Woochow.

Chungdoong was not successful against Kanchow, and his various attempts on Kienyang were equally fruitless. His victorious career ended with his revolt. His opponents, when he was under the Manchu banner, were smitten with the Ming paralysis; but when he became a Ming officer, he was opposed by the stubbornness of the Manchu, or of the Manchu-inspired Chinaman. He crossed the Annam frontier in

January 1649, saying he would look after the regions beyond the border.

The seat of government in Chaoching was then in the hands of cabals. There was a Kwangtung clique, and a Kwangsi clique, and others formed a third clique. Li Yuenhow was an adopted son of Chungdoong's. He was commandant of Chaoching; and he soon usurped all governmental authority, while Chungdoong was master of all outside of the court. Yuen Pungnien was called by the people the tiger's head; Hiangko, tiger's skin; Shukwei, tiger's tail; Jinpoo, tiger's claws; and Mung Jung, tiger's feet: and combined they made the "five-tiger." Chungdoong was sailing with his vessel on the river when he fell in with the count Wang Chungun in February. He invited the count on board. They feasted and drank; and when the count was drunk, Chungdoong had his throat cut and murdered him. Gwei Wang nominated a Fukien man to be a cabinet minister. Chungdoong had not approved of him, seized and put him to death. Bangchuen was made a marquis for distinguished services and Chungdoong a duke. A commandant had been set over Hünchow by Gwei Wang on his eastern journey, against whom the tiger raised vehement objections. Bangchuen supported his sovereign, and the sixteen officials thereupon made the greatest uproar, threatening to resign in a body. Gwei Wang spilt his tea in his terror, and the result of it all was that the commandant retired from his post. From these incidents we can easily read the capacity of Gwei Wang, and perceive the rottenness of the southern court; while at Peking everything was done with the regularity of clock-work, because there was a man at the head of affairs.

Chungdoong was however not unmindful of Nanchang, and passed over Yü ling pass to strike a blow at Kanchow. Gao, to gain time, sent messengers with overtures to surrender; and this caused Chungdoong to retire his men on to the pass again.

The dreadful famine in Nanchang had meantime carried off almost the whole of the civil population, and had decimated the

military, while, worst of all, it had gnawed away all the courage which they had possessed. A great cannon, made by the "red barbarians" (Dutch), was brought to bear upon the walls, and its echoes filled the surrounding valleys for 100 li. The officer holding the west gate offered to turn traitor and open his gate. To veil the move, a furious cannonade was opened on the east side, while a body of men darted in by the west gate; and as all spirit had died out of the garrison, the city fell at once. Jin, well aware that his men could not stand an assault, put on his silver mail and leaped into a well. His family was all burned to death. Duayin, even yet true to his nature, dashed with his men into the Manchu ranks. Thrice he cut his way to the spot where the Goosa rode, but he was not recognised. He was at last slain. Yuegwang, who was to a great extent responsible for the useless suffering, drowned himself in his official robes. Many of even the officers and civil officials had been eaten! About the time when Nanchang was falling, vice-president Choongsi was starting from Chaoching with an army to raise the siege. He found he was too late, and was defeated at Chunhiang.

The Manchu army now marched to the roll of the drum—no man raising a finger in opposition—to raise the siege of Kanchow. Had Jin taken Duayin's advice, waited a few days longer, and taken Kanchow, as the Manchus had stuck to Nanchang, there might be still a Ming dynasty reigning in Nanking. But people who were eager to spend money and life, found all was thrown away because of incapacity or selfishness; and no wonder if they did gradually cool down and become indifferent to a dynasty represented by the weakness of Gwei Wang and the cruel covetousness of his officers. Gwei Wang had long ago ordered Li Jin from Kingan, against Kanchow, and commanded Chungdoong to march down from Yüling and press the siege. But Li had his own purposes to serve; and Chungdoong was engaged for months parleying with Gao, who angled him most skilfully, keeping him on the Pass, on the heights of expectation, till his provisions ran done; and his men became at last so weak that when he did march, many fell on the road and were too feeble even to

crawl out of the way to die. He moved down only in November, when Nanchang made another piteous cry for help. He got down to the vicinity of the city, and Gao, knowing the condition of his army, issued out with his whole force, before the weary men had time to rest or taste a morsel of food. Their defeat and flight followed as a matter of course. They drew away in confusion, and he moved them into Sinfung. The Manchus were now drawing near this city from Nanchang, and he determined to make a stand here; but as soon as his men heard of the arrival of the Manchus, they began to glide away, and do what he would he could not persuade them to remain. They knew somewhat of want; they had heard of Nanchang, and they doubtless feared a repetition of the dismal scenes which had occurred in that woeful city. He, however, took their departure so ill that he drank himself drunk before setting out. He started; and that evening an iron man and horse were observed to enter the river, and Chungdoong was never seen again. Thus was terminated the revolt which had given Gwei Wang so much territory, which had shaken with a moral earthquake the Manchu power, and had threatened to topple it over.

In the west, Yinsi and Yiching were driven off by the Manchus at Hungchow, and Jinjoong stood alone in Wookang. Tsao Jujien was in Yungchow, and Jintsai held Tsingchow. Jujien, then in Taochow, was the first attacked by prince Koong. At first he was defeated; but showing his men two hundred thousand taels, he said that each man who slew a foe would have a "button" (from one to four taels). The Manchus had to retire. Prince Koong,—whose men, as well as those of his two fellow princes, were allowed to have their families with them,—got to Hungchow, sent a division against and defeated the enemy at *Yendsu wo*, while he defeated an army of several myriads at Yungchow. He despatched a division to attack the rear of Jijien, while he attacked in front. He gained a complete victory at Loonghoogwan; fifty thousand of Jijien's men submitting.

After the fall of Hiangtan, the Manchus marched for Yunghing.

A body dashed in by an open gate, and the city was taken by surprise with its lieut.-general. Li Jin, hearing of the approach of the Manchus, forsook Chunchow,—not acting in conformity with his formidable name of “Number-One-Tiger.” Jinjoong, with the cognomen of “Breaker-up-of Ten Myriads,” and his colleague, Jintsai, were attacked and defeated by Nikan, and Paoching fell in consequence. Number-Two-Tiger, and his colleague, were also defeated, and their ten camps along the Hoongkiang broken up. Defeat followed defeat in all directions, till Jinjoong had to abandon Wookang, and Chingchow fell, opening up the road to Kweilin. Completely breaking up an army sent by Shushu to Chuenchow, Koong marched for Kweilin. When Koong’s army got up to Kweilin, it found the garrison utterly demoralised. The soldiers broke up in the greatest confusion, flying in all directions. The former “rebel” Jingjiang Wang fled, his two eldest sons strangling themselves in the palace. General Hoo Yichung, one of the officers sent by Shushu to stop or impede the Manchu march, rushed into Shushu’s presence, nervously shouting, “They’ve come! they’ve come!” and called for horses. “Whither?” asked Shushu, and said, “better drink and die.” The coward fled; Shushu remained and called for drink. He was soon joined by a similar-minded official, and both drank and sat still, clad in their official robes and facing south,—representing the ghost of a majesty which was vanishing. In this position they remained when the Manchus burst in upon them, but they sat like two statues,* not moving a muscle or bending an eye; and the Manchus were terrified, thinking them “gods”; and it was only after some thousands had gathered round, that they dared approach, lay hands on and seize the two. Prince Koong was eager to save the life of a man whose ability was unquestioned, and whose fame was spread abroad. He first of all reasoned with him, in

* This same characteristic has been ridiculed as indicating great stupidity, or ineffable conceit. But whether in circumstances of danger or novelty, it is to the Chinese gentleman the perfection of bravery and the essence of politeness, to appear as if wholly indifferent; and the self-control we admire in the ancient Spartans, we need not despise in the modern Chinaman.

order to get him to desert; using as his strongest argument, that it was now clear as day that Heaven's will had given China to the Manchus. Failing in that line, he urged him to become a monk; but also in vain. For forty-two days did this struggle go on,—the one seeking to save the life of the other, who sought to die the death of a faithful minister. Shushu complained bitterly that he was left so long in this condition, and at last "reviled" the prince into an irritation so great, that he said, "To-morrow you shall die;" nor did either of the two officials change colour, when the soldier executioners cut their throats next day. But far and near was mourning made for the people's favourite. This was in December; and the end of this man and the fall of Kweilin, warranted the recall of Jirhalang and his army to Peking; an attempt by Jiao Lien in the beginning of 1651 to recover lost ground being abortive.

Ever since the siege of Kanchow had been raised, the men of Jin, and of the camps of Jang, Hoong, Tsao, and Li Jin, had dispersed among the mountains of Fukien and Kwangtung. Choongsi and Foo Tingchuen collected them again, and the formidable Yüling Pass was occupied with the greatest watchfulness by Kwangtung men. But all this praiseworthy care was of no avail; for Shangjoong, an officer of the Ming, offered himself as guide, and led princes Shang and Gung from Kiangsi over unoccupied mountain paths beyond Yülinggan. The Manchus took Nanhiwng, driving out the commandant, who fled into Kweilin, where Kwei Wang ordered his execution. Shaochow fell into Manchu hands in February 1650, its lieut.-general submitting. Next month Canton was surrounded, the viceroy Doo Yoongho being inside. Fan Chungun was commandant. Gwei Wang therefore, seeing the Manchus crowding his east, and prince Koong pushing rapidly south from Hoonan,—once more pitched his moving tent, left Chaoching under Li Yuenyin, and flitted into Woochow.

Canton was well prepared for defence. On its west—the threatened side—a masked battery had been erected and a wooden wall. Three ditches dug deep admitted the ebb and flow of

the tide; the silt caused by which made so deep and soft a mud, that the Manchus found it impossible to cross it. They therefore drew a wide line round the city, to starve it into surrendering. The weather too fought for the city, for the summer was an exceedingly rainy one. The bow-strings of the Manchus lost their elasticity, and an epidemic broke out among the soldiers of so severe a character, that the commanders were about to order the raising of the siege, when another of those endless "accidents" happened, which were determined to ruin the Ming cause, and establish Manchu rule.

Canton had some time before sent a demand for aid, which Gwei Wang at once prepared to send. An army was collected, which however first marched on Woochow, demanding the heads of the "Five Tigers," some of whom were slain and the others punished. After this purgation, the army marched; but two of its generals quarrelled by the way, and sought to exterminate each other. It was, therefore, an easy matter for the large Manchu army to scatter the ten thousand who appeared, though Ma Bao was among them. That victory sealed the fate of Canton, for it raised the spirits of the besiegers. The viceroy about that time escaped from the city by sea; but on being reprimanded by Gwei Wang, he returned, and was created a marquis!


Liwchi was ordered off to summon the surrender of the cities Chao and Hwi, and Chaoching commander dared not move to the rescue of the threatened posts. Just then a large reinforcement of fresh troops from Kiangsi joined the plague-stricken Manchus. Prince Shang ordered them, while still fresh, to dismount, and wade on foot through the mud. They advanced amid showers of arrows and stones, and cut down the wooden walls. Artillery was then brought to bear upon the north-west corner of the city, and under cover of their cannonade the Manchus scaled the walls and took the city. The viceroy commandant and many other officers submitted; but a scene of cruelty unsurpassed was enacted by the maddened Manchu-Chinese soldiery (see *Army*). Canton fell November-December, 1650,

having stood a siege of nearly a year. Thus the capitals of Kwangtung and Kwangsi fell about the same time, and Kwei Wang had his locks sadly shorn.

The actors in the first and second phases of Gwei Wang's rule have now all disappeared. The best of them are in their graves, the less worthy have joined the Manchus, or fled to the mountains to live by plunder. Whether he thought it or not, Gwei Wang had at least as good reason as the lovely but unlovable Mary, to say that all who loved him must die. Had Shushu been Gwei Wang, the war would have had a very different issue, or had Gwei Wang been a man of some mental calibre he would have found it to be to his and his people's benefit to listen to the advice of Shushu. But every George III. will have his Aberdeen.

It was against the advice of Shushu that Gwei Wang fled from Chaoching to Woochow. But now that Kweilin is fallen, probably from lack of that hearty support which Gwei Wang was doing all he could to throw away, he found Woochow too near the Manchus; and under cover of a heavy rain he got into a boat and made for Hünchow, then for Nanning, but destitute of money. Bangchuen had deprecated flight from Woochow, and, unlike Shushu, when he found Gwei Wang gone beyond his influence, he put to the sword as many ministers as he could lay hands on. The new year of 1651 Gwei Wang passed in Nanning, whence he sent grand secretary Wunngan, as commander-in-chief, into the Hoo provinces, to endeavour to recover them. The Manchu government had certainly committed one mistake in recalling their army while the Ming cause was only "scotched not killed." But they were doubtless compelled for the want of funds to decrease the enormous forces which they had been compelled to send into the field; and they believed that the armies left were sufficient to terminate the dying struggles of the fallen tiger. And we come now to the third scene in this drama.

We have had already to notice the state of Yunnan, and we have seen why it was compelled to take no part in the great



struggle going on outside, as it had a life-and-death struggle on its own account; and Kweichow shared the fate of its big neighbour. The four generals had meantime all their own way, after the extermination of Dingjow and his remarkable love. They feared no man and acknowledged no prince. But in 1649, Swun Kowang believed it might serve his purpose better if he had a title from Gwei wang; and on his application, a title was given him, rather than permit him to become an enemy. In September next year, he sent three hundred men with a tribute to Gwei Wang of ten thousand taels and a hundred excellent horses. Soon after, he sent forty thousand ounces (liang) of gold. Pi Hiwng of Kweichow was suspicious of Kowang's designs. The latter sent him a letter to reassure him; but the letter had the contrary effect. Wang Hiang therefore marched against Kowang with between sixty and seventy thousand men, in thirty-six divisions. He was completely defeated, and his men joined Kowang. In disgust, he took up his official belongings and made off; but was pursued by a hundred men, and, when about to be overtaken, cut his own throat and died. Thus did these worthies uphold their dynasty! But when Gwei Wang got to Nanning, Kowang,—doubtless hoping thus to acquire supreme power, as so many worthless men had done under that prince before,—sent some lieut.-generals, with their men, to guard Nanning.

Gwei Wang was apparently too nervous to sit still; so April saw his three empresses in Tienchow, where one of them immediately sickened and died. Kowang was meantime forcing himself higher and higher up the political horizon, when he discovered that the title of wang, which he had received and been sporting some time, was after all a false one,—the official stamp having been given by an underling, and not by Gwei Wang, who was opposed to granting him the title. He was angry at the discovery, but said it mattered little, for he was wang all the same. He, however, sent Jia Jiwyi privately to discover who among the ministers had opposed him. It was found that Yang Tingho was the chief opponent; and Yang was secretly

assassinated. Yen Chihung was also implicated, and he was drowned. Some days after, a fisherman reported that a tiger had come from the hills, dragged the body of Chihung out of the water, scratched out a hole with its claws, where it placed the body. Jiwyi sent men to prove the accuracy of the story, and there, sure enough, was the tiger beside the body! And Jiwyi was startled and terrified. Yang Weiju, a native of Shensi, was the first Jüyin of his year, and held in high honour by Kowang. He was nominated Grand Secretary by Gwei Wang, to whom he had been recommended by Kowang. He refused the honour, but it was thrust upon him; and he tried to act up to its responsibilities. When Jiwyi returned to Kowang, he reported that Weiju was not to be depended on, and thus led Kowang to suspect him.

At length the gold seal of a prince was sent to Kowang, who was extremely glad, went far to meet it, and wrote a letter full of gratitude, but written in such a style that the ministers said, "If he does not rebel, it shall be well." He then invited or commanded Weiju into Yunnan, and angrily rebuked him for accepting office on the terms to which he had agreed. No excuses or explanations were satisfactory, and Kowang ordered him away, for that "he must be slain." He was led out, when some of the officials reasoned with Kowang that Weiju should be kept alive; for the business in which they were engaged was one of the greatest gravity, and Weiju was indispensably necessary. He saw they were right, sent out a messenger to release him, but the messenger found him already dead. Kowang was deeply repentant and said it was now impossible to effect their great purpose:—of raising Gwei Wang to the throne of all China. Seeing all power slipping into Kowang's hands, Bangchuen joined the Manchus in October, and his desertion threw Gwei Wang into a state of the most confusing terror; ignorant what to do, not knowing where to look or to go. The unsettled minds of the people were reflected in the Cabinet, and ministers advised, some this course some that. He had already been invited into Yunnan, but he seemed still to be unwilling to be

the tool of Kowang, and refused. Some urged flight into Kweichow, others would go into Yunnan notwithstanding the dark and overshadowing figure of Kowang. In November Jiwyi came with an army from Yunnan to escort Gwei Wang, who however still hesitated and doubted. Jiwyi angrily ordered an immediate start, or he would go alone. And he left, taking his men with him. This terrified Gwei Wang, who sent a messenger after him desiring him to stay for a time, when the emperor would go with him. But there was no response. His ministers were equally irresolute and nothing could be decided; but the advance of the Manchus compelled some decision, and Gwei Wang departed for Laitwan.

When Canton was besieged, Gwei Wang moved out of Chaoching, leaving the army under Yinhüen and Yiching, making the former a duke and the latter a marquis, to help them to the better protect his rear and fend off the Manchus, who could not but soon march against him. He knew well enough the fate awaiting him at their hands; for hitherto every member of his unfortunate family taken was put to death. In reference to this subject, we may quote the emperor, who, in addressing the Board of War in April 1651, said, that "the son of Yütien Wang of the Old Ming, had recently collected an army and sacrificed* to his Flag at Chingchow. The rebellious commanders, Wang Yuen and Ma Dua, murdered the governor of Shensi and meditated a junction with Ching Wang's grandson. Because of this, many of the Ming family lost their lives. We have much pitied them. At the present we are rulers over all places and persons, with the firm resolve to preserve all the people in their homes in peace. Are the sons and families of the Ming alone beyond the reach of our care? Henceforth wherever in any province or city a Ming Chin Wang or Kün Wang is taken or found wandering homeless, let the viceroy or governor see that he is with his family immediately escorted to Peking, where adequate provision shall be made for them according to

* It is by a sacrifice of sheep, &c., to the god of war that a collection of men is constituted into a fighting army.

their rank. All are our people. There shall be no distinction in taxation or office between the peoples; and you of the Ming family are bound to cast aside suspicion, and look to the throne which desires only to save men alive." From this we learn what the fate was of the numerous members of the Ming family who had previously fallen into Manchu hands;—into the hands of those who pretended even yet to have entered into China to revenge the death of the last Ming emperor! Hence too arose the numerous "rebellions" of the doomed family all over the empire; for events proved that there was not a single warrior or statesman among the widely extended family; and had the lives of the first members taken been spared, little resistance would have been offered by the mentally weak but numerically large family.

Prince Gung Jingjoong, for some unknown reason, committed suicide at Kingan on the march from Kiangsi into Kwangtung. His son Jimao succeeded to the title and command of his father. He and prince Shang were ordered to occupy Kwangtung, and prince Koong to hold Kwangsi. Before prince Shang, the prefectures of Kao, Lei, and Lien soon fell, and Yuenyin was taken prisoner at Chinchow. Prince Koong was not inactive, for Woochow and Liwchow were soon occupied by a lieutenant of his; and the gates of Showchow were opened by Chun Bangchuen, who first murdered Jiao Lien and then deserted. He sent by three routes into Kwangsi, three divisions under the marshal Sien Gwongan, lieut.-generals Ma Siwng and Chuen Ji. Yinhüen and Yiching were defeated and fled notwithstanding their titles; and Sungun, Nanning and Chingyuen, prefectures, fell. Sangwei had marched into Szchuen, and happened to go in at a time when the Ming generals were as usual quarrelling over their oyster, and tearing each other's throats. Hence Sangwei found no great difficulty in pushing forward, many of the enemy joining him; and with the easy fall of Changtu, Choongching, and Süchow, Szchuen was at his feet. Five of the seven provinces were now again flowing the Manchu tail, and Gwei Wang was once more driven into a hole.

We have already seen Gwei Wang started from Nanning in

the south of Kwangsi, and safe in Laitwan, pursuing his flight against the stream of the river. Nanning fell soon after he left it, and many officials were slain in it. Sien Gwongan was on the track of Gwei Wang with a choice body of troops. Gwei Wang, up the river, heard that the Manchus had already passed Sinning chow, distant only 100 li. The boats were therefore driven ashore, burnt, and abandoned. The greatest terror seized the fugitives, ministers flying hither and thither; and one of Gwei Wang's wives was left behind in the confusion! Gwei Wang left the main road and fled by bye-roads for Yunnan. Gwongan never lost the scent however, and was at one time so close that the dust raised by his horse's hoofs was swept by the wind past Gwei Wang's carriage. Just then the pursuer came across an old grey-headed man and asked whether Gwei Wang had passed that way. "Oh, yes," replied the grey-head, "he passed this spot some time ago, and is now 30 li ahead on his way to the *Toosu** beyond the border." Believing the old man, and fearing he might not be welcomed by the Toosu, he called a halt to bivouac. An officer expostulated that if the fugitive were only 30 li ahead he might yet be overtaken. Gwongan replied that his orders were to take Gwei Wang in Nanning; and it was too serious a risk for him to go beyond his orders, lest his men came to grief; for he had no orders to fight a Toosu.

At the border of Yunnan, Kowang had a guard ready to escort Gwei Wang, who since his narrow escape had lived in the wilds. In February 1652, he journeyed *via* Foochuen, Shatow, and Siyangkiang, reaching Kwangan on 16th of Chinese 1st moon. Thither Kowang sent messengers to welcome him, and recommend his journey to Anloongswo in that corner of Yunnan touching Kwangsi and Kweichow. After a rest of nine days, the fugitive emperor therefore went as he was bidden, passing Toongboo, Tsaili, Nanien, resting some days at Chutang, then through Hooma, Bienshan, Banchiao, and Toongsha to Anloong, which

* See *Aborigines*. It will be observed that all this is taking place just on the border of China, close to those aboriginal tribes, nominally dependent on China, which skirt the north of Burmah.

was converted into a prefecture, and garrisoned by Jangshung, a general of Kowang's,—who was there however rather to overawe and command Gwei Wang than to defend the place. Kowang expressed a desire to visit the emperor, but an officer of his dissuaded him, saying that “the Master of the Empire had better not go; it was not well that two Dragons* should look each other in the face.” At the desire of Kowang, Yingko was made Marshal of Anloong; and he presented a memorial stating that the “emperor would have two hundred taels and six hundred *dan* of rice per annum!” The prefect of the city who had to endorse the memorial added that “the emperor is an official of Kowang's!” The latter took no notice of the sarcasm. As the emperor had now nothing for himself or his ministers to do, he occupied his time in gardening. Pity he had not always employed his talents in the same peaceable and gentle employment.

But just when this emperor could call not an inch of Chinese soil his own, when all hope was extinguished, a powerful party sprang up again out of the ground, to measure strength with the Manchus, and hurl themselves boldly and bravely on the well tempered swords, and in the face of the arrows of the long-tailed barbarians; and the Manchus seemed to be under the doom of having dragon's teeth to the end of time.

Of the four commanders, Kowang was only one. The others seem, for a time at least, to have been eclipsed by him. But some of them again asserted their individuality. Li Dinggwō was he who persistently dogged Dingjow to the death; Liw Wunsiw and Nai Nungchi, were the other two. Bai Wunhüen and Fung Shwangli were generals, but under the four. Each now appears on the scene. Kowang's design was manifestly to use Gwei Wang as a stepping-stone to imperial rank. He had early sent Bai Wunhüen into Szchuen; but he fled back into Yunnan before Sangwei. Kweichow was thus threatened on the north; and prince Koong, with a picked body of seven hundred horse, went to Hochi, near the southern border of Kweichow, his main army being still in Liwchow.

* The Dragon is the Imperial Coat of Arms in China.

Kowang had gone with Nungchi's army into Kweichow, sending Dinggwo and Wunsiw against the *Toosu* Shadinggwo at *Yidoong*, who had revolted from the Ming. He took Tsunyi, where he planted a garrison to stand instead of Choongching. After Dinggwo's successful mission, he was again, along with Shwangli, sent with eighty thousand men by Wookang against Chuenchow and Kweilin; Wunsiw and Wunhüen being ordered with sixty thousand men by Hüchow and Choongching, against Chungtu. Both Dinggwo and Wunsiw had been by this time made princes, and Dinggwo was smarting under the superiority over him of Kowang. He was joined on his march from Liping by Ma Jinjoong. He therefore put Shadinggwo to death, saying that there was now an emperor; he also became the friend of duke Tienbo.

In 1652 Wunsiw defeated Sangwei at Hüchow, and immediately surrounded him several deep. After desperate fighting Sangwei cut his way out, and retired on Sienchow. Two generals Bai were defeated and captured by Wunsiw at Choongching; the victor marching from Kiating took Chungtu, the capital of Szchuen, and besieged Sangwei in Paoning. His camp was 15 li in length; Jang Gwangli, a recent recruit, commanding the west, and Wang Foochun the south. Both camps were elated beyond measure, and well they might be, at the success which had attended them. But they should not have forgotten who commanded in the city. Sangwei had a constant watch set; and seeing one day the men of Gwangli straggling, he instantly put himself at the head of a picked body of horse, made a sudden charge, and broke the men of Gwangli, who began to retreat, then to flee into Foochun's camp. Sangwei immediately galloped among the fugitives into Foochun's camp, whose men were thrown into disorder by the sudden rush of the fugitives; and though they made a gallant defence, the siege had to be raised. Foochun's was the most terrible arm in that fight; and when all was giving way, he stood stock still, slew several pursuers, and seeing he was about to be surrounded, he cried out with a loud voice, "A prince of reputation cannot be

taken alive,"—then, to the terror of the Manchus, cut his own throat. Such was the effect produced by the prowess of Foochun, that Sangwei did not think it advisable to pursue the retreating army. Wunsiw did not retreat far. And Sangwei, leaving a garrison in Paoning, fell back on Hanchung, leaving the west, south, and east of Szchuen, in the hands of Wunsiw; who, on his part, did not think it wise to hurry the retreat of Sangwei. But Kowang was much displeased that Wunsiw had not displayed the bravery of Foochun.

In May 1652, Prince Koong could proudly report that all the important cities of Kwangsi were "down in his map,"—his greatness culminating with the death of Jiao Lien, the faithful and brave second of Shushu. But three months after, he hanged himself in the bitterness of his spirit at seeing his work undone far more rapidly than he had built it up. Gwongan, Ma Siwng, and Chuen Ji, had been sent by him to occupy Nanning, Chingyuen and Wookow. They had not completed their arrangements ere Dinggwo came upon them like a whirlwind, took Yuenching and Wookang at a rush; and Yoongjoong, who had been sent to Yuenchow, now cried out for help in Paoching. Responding to the call, prince Koong sent off a large proportion of his men from Kweilin; but before their arrival Yoongjoong was compelled to retreat to cover Hiangtan. Dinggwo, wiser than to follow the retreating main army, leaped aside, and laid siege to Kweilin, whose garrison had been weakened to aid Yoongjoong. Couriers flew in all directions from the capital of the province to demand Manchu aid, which came, but after Kweilin was again flying the Ming flag;—and then Koong, in his vexation, hanged himself. He had an only son whom Dinggwo seized and put to death in Yunnan. Bangchuen was also taken, sent to Kweichow, where he was beheaded and Jiao Lien avenged. Koong had an only daughter, a mere child, who was brought into Peking, brought up in the palace with the empresses, and called a *goongjoo* or princess. We shall meet her again in the still more desperate struggle of the Manchus in the great rebellion of those same provinces.

At the sight of Dinggwo, Liwchow willingly opened its gates. Ji and Siwng combined their forces at Woochow, but they were no match for Dinggwo, who broke up their army. When Dinggwo marched to the neighbourhood of Hungchow, Hoo Yiching, Ma Bao, and other officers, who had fled to the mountains on the fall of Nanning, gladly swelled his ranks. Kowang at the same time with fifty thousand of the Lo and Gwo savages, placing a line of elephants in the front line of battle, attacked Hü Yoong, who perished; his men fled, and Kowang entered Chunchow.

Nikan, the Jingjin prince, with Twunchi were ordered into Hoonan and Kwangsi; and Chungchow, who had been so successful in the east, was made dictator of Hookwang, Yunnan, Kweichow and the two Kwang, with head quarters in Changsha. Nanking was left in charge of general Jobootai; Chuntai, great commander, was ordered to Kingchow; and Li Shwaitai made viceroy of the two Kwang.

Nikan defeated Jinjoong at Hiangtan, the vanquished retiring into Paoching. He and Dinggwo then confronted each other for nearly a month, each watching the other in the neighbourhood of Hungchow. Dinggwo placed an ambush on a bye road, then attacked and, after some fighting, withdrew as if defeated, drawing the Manchus after him in eager haste. Then after he knew of the appearance of the ambush in the rear, he faced round and attacked the Manchu pursuers, defeating them with great slaughter. Nikan was slain in the *mêlée*, had posthumous honours awarded him in Peking, and the Beira Twunchi was nominated his successor. Dinggwo retired on Wookang, and latterly on Kweilin. The Manchus attacked Chingyuen and Wookang; which defied them. They were on their way back when they came across the army of Kowang, his left under Shwangli, his right under Wunhüen, he himself occupying the centre with the dragon standard, and with sounding drums and blowing horns. The Manchus attacked him at the run, and the result did not justify his condemnation of Wunsiw; for only Shwangli held his ground, which he did so obstinately

that the Manchus retired. Commander Arjin defeated Wunhüen again at Chunchow.

After Dinggwo's success in Kwangsi he threw off the sovereignty of Kowang, saying there was now an Emperor. Kowang was therefore eager to seize the "rebel" and to have him out of the way. A friend of Dinggwo's apprised him that Shwangli was on the way to Liwchow to seize him unawares. He therefore sent a body of men who fell upon Shwangli on the way and defeated him; his ambush before Liwchow being mostly put to death. Dinggwo then marched against the Manchus at Hwiloo and defeated them. He had now conquered a province for Gwei Wang, and Ma Jisiang and other friends whom Kowang sent to Liwchow united with him in upholding the old dynasty. In his anger Kowang sent men who brought Jisiang into Kweichow. As he had not managed to get rid of Dinggwo privately, Kowang attempted to ruin him publicly, and got officials to memorialise against him as a traitor. This memorial was sent by a messenger from Liwchow. Gwei Wang said he could not act, as there were so many false accusations floating about. The messenger, worthy of his employer, angrily asked how he could know that this one was false; and the reply was that he had private information. Kowang ascertained that this information had been given by Jisiang. Kowang had spies everywhere. As he had no other means of injuring Dinggwo he got an underling to go to Dinggwo's house in Yunnan and to seize his wife and daughters to prostitute them in the army! He returned at that time from Kweichow into Yunnan. His mind was now bent on having higher honours,—or as the history says, his "wang's cap was too small" for him and he wanted an emperor's.

When Dinggwo was occupied with the Hoonan army, prince Shang had sent his fleet to support Gwongan and Ma Siwng, who soon retook Pinglo and Kweilin, defeating Yiching and Wang Yingloong several times at Hiangchow, and Pinchow, recalling to Manchu allegiance the Yao and Doong savages of Yuichuen, and thus recovering all Kwangsi. But with the retreat

of the northern army, Dinggwo with forty thousand horse and foot pierced into Kwangtung, took Kaochow, ravaged the prefectures of Lei, Hung and Lien, harassed Chaoching and besieged Sinhwi. Shang and Jimao reported urgency and prayed for Manchu troops,—probably fearing that Chinese troops might not be reliable. General Joomala with the Manchu troops of Nanking were ordered to the rescue. But though combined with the troops of both the princes, Dinggwo remained before Sinhwi over the spring, even after he is said to have been several times defeated. The Manchus camped on the hills but had an ambush on the Kiang. Dinggwo was at last driven to take shelter in the mountain gullies where he ranged his artillery and drew up his elephants. A band of Solon horse pierced his lines throwing his men into disorder. To counteract that move he sent down four thousand horse from the hill top to attack the Manchu flank; who however faced round and fought both his front and flank and took his hill. Dinggwo had therefore to retreat, fighting as he went; and daily suffering defeat. This we must understand to mean that he always retreated. He was badly defeated at Hingpoo, and again at Hungchow, and Kwangtung was restored to peace. The viceroy of the Kwangs was therefore moved to Woochow.

Wunsiw just then issued out of the Szchuen gorges with sixty thousand men, and one thousand vessels. He sent Shwangli with a division against Yochow and Woochang; but he was driven off by Chuntai and the Kingchow army. Thence he sailed on Changte. Kinchow and Changsha armies combined to the rescue. They placed a large ambush outside the city, permitted a large proportion of the enemy to pass, then cut them in two, utterly routing them. They fought six battles, in which Wunsiw lost in slain and captives enormous numbers. Most of his war ships were burnt, and he retreated with Shwangli to Kweiyang. Kowang sent him into Yunnan to look after the province. But his army was now weak, as was also that of his colleague Dinggwo.

Kowang had now his desire; for of all the commanders he

alone was powerful. Gwei Wang had for some time had his capital in Anloong city, which he called *Hingloong foo*, the City of the Prospering Dragon. Kowang was in Kweiyang; and to "shame his lord" put to death a number of the imperial family there, and then assumed imperial rank, erected an Ancestral Temple, established a Court Etiquette, nominated officials, &c. Gwei Wang heard of it, and, as we might expect from his antecedents, he was thrown into a state of extreme terror. He nominated Dinggwo Tsin wang, and Wunsiw Annan wang; commanding Dinggwo to advance to his rescue.

Kowang was terrified at the report that Dinggwo was marching on Anloong. He therefore sent a large army under Yootsai, an able officer, to prevent Dinggwo at Nanning; and Wunhüen was ordered to have Gwei Wang escorted into Kweichow. Dinggwo, flying the Manchu banners, defeated Yootsai at Tienchow, and made towards Anloong, praying Gwei Wang to go to Wunsiw in Yunnan. The family and ministers of Gwei Wang wept at the message of Wunhüen, but were comforted with the assurance that, with the coming of Dinggwo, all would be well. Nor had they to go to Kweichow; for Dinggwo sent an officer to Anloong to pacify the minds of the people, at whose approach Wunhüen fled. The ministers and people were overjoyed at Dinggwo's approach. He sent messengers after Wunhüen, who came back with them, joining him to support Gwei Wang.

Dinggwo sent troops to the Pan Kiang to oppose Kowang, while Gwei Wang moved from Anloong to Poongan. He followed a month after with three thousand horse in the van, as many in the rear, he with Wunhüen in the centre. They marched by Sinchung, Poongan, to Chüking. Kowang set out to attack, ordering Wunsiw to defend Yunnan; but Wunsiw sent a few horsemen to Dinggwo privately, to say that they followed Kowang only because they were afraid Dinggwo would not treat them well. Dinggwo, on swearing by Heaven, had the satisfaction of seeing Wunsiw join him at Chükiang. Wunsiw was then left to protect the emperor, and Dinggwo entered Yunnan. Thence he sent messengers to Kowang, saying that

no harm was designed him, if he agreed to support the empire. Kowang, desiring to murder Dinggwo, replied that if peace were really sought, Dinggwo might go to him to come to terms. Kowang's wife was then a prisoner with Dinggwo. The two did come to terms, and Kowang's wife was sent him. Kowang's palace in Yunnan city was occupied by Gwei Wang; but he got crafty command of some of Dinggwo's troops.

Kowang was all the while irritated in the extreme that Dinggwo had baffled his plans; and in 1657, still harbouring revenge, he petitioned to be permitted to go into Kweichow with his army. Leave was granted, and Gwei Wang's son-in-law convoyed him to a distance. His one burning desire was to crush Dinggwo, but he feared his men were yet too few. However, on hearing that Dinggwo was become weak, he determined to act at once. He moved forward with one hundred thousand men, leaving Shwangli to hold Kweichow for him, and taking with him over three hundred fetters to bind the ministers of Gwei Wang. Kowang was not aware of the defection of Wunhüen, who as a Kweichow officer was again under his orders. He did suspect that he was too friendly with Dinggwo, and had a long conversation to sound him before mentioning his purpose; but as the deserter took good care to hide his real sentiments, he was appointed to command the van. He and Jinjoong, also commanding in the army, sent secret information to Dinggwo that they would certainly desert. When Shwangli got his orders he left Kowang weeping. Yunnan city was held by Tienbo and Wang Shangbi. It was discovered that Shangbi was a partizan of Kowang's. Tienbo therefore seized the army stores and set a watch on Shangbi.

It was the first of the ninth moon (October) when Dinggwo got to Chüking and camped at Sancha. On the fourteenth, Wunhüen camped 20 li from Sancha, and with his best horse fled to Dinggwo, informing him that one battle would scatter Kowang's army, which was composed of very discordant elements. Kowang camped on the left bank of the river, Dinggwo on the right. The former did not wish to fight just immediately, as all

his men were not up. But those already forward were much more numerous than the men of Dinggwo; and Ma Bao was ordered with his division to march upon Yunnan and seize Gwei Wang. Jinjoong and Yuenji commanded the division under Kowang.

Dinggwo ordered breakfast (!) at third watch or midnight, and the attack at fifth watch (2 a.m.). He himself led a choice body of horse right into the centre of Kowang's lines, which were broken by the dashing charge. The other divisions, with a great shout, revolted to "Tsin Wang." Kowang fled with his one division, which speedily dwindled down to three hundred men. He made for Kweiyang, but found the city occupied in the name of Gwei Wang, his own family prisoners, and his property confiscated. He fled for the Manchu lines, was opposed by Bungao, who got shot by an arrow; and Kowang got safely to Chungchow in Hoonan. He was ordered into Peking, where he received the title of Yi Wang, the upright prince. This was in November 1657. Fearing trouble in the provincial capital, Dinggwo marched his army thither after the victory. He was opposed by Jangshung, who had attempted a diversion in the capital. Jangshung was defeated, fled to the mountains, was apprehended when begging bread, and executed. Shangbi, on receipt of the news of Kowang's defeat, fled in deep grief; but knowing not whither to flee, he cut his own throat. Both Gwei Wang and his ministers went out by the east gate, and joyfully welcomed Dinggwo; and the Yunnan men, now the sole kingdom of Gwei Wang, composed a song to celebrate their joy at the defeat of Kowang.

Shortly before that victory, Loo Wang, then in Chowshan, sent messengers inviting Gwei Wang to combine his forces with those of the east, and attack the Hoo provinces. But while unity guided the counsels and union animated the officials of the Manchus, the petty quarrels of selfish generals reigned supreme in Gwei Wang's court. Obedience is the salvation of armies and states, as it is of individual men; and selfish interests and self-willedness bring only calamity and ruin.

In the summer of 1658, Dinggwo was left the sole representative

of the Yunnan four generals, for Wunsiw was murdered by a Shensi man, who gained admission into his room as an astrologer, when the general was lying sick. The court of Gwei Wang had deliberated seriously on the advisability of making Burma a Chinese province. Had that step been taken, as it could easily have been, the history of China for the past two centuries might have to be told differently. The viceroy of Szchuen was meantime in Paoning; Chungchow in Changsha; Arjin succeeded the deceased Chuntai in Kingchow, where Jolo was general; Joomala was ordered with his men from Changsha to Peking. Shang held Chaoching and Canton, whence he had to fight over a hundred battles with the rebels, gallantly driving them beyond his borders. Now that Kowang was with the Manchus, they were made minutely acquainted with the hollowness of the southern power; and Sangwei joined Chungchow in praying for the immediate advance of the main armies into Yunnan to crush the rotten cause. To a prayer like this the Manchus were never deaf since the first day of their career. Hence Loto the Beidsu was ordered at once to join Chungchow, and advance from Hoonan. Sangwei, as great commander of the west, was ordered with general Morgun and Li Gwohan, to advance from Hanchung and Szchuen; and Jobootai, as great commander, with general Sien Gwongan, to advance from Kwangsi. These three main armies were ordered to unite in Kweichow.

Chungchow and Loto combined at Changte in March 1658; and in May they started from Chingyuen and Chunyuen, making for Kweiyang; Jinjoong and his fellow-officers retreating as they advanced. Sangwei started about the same time from Hanchung, ravaged Choongching, took Tsunyi, defeated Liw Jungwo, took thirty thousand *dan* of rice, and received five thousand deserters. He broke up Yang Woo at Kaichow, and summoned to his standard all the Toosu of Linchow and Shwisi. Wunngan was still commander-in-chief of the thirteen camps in the east of Szchuen, which had continued strong, under Tan Hoong, Tan Ju, Tan Wun, &c., ever since Li Jin their commander was killed at Woochow eight years before. These Tan

officers led a large army against Choongching, and Sangwei was compelled to retreat to save the city. The other Tans, however, murdered Tan Wun, and submitted to Sangwei; those who would not submit scattering in the greatest disorder. Sangwei was at Tsunyi in August, by which time all Szchuen was annexed, and Kweichow overrun by the Manchu arms.

Doni, the Sinkün wang and son of Yü chin wang, was nominated commander-in-chief, and set out with a body of Manchus for Kingchow. He got to Pingyue of Kweichow in October, when he collected the three armies into one. Chungchow and Loto were ordered to remain in Kweiyang to look after the commissariat; and Doni was ordered against Junchung, as Yunnan city was called. Each of the three divisions numbered fifty thousand men, and had a fortnight's provisions. Kweiyang had been occupied by Wunsiw, who, with deserters from Kowang, made up a total of thirty thousand men. The roads were of the most wretched kind possible, and irregular beyond description. Hence it was with great toil the Manchus marched far into the interior of those unproductive regions.

The report was spread in Yunnan that these formidable preparations were made by the Manchus to give Kowang the means of avenging himself; and the report threw all the province into a state of terror! Dinggwo early summoned all available troops for the border. But generals appeared at the rendezvous without soldiers, and soldiers without officers. He had besides to subdue two generals who had rebelled; and though he did advance some generals to the more exposed frontiers of Kweichow, they retreated on Yunnan before striking a blow; and the Manchus entered Kweiyang without fighting. Dinggwo set his main army in motion in September; but at its start rain poured down like a river, and the men scattered everywhere for shelter; and when they did start they could march no more than 20 or 30 li per day.

Arrived at Gwanling Pass, Dinggwo sacrificed an animal before the army; pouring out a libation to the spirits, and making an oath to defend the national lares, and to fight with

no other aim. He urged all the general officers to make public acknowledgment before the gods of the favour of the emperor, and their gratitude to him. Whereupon all knelt down, and promised the gods to exert themselves with their whole heart and strength to recompense the favours of the prince their father. Then they all pledged to each other, and Dinggwo was full of joy.

Fung Shwangli prayed for help from Kweichow, in November, on the arrival of the Manchus; and Dinggwo was only too willing to give it. He was hurrying on when he seized a messenger of Chungchow's to Sangwei with a letter, stating that for several reasons it was impossible for him to march till Sangwei's arrival. Dinggwo was caught in the trap, and believing the letter to be sincere, he moved slowly ahead; while the Manchus, in three divisions—by the west side of the river, by Suchung and by Chuenchung—were hurrying forward. He soon discovered the truth, and hastened on. He camped on the North Pankiang.* Wunhüen was already stationed on the West Water (Sishwi), and Shwangli was sent to occupy the further side of the Kikung† river to bar the central route; while Gwangbi was ordered to hold the east route at Whangtsao Ba or dyke on the South Pankiang,—he himself being at *Tieswochiao* bridge on the North Pankiang, to be ready for any emergency.

Because Chihing‡ gwan is an extremely difficult one, Sangwei made a detour through the Miao lands, crossing the river above *Tienshungchiao*. Wunhüen, who had already crossed arms with Sangwei, fled with the utmost precipitation to Woocha. Ma Bao, who was on the higher reaches of the North Pankiang, called *Kadoo ho*, also fled, and the Szchuen army got to Chanyi.

The Kwangsi army secured the Toosu of Suchung as guide,

* The boundary between Yunnan and Kweichow, also called the Tsanggo Kiang; the South Pankiang divides Yunnan from Kwangsi.

† Or Jigoong; rising in Kwangshwunchow, and falling into the Wookiang, a score or so of li from Kweiyang.

‡ Chihing is the river Lookwang between Picli and Tatung.

and passed by unoccupied roads into Anloong, and were about to cross the river in boats, which they seized on the river bank, when Dinggwo, hearing of it, hastily marched up with thirty thousand men to Yenja ho; and when the Manchus marched up he beat them back. They, however, returned to the charge with fury; their guns rending the heavens! Dinggwo was driven out of his camp, and retired to secure the Pankiang. It is also stated that during the battle the report went abroad that the Manchus had come to avenge Kowang; and Dinggwo, who had a number of Kowang's old officers, fearing they would desert to save themselves, fought despairingly. But without such despair it was no disgrace for him that thirty thousand men had to fall back before fifty thousand. The way of the Manchus was now open by Poonganchow. When Doni came up to Shwangli, on the central route, the latter had heard of Dinggwo's defeat, and his disheartened army was easily broken up. They were pursued to the North Pankiang, which they crossed, and then burnt the bridge. But the burning does not seem to have been very complete, as the Manchus restored it in a single night; and Doni pushed on to Chüking.

When Dinggwo saw that all was lost he hurried into the capital and urged Gwei Wang to flee at once into Burma. Wunsiw had left a will advising flight into Szchuen. But the prince agreed with the councillors who advised a westward flight;—if it was driving him into a corner there was no immediate risk! One minister was bold enough to say that they should all remain,—if not to fight, then to die for the national lares, the ministers for their prince. But the love of life at any price was strong in Gwei Wang's court. The city was thrown into the utmost confusion and terror was supreme. By Gwei Wang's advice, Dinggwo ordered the soldiers to leave all the stores intact; for if destroyed, the Manchu armies would oppress the people;—and this is the most unselfish thing Gwei Wang ever did, proving a good heart if a poor head.

By the way, an attempt was made on Gwei Wang's life, but Dinggwo's foresight prevented its success. Gwei Wang was so

affected by the deep grief of the people manifested all along his route, that he had decided to remain and die with them; but Tienbo was soon seconded by Dinggwo, who galloped up and urged him onwards till they got to Tali. On Chinese new-year's day the combined Manchu armies entered Yunnan city, every city in the east opening its gates without a drop of blood shed. On the same day the fugitive emperor was confessing his sins to Heaven, on account of which so great calamities had fallen on his people; and Dinggwo prayed the emperor to allow him to disuse his title of Wang, as he had been unsuccessful in saving the empire; but the emperor would not.

Pursuit was ordered in March, after the armies had sufficiently rested in Yunnan foo. Wunhüen was defeated at Yüloongwan, in the neighbourhood of Tali. Dinggwo therefore sent a force of four thousand men, under a lieut.-general, to escort Gwei Wang to Tungyue. When Gwei Wang crossed the Loo Kiang, Dinggwo followed to make a stand at Mopanshan, a mountain range 20 li south of the river. The entrance into this range is a narrow gully, 5 li in length, each side being like a wall of high rock, and so narrow that the men would have to march in singly, while there was no other road. In this range he laid three ambushes, the first in Dowming gwan, the second at Wungwei, and the third at Gwosi, composed in all of six thousand troops. His plans were based on the supposition that the Manchus having been so easily victorious when opposed, and having had little of that opposition, would march forward with the recklessness of confident superiority. He therefore planted these ambushes of two thousand men each, with artillery. The first and second were ordered to let the Manchus pass till the cannon of the third ambush roused them to action, when they should all appear, and permit not a single Manchu horseman to escape.

The Manchus were meantime crossing the Lantsang Kiang, then the Loo Kiang, and marched several hundred li without meeting a single foe. They believed that Dinggwo had fled to hide himself among the hills; and his strategy was so far successful, that when the Manchus began to enter the very gully

in which his men were waiting for them, they marched in the greatest disorder, believing him far thence. Twelve thousand of their men had already penetrated into the valleys, and were scattered hither and thither, when luckily for them and unfortunately for him, the evil genius of the Ming cause again appeared on the scene in the person of an inferior official of Tali, who secretly joined the Manchus and informed them of Dinggwo's plans. The twelve thousand had already entered the second ambush before the plan was revealed to them, and they began instantly to retreat in the greatest haste, abandoning their horses, in order the better to form to defend themselves. They had their artillery with them, and with it they began to pound away at the ambush, in its lurking place among the trees on the precipitous hill-sides. Their position, when known to the foe, was so exposed to shot that a third of them perished before they recovered sufficient self-possession to attack the Manchus. They attacked however with desperation, another third of them falling in the fight. Dinggwo, who was seated on a hill to watch the progress of his plan, was in terror when he heard the firing where no firing should be; he smeared his face with earth and fled. The officers set over the first and second ambush died a soldier's death with many of their men. The Manchus also fell in great numbers, but they could afford to lose more; and with their organised survivors they pursued the flying for 120 li westwards, to the very gates of Tungyue. Thus all China was for the first time under the Manchu flag. Most of the officers and men of Gwei Wang joined the Manchus, taking with them their horses, elephants, and mules.*

* The History of Gwei Wang gives a slightly different version. It states that *Gooshan*, who had marched at the van of the Manchu army, was put to death with every soul who accompanied him. A small official of Dinggwo's was seized, and to save his own life, promised to point out where the ambush was situated. Ming Wang, one of the officers commanding in the ambush, fearing such treachery, appeared too soon to fight. The sound of his cannon brought Gwosi out of his ambush; but though bravely fighting he was slain. Ming Wang, smarting from an arrow wound in his eye, cut his own throat. The third ambushes then displayed itself, and its fire caused Dinggwo to believe that the ambushes had been driven in one by one, and he fled from the hill whereon he sat rather than wait a useless death.

Most of the troops were ordered back into Peking, while Yunnan was placed under Sangwei, who had a number of "great western cannon" situated in the most important posts. Dinggwo and Wunhüen were hiding among the savages of Munglang and neighbourhood, on the borders of Burma, into which Gwei Wang had fled. They were unable to re-enter Yunnan, though Yuenkiang Toosu joined them. But Sangwei, eager to have the control of a large army, and believing it would be a work of the greatest merit to lay hold of Gwei Wang, petitioned for permission to enrol an army sufficient to seize the fugitive even in the capital of Burma.

As soon as Gwei Wang heard of the disastrous defeat of Mopanshan, his ministers fled their several ways and hid among the mountain gullies. His guard went over to the Manchus, and Tienbo with about a hundred men remained with him. He too fled, and in two days got to *Nangbun Ho*; and two days more to Burman territory at Tiebi gwan. Here the Burmese authorities professed to be afraid to permit armed men within their borders. Gwei Wang was unwilling to disarm, but by the advice of Ma Jising all the men threw away their arms.

When they arrived at Manmoo, a Burman high official presented himself, apologising for not having gone to the border to welcome the great emperor; but theirs was a small kingdom, and with large armies pursuing behind, they dared not outwardly display the hospitality they desired to give. Tienbo saw their disinclination to receive the fugitives, and proposed that the emperor should go alone, while he would remain to watch the border at Chashan. He also begged to have the son and heir of Gwei Wang nominated guardian of the empire and left behind, but the son was too filial, and the plan was declined by Gwei Wang; whereupon prince and ministers mingled their tears. And on the first of second moon (March), four boats came by the Great Gold Sand river (Kinshakiang), to welcome them. The retinue of Gwei Wang was then six hundred and forty-six men and nine hundred and forty horses. On the eighteenth of second moon they arrived at King-Kun

(Jing-Gun), where the Burmese in vain endeavoured to stop them.

When Gwei Wang had got to Chashan, on his way to Burma, Dinggwo moved to Mungliang. He now sent in Wunhüen with an army to look after the prince. This army got to within 60 li of the capital *Yinwa* (Ava), where they were ordered by the Burmese to halt. But they pressed on to within 5 li of the city, where the Burmese rushed on and defeated them, slaying many, the survivors scattering in their flight. To prevent further inroads of troops from the frontier, the Burmese authorities sent orders to the border garrisons to say that the emperor had already started for Fukien by sea. Tienbo and others wished to move away from the capital but were forbidden. The Burmese king then sent his "dragon boat" and messengers to welcome the emperor, who went in this boat to Ava. Here they heard of the expedition of Wunhüen, of the capture of many of his defeated army, of their reduction to slavery by the Burmese, and of the consequent suicide of many of them.

A straw palace was built for Gwei Wang at Juakung, whither many men and women went to sell articles. There the harvest moon found them, and as it is a great day in Burma, the Burmese have the custom of that day saluting their king. Tienbo was the first presented to the king. Jisiang and others were invited to drink. He apparently drank freely, for he called upon a young lady, belonging to Gwei Wang's relations, to sing and dance. She refused, asking whether that was a time to be merry and dance; whereupon he struck her. Gwei Wang was sick inside, heard what passed and sighed.

Dinggwo was meantime doing all he could to cluster round him a force sufficient to support Gwei Wang. He was eager to have him back on Chinese soil, doubtless thinking this the best means of rallying the scattered well-wishers of the cause. He marched therefore with an army to the borders of Burma, but the Burmese saw, in the complications, a mode of extending their own frontier, and would permit neither Dinggwo to get to Gwei Wang, nor the latter to go to Dinggwo. In the beginning of

1660 Dinggwo had sent over thirty letters, but never received a reply; for not one of the Chinese at Ava would the king allow to go away. He however made use of the Wang's imperial seal to attach to himself the Toosu or petty chief of Yuenkiang. He whose name was Na Hao proclaimed for them, with the officers Gaoying and Fungchang,—for they doubtless represented themselves as ready to reinstate the emperor,—their real desire being, if possible, to gain possession of Yunnan for Burma. Dinggwo, meeting with no success, not even as much as a reply to his letters, returned from the Burman frontier; while Sangwei, hearing of the defection of the chief Na Hao, marched against him from Shiping, besieged his city, opening a trench all round to hem him in. During the continuance of this siege he attacked, defeated and slew the chief Ying Fung. Na Hao, finding resistance impossible, burnt himself to death; and Sangwei changed his lands into *Yuenkiang foo*.

Sangwei prayed for permission to use a seal, authorising him to summon to his aid against Burma, the Toosu chiefs of Loong-chüen, Chienya, Janda, and Chuali; stating at the same time that the Burmese were willing to hand over Gwei Wang, provided Dinggwo, who was then their thorn, were defeated. This prayer was favourably received, the necessary authority granted, and Aihinga of the Privy Council sent to second him. Sangwei had his own purposes to serve, for he could not but know that Dinggwo was able now to do no harm. Wunhüen employed a Burmese secretly to give a letter to Gwei Wang, informing him that there was still an army eager to serve him, but unable then to move for fear of the Burmese. If however his prince desired him he would march in. He did go 60 li to Kiafoo kiao, but dared go no further.

Meantime Gwei Wang was having a sorry time of it at the capital of Burma. Most of his retainers had gradually disappeared; and he was compelled, for want of better material, to nominate Jisiang grand secretary. The new grand secretary desired to write a memorial worthy of the occasion; and his first was to the effect, that for three days he had not been able to get

a fire lit! Gwei Wang was angry at this use of the exalted post, and told them they might have his jade seal, which they broke up to purchase necessities.

One of the retainers desired to kill Jisiang and Gwotai; but they discovered his object, and slew him in April. Two months after, these two worthies went into his "majesty's" presence to explain the books. Yin Gwosi was angry at this mockery of state, and said that they should have devised some plan of escape long ago; that last year they were asked to "explain the books," and would not; their time would be now better employed in planning an escape; for if the emperor could enter Burma, he could also leave it. One of these officials on another day went in to expound, and seated himself. Another went in, but stood; and in reply to Gwei Wang's invitation to sit down, replied, "Though we are in confusion, I dare not act with such great impropriety;"—a thorough Chinaman he.

In the end of June, the younger brother of the Burmese king slew him, and took his throne. He went to Gwei Wang to make terms; and Gwei Wang had nothing which he could present to the new king. In August, the Burmese prayed to be allowed to "curse by the water"; i.e., to make oath, apparently to their new king. The followers of Gwei Wang were asked to take part in the ceremony on *Wanghai low*, "Tower overlooking the sea." While the Chinese were on the way, an ambush fell upon and slew forty-two men of them,—Jisiang and Gwotai being of the number. Tienbo had guessed their plot; but seeing no way of escape, prepared a weapon, and slew a dozen men before he was seized, tied to a tree, and shot dead by an arrow. Almost all the women belonging to the fugitive band had committed suicide long ago, and there was now left only a fragment of the thousand or more individuals who had accompanied Gwei Wang to Ava. There were at least a hundred of the immediate relations, empresses, &c., of Gwei Wang who had ended the discomforts of their exile by suicide. Gwei Wang attempted to strangle himself when he heard of the murder of his followers, but he was saved. Not so the empress

Wang, who perished. Just then a large number of Burmese surrounded Gwei Wang, apparently with the design of ending his life, but a rider came up, ordering them not to touch Gwei Wang; for the Manchus, who had already moved, would come to demand him. That attack had indeed been instigated by Sangwei, who feared that the exiled followers might murder Gwei Wang, and Sangwei would lose the glory of his move. He therefore sent men who incited the Burmese to fall upon Jisiang and the others.

A few days after the attack a new straw palace was erected for Gwei Wang; and to reassure him, he was told that it was not royal troops who had set upon his men, but a band of robbers. It was of course useless to argue the matter, however absurd the statement. Twenty-five men, followers of Gwei Wang, were now placed in the house lately occupied by duke Tienbo, and food and liquor provided them.

Dinggwo had again and again attempted to get to, and to free his lord, but always failed, though seconded by Wunhüen. His last attempt was in September 1661, when he sailed down with sixteen ships, and had to pull back with eleven. In the following January, the Burmese prayed Gwei Wang, with his surviving retinue, to return to China, which he was overjoyed to do. They started about midnight, crossed the river, and found themselves in the midst of Sangwei's army.

We have already seen that Sangwei was eager to gain possession of the last pretender to the Ming throne. He had prayed for powers which he had received, and for men who were sent. In September 1661, an army of Manchus, Chinese, and border savages, numbering little short of one hundred thousand men, started from Tali and Tungyue. Fifty thousand under Sangwei and Ahinga went beyond the frontier by *Loongchuen* and *Mungmao*;* over twenty thousand *via Yaogwan*. They reunited in December at Moobang. He had formerly sent a band under Ho Jinjoong from Tungyue *via* Loongchuen and Yifoo Su to Mungyin, to demand the Burmese to advance and

* Another authority says *Mungyin*.

welcome his host. This was in February 1661, and it was long on the way; for Dinggwo was then fighting against the Burmese, and stopped their way. The Burmese therefore responded to Sangwei to welcome him as their deliverer from Dinggwo. The two Toosu of Loomanmo and Mungmi (or Looman and Momungmi) threatened Sangwei's rear in the interest of Dinggwo; and Gwojoo with three thousand men had to be left at Nandien (south of Yunnan) to check them.

When the army was nearing Moobang, Wunhüen was posted there. He fled on their approach to Chashan, destroying the Sibokiang bridge. Fearing that Wunhüen might retreat towards China, and cut off his communications, Sangwei appointed Ma Ning to watch him; while he, with Ahinga and the main army, marched for 300 li along the river bank into Burma,—natives acting as guides. Dinggwo had meantime retired to Tsingchuen.

Sangwei's army got to Lankiwkiang, opposite the Burmese capital, in the beginning of January, as we have seen, and to them the Burmese delivered over Gwei Wang, his mother, his empress and children, together with his surviving retinue. There are various modes of accounting for the surrender. One says that the Burmese invited a hundred men over the river, and handed them the prisoners; another that the Burmese in terror brought the prisoners to the camp; and a third, that mentioned above,—a remark following that Sangwei gave "large sums" of money. The two former accounts are official and should have agreed; the last is unofficial, and upon the whole is the most likely. The army returned with its prey to Yunnan, in the capital of which Gwei Wang strangled himself in May, with a red silk cord. And thus was extinguished with a bit of string the last of the great Ming family, founded by the monk; for great it had been.

Dinggwo and Wunhüen, having lost their chief, felt they were no longer bound together. Wunhüen started northwards; and Dinggwo, fearing his designs, sent his son after him to ascertain whither. Wunhüen, on seeing the band, was angry; and was

about to order an attack, when Dinggwo rushed up and forbade his son to fight, saying that he had been sent to look and not to fight. He added, "We have still a few score men left, let him go his way." And the readiness to fight showed whither Wunhüen was bound; for he remained with the old dynasty long after hope was gone, and he now joined the new. Dinggwo moved on to Kinloong kiang, then to Mungla, where many of his men and horses died, and where he prayed that, if it were Heaven's will to destroy him, his men might not suffer, but that he alone should die. He died two months after his former master. Ignorant of what was happening to Dinggwo, Sangwei sent commander Jang Yoong with over ten thousand men to Poor, to watch lest Dinggwo crossed from Tsingchuen by Chuali to plunder. But Jang Yoong arrived to find Dinggwo dead, and his son with over a thousand men ready to serve the Manchus. The army sent to Poor showed the estimation of Dinggwo's character held by Sangwei, a capable judge. This son, with Hüen's son, were sent to the capital, where they were warmly received, and declared heirs to their father's rank and properties. Kowang, the Mooyi duke, died with the other worthies, his former colleagues, and his son succeeded to his title.

Sangwei soon after sent armies, which slew the Toosu of Dafang, which he converted into *Tating*; him of Bila making this *Pingyuen*; him of Shwisi creating it *Chiensi*; and him of Woocha, which he changed to *Weining*. He afterwards established *Kaihua foo* and *Yoongting chow*, destroying the Toosu; and found that he could dispense with five thousand of his men, whom he disbanded. He had now attained the climax of his splendour, and was triumphant over all enemies, and elevated beyond the reach of envy. He had the title of Tsin Chin Wang conferred upon him, as if he were of the emperor's flesh and blood. He had more substantial rewards conferred; for Kweichow, from its governor downwards, was placed at his disposal; and the viceroy and governor of Yunnan were ordered to look to him for orders. Appointments, civil or military, were in his hands; and the revenues of those provinces were to be

answerable only to him. He added enormously to these, as we shall see in his later career.

In the height of his dignity, he desired his old love Yuenyuen to be his chief wife,—or queen we might call her. She however firmly refused, saying that he had purchased her; and therefore though he had dealt mercifully with her, she could not consent, for she was unworthy to be the chief wife of a prince. He therefore married another, who proved to be a “braver” woman, and one able to lord it over this warrior husband. Every pretty lady likely to draw her husband’s attention, she had murdered; and she graciously permitted Yuenyuen to live, only because the latter, faithful to what she believed her duty, refused even to see the great prince who had bought and loved her. Yuenyuen had no child of her own, but she had adopted and brought up a girl, whom Sangwei desired to adopt as his daughter. But the girl refused to be anything else than a Taoist nun. A peculiar family relationship, which might give scope sufficient to the imagination of the romancist. This girl had, and continued to exert, great influence over Sangwei; and her prayer saved any one whatever who came under his displeasure, however great that displeasure might happen to be.

While Sangwei was yet on his way towards Burma, after he had dispersed all the forces nominally attached to Gwei Wang, the latter sent him an epistle from the capital of Burma thus:—

“Commander, you are the most renowned of all the ministers of the new dynasty; you are the most powerful repressor of the old. In both dynasties you have held high office. Both emperors agreed in highly honouring you. Who is able to set forth the trouble which befell our dynasty by the unbridled wickedness of the ‘Bolting Robber,’ when he suddenly appeared before the capital and destroyed the *Shuaji*—national lares—causing the death of our ruler and the destruction of our men? Your inclinations, commander, and desires were to re-establish the empire, like Woo Dsuhu of *Tsin* Kingdom, who went to implore aid from the court of *Tsin*, with tears in his eyes. You too prayed for men, and swore to search out the crime and to

punish the criminal. Your mind was then untainted. Why are you now, under the shadow of a great kingdom, acting the fox, borrowing the tiger's terror; outwardly pretending to be avenging the act of the enemy (Dsuchung), but inwardly supporting the new dynasty?

"When the notable Robber lost his head, the lands of the south had not to be recovered to the Ming.* We, officials of the south, found it hard to have to acknowledge the utter loss of the national lares and the Ancestral Temple. We therefore established the new emperor at Nanyang. To what purpose? Before we could lay head to pillow, or stretch us on our mat, war was upon us. *Hoonggwang* was not long sacrificed to (i.e., dead), till *Loongwoo* was slain. At that time, how often did I decide for death? And how could I bring myself to offer sacrifice to my imperial ancestors and the national lares? The ministers again and again urged me to become emperor, and again and again I refused. But at last I consented, because I could not withstand their earnest wishes. On the first battle thereafter, I lost Choo (Hunan and a portion of Honan); in the second, I lost Kwangtung. The places to which I have fled, a trembling fugitive, are without number. Li Dinggwo fortunately welcomed us in Kweichow, and again in Nanngan. But as for me, I desire to trouble no man to fight for me with the world.

"But you, commander, have forgotten the great virtue of the prince-father. You seek the reputation of setting up a new dynasty. For this purpose you have led troops to *Dien* (Lake south of Yunnan foo), to rob me of my rest; and I was compelled to cross Shamo† to borrow the use of a stable for a home. The mountains are far and the waters are distant. Who will rejoice with me if I speak or laugh? If I sing, it is only to increase sorrow. The defenders of the rivers and the hills of my father are gone. If I can only exist among these poor barbarians I am content. But you, commander, avoid neither difficulty nor danger, but petition to march to great distances, at the head of several scores

* I.e., they were already under Ming authority.

† A desert land.

of myriads of men, to pursue a forlorn wanderer. How is it you esteem the empire so small? How is it that, of all between the blue concave above and the surface of earth, you persist in pursuing to the death a solitary man? Is it because, after you have been created a wang, you desire by my death to acquire greater reputation? I have been wondering whether there is not a single corner where wind blew and rain fell, within all the lands belonging to the High Emperor, where the commander could not establish a reputation.

"Commander, you have already destroyed my family: you now desire to take my life. Would you but read the ode *Chuhiao*,* and could you but have sorrow of heart! Do you not remember, general, that you are the descendant of many who received the salary of the late dynasty? And are you able so far to forget the late emperor, that you can show no pity for me? If you cannot remember him, might you not recall the many bounties of his predecessors? If you cannot think of the late emperor and his predecessors, is it not right to bear in mind your own father and ancestors? I do not know what the favours bestowed upon you, and the merit won towards you, by the great *Ching* (Manchu dynasty); nor can I comprehend why, general, you should be mine enemy. You, general, regard your policy as of great wisdom; it will yet be seen to be a foolish one: you consider it is deep; but it will hereafter appear shallow. Succeeding ages will record your act; you will be handed down by history. As what kind of man should you be pictured?

"At present my armies are defeated, my strength weakness. I am poor, a solitary man, with only a weak life, which is in your hands. If you desire to take my head, to break up my bones into fragments, and to dye the grass with my blood, I am not able to oppose you. If you can change my misery to happiness, and leave me a square inch of ground, I am still respectfully at

*This is a fabulous owl, reared by its mother, whose eyes it picks out as soon as it is grown strong enough to be independent, when it flies away, leaving its mother to die. The parallel is a very apparent one, and Sangwei is pleaded only to leave the "blind mother" to die in peace.

your mercy. But this I dare not hope for. But perhaps I too, with the grass and the trees, can share the rain and the dew, by the permission of the Holy Dynasty. Had I ten myriads of men at my disposal, they would gladly be all yours, general, to do your bidding. You, general, are the minister of the great Ching; but you should not forget the flesh and blood of the ancient rulers, nor render ingratitude for the great merits of the former emperors. (This I lay before you to) think and decide."

The above letter shows the writer a most unfortunate choice for a leader of turbulent men in troublous times. The Ming family had lost its vigour. It is difficult for a mere western to judge of the above composition, the force of whose beauty is lost in a translation. But unless it, with its accompanying circumstances, tend to excite the tear of compassion from the heart, which sheds no tears for its own griefs, it will rouse the scorn of him who despises the lack of manliness in a misfortune brought upon one's self.

Shwunchih lived to have the satisfaction of seeing the whole of China and the most of Mongolia, with Corea and all Manchuria to the Yaloo and the Songari, under the flag which his grandfather raised seventy-eight years before in the obscure glen of Hotoola. He then passed away, leaving his large territory in unchallenged possession to the young boy reputed his son, who is known in history by his style of Kanghi.

In concluding this portion of his history, Wei Yooenhüen of Shaoyang says: that in acquiring empire, it is absolutely necessary to have brave and constant soldiers, and single-minded ministers. And the reader of the preceding history cannot help perceiving that his remark is more than a mere truism; for the soldiers of the Ming differed nothing from the Manchus, and from first to last were a match for them; but the Ming ministers in every instance selfishly betrayed their trust, and ruined the cause which they pretended to support and for which their soldiers would fight to the death. We would so far modify the statement of the Chinese author as to say, that the making of the soldier, if necessary to the founding of empire, is dependent entirely on.

the character of the minister. The utterly selfish Ma Shuying, who had a good cause and willing hands able enough to support it, by his self-seeking lost control of the armies. This produced civil war, and he gained command of the various Boards by putting to death or throwing into exile every true patriot. His enormous means of defence crumbled therefore at the first touch. Chü Shushu, a subordinate civilian, with scarcely a tithe of the resources of Shuying and with the *morale* of the Ming cause hopelessly low, brought to a stand, and drove back the hitherto invincible Chungdoong. But examples crowd on the reader to show that from the first brush with the Manchus, or with internal robbers, the ministers in authority failed their country, and the soldiers, losing confidence in the integrity of their chiefs, necessarily fought with a half-hearted bravery, or under the fear of betrayal. The example of the Ming on the other hand shows the supreme importance of having a good head at the helm of affairs. The Manchus were not superior in courage to the Chinese. They began with only one hundred and thirty men under arms. As they increased, their ministers showed precisely the same selfishness, the same haste to be dishonestly rich as their Chinese neighbours. But they had a man at their head who, if he could not and did not make them absolutely honest, restrained their avarice within bounds, and made such examples of the dishonest, that "honesty" was found to be as a rule "the best policy."



CHAPTER XI.

CONQUEST OF FORMOSA.

LYING quite close to her shores, Formosa has yet been a *terra incognita* to China up till a very recent period of her long history. For though possessed of so extensive a sea-board the Chinese have never been a navigating people. Their sailing ambition was satisfied with coasting trade,—their men-of-war being an invention but of yesterday. In past Chinese history the Japanese were the rovers of the sea, and Japan was better known to China as a pirate-producing land, than as a well established country, as highly advanced in civilisation as herself. It was the visits of the Japanese to her shores, not hers to theirs,—the blazing of her villages, the sacking of her sea-board cities from Kwangtung to Shantung by Japanese hands, which made Japan's existence so patent and real a fact. But as Formosa was thinly inhabited by a number of scattered tribes, deserving the name of savage so freely bestowed by Chinese authors on all nations outside the Flowery land, its natives never sought Chinese shores, and the Chinese had no desire to discover, save by land journeys, "green fields and pastures new." It was impossible for the Formosans to be pirates, else they would have ceased to be savages. For though piracy is almost always carried on in a savage manner, it cannot be carried on by savages, as it requires a large capital, not possessed by savages, to build the ships fitted for piratical purposes; and piratical expeditions demand an amount of discipline, which if submitted to by savages, would prove them no longer savage. The width of sea therefore, between Fukien and Formosa, which seems a mere ferry to a foreigner, was sufficient to keep the Chinese and Formosans mutually ignorant of each other's existence. Yet in

the records of the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960—1278) it is related that to the east of Punghoo or the Pescadores, is the kingdom of *Kwunshun*, which the Chinese now know to be Formosa.

Taiwan, the "sinuous tower," as the Chinese call Formosa, possibly because of the sinuosities of its coast line, is by Chinese measurement 2800 li in length, and 500 li in breadth, lying opposite to the Fukien prefectures of Hing, Chüen, and Chang, distant from Amoy 500 li and from Punghoo 200 li. Its mountains rising in Kelung* and running south to Shamachi, stretch over more than 1000 li. From their east and west base to the sea, along their length, was a waste plain of rich soil fully 100 li wide, forming the land on which the Chinese began to squat more than two centuries ago. But as both the original occupation and the subsequent conquest of Formosa are inextricably blended with the personal and family history of Jung Juloong, the remarkable pirate, and founder of a remarkable family of pirates, it is necessary to throw together as many hints of this man as we can hunt out of various Chinese sources.

Jung Juloong was a native of Nanngan, a district of Chüen prefecture in Fukien. In Nganping district there lived a Ji Si who had massed a considerable fortune by constant merchandise with Japan. His daughter became Juloong's wife, with a dowry of ten thousand taels. When he died, Juloong connected himself with a lot of Japanese pirates, who then made Taiwan their headquarters; and when Yen Junchüen, the chief, died, Juloong took command. He sometimes resided in Japan, and there married another wife, in spite of the law that none marrying a Japanese woman could afterwards leave the country; for Chinese customs then, as now, permitted a man to have a wife in every port he visited, and as many as he chose. Juloong, the free-booter, was not to be bound by any law affecting ordinary mortals, and therefore he stole away with his wife and returned to his native place. His power gradually increased under the weak rule of the Ming Tienchi, when Chinese administration

* According to English measurement the length of Formosa is only 237 miles and average breadth 70, distance from Fukien 90.

was daily becoming more rotten, and insubordination, robbery, and rebellion, more rampant throughout the empire. So great was that power, that no merchant vessel dared sail the seas without Juloong's flag flying at her stern; and for that flag each large vessel had to pay an annual black-mail of three thousand taels. No wonder his treasury received a yearly revenue of ten million taels, or three million pounds sterling; a sum which will appear all the greater when we remember that seventy years after, at the Union of England and Scotland, the income of Great Britain was only five and a half million pounds, though it is true the value of money has not during that period depreciated so much in China as in England.

Juloong distinguished himself in 1627, by not only possessing the sovereignty of the Chinese seas, but by taking the coast cities of Fukien, and ravaging the country. In order, if possible, to prevent a recurrence of such land spoliation, when the hands of the government were more than sufficiently occupied elsewhere, the Board of War in the summer of 1628—the first year of the reign of the last Ming emperor—came to the resolution of inviting Juloong to acknowledge the sovereignty of his imperial majesty. Juloong agreed; for his submission was asked on the understanding that at sea no one would have the right to interfere with him. He was forthwith acknowledged as an inferior official of the Chinese government; which, however, was rather a nominal connection, than a criterion of his power and influence even on shore. In this capacity he seems to have done some service; for in 1632 we find him attacking and defeating the pirate Liw Hianglao, who was ravaging Fukien. He never did build himself a city of the ordinary sort, for he believed truly that the waves were the best moat, and flying sails the surest walls. But he built a palace at Nganping of several li in length, into a gate of which his vessels could enter. And the army, with which he occasionally served the Chinese government, he supported entirely himself. His most effective services, however, were those rendered at sea; for the governor had only to inform Juloong of the escape to sea of any number

of robbers or rebels hard pressed by land, and they would soon thereafter be handed over to the governor for punishment. He therefore got himself the honourable name of the "*Chang-chung* of the south."* On these expeditions he was very careful of his person; for he was not of that almost reckless kind of disposition which we usually associate with animal courage and fighting bravery. He therefore had a hundred of his retainers fitted out in every particular like himself, so that no one could recognise him.

Juloong had three brothers, all of them warriors under their big brother's flag—Hoong'kwei, Juhoo and Jubao; the latter two younger than himself. When Juloong submitted and became a Chinese magistrate he had the right to regard all rivals as outlaws; and Gow Hwi, a notable pirate of Nanngan, but independent of Juloong, fell before his rival. At Hwingan the powerful Liw Hianglao, had his head-quarters. He was extremely wealthy, and was asked by the governor to follow the example of Juloong. On his scornful refusal, the governor appealed to Juloong for the execution of justice, and Juloong, nothing loth, sailed all his fleet against Liw. A severe battle at Dinghaiswo and Woohoomun was a drawn one, till the young and brave Juhoo directed his ship towards that of Liw, threw himself into a small boat, boarded him, and dashed through his men to the great chief. They were both men of more than ordinary power and skill in stroke and fence. So sudden and unlooked-for was the onset, so fierce the attack, and so loud the clash of their weapons, that the astonished beholders could only look on at this fight of the two powerful men in admiration and in fear. The two antagonists, finding each other perfectly matched in their weapons, threw them aside, and in wild rage closed with each other with naked fists. They seized each other, they wrestled, they struggled, they fell. Still apparently a perfect match, they rolled over and over each other, till they rolled over into the sea, when both sank in that frightful embrace and neither ever rose again. Juloong lost his brave brother, but he gained the fleet of Liw, which joined him on the

* Chang, or the "Long," being the common name of the Great wall.

spot,—while his government acknowledged his services by making him colonel!

When the robber Li, the one-eyed, put an end to the struggling existence of the Ming dynasty, Juloong remained nominally faithful to the dethroned house. He did nothing directly to support the first pretender to the throne established in Nanking, but his brother Hoong-kwei held Kwachow for Foo Wang. Tang Wang the next pretender, after Nanking was taken by the Manchus, was set up in Fukien, and Juloong became, as we have seen, “Mayor of the Palace.”

In 1646, when the Manchus seized and put Tang Wang to death, their commander, the Beira Foolo, like the former governor of Fukien, invited Juloong to acknowledge the Manchu emperor. He was wise enough, now that all the north and north-west were in Manchu possession, to know that resistance in the field was vain; and as he had immense possessions in both the Kwangs in over five hundred different places, he was only too glad to accept Foolo’s invitation. He was not now so young as he was, nor was there any reason why he should risk what he had; for the idea of employing any of his enormous wealth for purely patriotic purposes must have seemed rather ludicrous to the successful pirate, the weakness of whose country had made his accumulations possible. It was, however, probably with secret satisfaction that he found so strong, lengthy, and bitter an opposition from his afterwards more famous son, Chunggoong, and his own brothers: for his son left him in bitter tears, renouncing a father who renounced his country; and all the army, which he professed to hope would submit with him, left the alien shore, and took to their ships again after Chunggoong or Coxinga. Only five hundred men followed him into the Manchu army; and his Japanese wife, the mother of Chunggoong, strangled herself.

The letter in which Juloong was invited to submit, praised his power and ability in being able to set up a *wang*, and the skilful energy with which he had supported a cause, the downfall of which did not so much prove his crime as Heaven’s will.

It concluded by saying that the two Kwangs were still in a most unsettled state, and that his counsel was greatly needed as to the measures to be taken and the men to be employed. This flattering letter Juloong displayed in Chiüenchow as he passed through, to prove that his influence was unabated, triumphantly declaring that he could secure a place for any man, and he haggled over terms with many place-hunters. Most sailors are credulous. He got to Foochow in December, and was met and welcomed by the Beira, who feasted and drank with him for three days. After the third day the camp broke up suddenly at midnight, marching northwards, Juloong's men having been separated from him, and he was allowed only a personal friend as attendant. He was also forbidden to hold any communication with his home; but he ceased not writing letters, urging his people to remember the goodness of the Manchus. The historian supposes these may have been so written to be seen by the Manchus. It would certainly not be at all surprising if the Manchus regarded the almost solitary arrival of so powerful a chief with suspicion, for they cannot be expected to have been able to credit that his influence, formerly and for long so great, could be at once annihilated. But in reply to his anxious queries as to how his rebellious brothers and son could be dealt with, he was told to make himself easy on that score, for that having him with them they had little anxiety about the rest; which was a reply more pleasing to his vanity than satisfactory to his judgment. He was brought to Peking, and presented to the emperor. Some of his family followed soon after; and there we leave him for the present.

Soon after his submission to the Ming dynasty, Juloong had been consulted by governor Hiwng Wunchan as to what measures could be taken to alleviate the ravages of famine in Fukien. And Juloong, who knew Formosa well,—its rich but waste plains waiting only the hand of the diligent husbandman to abound in the richest harvests,—recommended a donation of three taels in silver and an ox to every householder, and to have as many as possible sent across to Formosa. The suggestion

was adopted, and many tens of thousands were sent across, forming the first Chinese colony to Formosa. One city was erected and named Jienchung or Tsienchung. The soil was of the most superior character, yielding three crops a year, and abundantly. Once the way was opened up, the men of Chang and Chi'en flocked over like "people going to a market." These rapidly increasing colonists considered Juloong as their chief and landlord, and to him they handed over a certain portion of their yearly crops. Gratitude to him who launched them across from starvation to plenty was bond sufficient between them; and the people afterwards always regarded themselves as the dependants of the Jung family rather than as the subjects of any of the Chinese emperors, Ming or Manchu; and in all circumstances, as far as they dared, proved themselves so.

As a youth, Chunggoong was always with his father; and apparently became a favourite with the second Ming pretender, Tang Wang, who gave him his own surname of Joo, and the name *Chunggoong*, "Completed Merit." He also created him *Bai*, or "Count Faithful and Dutiful." When, in 1646, Tang Wang was seized by the Beira Foolo, and put to death, Juloong, who of course owned all the shore possessions of the family, acknowledged the Manchu emperor; but his fidelity being of a questionable character, he was escorted to Peking, retained as a prisoner, though treated like a prince.

Chunggoong, then twenty-two* years of age, was full of the romance of youth, and of dauntless courage. When his father joined the Manchus he put to sea, swearing that he would slay his father to avenge his country. With his uncle Hoongkwei in Baisha, and his near relations, cousins of his father's, Jung Tsai in Amoy and Jung Lien in Woochow, he made a solemn oath to uphold the Ming dynasty; and these various stations mutually strengthened each other, and commanded all the

*Twenty-three according to Chinese computation, which is always one, sometimes two, years more than ours; for the Chinese child is one year in the year of its birth, and on next new-year's day, even if it be on the morrow after birth, he is two years old.

coast cities. How far these men were actuated by motives of patriotism, and how far by a desire for lawless liberty, it is difficult to determine. That there was patriotism of a kind influencing their conduct there can be no doubt; for both then, and for many years after, the Manchus would gladly have purchased the adhesion of the Jung family on the terms granted by the Ming,—that the sea should still be regarded their property. But their patriotism must have been of an entirely personal character; for their lack of wisdom was manifested in their want of union. The Ming cause was represented by three various aspirants to the throne,—Loo Wang, driven to be emperor of a small island on the coast of Fukien; another for a brief period in Canton; and Yoongming or Gwei Wang, weak himself, but surrounded by strong men, and supported by the powerful south-west provinces. Jung Tsai declared for Loo Wang and Chunggoong for Gwei Wang. If true patriotism had existed in the southern provinces at that time—a patriotism which placed country first, and self next—all would have rallied round one centre, and could with the greatest ease have prevented the Manchus from crossing the Yangtsu; and thus compell them to rest content with the empire of the Kin dynasty (see “Corea”), which also rose in the north of Manchuria, and was of the same race as the Manchus. But a patriotism centred in self made unity impossible, and divided counsels weakened numbers. The patriotism of the Chinese was based upon their pride in their own customs, and in the shame of being plundered by the officials of a barbarian instead of by those of a native. But that patriotism went no further than “each for himself,” and therefore had to collapse. It is possible that Chunggoong was in earnest; for he certainly decided, as a wise man should, in acknowledging the remote but powerful Gwei Wang instead of the powerless Loo Wang, who was at his door. And the enormous expense of keeping a huge army in the field to seize and protect the cities of Fukien, which he could not get refunded, and the energy with which he carried on a war wholly unnecessary for his own immediate purposes, seems to prove

him desirous to act as a worthy subject of the emperor Gwei Wang.

Of his five brothers, only one, Shujoong, followed him to sea. To collect their men and form their plans, they stood out to sea over against the south and south-east of Kwangtung. Loo Wang had gone to find an asylum in Chowshan island, also called Wungchow, about 100 li by sea from Ningpo. But his own officer, Whang Binching, commandant of the pirate fort, refused him entrance. Tsai and Lien fell in with Loo Wang, and escorted him to their place, Joong-dso-swo, the then name of the Amoy district. But Chunggoong was supreme here now; his men were far more numerous and brave than those escorting Loo Wang; and as Loo and Gwei Wangs had a quarrel of long standing, Chunggoong refused him a landing place, and the wandering emperor had to go to Changun of Chihkiang.

Before Foo-lo returned to Peking, he placed garrisons in all the cities, and took precautions to protect all the important posts. On these Chunggoong now began a regular and vigorous attack. He first attempted Kinchow, from which he was driven back. He was elsewhere more successful; for in 1647 he took Kienning, Shaowoo, Hinghwa, Fooning, with twenty-seven hiens—Haichung, Lienkiang, Changpu, &c. The garrison of Hinghwa went out one day on some expedition, and on their return found the Manchu flag gone, and the Ming flag flying in its stead. This was a trick played by an old Ming officer in the city. But the Manchus, believing the city fallen before an army, precipitately retired, and the keys were handed over to Chunggoong. Some men inside Kienning raised a fire, and in the consequent tumult opened the gates to Chunggoong's men. This extraordinary success proves that the Chinese there believed Chunggoong faithful to the Ming dynasty; for his father could never, as pirate, have secured any such favour in the eyes of the people. The news startled Peking also; and the viceroy of Fukien and Chihkiang, appointed by Foo-lo, was ordered to make sure of Chüchow in the south-west; and Chuntai and Li Shwaitai were ordered to march in upon Fukien

from Chihkiang and Kwangtung. The viceroy having proved so incapable, or so unfortunate, Chun Jin was appointed in his stead, and showed his activity by seizing this opportunity of disorder and insubordination among Tsai's men to entirely break his power. He also, in 1648, retook all the cities lately fallen; and drove Chunggoong away from Chüenchow, which he was besieging after he took Toongan. But he had the advantage over his predecessor, that he had assistance from Kang-chin-Wang; for when twenty thousand pirates were sent by Jin against Foochow, camping along the Woo-long-kiang, Kangchin Wang sent Rahada across the river, who, after long fighting, drove the pirates out of their camps, and chased them 40 li. Rahada afterwards took the districts of Hing, Chüan, Kiang, and Chang. Foochow was visited by a severe famine this season, and the besieged were compelled, as so often in Chinese history, to live by cannibalism. A band of robbers, under Jin Shunhung of Kangsi, a man of great talent, advanced along the river bank, pretending to be gone to cut down rice and wheat, thus enticing the country people out of their hiding places, when they were seized and eaten. Li Shwaitai at Kienning, hearing of this enormity, marched against the cannibals. But the rebels by night burnt down the bridge of Hoongshan, took and ate a thousand men, and then fled.

The marshal of Sungkiang rebelled and invited inland the pirates then infesting the east of Fukien. They came, but when their fleet got off Yenping, a typhoon blew upon and sank the most of them. The remnant of this fleet was reinforced, and took Kien-tiao swo, and again escorted Loo wang into Chihkiang, Tsai having already thrown him off as a burden. A force was sent under Wang Chaosien who slew Binching in Chowshan island, whither Loo Wang retired; one camp was pitched at Doongchiao, and Chaosien set up another at Nantien to be "horns" or mutual protection. Mingchun was the acknowledged chief of all the Chihkiang pirates, and Chunggoong of those of Fukien, including Kin-mun, "Gold gate," and Amoy. The main Manchu army of Chihkiang was then under the viceroy in Fukien, and an attempt

was made by the people of the prefectures of Wun, Tai, Ning and Shao, to throw off the Manchu yoke. But the return of the army from Fukien in 1649, made a successful rising impossible.

Next year Mingchun, in a fit of jealousy, slew the Chowshan commandant. In their anger the men of the latter left the island, crossed the sea and deserted to Chun Jin, who then, for the first time, ascertained the real condition of affairs among the pirates. He was probably right in proclaiming their support of the late dynasty a mere pretence to cover deeds which deserved another name than that of rebellion. He found also that there was a league between the land robbers and the pirates. When the former were attacked, the latter ravaged the shore to draw off some of the troops, or welcomed the robbers to their ships and their islands; the robbers joining with the pirates when the latter went ashore to plunder. And he ascribed the main-spring of the pirates' power to the connection between the pirates of Fukien and those of Kwangtung. He requested permission to attack Chowshan; saying that with a fair wind, a half day's sail would carry him across from Ting-gwan, and he could then take them when unprepared. He received a commission in 1651 to unite his forces with those of the marshal, but was ordered to commence operations against the mountain robbers, employing the hill people as guides. The troops marched in upon the Suming and other mountains, harrying all the robber nests, and then crossed the sea by Loto-mun. The pirates sent off fire-ships to burn down the imperialist fleet and came out to fight at Hungshwi-yang. But the wind turned round, drove the fire-ships back among the pirate vessels, many of which, with numbers of sailors, were burnt. The confusion caused by this unlooked-for event made him an easy conquest; a few thousand men were sent ashore, who marched behind the fort and attacked it most energetically. In October they dug down the wall by mining, took the city, putting all the garrison to the sword, and left three thousand men to hold it. Mingchun, who was then at Woosung with his main body to take that city and break up the Manchu army, had never thought of the appearance of a large army at

Chowshan, for he did not conceive it possible for the Manchu officers to get it across the sea. He therefore left a force of only six thousand on the island, and was now hurrying back to its aid when he heard of its peril; but he was too late.

In addition to the accumulations by Juloong from the shipping, when he became prime minister of Tang Wang, the million taels raised in Fukien and Kwangtung in name of army supplies passed through his hands, a fair proportion remaining there. All this treasure was stored up in Nganping. Chunggoong went south in 1650, ravaged the country about Shaochow, and besieged the city, though unsuccessfully, for the eye of Chun Jin was upon him. In the north, Jang Hiaoshung, the governor of Fukien, determined to make a raid upon the nest at Nganping. He took Amoy and plundered the home of Chunggoong, who returned immediately thereafter, after being defeated at Chaochow by general Wang Bang, who was himself slain. At his approach the Manchu army retired. But in revenge for the insult done him, he took the cities of Toongan, Changpu, Nanngan, Pingho, Haichung and Changtai, and laid siege to Changchow. In August, Hiaoshung and the chief actor in that raid were summoned to Peking and punished according to their crime! * What a state of utter lawlessness and lack of principle does this one sentence display!

In April 1652 Chun Jin marched to the relief of Changchow, but was defeated at Kiangdoong-chiao, and fell back towards Toongan, where one of his slaves entered his tent at night, cut off his head, going with it as a handsome present to Chunggoong. Chunggoong was very grateful, rewarded the man handsomely, and then cut off his head, in order that he might follow his

* *Doong-hwaloo* gives another version by the new viceroy: "Your minister has received the emperor's secret orders to examine the cave at Amoy, commonly reported to be the old haunt of the rebel Jung. Hiaoshung, &c., marched to the cave, breathed into it, and retiring, cried out that they had conquered. They marched elsewhere, destroyed Jung's house, and took his family property. Whereupon Jung demanded the restoration of his goods, and all the neighbouring cities suffered severely from the consequence of his anger." Hiaoshung, &c., were therefore degraded of all rank.

master and attend upon him in the spirit world!* But in November, Jin Hwang arrived with an additional army, defeated Chunggoong, who retired on Haichung to defend it. He was immediately, closely and vigorously besieged. Over a hundred feet of the city wall were knocked down, but Chunggoong obstinately held out, himself constantly surrounded by showers of shot, stones and arrows. One day, hearing a blank cannon shot fired, Chunggoong said, "That is a signal cannon. They are about to storm the walls." He therefore ordered every man to provide himself with a hatchet, and, on the wall and in the breaches, await the attack. In a little time, Hwang's men were swarming up all sides of the wall like ants; but when they got to the top, one blow of the hatchet sufficed to send them rolling into the moat, which became filled with the dead bodies. The siege was immediately raised, and Chunggoong then withdrew from the ruined city.

Chunggoong's rival, Mingchun, with a colleague, Whangyen, was still sufficiently powerful to sail up the *Changkiang*, "Long River" or Yangtsu, to Yendsuji of Kinshan. At the mouth of Woosung they took three hundred ships, but were unable to do more than pillage. Mingchun died, and his men fell into the ranks of Whangyen, who rejected many offers from the Manchu government, whose main energies at the time were bent on the south-west provinces. Chunggoong was not inactive, for he continued to ravage the country and to take cities, which he lost again. Among others he took Chowshan and garrisoned it. When, two years after, commander Yirda was ordered to retake it, he replied that it was easy to take, but difficult to keep, and not worth the trouble; but if it was to be taken, he prayed to have a garrison of pure Manchu troops to hold it. In 1654,

* Anciently such a practice is said to have been as common in China as among the Africans now; several scores or hundreds having been put to death according to the rank of the dead man. Hence probably the modern practice of burning paper men and horses to accompany the spirit, and the curious practice of sometimes purchasing a man and a horse, at a goodly cost, throwing them both into a fire, but allowing them to escape with life,—the horse belonging to the first who catches him after his fiery ordeal.

Chunggoong took Toongan and Nanngan; and when besieging Chang, had the gates opened to him by a petty officer. Nine neighbouring cities opened their gates, Loongyen alone remaining to the Manchus. The imperial court therefore made one other effort to crush him, sending Jidoo, cousin of the emperor, as a "great commander" to Fukien. But Jidoo was unfortunate in his right arm,—the fleet, which was lost under its admiral. And Chunggoong was only the stronger. He secured next year, with more or less severe fighting, six out of the seven cities under Chiënchow. His troops were defeated on their way to Kwangtung, when going to help Gwei Wang's generals there. But after sacrificing to the sea, he took Kieyang, Chunghai, and Pooshing.

Chunggoong, because of his useful services, had bestowed upon him by Gwei Wang the title first of duke, then of prince of Yenping; and if he had not official rank from the Manchu government, with full liberty to do as he wished by sea, it was from no fault of his. In 1652, Juloong, who had his wives, concubines, and children already brought to the capital, was requested by the emperor to write to his son Chunggoong and his brother Hoongkwei, advising them to submit, when their past offences would be condoned, they would receive official rank, be permitted to remain in their own homes on their own properties, and be employed in hunting down the pirates and looking after foreign ships. As there was no other response to this friendly communication than more cities taken and country pillaged, in the following year actual rank was offered. For Juloong was created *Count of Toongan*; Chunggoong, *Count Haichung*; Hoongkwei, *Count Funghwa*; and Jubao, senior major-general. As soon as the messenger with the investitures reached Fukien, Jubao received him and his own rank, returning with him to Peking; but the chief object of all this weak diplomacy, Chunggoong, would have no Manchu rank, but instead dared the Manchu troops to do their worst, insulting them by ravaging the country all around. As neither by arms nor honours could Chunggoong be brought to submit, the unsteady government tried the plan of appealing

to his affections by threatening his father's life, who was, in February 1655, thrown into prison on the charge of being a partisan of his son's rebellious conduct, and his recently bestowed dignity was taken from him. After eleven months' imprisonment, which did not in the least alter the policy of his son, he was released, and again ordered to send a letter to his son calling upon him to submit. But it had the same effect as the former communications. The next move was to summon all the islands to manifest their loyalty by shaving their heads; but the islands were deaf. Strict orders were then sent down to the sea-bordering people, forbidding them, under heavy penalties, to hold any intercourse with the wicked pirates. The orders remained a dead letter.

Chung-goong, as if to mark his contempt of the honours proffered and for the force displayed, marched beyond Fukien into the south-east of Chihkiang, and plundered the prefectures of Wun and Tai. This journey was of consequence in a way not so pleasing to him. On a former occasion he sent his general, Ji Mao, to take the city of Kieyang to the south. Mao returned defeated; and so severe was the discipline of Chunggoong, that he beheaded him. When he went northwards, he left Whang Woo commandant of Haichung; but with the example of Mao before him, Woo, in fear, opened the gates to the Manchus: for if he should be defeated and lose the city, he looked forward to death by the Manchus in attack, or death at Chunggoong's hands if he escaped. His treachery was well rewarded; for he was made duke of Haichung, and commissioned to hold command in Changchow. He memorialised the government on the subject of rooting out the pirates, recommending five measures as necessary to the successful prosecution of the war. Military camps should be established along the coast to prevent them coming ashore; small vessels should be constructed with which Joongdsow, afterward called Sumingchow, could be taken; submission should be made easy and of course profitable; merchandise and intercourse along the shore should be forbidden with them; and their graves should be demolished, that

thus all might see the heinousness of their fault. Probably as the easiest of all those measures, duke Woo was ordered to attack the graves of the Jung family. This commission he faithfully carried out, destroying the tombs, overturning the graves, and slaying the five officials who had charge of them. This wanton barbarity, and the frequent attempts, on any terms, to have Chunggoong shave his head and plait a "tail," prove the power of the great pirate, which was practically displayed in April 1657, when Jidoo found his easiest and most honourable march was one to Peking; for then Chunggoong penetrated into the province, retook Minan, which was taken by Li Shwaitai some months before, then devastated the neighbourhood of Foochow, and wheeling round ravaged the prefectures of Wun and Tai, both of which cities he took; the officials of Taichow all joined him. His prince title was thereupon enhanced by the prefix *Kun-wang* and the gold seal of a "great comander" was sent him by Gwei Wang from Yunnan.

Though it was not so with his chief, Chunggoong was now at the zenith of his greatness. He had seventy-two camps, under the care of six superintendents, probably in imitation of the six Boards, and now put forth all his energies, either to make a considerable diversion in favour of his prince, Gwei Wang, whose star was waning before the perseverance of Woo Sangwei, or to make sure of a firm foothold for himself. Connected with his army and navy he had one hundred and seventy thousand men; fifty thousand of whom were trained to fight by sea; fifty thousand cavalry and archers, and fifty thousand infantry. Ten thousand were always on the move, possibly a reserve of choice troops to be ready to strike where most needed; and there were ten thousand clad in mail impenetrable to arrows or shot. To this force was added whatever remained together of Whangyen's army, which was to act as guide. They swooped down with their fleet upon Wunchow and Taichow prefectures, carrying all before them till they got north to Yangshan, "Sheep mountain," so called because it was the custom to worship there by giving a living sheep; and as it was sacrilege to take any away, the sheep

became very numerous. Chunggoong believed he might venture with impunity to taste the mutton of Yangshan, and many of those sheep disappeared among his ships; for as they were never molested, they were extremely tame. The pirates, however, no sooner set sail than they encountered a tremendous storm,—thunder, lightning, a fearful wind, and a heavy sea; and as every vessel carried a heavy cannon, as many as crashed in collision went to the bottom, and many thousands of men were lost. He should have let the sheep browse their sacred hill in peace! So serious were his losses that he had to return; but hearing that the Manchus were fully occupied in Yunnan, Kweichow, and other places far inland, he made formidable preparations to penetrate the interior of Kiangnan. In 1558, he sailed up the Yangtsu by Choongming. The Manchu marshal of Kisoong was then on the Soongkiang, and Kiangning marshal on Fooshan, holding the most important passes. On Jwanshan and at Tankiachow large cannon had been planted, and a strong iron chain fixed across the river at Kinshan, and Chiaoshan was hoped to be barrier sufficient against all ships. The prows of Whangyen's vessels went several times butting against those chains; but it was not the chains which were damaged. He therefore ordered many swimmers into the water to file the chains, which they did so well that, with a favourable wind and tide, seventeen of his vessels passed up the river. The wooden-walled city on the bank was immediately deserted, Kwachow fell, and Chunkiang was besieged. The mounted rebels dismounted, and fought desperately on foot at Beigooshan, compelling the Manchus to retreat within the walls, rushing in after them pell-mell, before the gates could be closed; and Chunkiang was in Chunggoong's hands, with the good-will of the people, who had gone out 50 li to meet him, before the battle was fought.

Gan Hwi advised the immediate advance of the whole army on Yangchow to cut off Shantung, and prevent the two Kiangs from marching in by occupying Kingkow. At the same time a deputation came from Woohoo, praying Chunggoong to advance thither to free the people from their hated long-tailed conquerors.

Chunggoong probably believed this policy too rash, at all events he would not run the risk ; and Whangyen, with Jin Ling and Hiao Ling, withdrew their detachments in anger, marching themselves towards Woohoo, and occupied the districts of Hwining and neighbourhood. The Manchu armies were then far in the interior of Yunnan, and their necessities there had drained all the northern cities of their garrisons, so that the region now pounced upon by the pirates was undermanned. Ma Jinbao, the Soongkiang marshal, was besides secretly well disposed to the rebel cause, and took no measures to relieve cities at a distance from him. Hence Chunggoong was free to march where, when, and how he pleased ; and in a short time 4 *foo*, 3 *chow*, and 24 *hien* cities fell before him.

So rapid and extensive were his conquests, that the great alarm in Peking determined the emperor to march in person to drive the pirates into the sea. The people also were rejoicing in the certainty of freedom from the Manchu "tail." A Manchu general travelling into the affected country was dining at a village inn. After sitting down to his dinner he asked the news. The innkeeper, an old man ignorant of the character of his guest, clasped his hands together, and raised them towards heaven, gave thanks and said, "The northern people are all put to death." The general left his untouched dinner, flying back as fast as he could. But Chunggoong's success defeated him. So general were the desertions to him, and so easy were the conquests he made, that when Lang Ting-dso the viceroy sent messengers to him agreeing to join the Ming cause and act in concert with him, he readily believed him, and led a large body of troops to welcome his new ally, drawing up in a line of several li against a hill outside Yifung gate of Kiangning. Governor Jiang Gwojoo, and the general of Choong-ning, Liang Whafung, marched to the aid of the city ; the latter occupying high ground to overlook the enemy. These however did not seem to notice the presence of the imperialists, and were apparently entirely off their guard. In the evening therefore a picked body of five hundred horse made

a dash through one of the gates and seized and occupied the foremost village of the pirate camp at Baitoo-shan. Next morning by daybreak, before the pirates had breakfasted and while entirely unprepared for fighting, the main army, joined by all the garrison, marched in three bodies against the rebel van, while a body of horse was sent round the hill to fall upon the rear. Chung-goong himself was then at the head of his fleet, which had got up to Gwanyin-mun of Kweichow, and Gan Hwi was in charge of the Kiangning siege army. Whether Hwi was yet asleep, or for whatever other reason, the signal flag on the top of the hill gave no sign, and nobody in the camp dared move, though they saw their enemy pushing upon them. Thus the various bodies, which were not attacked, and which would if ordered march on to assist the threatened points, were compelled to remain inactive. They were therefore broken up at the first charge; the wildest confusion ensued; Hwi was taken and put to death. Many more of the chief officers were seized and multitudes were slain. Hwa Fung sent on a body of men flushed with victory, which burnt five hundred ships. On the news of this utter rout Chunggoong sailed his vessels down the stream, pursued by land and water forces. Chunkiang and Kwachow were retaken. Hwangyen had his army completely shattered; he himself escaping to the sea under an assumed name. Hwa Fung, to whose prompt energy this great victory was mainly due, was made marshal of Kiangnan. But the success was partly due to the fact that the Kweichow troops were free, Gwei Wang having been driven thence; and a considerable force, coming down the river to drive back the pirates, united with the forces already gathered in and around the besieged city.

Chunggoong had still a considerable army about him, with which in his retreat he attacked Choongming; but after ravaging the district, he was driven off by the colonel. His successes occupied three months (June—August, 1659), and his disaster fell upon him in the following month. He must have recovered himself with wonderful rapidity, for in November he was ready

to receive the attacks of two armies. These marched in upon Amoy, under Li Shwaitai, one *via* Changchow, the other *via* Toongan, the deserters from Kwangtung acting as guides. In the battle Chunggoong held the standard in his own hand, and pressed forward into the midst of the foe, of whom thousands perished in the mud. Shwaitai had therefore to retreat as well as he could.

In 1660, however, Chunggoong began to fear that his greatness was about to end, for Sangwei had driven Gwei Wang into Burma, and made his chief generals fugitives. Hence the strain was removed from off the other provinces bordering those under the control of Sangwei's armies; and Gung Jimao, then one of the southern Manchu feudal princes, was ordered from Kwangtung into Fukien, aided by Loto, a member of the imperial house, to exterminate the pirates. Then too (in October) was carried out the extreme measure of driving inland every soul in Fukien within 30 li of the sea, belonging to the districts of Haichung and Toongan. Eighty-eight large villages were at once emptied, and all the agriculturists, and men of any and every description living outside the walls of those two cities, were compelled to remove, to the number of several hundred thousand. This measure caused incalculable suffering; but Shwaitai felt himself justified in recommending such a course, as the only mode of cutting off the pirates from the shore; for no matter how severely worded were the prohibitions sent from Peking against intercourse with the pirates, such intercourse went on undiminished. Nor was this matter of surprise, as the pirates were largely composed of the natives of those districts; and the traffic of robbery, which brought poverty to wealthy families and misery and death to untold myriads, threw great wealth into the pirate head-quarters. Hence it was difficult for the people there, who were Chinese like their descendants, to renounce a connection of the profits of which they were assured, though before now ignorant of its penalties. Hence too we can understand, and in a great measure sympathise with, the government in taking this apparently cruel step. The *Doonghwaloo* says, as

if with a grin, that the government was pleased to inform those houseless and homeless people that their taxes would be remitted for that year. All ships large and small were also prohibited from going to sea on any pretence, whether of merchandise or fishing. This measure caused greater misery than the other. Its effects were perhaps more felt in the large city of Foochow, where so many depended on fish and salt, than elsewhere. So great and universal was the opposition on the part of the people to be transported, that Wangyen strongly urged Chunggoong to make capital out of it, by removing all the people to the islands; he believing that if the measure was carried out by the government, Amoy and Kinmun (Gold Gate) must fall. The people were however driven inland, and the coast for four years was made a desert, and they called it peace.

Now that Chunggoong was no longer feared, nor his peaceful submission hoped or much cared for, Juloong, with two sons who had never joined the pirates, was publicly executed, and all his family put to death in Peking. There was an attempt three years before by some officials to have him executed. The emperor was willing to banish him to Ninguta, but the government dared not then put him to death. Whangyen was taken prisoner at Hüenngao of Nantien, and the Kwangtung pirates were put down by prince Shang Kosi, who also removed the coast people inland.

A less able man than Chunggoong could understand that the Manchu government, which had trampled under foot every competitor, and executed every robber chief from Kansu to Yunnan, from Kwangtung to Shantung, and was that moment more powerful than the late Ming dynasty, even in its early palmy days, would not permit him to molest it with the feeble impunity of the latter days of the Ming. As therefore he already saw clouds of armies converging from south, west, and north of him, and as Amoy was wholly inadequate as a last refuge, he anxiously looked about him for some retreat. One day coming across a ship belonging to the "red-haired western barbarians," his Annamese interpreter, or business-man, said, "Why not take

Taiwan—Formosa—which has always been the head-quarters of the sea-rover, and the ancient property of his family?" And Chunggoong appropriated the brilliant idea, and prepared to drive the Dutch out of his paternal estate.

The Yuen dynasty was the first to establish an officer on Punghoo—the Pescadores—off the mainland. This official was removed by the Ming. In Chiaching's reign (1522-67) a Chinaman, the pirate Lin Daochien, made Formosa his head-quarters, till he was driven out by the Loochooans. The latter were in their turn dispossed by the Japanese, who, during a great part of the Ming dynasty, constantly ravaged the coast of China. It was with them Jung Juloong passed his piratical apprenticeship, and it was while with them he saw the uncommon fertility of the land then unavailed of, but which was so beneficially utilised by him afterwards.

The "Red-haired Western Barbarians"—the Dutch—were at that time in the zenith of their trading prosperity in the east. They petitioned the Chinese emperor, first for possession of Hiangshan, "mountain of incense"; failing which they sought Punghoo: but in vain. They therefore made large presents to the Japanese and got Formosa. They opened a barter market; and to beguile the people into submission, they employed the Roman Catholic religion.* They then drove out the Japanese, and took possession. When Jung Juloong left the island after establishing the colony and building a city, two thousand Dutch occupied the city; all the Chinese living in the surrounding districts in

* Lit. translation. It is the universal belief of Chinese that propagandism has been initiated by the westerns, in order to gain a footing among the natives, by means of which they can ultimately seize the empire. This belief is founded on the magisterial status assumed by Roman Catholic missionaries; most of whom so style themselves that the Chinese take them to be official magistrates of France. In another portion of his book my author says that but for the Roman Catholic religion the Dutch would never have entered Formosa. Yet the name given to the propagandists is certainly incorrect; for it is not at all likely that the Dutch would permit Jesuits there at a time when Jesuits were using every means, foul and fair—chiefly the former—to keep the Dutch out of China. The Dutch were Protestant; and the preachers were certainly Protestant. The only objection made by the Chinese to mission work is, that it is a political agency to found a foreign party in China; but they detest the humiliating presence of all westerns without distinction.

hamlets and farm houses. The Dutch did not seek possession of the land; they desired only to make the city their trading headquarters. They lived on the very best terms (lit., "were coupled together with") the agriculturists, and without the least distrust. When therefore Chunggoong discovered that the days of his greatness on the mainland were numbered, and set sail for Formosa, he found two forts in the hands of the Dutch. These were under the command of Kweiyi Wang. They had a barter trade with *Lüsoong*, or Borneo, and *Janchung* in the South seas.

Shu-chijoo the *Doohwi* of the city Jienchung, the minister of the company, was deficient to the amount of two hundred thousand pieces of silk. Fearing the discovery of a deficiency which he could not make good, he fled to Chunggoong, and offered to act as guide. When Chunggoong examined the map which he carried with him, he exclaimed with a sigh: "This is surely but the surplus of the Outer Seas."

In 1661, therefore, Chunggoong sailed to Punghoo with one hundred ships, and then got to Loo mun. But as the shore for several score of li is nearly level and the water very shallow, he could not push in with his deep sea ships. The Dutch had, besides, sunk large vessels in the channel. But an unusually high tide raised the depth to over ten feet, and several hundred vessels got to the shore. The Dutch soldiers did not stand fire; therefore Chukan chung fort was at once taken and Wang chung attacked. The walls of this city were made of pieces of stone piled up in layers and cemented with stone-burnt lime.*

* The text would be better translated by stating that the "piled up stones were converted by fire into lime!" Another authority says: The Dutch built cities Taiwan, Keloong, Tamsui, besides "earthen forts some score. Taiwan was the best; a stone wall several tens of feet high and ten feet thick. They used fire to convert the stone into lime for cement." This is of course Wang chung or "capital." Davis in his "Chinese" shows there was a good deal more fighting than is here represented. The Dutch body faced the four thousand Chinese who landed; but instead of driving away these as they had expected, they had to flee themselves, leaving their captain and half their men in the hands of the Chinese. These latter soon landed to the number of twelve thousand, divided into three bodies,—the first with bows and arrows, the second with swords and shields, the third with back

It was therefore a "stone" city, and cannon balls fired at it for a whole half year made no impression. The natives then informed Chunggoong that the water supply of the fort came from a high mountain outside, by a stream which ran round and into it. Were this supply stopped short, the besieged must come to terms in three days, for there was no well inside. Chunggoong at once acted on this knowledge, and the garrison was compelled to surrender, on terms which, after a half year's siege, were certainly not ungenerous; for the Dutch were permitted to take with them all their property and valuables of every description.* He wanted only the land which by right belonged to him. After the treaty was signed, Chunggoong went away three days' journey, and the Dutch departed in their large vessels.

Chunggoong took immediate possession of his "kingdom," which was the best guard of Amoy and Gold Gate. He nominated a Master of Plans, made villages and stations, prepared weapons of war, established laws, appointed magistrates, provided for universal education, all according to the Ming custom; for he still adhered to Gwei Wang, who was then a wretched prisoner in Burma. He erected Chukan into *Chung-tienfoo*, created two *hien*, Tienhing and Wannien, and gave a cordial invitation to the people of the opposite coast of Fukien to settle under his rule.

The fighting of the Manchus was now all but at an end, and with it passed away the youth who was the nominal head of the empire: for the first Manchu emperor died in February 1661, and was succeeded by the emperor known as Kanghi, whose reign is one of the longest and best in the annals of China.

swords and three-foot-long pikes with broad pointed iron heads. The "chief commanders in long robes without arms had a most awful countenance." A deserter from the Dutch showed the weakest points; and at last, after losing sixteen hundred men, the Dutch had to leave Formosa.

* Ogilby gives a different version: "Very cruelly were several of the Netherlanders dealt withal, especially the ministers, A. Hantbroel, A. Vincenius, L. Campen, P. Muts and others, and at last put to death." . . . The name Coxinga or Koxinga is given by Ogilby to Chunggoong, to his father and to his son.

When Chunggoong entered Formosa, he made his eldest son, Gin or Gold, also known as Ching, his representative or regent in Amoy. Soon after, a son was born to Gin by a slave of the family, the wet nurse, who had nursed himself. So enraged was his father at this disgrace to the family, that he sent his minister of Punishment and his minister of Rites to put Gin and his mother to death.* A general was also to accompany them, to arrest and execute all the chief officers of Amoy; for the shame reflected on them as in some measure responsible for the deeds of such a youth as Gin then was. The order was too general, however, and affected too many influential men, who were not to die like sheep. Their errand was known long before those messengers arrived. The Amoy officers compelled Gin to assume the independent rank of Pinggwo Duke, and on the approach of the ministers of justice, there was a brief struggle and the executioners were slain, the general being seized and bound as a prisoner. On hearing of this unexpected issue, Chunggoong was so wild in his rage that he became mad; he gnashed his teeth, bit his own finger, and, as his powerful constitution was probably ruined by his indulgences with wine and women, he died, aged thirty-eight.

On the death of their chief, the Formosan officers elected his brother Shusi his successor, but Gin proved his right to reign by attacking and defeating his uncle, who fled to Chüenchow, submitted to the Manchus, and was made a major-general. Gung Gimao, with commander Shwaitai, urged Gin to submit, now that his father's death made submission so easy. Gin consented to acknowledge the emperor as his superior and pay tribute, if he were permitted to do so on the same terms as Corea and Loochoo, viz.: to retain the old fashion in doing the hair and in dress; he on his part promising never to molest the Chinese shore. To this reply there was no response.

In July 1633, Dutch ships (no barbarians this time!) were

* Wet nurse is also called mother in China; but I infer this must have been his proper mother, as she is called Mrs. Doong; and a slave-servant would scarcely have that title given her.

ordered (*sic*) to second the Chinese armies against the pirates. Gimao, Shwaitai, Shu Liang and duke Whang Woo marched out by Toongan and Changchow, the Dutch ships sailing from Chüenchow. Amoy fell before the allies in November. The pirates fled, pursued by the Dutch ships under Liang, who had a native fleet besides. In the pursuit, Gold Gate fell to the Manchus, with eighteen thousand of Gin's men. Chunggoong's former colleague, Whangyen, was surprised and taken prisoner at Hüenshan of Nantien. A pirate major surrendered in the south of Kwangtung, and was made a major-general; and a general who had retreated with Gin, forsook the sinking ship, deserted, and was created a count. Ogilby, to all appearance, correctly states that the Dutch alone defeated the pirates,—the local Chinese mandarins acknowledging as much to them, while doubtless claiming all the glory for themselves in their despatches to Peking. Gin fell back on Toongshan with Hwang Ting, the marquis of Yoongan. But in the April following, Gimao, Shwaitai, and others, with a huge host, attacked Toongshan; and the worthy marquis, with commander Giang Seek-much,—an appropriate name for a pirate or conqueror,—surrendered with thirty thousand men. Toongshan was therefore taken without a blow, and was burnt down. Numerous ships and enormous stores fell to the conquerors. Gin, accompanied by his wife, crossed the sea to Formosa; having lost the great game of independent monarchy for which he was virtually struggling, while nominally adhering to Gwei Wang, and still using his name, though the pretender was now sometime dead. All the coast islands were thus completely cleared of pirates.

In August of this year (1664) Shu Liang received an imperial commission to sail against Formosa, with the title of Commander 'Clearer-of-the-sea.' And again the efficiency of the Dutch ships was proved by their engagement to aid in the attack. A contrary wind prevented their crossing, and Liang had to return. As the easiest plan, an attempt was made next year to induce Gin to throw himself into Manchu arms,—this time the proposal coming directly from the court. Gin again declared his extreme

willingness to be considered the minister of his majesty, if he could do so on the same terms as Corea. But the court could not listen to such conditions. And as Gin believed the Manchus incapable of ever attacking him in Formosa, he was in no great haste to submit. He, however, determined to use his position and scourge the Chinese coast indirectly if not directly. He therefore levied black-mail on all trade carried on by the sea-bordering people. Liang, who soon discovered but was unable to check the evil, privately memorialised the throne, stating that if Gin were thus permitted to prepare for the future, it was only to make great trouble. It was necessary to take strong measures to root him out. But though he (Liang) was summoned to Peking two years after, to consult with the Boards as to a practicable mode of seizing Formosa, their plans ended on paper, for it was finally decided by the court that on account of the difficulties raised by the wind, an attack on Formosa would be a task, the accomplishment of which would not be worth the trouble. And as long as no cities were sacked nor villages burnt, imperial dignity could wink at burdens on coast trade and ships fired far off at sea. For ten years Gin remained contented with his ocean dominion, and the government was well satisfied he should continue to amuse himself by imitating the old Ming ways, as long as he confined himself to the sea and did not ask them to recognise such fashions.

But in 1674 broke out the greatest storm which ever tested the strength of the Manchu government, and blew down in a few days the house of cards which occupied so many years in building. For Sangwei, the author of the Manchu rule in China, and who had for years virtually independent authority over three provinces, now made a bold push for the founding of a southern empire. And in a few months the Manchus may be said to have lost all the country south of the Yangtsu. Gung Jingjoong, the son of Gimao, recently deceased, rebelled with Fukien; and to strengthen his position he proposed an alliance with Gin, paying him as the price of his assistance the two prefectures of Chang and Chüen. The Formosans were almost

beside themselves with joy at this unlooked for restoration to their old homes, and especially with the manner of it. They therefore lost no time in crossing to Fukien. Yet they were no sooner at his side than Jingjoong repented of the price he had to pay. He refused to impliment his engagement, and bad blood sprung up between the two. But he had the worst of it in the long run; for former adherents of the Jung family were scattered over east Fukien in places of trust; and as all anticipated the complete downfall of Manchu rule in the south, now that the greatest of the generals of China was at the head of the rebellion, those adherents had no great difficulty in giving secret or avowed assistance to their old companion in arms, the son of their former chief. Among these was the major then holding Haichung, and the major in Chaochow in the north-east of Kwangtung, who, though revolting with Jingjoong, declared for Gin. Jingjoong and Shang Jusin, who had revolted in Kwangtung, after first of all marching against Jingjoong, regarded Sangwei as the leader of the southern movement, and highly respected his word. Sangwei was extremely anxious to secure the fidelity of Gin to the cause, and therefore urged Jusin to offer the district with the city of Hwichow to Gin to guarantee his adherence. But the breach of faith on one side, and the forcible possession on the other, caused a complete rupture of the friendly relations of Jingjoong and Gin. While therefore the former was occupied with the Manchu troops in the west and north-west of Fukien, the latter, instead of fighting the Manchus, occupied his time in attacking Jingjoong's rear, and in reality was fighting the battles of his chief enemies, in his foolish, short-sighted policy; though several cities, among them Tingchowfoo in the south-west of Fukien, fell into his hands. Had Jingjoong been a man of more solid character, and worthy of the position he aspired to attain, circumstances might have turned out otherwise. Apparently as weak as he was wicked, Jingjoong acted the horse who asked the man to ride him to be avenged on his enemy! for, unable to meet the attacks of the Manchus before and of Gin behind, he threw himself at the feet

of the Manchus, by whom he was gladly received and re-instated in his old title and power. He was all the more readily welcomed that Sangwei was then in the zenith of his power, and causing Peking to tremble.

Gin was now overpowered, and lost in 1677 the cities of Chang, Chüen, Shaowoo, and Hinghwa. The commandant in Chaochow, seeing his second commander faring so badly, and his first chief still living after rejoining the Manchus, believed it better to open the gates of Chao city and retain his head, than have the walls battered down and lose it. He submitted while the Manchus were yet at a distance, and Hwi city followed his example. Gin finding his foothold on the mainland trembling, retired to Formosa. The excitement of war and the pleasure of plunder gathered a host again around him as of old, with which he sailed back the next year, ravaging the whole coast, taking over a dozen cities and fortified towns. And again, as the pirates gained so much strength from the coast people, was the old order re-issued to have all the people within 30 li of the sea removed inland. For, four years after they had been driven in, they were permitted to re-occupy their houses and lands, at the time when Chunggoong took his final departure for Formosa. The success of the plan on the former occasion counterbalanced the thought of the misery sure to ensue from this wholesale transportation.

In 1679 Gin's general, Liw Gwohan, who remained true, with other generals, penetrated inland by various routes. The viceroy divided the imperial army into four companies to oppose them. A terrible battle was fought, in which the duke of Hiangchung the general and the marshal were all defeated and besieged in Haichung by Gwohan. When the Manchu army arrived to raise the siege, Gwohan drew off his men from one side of the city lest he should have to fight one army from the city and another in his rear, and permitted the new arrivals to enter. He then reclosed his lines. The armies which entered Haichung served only to accelerate the disappearance of all victuals, and the city was compelled by the famine to open its gates. With

the city thirty thousand men and ten thousand horses fell into Gwohan's hands. He put to death all under the rank of marshal and major-general. At least so it is written, though it looks extremely improbable. On account of this terrible disaster, whether it was his fault or only his misfortune, the viceroy was recalled and Yao Chishung appointed in his stead.

Following up his victory at Haichung, Gwohan attacked and took Changping, Changtai, Joongan. He besieged Changchow in person and detached a portion of his army against Chüenchow. To prepare for the possible arrival of the imperialists he cut off Kiangdoongchiao bridge from Chang, and Wanngan bridge from Chüen. But Kangchin wang dared not move out of Foochow. Yang Jie the new marshal took Hwingan, and Laita with the new governor retook Changping. The new viceroy marched from Ngansi by Toongan, the governor by Yoongchwun, the marshal by Hwingan from Hinghwa, Lin Hien and another body under a lieut.-general from Tinghai,—all to converge on Gwohan. Jie sent a body of troops which broke up Chunshanba in order to march behind Wanngan chiao and attack in the rear while the main army marched against the front. The bridge was taken and the rebel vessels sunk by shot. Chüenchow siege was immediately raised.

Gwohan led fifty thousand of his troops by various routes to re-unite between the hills Woogoong and Loonghoo. Changchow, whose garrison was not strong, was filled with terror, and Halada and Jingjoong eagerly advocated the evacuation of the city. The viceroy, however, closed the gates, permitting neither ingress nor egress. In a great mist he sallied out against the rebels with five thousand men, and in quick succession broke up sixteen detached camps, slaying four thousand men. The Kiangdoongchiao army was more obstinate and retreated only when Jie was approaching on the other side. In a short time all important posts in the Chang and Chüen districts were recovered. Gwohan retreated upon Haichung; three sides of which is defended by the sea, and on the remaining side he dug an additional moat. He was soon out again, ravaging the

country on the way to Changchow and plundering the various camps established at Kiangdoongchiao.

Great efforts were now made to collect a large fleet, and once for all crush this pirate pest. Sangwei had already died in Honan, and with his death the rebellion lost all its terror to the Manchus. Yochow was taken soon after, and the land and lake armies, so long engaged in attacking it, were freed. Wang Jungsai, admiral of the fleet there, was ordered to sail with a hundred ships for Amoy. The Dutch ships were again engaged. The viceroy and governor had provided three hundred sail to transport thirty thousand men. The viceroy also regarded that money as well spent which bought off the men of Gin; and he got over four hundred officers and fourteen thousand men from Gwohan's army, whom he placed on his own vessels. He promised Gwohan to be made a duke if he submitted. Without waiting for the Dutch ships, Chishung and Jie retook Haichung, while Chundsai, in February 1680, retook Haitan, some of whose men had already received the viceroy's money. Sixteen large pirate ships were sunk, over three thousand men killed and drowned. The survivors fled to Namo, Yi ao, Mei ao, Chow ao, and were pursued to Pinghai. Thence they sailed to Choongwoo, whither Chungdsai bore down upon them with a favourable wind, completely defeating them, and clearing the islands of Meichow, Nanyi, Pinghai, Choongwoo. Joo Tiengwei, a commander, deserted a second time to the imperialists, with all his portion of the fleet. The rebels were again defeated at Tating and Siaoting. The army crossed by sea to Yüchow, and Gwohan retired on Amoy,—whither the greater portion of Gin's army had already withdrawn. But they were being so closely and hotly pressed, that they abandoned Amoy and Gold Gate, again making for Formosa. Laita and the other commanders occupied Amoy, left garrisons there and in Gold Gate; and Kang Chin wang, with his army, was ordered to Peking in September.

So difficult was the capture of Formosa regarded that Laita memorialised the throne, urging peace on the conditions asked by Gin, viz.: no change in fashions of dress; the laws on hair-

cutting to remain in abeyance; and Formosa to be in all respects like Corea or Japan. If Gin brought in tribute, well: if not, it was a matter of no consequence; but he would style himself the minister of his Majesty, and cease hostile raids upon the mainland. The interminable strife would be then ended,—Gin only adding another proviso, which was reasonable enough:—that Haichung be a place where the Formosans and the Chinese could exchange their products. This plan would doubtless have been adopted; but it fell through by the stern opposition of Chishun, who said it was not to be considered for a moment.

Next year, when the coast was at peace for some time, Chishung and the governor petitioned to have the coast people return to their homes, and it was granted. But Fukien was still in a state of the greatest anarchy. Many of the officials were secretly in the pay of the Jung family; and when war broke out between Gung and Gin, they had assumed the character of Gung's men when it suited, and of Gin's when they could plunder Gung's lands; but they robbed impartially from any side when they had the opportunity. It was therefore impossible to classify them as belonging to any man or any side. To disband them was an easy matter on paper, but it would be only to convert robbers in fact into robbers in name. They were therefore retained in the service of the government. But stern orders were issued, that every officer under the rank of commander and major-general should have barracks for his men, who were forbidden to wander from place to place, to dwell in the houses of the people, to eat the people's food, or forcibly take possession of their wives and daughters; they were forbidden also to compel the people to work for the army. To keep order, one *wang*, one *beidsu*, one *goong*, and one *bai* was left in Fukien. And for some unexplained reason, the coast people were again removed inland. It is no wonder that they took a new direction for themselves, marching northwards, plundering as they went. Chishung prayed Kangchin Wang to sternly forbid their departure out of the province, and collected twenty thousand taels to pay their way back. Indeed Chishung was so liberal in his expenditure that the

province was unable to supply the necessary funds. He had spies in all the islands, his "eyes and ears." Like his contemporary ministers in Europe, he was not very particular as to the means taken to carry out his ends. When Gin was in Amoy, a spy was sent to inveigle him into walking to the coast. By the way there was an ambush already set, which rushed out upon and seized Gin. They were hastening off with their prisoner, but were overtaken by some of his men who had been made aware of the plot, were defeated, and Gin was recovered out of their hands.

Kotsang was the eldest son of Gin,—the son of Gin's foster-mother. He was a young man of remarkable ability, but none the less hated by the other members of the family, who regarded him as a disgrace, not from his character, but because of his origin. When Gin went out to fight he left Kotsang, by the advice of a minister, to act in his stead as regent. When his father Gin returned to Formosa after his defeat, Kotsang still held the post which he had very successfully filled. But Gin, probably disgusted with the position of affairs, occupied himself exclusively with wine and women for two years, which sufficed to put an end to his life. His younger brothers were all opposed to the accession of their bastard nephew Kotsang; and to carry out their plans they first got the minister Yoonghwa removed from his high office. Knowing their plans, he died immediately after of extreme grief, whether by suicide or not is left to conjecture. Kotsang in him lost his chief and ablest support; and the remainder of the plot was easily executed. Mrs Choong, widow of Chunggoong, laid charges against Kotsang; but his great crime, if not that he was a man of greater talent than the others, lay in his being the son of the slave-woman. He was therefore put to death, and Gin's next son, his first legitimate child, Koshwai, was elected. But he was young and feeble, and had no business talent. All business, and therefore all power, fell into the hands of Fung Sifan, at whose instigation the minister had been removed. He began to lay a plot to take the life of a duke, and gain possession of his property; and

government and unity were at an end. Gwohan, though then in Formosa, did not help matters.

Chishung was therefore in ecstasies of delight, and sent a despatch to Peking, informing the emperor of the complete anarchy into which Formosa had fallen,—an anarchy which he had paid much to increase. He urged an immediate attack. The grand secretary supported the proposal, and both urged that admiral Shu Liang should at once set his fleet in motion. The commission was given in the joint names of Liang and Chishung. As in many another colleagueship, they disagreed on a point of vital consequence, just as they were ready to start: Chishung advising to wait for a north wind and start from Weitow; Liang to take advantage of the south wind, and go from Toongshan to Punghoo. As neither would yield, there was no expedition that season. Liang memorialised the throne, that if Punghoo stood, Formosa's fall was of little consequence; but Punghoo fallen, Formosa would yield without fighting. He also prayed to be permitted to start alone with twenty thousand men and three hundred vessels; while a competent officer should be left in Amoy to look after provisions. His request was granted.

In the spring of 1683 Gwohan sent messengers to Chishung, asking if he would be permitted to bring tribute to Peking as ambassador from Loochoo. The emperor was consulted, and refused his permission. Gwohan had then twenty thousand men in Punghoo, where he guarded well each port, no ingress being allowed. In June the imperial fleet, with Liang at its head, left Toongshan, entered Badan, and with the south flood sailed in on Punghoo, slaying a commander and seventy men. They then got into Chitan Bay with the tide.

Gwohan had built an embankment 20 li in length along the bay, with cannon at regular intervals. A great wind arose at night, and scattered the van of the fleet. Gwohan immediately took advantage of the confusion, pushed out on all sides, and surrounded the fleet. Liang was wounded in the eye by an arrow, but continued to lead the fight with vigour, his object being to break the circle of his foes; and he was successful.

Gwohan himself, at the head of a large army, went across to Niwsin or Ox-heart bay, leaving another at Kilungsu or Hen-dragon island. He then attacked Liang with fifty vessels from each of these places, bearing down upon him in front and rear. But Liang attacked the centre of Gwohan's fleet with fifty ships, ordering eighty more to second him, and drew up his vessels so that five of them got opposite to and grappled with one of Gwohan's. The battle raged furiously during the whole day, the noise of the shouting combatants being heard several hundred li off! The day was one of wind and thunder. When, in the thick of the fight, a great black cloud arose, the pirates congratulated each other. But suddenly there was a tremendous crashing noise, and the shock completely unnerved the pirates, who were at once broken up. One hundred of their vessels were sunk or taken; three hundred officers and twelve hundred of their men lost their lives.

Gwohan burst through the imperial fleet in a small vessel, and by Koongmun made for Formosa. All his surviving men laid down their arms. He was followed by the imperial fleet immediately, which got to Loormun, but could not enter on account of the shallows. They had to anchor outside for twelve days, when suddenly there came a great fog. The tide rose over ten feet, and the fleet was floated in to the shore. Possibly enough, the Formosans were already decided on surrender; but they said that "the first wang (Chunggoong) got possession of Taiwan by a high tide. The fleet now comes in the same manner. It is the will of Heaven." And they proposed to submit.

In August, Koshwai sent messengers offering to submit; and, with his document, Liang wrote to Peking urging the acceptance of this submission and the pardon of the past. The emperor wrote a long reply, employing strong language as to the past conduct of Koshwai's ancestors and his own, but concluded by saying that, as the emperor desired to imitate Heaven and exercise mercy, he would not order Liang to take Formosa, as he now so easily could do, but would receive and forgive them all.

The Formosans now, last of all the Chinese, had their heads

shaved and their queues plaited. And in September, Liang received the formal submission of Koshwai at the head of all his people. Koshwai handed over the gold seal of his wang-ship, the gold seal of his commander-ship, and five silver seals of various high offices, all given his grandfather by Gwei Wang. He also gave in a list of the treasure and army of Formosa, and statistics of the land and families. The land was then divided into one foo (Taiwan) and three hien cities (Taiwan, Fungshan, and Joolo). Formosa was thus subdued twenty-three years after the Jung family had first asserted their independence there, and thirty-eight since Chunggoong first assumed command.

The messenger sent by Liang by sea got to Peking with the welcome news in seven days, the message of Chishung by land arriving two days later. Koshwai went to Peking, where he was made a duke for life. Liang was created marquis Clearer-of-the-Sea. Gwohan and Sifan, the one the upholder, the other the destroyer, of Formosan independence, were both made counts.

In the end of the reign of Kanghi there was another serious rebellion in Formosa,* which occupied much time and treasure and many men, to put it down. And a third in the end of Kienloong; since which the affair with Japan has been the most serious disturbance of that island. To describe these and some other interesting insurrections in the island is, however, beyond our present scope.

*Ogilby states that Taiwan, the name given by the Chinese to the main island, "lieth south from Formosa, the uttermost north point being distant almost a league, but the southernmost point within a bow-shot of the land, over which at low water they wade to and again; but between the north and Formosa, it is at least thirteen feet deep at low water. . . . It hath two leagues and a half in length, and a quarter of a league in breadth, being naturally a spot of barren sand. . . . Yet here resided above ten thousand Chinese." On the north of this islet was the fort and city of Taiwan, built by and taken from the Dutch, and now from the pirates. A history of Formosa, from a native source, in "Notes and Queries on China and Japan," is most romantic, ascribing the final annexation to China, as arising from the great mercy of Kanghi, who permitted the Formosans to shave their heads!

CHAPTER XII.

REBELLION OF THE THREE PRINCES.

AFTER the many years of toilsome marchings,—first to Peking, then through Shensi, Szchuen, and Yunnan, into Burma, where the last sparks of the fire kindled by the Ming pretenders were crushed,—it was natural that Woo Sangwei would crave and enjoy his kingly leisure. For the generosity of the emperor to the man who had made him emperor was unbounded, making Sangwei all but absolute lord of the three south-western provinces. But to the man who, from his boyhood, breathed and delighted in the exciting atmosphere of war, and to whom the clash of arms and shouts of armed foes made the finest music, several years of easy dignity and quiet stately grandeur, brought with them a feeling of insipidity; and it was with a sense of relief, if with a measure of apprehension, that he rushed from the sweet atmosphere of otto of roses, to the keen, clear, exhilarating air of the battle, taking advantage of a measure of Kanghi,—wise in its design, scarcely so in its execution,—to unfurl his own banner against that of the emperor he had made.

We have already seen how Sangwei, while yet a boy without title or rank, followed his father in the battles, in which his rank of lieutenant-general of Kingchow involved that father with the Manchus; how the bravery of the youth raised him to rank; and how the skilful manner in which he defeated the plans of the Manchus, while he was holding Ningyuen, made him a noted man; so that when Dsuchung was threatening the capital, he was summoned westwards as the only man capable of meeting the more imminent danger. The seizure by a follower of Dsuchung of the singing girl, whom he had purchased for

three hundred pounds, when drinking and making merry with his friend count Jiading, threw him into the hands of the Manchus, by whose aid he overthrew the overwhelming numbers of Dsuchung,—pursued him into and out of the capital, and desisted not till the once triumphant robber, chief of over a million of men, committed suicide, rather than be murdered in his retreat by a few country clowns.

As soon as all the rich country north of the Yellow river,—which had been the empire of the two former Tartar dynasties, the Liao and the Kin,*—had become the peaceful possession of the Manchus, Sangwei was one of those sent across the river to complete the conquest of the whole of China. He continued to play the chief actor till the third aspirant for the throne of his Ming fathers was, after various fortunes, hunted a fugitive into Burma; and though both incapable of raising, and unwilling to lead any troops against his native land, Gwei Wang had to be handed over to prince Sangwei at the gates of the Burmese capital, which would have been otherwise razed to the ground. Except on the high seas and along the south-eastern coast, there was then none who dared to raise a finger against the new dynasty.

When Sangwei got to Yunnan and Kweichow, he received a letter from his majesty, stating that the Boards of Appointment and War could not meddle with his selection of men; nor the Board of Revenue interfere with his management of the taxes. He was thus really the absolute lord of those two provinces.

In 1660 a memorial was presented to *Shwunchih*, stating that Yunnan provided nine million rations yearly; and that as all the Manchu soldiers had been recalled, it was desirable that two fifths of the fifty thousand Chinese troops should be disbanded, and that the general revenue be supplemented by that of Yunnan. Being submitted to Sangwei, he replied this memorial,—that because of the unsettled condition of the frontier, it would be dangerous to disband any soldiers just then. He strengthened the border army, and increased the yearly expenditure; and as this amounted to more than his own provinces could always

* See "History of Corea."

provide, and more than the neighbouring provinces would provide, he petitioned the emperor when there was a deficit, but permitted no one to examine the accounts when there was a surplus.

Two censors and the prefect of Chingyang accused him of treason, but lost their pains,—the court, whether from gratitude or fear, or as we believe from a compound feeling of both, refusing to listen to his detractors, and continuing to bestow upon him proofs of the highest esteem and the greatest friendship and confidence, creating him a “prince of the blood,” and making his son, who was already an imperial son-in-law, a duke. And in 1667, having a bad eye, he petitioned to be relieved from the duties of making appointments and paying the army, hoping—according to the historian—thus to increase his reputation. The emperor Kanghi was then a mere youth, and surrounded by the ministers of his predecessors, who refused to decrease Sangwei’s influence or to abate his power.

He now rebuilt, at an enormous outlay of money, the old palace of Woohwashan, calling it a *foo*, or prince’s palace. Seven hundred ching* of land belonging to a Mrs Ma he took from her, calling it the *foo* property. With Dalai Lama he established a market at Beishungchow, whither millions of horses were yearly brought from western Mongolia and Tibet. On pretence of building new cities he pleaded for grants of money; set up custom houses, exchange markets, and salt-tolls everywhere. By these means he acquired enormous revenues. He opened mines of ore and smelted forbidden metals, secretly stored sulphur and laid up smuggled material of all kinds, collected great quantities of local gold and silk, and prepared engines and weapons of war.

To gain the good will of the literati, he distributed money and favours freely among them, and whoever resisted “felt his power of life and death.” His secret supporters were to be found everywhere by land and water, and his spies swarmed in all the provinces. His son was son-in-law of the late emperor, and

* Each about 17 English acres.

living in Peking. Early and late were flying couriers arriving or starting, reporting that the Mongols were plundering Burma and threatening the western frontier of China, but that they always fled before the men he sent against them;—thus by false despatches he made himself important as the protector of the border. This state of matters continued for ten years, during which he was all but absolute lord of the south-western provinces.

The south and south-eastern provinces were lorded over in a similar manner by Liaotung men. Shang Kosi was one of those three Liaotung men, who with a small body of men had fled from Tungchow of Shantung across the sea * to join the Manchus. They speedily rose to high rank and each was made a prince-ruler, like Sangwei. Koong Yoodua died without heir; Gung Joongming was succeeded by his son Jimao, who soon died, succeeded, in July 1671, by his son Gung Jingjoong, son-in-law of the late emperor. Fookien was also misgoverned and groaned under the brutal cruelties of Jingjoong. Kosi still lived, but was old and frail. He therefore handed over the control of the army in Kwangtung to the hands of the drunken, fierce, implacable Jusin, his son, and all the south was outrageously taxed and in misery.

In 1673, the twelfth year of his reign, the emperor had already taken the reins of government into his own hands; becoming, like Louis XIV., master of his former masters. He had, by constant study, made himself intimately acquainted with the history of the empire,—the encampments, victories, and defeats of former dynasties, the lines of policy which benefited and those which endangered the empire.

Kosi was bent on returning to his old Liaotung home; petitioning the emperor, as he was unable to see him face to face, to give the succession to his son Jusin. On receipt of this petition, in the end of April 1673, the Boards were commanded to examine the whole question of the standing armies of the three princes. They at length came to the conclusion that the

*“History of Corea” p. 280.

old army* of Kosi should be permitted to return to their homes ; i.e., should be disbanded. The decision, which of course followed the wishes of the emperor, caused great uneasiness to Sangwei and Jingjoong ; who, in order to confirm their suspicions or allay their fears, sent up petitions in August to have their troops also disbanded. By command of the emperor, all the ministers discussed the propriety of this step. With but three exceptions the ministers were unanimously of opinion that Sangwei's troops should not be disbanded ; for the state of the aboriginal *Miaodsu* in Yunnan and Kweichow was so unsatisfactory, that the withdrawal of Sangwei's army would necessitate the movement thither shortly of Manchu troops. From this decision three presidents strongly dissented, and earnestly advised the breaking up of the three armies. The emperor had already given proof that he was now breaking off from the condition of war against the people, by which the Manchus had been enthroned. In October 1672, the question came up in the form of a memorial by a censor petitioning, that as Swun Kowang, who had fled to the Manchus, by whom he was created *Yi Wang*, had been famous only as a robber, and had done nothing since he joined the Manchus to merit so high a rank, his *Wang* should be made a *Goong* (duke). The emperor decreed that, as a title by one character (*Yi*) was not according to custom, it should be changed to *Mooyi*, lowering the rank to *Mooyi Goong*. The emperor had also agreed, at the suggestion of the president of the Board of Appointments, that the service of any official sent by the emperor on any public business would cease when five full years had passed.

Just then came the petition of Kosi to be permitted to return to Liaotung, followed by the above detailed result. The emperor was secretly bent on the disbanding of these forces, as a measure necessary to the welfare of the country. He ordered the princes and Beiras to deliberate the matter ; but as they were divided, he sent a commission of enquiry to each of the three princes.

* *Fan bing*, "tributary troops," so named because the three princes were really kings in vassalage.

In spite of his hopes that he would be left with all his troops in Yunnan, as was Moo Yingshu of the preceding dynasty before him, Sangwei was apprehensive of failure, and forbade all exit of horse or man from his jurisdiction, while entrance was free to all; and the imperial commissioners found him ready to pay them outwardly all manner of respect, while he was secretly maturing his plans,—defying all the generals of the empire to stop him. But as it was difficult to find a decent pretext for war, he had thoughts of starting an heir of the Ming dynasty, and making proclamations accordingly. He also commanded the troops on the borders of Burma not to disband. Desiring to strike his first blow at the heart of the empire, and fearing his design might become known, he raised his standard on the twenty-first of the eleventh moon (about new-year 1674), killed the governor of Yunnan, and sent proclamations through all his wide territories.

He grew his hair, changed the form of his cap and garments for the old Chinese style, and erected a white standard and flags of the same colour. He was speedily joined by the governor of Kweichow and its marshal, with Yunnan marshal. The second governor-general of Yunnan and Kweichow under Sangwei, who had always been disliked by him because he would not obey his orders, resided in Kweiyang, and now reported the revolt to Peking; and with over a dozen men,—the rest having probably all deserted to Sangwei,—hastened to Chunyooen to prepare it against the rebels. But he found it already revolted, and he was there slain. The governor-general of Szchuen reported this death, stating also that Sangwei had assumed the title of “the sole great commander of the horse and foot under heaven,”—had first fixed the title of *Jow wang* for next year (1674), changing it afterwards to “*Jao woo*,” and had cast cash with the characters “*li yoong*.”

The renown of Sangwei had early attracted to his side, from all directions, the choicest and most fearless soldiers. As the recruiting field of his army, he had many hundreds of thousands of families,* every five of which was to provide one soldier.†

* *Ding Kow.*

† *Gia.*

Two hundred soldiers had one dsoling; fifty of whom were under a senior and junior general. His whole army was divided into ten camps of twelve hundred men each. There were four generals,—Woo Yingchi, Woo Gwogwei, Hia Gwohiang, and Hoo Gwojoo,—and nine lieut.-generals, the most famous of whom was Ma Bao. All these were of pure Chinese blood, and were all overjoyed at the change from the obnoxious Manchu tail to their own long hair.

The emperor, possessed of the earliest possible intelligence, took prompt measures to avert the tempest he had brought about his ears. He rejected the advice to slay those ministers who had advised the disbanding of the troops, but sent an order to Fukien and the Kwangs to prevent that disbanding; and had previously sent Barboo with three thousand picked Manchu troops from Kingchow to Changte. Jooman was ordered to push forward with other three thousand from Woochang to Yaochow. With all possible speed, princes and ministers were hastened with long titles and as many men as they could collect, in all directions along the threatened provinces; but in spite of a few insignificant victories, they were forced back, or dared not advance.

Wang Pingfan, one of Sangwei's generals, ravaged Szchuen. Ma Bao marched through Kweichow into Hoonan, taking Yooenchow by night. The governor of Hoonan had soon to flee; and in April, Changte, Changsha, Yaochow, Lichow, Hungchow, were all captured by the rebels. The lieut.-general in command of Hiangyang, handed over the city to the rebels. Commander Swun Yenling revolted with Kweilin, the capital of Kwangsi. The governor and generals of Szchuen, with their province, took the same side, and were forthwith joined by Fukien under Jingjoong. Thus the six south-western and south provinces were lost to the Manchus in a few months, Kwangtung alone remaining in a sort of neutral condition under Kosi.

This terrible moral earthquake shook the whole of China, and Peking was sadly rocked. We find the emperor severely censuring the people, through the Board of War, for fleeing for shelter to the western hills. He also said that Yang Chiloong



must still be in the city, lurking in some hiding place, and that he must be apprehended: then men's minds would compose themselves. Chiloong had, just before, displayed a white standard bordered with red in the name of the third son of the last Ming emperor, whose style he gave out to be "Extended Virtue." He collected a large following immediately. But as he was at once attacked, he was defeated, most of his officers taken, and his army broken up, but he escaped.

Powerful though Sangwei was in the country, the idol of his large armies, and the ideal general of all who desired to be soldiers, he would scarcely have ventured a tussle with the strong Manchu government if he were certain of having to rely only on his own resources. The stake for which he ventured was independent empire; for he could never be other than highly honoured by the government he had made, even if the emperor, for the benefit of the country, found it necessary to reduce his enormous power. If he consulted beforehand with the other princes, he might find it difficult to impose his will upon them, and create a splendid independent empire of the provinces south of the Yangtsu. While having that object in view, though unacknowledged, his revolt for the retention of his existing position, without any apparent ulterior projects, could not but be felt and sympathised with by the other two princes who were in precisely the same circumstances. It is probable, therefore, that he hoped to incite them to rebellion by his example more than by direct public overtures. But if he had not his acknowledged agents in the palaces and camps of the other two princes, a general of his abilities would not be without his trustworthy spies there. Through those spies he would be constantly and fully informed of all that took place in the palaces of the princes; and his expectation of aid from them soon realised itself, for scarcely was his white flag waving in the breezes of Yunnan, before six of the provinces south of the Yangtsu ranged themselves either under him or at his side. Shang Jusun in Kwangtung did not yet dare venture into the fray; but Sangwei would not look for strenuous opposition from

a man who was himself in such a position as compelled him to wish well to the revolt.

The revolted provinces under Sangwei were bordered on the north-east by the Yangtsu, and the province of Hoopei on its northern bank, and on the north by Shensi. Manchu armies were at once sent on with the greatest expedition to the neighbourhood of the rebels. Lurjin arrived at Woochang, on the north bank of the Yangtsu, to prevent an immediate raid on Hoopei; but with Hoonan as his destined field of action, Warka was ordered with his horse and foot to march through Hoopei. Shensi was placed under the martial orders of grand secretary Molo, who was elevated from being president of Board of Punishment; and his principal aim was to prevent any possible union of the western Mahommedans with Sangwei; for the former were in a state of chronic revolt.

They were, however, able to do no more than observe what was passing on the other side of the river. In February 1674, the viceroy of Hookwang had to report the fall of Yunchow before the rebels. A prince was told off to retake it; and Niyahan was marched off with the Manchu troops of Techow, to keep Yooenchow (Kiangsi), then threatened by the rebels. A month before, the governor of Hoonan was ordered to Yaochow; and Mahada was sent to attack Kiangning. Szchuen had thrown itself into the arms of Sangwei,—its governor, marshal, and lieut.-generals, all revolting. Yiling was therefore strengthened, and Singan army largely increased to secure it against any possible attack, and to second the army of Szchuen; while Kwangerkwun marched to Hanchong. The commandant of Changte, in the north of Hoonan, opened the gates for his son, who was commander of the rebel army which marched from the west against the city, and the prefect revolted to the rebels. Lichow fell next. Its garrison was put to the sword; but the marshal retreated with what men he could save on Kingchow. Changsha, the capital of Hoonan, being without a chief, its commandant opened the gates to the rebels, and Jooman was ordered to cross the river and fortify Yochow, where the governor of the province

was holding state. Notwithstanding the critical position of their empire, the Manchu army had to be severely reprimanded for plundering the people. Commander Swun Yenling, with the marshal of Kweiling, capital of Kwangsi, declared for Sangwei, killing several officers who would not accompany them. An officer of Sangwei's crossed the river and took Yiling (or Yichang). But a body of the rebels marching further, was defeated and driven back on Yidoo. Another serious blow to the imperialists was the revolt of Hiangyang in Shantung, in the rear of their main armies.

Sangwei himself was not inactive,—for one body of men he pushed into Shensi, under general Yemoo, which was defeated by Warka, commander of Singan, who retook Yangpinggwan; with another he was threatening Woochang, which compelled a large concentration of imperial troops there. Yichang had been retaken, and was now again in the hands of Sangwei's men, who soon lost it. Another main division of his army was marched eastwards by Changsha, took Yooenchow, Kiangsi, and other cities, on the way. They joined Gung's army in the east, and the combined army sacked over thirty cities.

Laita was ordered to Hangchow. He was just in time; for a petition from the viceroy of the Kiangs soon reached Peking, saying that not only was Fukien gone, but the Kiangs likely to follow,—for the few men in Hangchow were utterly unable to cope with Gung's strong armies. Shang Kosi was formally informed, probably as an argument to keep him from following the example of Sangwei, that a large army was to march from Changli for Yunnan and Kweichow; and Niyahan, with another army, to march through Yaochow and Changsha into Kwangsi. Yiliboo held Yiling; Fandali was in Hünyang. Yehua was sent from Hanchoon to Szchuen; Kwangerkwun to Hanchoon; Siboochun to Singan; and president Molo with a large army in centre of the three Chin. Rahada was told off to watch over Shantung and Honan; Kwashun was stationed at Kingkow, to look after both land and river routes; Amida to Anching and Kiangning, to command the river; Toora to Hangchow

to watch the pirates; Laita from Chihkiang to Fukien; Boorgun from Kiangsi to Fukien; and Shooshoo was sent to Kwangtung to be ready for emergencies, for Jusin was not without reason suspected. So much so, that his father reported to the emperor, that of all his sons, Juhiao was the only dutiful and faithful one who had approved himself a worthy minister,—and both father and filial son got rewards.

The Manchu troops were crowding each other out of King, Hiang, Woochang, and Yichang districts; yet they dared not move across the river. But the Chahar and Kortsin Mongols prayed for permission to march against the rebels. Woo Yingchi, a general of Sangwei's, surrounded Yochow with three deep ditches, fortifying his position against horse or foot by "Deers' horns." But whether, in spite of his present strong position, Sangwei was beginning to see his aims impossible of attainment or not, it is difficult to say. But it is probable that, though he had hitherto met with no serious reverse, or even check, his hopes of immediate conquest, by speedy and decisive action before the imperial court could have time to move, were now fast disappearing; for the clouds of war-thunder were growing thicker and thicker, and must sometime break. At any rate, the Dalai Lama of Tibet made overtures to the emperor, asking if Sangwei humbly implored for pardon, whether he might not be received; and if he continued acting like a murderous wild beast, was it not better to cut up the country (between Sangwei and the emperor) and recall the troops? The emperor vehemently opposed this suggestion of a divided empire, and replied by putting Sangwei's son and grandsons to death, whom he had imprisoned on receipt of tidings of the revolt. Loojun was executed at the same time for losing Hoonan. Efforts were redoubled at the capital to reinforce the troops, to keep them in provisions; and the Jesuit missionaries were ordered to cast a number of light cannon, easily transported over hills or across rivers.

Meantime general Liw Jinjoong, with the city of Chaochow, and the general of Pingyang revolted to Jingjoong, and Sangwei

sent on ten thousand men to occupy Whangsha ho. Kosi was ordered to carefully look after the south of the difficult pass between the Kwangs. Wunchow, with its commandant, followed Pingyang. Liwchow also revolted, and its capture was laid upon Kosi. Lo-ching, Hwangshu, and Taiping in Chihkiang, followed the example of Wunchow. Rahada was sent on to Taining. But attempts by Gung on Kienchang were defeated. His men attacked Kinhwa nine times in August, but were always beaten back by Rahada. And several cities were taken and retaken on both sides. The duke of Haichung died, and his son Fangdsoo went over to the rebels, pretending to become one of them. He thus got an opportunity, and slew their commander and two officers. After which he posted himself very strongly in Changchung, whence he sent an appeal for aid. A proclamation was issued by the emperor highly praising his conduct, giving him his late father's title, making him a lieut.-general, and ordering himself and his brothers into Fukien to act in concert with Kosi.

The Manchu troops were now beginning to make progress; for they got to Foochow, where a body of Gung's troops was defeated. Woochow was retaken, and notwithstanding the numbers and activity of the rebels, the wooden wall which they had made round their camp at Kinhwa was burnt down. Chwunan was retaken and five rebel camps destroyed. The rebels on the other hand rose "like bees" and vigorously attacked Whangyan, Ninghai, Hiangshan, Sinchang and Yüyao. Laita and Rahada were ordered to consult together on the growing difficulties and to devise plans for relieving the threatened cities. If Mongol followers were found plundering the people, they were to be put to death; a wise precaution to prevent all the people from rising. Yochow was defended on three sides by the lake. The fourth side was attacked by the rebels in a strong entrenched camp, with moats and walls. The emperor ordered a combined attack to be made upon them from the city, and by an army under Niyahan from Kiangsi. Neither side dared to fight a decisive battle, but occupied the time in besieging, taking and retaking cities. Perhaps both found this at once the more

pleasant and profitable employment; for each city as it was taken was pillaged, and the spoils again seized when retaken by the other side. Wars in the west are waged on the principle that the cities fall to the army able to drive its opponent off the field: this war in practice if not in theory, was just the reverse; the desire of the rebels being to take as many cities as possible, that of the imperialists to retain what they held and as far as possible to retake the cities lost, but both avoided risking anything like a pitched battle. The patience characteristic of the Chinese, together with the wide extent of the country involved, may account for that sort of warfare; while the absence of any noble principle in the war would tend to render it of a mere guerilla character. The brunt of the war naturally fell on the districts separating Sangwei from Jingjoong, who for mutual protection gravitated towards each other. In October Yaochow rebels marched on Wooyooen and neighbourhood, and were so threatening that orders were issued to hold Yenchow at all cost, while Manchu and Mongol cavalry was sent to guard Kiangning. Changsha fell and Yuenchow was attacked. The Manchus took some cities, and gained a few victories.

But the rebels had successes greater on their side to show; for Hwichow, Hihien, Chihien and Whangyen were all taken by them and they were recruited by the revolt of Artai, whose name is Manchu; and he must have had other reasons than love of country for his action. Indeed it would appear as if he were wise in abandoning an apparently sinking vessel. Sangwei sent an army against Yuenchow, which was met by Manchus sent from Nanchang to hold the place at any cost; while the Manchu Boogun was ordered to die in Kanchow rather than yield.

The Manchus were continually pushing reinforcements both by western and central routes. Their plan of campaign was to march from Yuenchow on Changsha, which once taken, the rebel communications would be broken up and their detached armies thereafter easily destroyed.

When Warka, commanding in Singan, retook Hanchoon in the south of Shensi, he retreated on Paoning. In the same

autumn (1674) the rebel general Wang Pingfan cut off the communications of the army, stopping the boats which came from Liaoyang with provisions. The Paoning army had therefore to retreat on Kwangyooen, where they were on short rations for two months. It was therefore impossible to keep the army together; and four thousand men scattered, while Wang Foochun the marshal deserted with two thousand men to Sangwei. He had no sooner got to Pingliang than Hanchoon again fell into the hands of the rebels. Whereupon Sangwei sent two hundred thousand taels to Foochun for his army; and sent Wang Pingfan and Woo Jumao from Hanchoon by the west of (Shensi) to welcome him. All the local banditti, and the Tibetans on the way flocked like bees to his standard.

By this time the troops raised from the aborigines of Kingchow, with the remaining portion of the army returned from Paoning, were concentrated in Singan. One thousand of these men were ordered to hurry off to strengthen Lanchow, and another thousand to Yen-an. But the order was disobeyed, and the men remained in Singan, where it was probably thought they had few enough. Whereupon Chinchow, Lanchow, Goongchang, Ting-bien, Chingbien, Lintao, Chingyang, Swite, Yen-an, Whamachu, fell to the rebels in rapid succession. Foochun himself made his headquarters at Pingliang. His army he scattered over the various districts taken. Thus all on the south of the Yellow river fell off to the rebels, nor was the north of it secure; and it would seem an easy matter, if there was only one head to guide the rebels, and that a wise as well as an intelligent one, to drive back the Manchus to their cold mountain home in the far north-east.

Jang Yoong, marshal of Kansu, and its lieut.-generals, had however remained steadfast. The marshal retook Lan, Yen and Koong cities. Doonga recovered Chinchow, and attacked Pingliang. The marshal took up his headquarters at Koongchang and Chinchow, to cut the communication between the rebels of Shensi and Szchüen. The emperor sent a son of Foochun's to invite him to return to his allegiance; but though he professed to acknowledge his "crime," he opposed Doonga for a

year. Foochun incited the soldiers of Ninghia to slay their commander. Jao Liangdoong, lieut.-general of Tientsin, was sent in great haste to retake Ninghia. The army in Hingan followed Ninghia's example, and united with the Hanchoon rebels. The danger was therefore so great and so near at hand that the court was necessarily alarmed; and great commander Toohai was hurried off to take command of all the troops. And not too soon; for Sangwei had pushed forwards Pingfan, Tan Hoong, and Jumao by three routes to overwhelm Shensi, and unite with the Pingliang rebels. He also ordered a local lieut.-general of Yunnan to march with one thousand of his Miaos to strengthen Pingliang garrison.

Toohai commenced operations by an immediate attack on the rebels at Pingliang, and defeated them at the north of the city; seizing *Hoo* or Tiger hill, and cutting off their communications. He also fired his cannon into the residence in the midst of the city; and Foochun, in terror, sent some of his principal men to surrender. Pingfan and Jumao had been unsuccessful in their object; for they were several times defeated, and had to retreat on Hanchoon. Kuyuen and Chingyang therefore fell to the imperialists.

Sangwei had, not without reason, regarded the defection to him of Foochun as opening the door to the capital. He therefore prepared at once to take advantage of his good fortune, by pushing his men on from both Shensi and Szchuen, and desired to go himself to strike a decisive blow at the "throat" of the imperial armies of King and Yochow. He got ready a flotilla of boats at Hoodookow, the port where the Lishwi river joins the Yangtsu; and was at the same time anxious to open communications with the rebels of Hingan and Hanchoon. But his plans were so far disarranged by Foochun, who, after a series of victories and defeats, craved permission to surrender to the Manchu government, and was received in the month of July. Whether or not because he was coldly received or was in danger of being ill-used, he again revolted; and was defended in a battle by Jinbao, who retook Chungning. Toohai was

instructed to invite Foochun to return, and was successful; for he surrendered with all his men. The emperor formally pardoned his past misconduct, made him Chingkow commander, ordering him to redeem the past by good service against the rebels. Toohai and Jang Yoong occupied all the important posts in their province; and prince Yolo retook the cities of Kienchang, Kwangsin, Yaochow, and was ordered against Changsha, while Raboo moved his army into Kiangsi. Sangwei had then seventy thousand men occupying the ports of Yochow and Lichow, over against the armies of Kingchow and the north of the river; and other seventy thousand at Changsha, Pinghiang and Liling, to meet the armies of Kiangsi. Yolo, seizing the opportunity of Sangwei's absence in the west, marched by Yuenchow, defeated the first army, taking their fort; he then marched by Liling against Pinghiang, defeated the rebels there, slaying over a myriad. Hia Gwohiang, in terror, fled the city; and Yolo marched on against Changsha. This rapid success threw the rebel Hoonan into terror. Sangwei scarcely knew what to do; but hearing of the peril in which Changsha stood, he drew his army thitherwards, forsaking Soongdsu. He took up his position at Yolooshan near the river, while he sent Hoo Gwojoo into the city, and Ma Bao to camp outside the city, surrounded by a wide and deep ditch, round which was placed iron caltrops, with a line of elephants in front. He then summoned out all the rebels of Yiling and Nanchang to help in the defence.

As the defence of Changsha was made so complete, the emperor, inferring that their camps in the various ports on the lake must be ill attended to, sent Luarjin, with the men of King and Yo, across the river, to advance with forced marches. Luarjin in obeying defeated the rebels at Hoodookow. Chani took Taipingjiai, defeating an army there; and the fleet sent to Tungting took Künshan, and with it fifty of the rebel vessels. Just then the rebels sent down bands of spies; and as the imperialists there were few, they dispersed and fled. If the imperialists had then acted with promptitude, they could have connected Lichow and Changte, broken up the rebel line

between the cities, and marched against Changsha in front and flank. But they trifled, and did not press in; nor did they look with proper care after Hoodookow, so that when rebel vessels from Soongdsu returned, prince Lurjin retreated before them, abandoning all he had occupied, and fleeing back to Kingchow. As the various attempts to cut through the rebels' communications had failed, they were as powerful as ever in the Kiang and Hoo provinces.

Sangwei, more prompt than his adversary, ordered Gao Daji from Liling and Pinghiang, to take Kingan and cut off the retreat of that division of the Manchu army, which had passed south; another Manchu main division having remained all this time inactive in Nanchang. Daji was a capital soldier. His vanguard was of four thousand picked men. With a small band he vehemently pressed against the imperialists, who were broken in the most shameful manner. One hundred of his men rushed upon the army at Dihiao temple, and with a rush slew their men and seized the standard. He again sent a few men suddenly among the imperialists at Lodsu shan mountain. A panic seized the army, and general Hirgun, with all his men, fled the camp. The rebels entered, ate, drank, and did what they desired, and then retreated at their leisure. On their return they were met by a rebel leader, Han Dayin, who inveigled them into joining Hoo Gwojoo. Daji died of vexation at this bad treatment, and Dayin dared not go beyond the city walls to fight. Hence Kingan was surrounded by the imperialists, and in the spring of 1677 was in extremity for want of food. Sangwei sent Ma Bao with nine thousand men to the relief of the city. Dayin was suspicious of a trick and would not move out to meet him. Ma Bao got to Dsooshwi river, and found not a single cannon opening in the city to respond to him. He too began to be suspicious and returned to Hoonan. Raboo sent twenty thousand men in pursuit; but they were many times beaten by the retreating rebels.

In May, Dayin quietly led away his men, forsaking the city from want of food. All went on foot, and got across the

river unmolested. When the imperialists heard the beat of drums and firing of cannon, they believed it was an attack on their camp. They were terrified, and Dayin was able easily to rejoin the rebels between Ningdoo and Longan. So sadly had the Manchu valour degenerated before Sangwei. The Peking court severely censured the superior officers, and replaced some of them.

Prince Gung Jingjoong was the grandson of Gung Joongming, who fled with a few more men from Tungchow, across the gulf of Liao, to join the Manchus. Joongming died shortly after he was made prince, and his son did not long survive him. Jingjoong succeeded to the kingly palace of Foochow; and was married to an imperial princess, daughter of prince Haogo; and he was called the emperor's son-in-law.

Duke Fan Wunsoo was then governor of Chihkiang, with headquarters at Hangchow. For three generations the Fans and Gungs had been intermarrying, and the closest friendship existed between Jingjoong and Wunsoo, their respective jurisdictions being side by side. As Wunsoo was the elder he styled himself the *Jwenshung* or equal of Jingjoong, who called himself the *Wanshung*, the inferior of Wunsoo. Wunsoo after a time persisted in taking a more lowly title, which was acceptable to both. This continued for some time, till one day Jingjoong abruptly assumed the old formal style, which implied that governors-general and governors of provinces addressed and were addressed by the three southern princes on equal terms. First was written the title, then the surname of the recipient, with four characters intimating the public character of the document. A letter so addressed was sent with beating of drums by Jingjoong to Wunsoo, who was startled at the innovation, but agreed to change his style of address for the first form in accordance with the wishes of the prince. This was the first indication of a changed disposition which the Fukien historian could discover, and he was an eye-witness.

Wunsoo, who was a Mookden man, gave himself up entirely to the good of the people under him, scarcely resting day or night

in his measures to further the interests of or avert calamity from the people. During his four years rule, he had all covetous officials accused, and all injustice put down, The pirate Jung was a great grief to him; and he projected a plan to have all the various forces of Fukien, the two Kwangs, Kiang and Chihkiang, combined to destroy the piratical forces.

Not satisfied with the memorial drawn up by his secretary, he shut himself up a day and night in his room. He drew it up in two thousand choice characters under five heads,—first, public matters belonging to his district; second, taxes and rations; third, the army; fourth, on spies and reports; fifth, on foreign nations. This he had copied out and sent to his brothers in Peking,—the elder of whom was a Goosha, the younger a small official in the Board of Punishment. They were terrified at the boldness of this exposure of the military affairs, and suppressed the paper; but the emperor heard of it, though he did not see it, and saying that this was a faithful minister, nominated him viceroy of Fukien soon after.

Like prince Shang Jusin, Jingjoong was a drunkard, and his men daily grew bolder in their oppression of the people; while the viceroy and governor, living in the same city, dared not interfere. When Wunsoo's appointment of viceroy of Fukien was made public, the people rejoiced, though Jingjoong did not. He politely sent messengers however, who informed Wunsoo that his expenditure as viceroy, what with soldiers, and what with carriages, would amount to a good many score thousand taels a year; but that Jingjoong would see that the money was ready. Wunsoo declined the princely help, and the prince was chagrined.

When he got to his new post, Wunsoo found that the rations of the soldiers had been permitted to run done three months before in Foochow, and for six months at the other stations. He was beset with demands for arrears, but he refused to take upon himself any responsibility for the past, promising to provide in full for the future. Yet he sent up an urgent memorial stating that there were arrears of six hundred

thousand taels, and expressing his fears for the future of the province. He actively inspected all the province, lodging in a tent, accompanied by a thousand good horsemen. After seven and a half hours sleep, the cymbals and drums of the watchmen roused the camp, and they travelled several miles before daybreak. His ambition being to put down piracy, he set up five stations, with a thousand men in each. Between these he established roving companies of seven hundred men each. He learned and practised the tactics of the western nations, making false attacks on one station with the men of some of the other stations and the "rovers;" or he suddenly fell upon some place under the care of one of the robber bands. Thus the men were practised in both offensive and defensive movements. With his vessels similarly active on the coast, he protected his seaboard from the pirates.

Before Duke Wunsoo went to Foochow the desperate measure was resorted to of compelling all the people on the sea coasts to remove inland; Taijai being made the border beyond which any civilian seen was to be put to death without mercy. Five thousand boats made six trips in five months to Poochung and other northern cities, removing over a hundred thousand families, or more than a million of souls.* Some few remained, and of those who had gone inland, not included in the above, many returned again in spite of the threatened penalty. Wunsoo opposed this desperate policy as a cowardly one, and recommended rather to strengthen the coast defences.

Another order from Peking prevented the sea-faring population to fish or prepare salt,—the two products on which Fukien people principally depended. Want of food gave rise to trouble, and was likely to cause more, when Wunsoo virtually removed the prohibition by declaring, in spite of official opposition, that the people were forbidden only to go on the high seas,—two or three hundred li out,—but that inside that distance they were at liberty to fish; and immediately the streets of Foochow were

* In the conquest of Liaotung and Liaosi we saw several instances of wholesale removal, though not perhaps on so extensive a scale.

again filled with the produce of the sea. He thus prevented riots by a wise evasion of a law which might indeed have starved out the pirates, but which would be the cause of calamities more than enough to counterbalance any good.

As soon as Wunsoo was established as viceroy he published every matter of importance to all the neighbouring provinces. Chai the governor-general of Szchuen and Hookwang was the first to respond, and his first very message proclaimed the news of Sangwei's restlessness and the universal terror which prevailed in the west.

Jingjoong had ordered the dismissal of his seven hundred soldiers, and their surrender to the viceroy, who was willing to enroll them with his own three thousand men in the little army of his five stations, to act against the pirates. They were scarcely under his command before an order came from the capital, forbidding Jingjoong to remove, or to dismiss his troops. It was then (February 1674) he first heard of Sangwei's revolt, against whose possible march eastwards he was put on his guard. The viceroy had secret instructions to the same purport, ordering him to restore the troops to Jingjoong. It was the reluctance, real or assumed, of the latter to receive those troops which made him aware of the private communication to the viceroy, who had to reveal it.

The prince was now all soldier and himself again, his palace resounded day and night with warlike preparations. But a second message of similar import made him uneasy, as he doubtless believed himself regarded with suspicion, and he was not unnaturally under the impression that the viceroy had secret instructions not calculated to make the position of the prince a safe one. A third embassy from his younger brother in the capital, enumerating the gracious bounty of the emperor to the house of Gung, had, as was natural, the opposite of a reassuring effect. On that evening the viceroy had a drinking party, as he often had,—which was suddenly and abruptly broken up about midnight by the report that Jingjoong was in the streets in complete armour, and that two civilians had been

murdered. The viceroy therefore became as suspicious of the prince as the prince of him. As neither hate nor love, politics nor war, affect any privacy in China, the mutual hate springing from mutual distrust spread like wildfire over the large city, dividing it into two parties, threatening to be satisfied only with much blood. To prevent uproar, and to tranquillise the citizens, the viceroy issued a proclamation, stating that the imperial court being vexed at the formidable proportions assumed by piracy, had permitted the prince to recall his orders disbanding his men; and he called upon all the people to be of one mind in serving the common weal. A similar proclamation was posted on his palace walls by the prince. This served to allay popular tumults, but did not remove the prince's suspicions as to the ulterior aims of the viceroy; and the numerous favours conferred on himself by the court only confirmed those suspicions of some inscrutable designs upon his liberty or life. But some days' peace moderated his fears.

The commissioners had already arrived in Yunnan with the imperial mandate for disbanding the army; and a nephew of Wunsoo's was sent on the same errand to Fukien. Before his arrival, a man had got to Foochow, who orally reported the insurrection of Sangwei, and the murder by him of the two commissioners. As soon as the Fukien commissioner heard thereof he became restless, and on the twenty-first day he returned to court. The prince and the viceroy had not seen each other for six days, but had to join in escorting the commissioner beyond the city. The duke was certain that insurrection was in progress at the palace.

Mrs Jow, a wife of the prince, who was a relation of the viceroy's, was dangerously ill, and the latter felt compelled to visit her. This he did, and to show his own peaceful intentions he took with him only two attendants; one before bearing his card, and another following. He was surrounded by crowds of the prince's men as soon as he had accepted his invitation to go inside. After they had mutually saluted each other the prince said: "You are a long-expected guest;" but changed his welcome and

his colour in his next sentence,—“Whatever your plots against me, I fear you not!” The viceroy smiled, and said there was nothing of the kind. The reply calmed the prince, who became smilingly hospitable; and the reconciled friends spent five hours over their wine, from which the viceroy rode home quite drunk. Next day they escorted the commissioner beyond the city.

The viceroy was one day thereafter greatly alarmed, and the city thrown into terror, by a sudden sound of cannon-firing, which continued throughout the whole day. To prevent any alarm, it had previously been the invariable custom in the city to give notice five days previously to the “washing of the cannon”; but on this occasion no information reached the viceroy till a messenger sent by him returned saying that the prince was “washing” his cannon. The drilling of the men was also carried on in the same irregular manner; beginning one morning at fifth watch, when the whole city was roused by the blast of horns, and the viceroy’s messenger informed him that the prince was already, at 2 a.m., in the parade ground. This state of matters continued daily at the most unlooked for times—first watch, midnight, early or late—and the wearied viceroy was oppressed to sickness. And not without reason; for though the capital of Fukien is 40 li in circumference, the palace of the viceroy in the west corner was only 5 li from that of the prince, and was thus entirely in his power. The prince had fully ten thousand men under arms, with numerous animals ready for the battle-field; his very boys of fourteen in the palace constantly practised the bow and riding; and their military cries were unceasing. The viceroy had nominally no more than three thousand men; in reality they were but two thousand. Most of these were secretly leagued with the prince’s men, and were certainly not to be trusted to fight against them.

In the circumstances, the viceroy was certainly justified in thinking it advisable to make a circuit to visit his province. Northwards 400 li was Yenping; through which and passing by Poochung, to the confines of Chihkiang, the distance was in all about 1000 li. But the sea was covered with pirates,

and the land route was so difficult on account of the many hills and difficult passes, that his few men would be valueless. To the south there was only the sea; but by Hingfoo, Chüenfoo, and Chungfoo he could get to Haichung to the duke and marshal there, where there was an army. He could thus escape out off the tiger's den.

The viceroy had agreed to start for Hinghwa on the fifteenth of second moon (March). In the beginning of that moon the author from whom we quote went away before; but never again did he see the viceroy, who was made a prisoner ere he could determine to abandon his post. For on the fifteenth of third moon, Jingjoong had openly revolted; giving out that his father had agreed at Shanhaigwan always to follow Sangwei. All the superior officers of Fukien gave in their adhesion, and the province was under his power. He employed the officers who joined him to march on the neighbouring provinces; one by the east route, to attack the large cities of Tai, Wun, and Choo; another by the west, against Kwangsin, Kienchang, and Yaochow; and a third by the central route over Hienloing pass, against Kinhwa and Küchow in Chihkiang. Just then large bands of robbers rose in great strength around Yenchow and Hwichow; and the whole seaboard was in consternation.

Li Jufang, viceroy of Chihkiang, took prompt measures to avert the calamities threatening. He rode off himself in extreme haste to occupy and defend Küchow; sending strong detachments to hold the most important points about Shangshan. Laita was ordered into Chihkiang to support him, and Boorgun was sent into Kiangsi. Other movements of imperial troops took place where thought needful. Efforts were made to recover Jingjoong to his allegiance; his own brother, on one occasion, being sent with generous overtures, to which he would not listen; nor would he even permit this brother to enter any of the lands acknowledging his sway. He was just then attacking Küchow, and ravaging its neighbourhood with a considerable army; against which, as he would not listen to terms, a Manchu army was forwarded under prince Shooshoo. Jufang rode up to the

very entrenchments of the rebels, and sword in hand led on his men amid a shower of arrows and stones from the ballistae. He passed the fosse, and the rebels had to retreat. Following up his victory he took the cities of Yiwoo, Yangsi, and Showchang; and a detachment of his men defeated the rebels at Kinhwa and Shaohing. When the rebels returned in force to attack Kùchow, he stole upon them by night, slew over ten thousand men, and raised the siege.

The rebel army which had gone towards Wunchow had been for a time successful; but a division of Shooshoo's army under Folata stopped its victories, drove it back, took Hwangyen, and compelled the rebel commander Yanghing, a native of Liaotung, to retire on Wunchow, coming up with him just outside the city. There a battle was fought in which Yanghing lost twenty thousand men; and had to swim across the river into the city. He deepened the fosse and strengthened the parapets, determined to make a firm stand there. That he found comparatively easy; for it was well protected by water, and a land attack was ineffective. While the Manchu army was idly investing this city, one of the Gung family was closely pressing the siege of Kienchang, and Jufang was watched by a large rebel army, divided into many small inter-communicating camps. But the investing army around Kienchang was quietly and stealthily withdrawn, and for no apparent reason. The emperor, however, correctly inferred that it was withdrawn because of active hostility on the part of the pirates along the coast. He therefore ordered the army around Wunchow to raise the siege of that city, and attack the rebels in the rear while the pirates were attacking them from the coast.

When he rebelled, Jingjoong had inveigled Liw Jinjoong, commanding in the city of Chaochow to open the gates for him, to make that city a buffer against any attacks from Kwangtung. The pirates (see *Formosa*) were then ravaging the coast of Fukien, which was under Manchu rule. Jingjoong had made an agreement with the pirates to permit them to hold certain cities and territories in Fukien on condition of giving

him their support. But when he believed himself grown great by the success at first attending the various armies sent by him into Chihkiang, he failed to implement his agreement; and took possession of the prefectural cities of Chang, Chüen, Ta, and Shaowoo. This occasioned a quarrel between the pirates and the rebels. The latter had to withdraw from Kienchang, and the Manchus prepared to pursue them.

But when the augmented army began to move from Küchow it found its path barred by a rebel army of several myriads, who held the difficult passes of Kiwloongshan by the Küho river. A myriad more at Tasinan protected the rebels' stores and kept open communications. It was resolved that the best plan was to attack this post, and take the city of Kiangshan. In mid-autumn some Manchu soldiers were ordered to wade across the river one evening, and attack the camp; while the cannon were so planted as completely to command the line of retreat. These men crossed the river and were rapidly massing on the rebel side of the river. The rebels were encamped on the heights, hidden away in thick forests of old trees. The gully was so narrow that the men could march only in single file. But if it was difficult to go in it was as difficult to come out; and the rebels were cut down by cannon shot as soon as they came to the open, and before they could touch the imperialists forming against them. This artillery fire therefore entirely disconcerted them. The imperialists took advantage of the effect produced and set many rebel posts on fire. The commander of the rebels fled with thirty horse, Changshan fell, and the pass of Hienhia ling was open to the Manchus.

Hienjoong was commanding the rebel army in Kiangsi. He was defeated in a battle; but was still very powerful though he lost two cities. He heard that the main imperialist army had gone into Fukien, and he threatened to cut off their communications. Jufang, however, sent spies to him, to falsely report that his two subordinate commanders had surrendered; and Hienjoong, fearing absolute isolation, himself surrendered.

Thus fell off two of Jingjoong's main armies; and the loss

being known to the Formosan pirates, they boldly pushed far inland, took a large number of cities, and pressed on to Yenping to meet and give battle to himself. Hearing of their approach, his army fell to pieces like a "broken tile;" and he was left helpless and without resource. He therefore sent his son to the imperial army, to hand over the seal of supreme command which he had assumed. He murdered the viceroy Wunsoo, to prevent unpleasant disclosures regarding the past, and then presented himself a prisoner to the imperial army. He asked forgiveness, and the opportunity of proving his repentance, by employment in active service against the rebels; promising to drive the pirates into the sea. Then last of all, the commandant of Wunchow, hearing of his chief's submission, opened the gates to the Manchus. Jufang continued his victorious career; pressed upon the rebels of Kiangsi, and slew, seized, or received the submission of fully a hundred thousand men.

The pirates were, in 1677, driven back upon Amoy, and afterwards to Formosa. Jingjoong ordered Chaochow to be opened to the Manchus. He was pardoned, and re-employed. He was afterwards accused of being a far worse man than Jusin; for while the latter spoke madly and acted cruelly when drunk, the former did so even while sober. He was therefore, with many of his comrades, put to death with torture in Peking. Fukien was restored to Manchu rule; and the armies were recalled.

Shang Kosi was become old and frail by the year 1671; and to relieve himself of some of his toil, he nominated his eldest son Jusin second in command. This son was a confirmed drunkard, of a coarse, brutal nature, and of a savage disposition which delighted in bloodshed; a craving he was able to satiate when he thus gained command. Two years after, Kosi prayed the emperor to relieve him of all office, permit him to retire to Liaotung, his native home, and give supreme command to his eldest son. The Boards had warmly recommended the disbanding of the fifteen Dsolings under Kosi and their six thousand soldiers, with the twenty thousand able-bodied men connected with them; and it was out of the measures taken to secure this,

that, as we have seen, these rebellions broke out. Kosi did not, therefore, receive permission to retire. He was apparently faithful to the dynasty, however; for he seized the messenger of Sangwei, sent to the emperor the message inciting him to revolt, and next year he sent his son Juhiao against Liw Jinjoong at Chaochow. At the same time he petitioned the emperor in favour of this son, as the only one of his sons who was faithful and trustworthy, and who therefore should be made his own successor. The son was nominated a great commander, while the father was still ordered to retain and use the supreme command.

Jusin when a boy accompanied his father into the wars; and at the age of nineteen went to court, where, because of his father's warrior reputation, he was made a duke. He had a separate camp of his own, in which he was really independent, when he was made second in command by his father. During his father's illness he was acting commander. His brother Juhiao was defeated by a force of ten thousand pirates, and driven back on Hwichow. He was tempted by Sangwei, and cast in his lot with the rebels. Men flocked to his standard in "clouds," just when the pirates were ravaging Chaohing, when Sangwei had sent a force to take Chaohing, west of Canton, and when half of Kwangtung was in rebel hands. Kosi was then in the south-east of the province, and was unable to rise off his bed; the troubles around him, and the division in his own family, may have been too much for the old man. He appealed for help from Kiangsi; and Shooshoo, the great commander, was ordered into Kwangtung. But though the imperial government openly declared that Jusin could not possibly succeed his father, secret overtures were made to him, which, while upbraiding him for his forgetfulness of the imperial favours bestowed upon his house, offered him full pardon if he repented of his criminal revolt. But the rebel had meantime accepted the title of Great Commander from Sangwei. He had, like the other rebels adopted a new standard and flags, and assumed the old Chinese style of hair and dress. He put some officials to death, and made his father a virtual prisoner.

His brother Juhiao occupied Hwichow, and the viceroy Jin Gwangdsoo held Kaochow, while a Manchu force from Shooshoo garrisoned Chaoching. There were in all twenty thousand or thirty thousand choice disposable troops; a number amply sufficient to restrain Jusin had the viceroy not already given in his secret adhesion to Sangwei, and soon openly withdrew his five thousand men, with whom he assumed the offensive against Shooshoo, preventing the Manchus from penetrating to Jusin, and cutting off their retreat. So numerous were the defections, that Shooshoo was compelled to move into Canton, soon followed by Juhiao, whose men had broken up entirely after a defeat at the hands of ten thousand pirates. Jusin pushed on towards Canton, guilty in his progress of the most barbarous conduct; and he so effectively cannonaded Canton that Shooshoo had to evacuate the city and retire on Kiangsi. Chaoching was also forsaken, and the governor joined Sangwei.

In the spring of 1676 Kosi died; the troubles arising from the divided state of his family probably dealing his death blow to one who was already feeble. His illness is even said to have been caused by the excitement of debating with his son against rebellion. Jusin was nominated a prince by Sangwei, who sent him provisions for his army. Sangwei did not act so wisely in sending two of his own men to occupy the posts of viceroy and governor in the place of those who had given him their adhesion, and who would doubtless consider themselves ill-treated. The impolitic act bore immediate fruit; for both Gwangdsoo and Jusin soon thereafter expressed their repentance for their revolt, and were gladly welcomed back to the Manchu ranks. Jusin was created a Family prince with the title of "Pacify-the-south"; and several other high officers and officials were restored to their original stations. Jusin was ordered to send some aid to Changsha; for Sangwei was still very dangerous, and apparently too powerful for the forces opposed to him. But in response to that order he sent some "tribute," and the apology that he could part with no men on account of the threatening power of the pirates; and when some of these surrendered, and the rest

were driven to the sea, he found an excuse in the numbers of local robbers. He thus proved that his restored faithfulness was somewhat problematical. It is evident that he was yet unprepared to decide who should be the victor, Peking or Yunnan. He was several times blamed from Peking, and severely censured on one occasion, when Gwangdsoo, on his way to Woochow, was defeated from want of boats to carry his heavy artillery and baggage, which boats Jusin had been ordered to supply. This rebuke frightened him, and compelled him to move; but just then pirates did infest Chingyuen and Kaochow, so that he was necessitated to return and defend those places.

In 1677, Sangwei's viceroy was seized in Chaoching; the hair and dress of soldiers and civilians were again changed to Manchu fashion; and an army from Sangwei, sent to relieve Chaoching, was unfortunate in reaching after the city had fallen, and when Chingan and Nanan were captured by the Kiangsi army, Yülin occupied by Mangyitoo, who took Shaochow and seized Wooling pass, the "throat" of the border of Kiangsi and Kwangtung. The rebel army made sure of retaking Shaochow; but Mangyitoo raised a great earthen rampart to the north of the city, which he valiantly and stubbornly defended against them. Up till October the siege was pressed vigorously; but no impression was made, till they, by a second camp, cut off communications by the river on the west of the city, and erected a third camp on the heights of Lienwha fung, whence they cannonaded the city. Then all the parapets were cleared, and the imperialists were driven in behind their earthen walls, which they defended with desperation. Meantime preparations were going on to raise the siege, and a large force from Kiangning, or Nanking, marched down upon the rebel rear, while another force pushed them in flank. These, seconded by the garrison, attacked them on three sides, and the rebels were compelled to give way. They broke up and fled, were pursued far into the night, and left large numbers of slain. Those occupying the camp west of the river had also to retreat. They were again attacked next month on three sides near Lochang and defeated, when the Yao savages

pursued them, slaying over two thousand men. Kiwngchow opened its gates; and the cities of Kao, Lei, and Lien followed the example. Several rebel officers were taken in their vessels on the river; and this pacified Kwangtung.

Jusin had meantime formed one excuse after another for remaining inactive in all that severe fighting. He stationed himself in Canton, and made himself the scourge of the city and neighbourhood by his drunkenness and fierce brutality. Even his friends latterly turned against him; and the emperor was at last informed that his brutality was the real cause of the frequent prayers of Kosi to be permitted to return to Liaotung; for he was afraid that Jusin might murder the rest of the family. At the same time, many incidents were mentioned of men whom he had put to death in a fit of anger or drunkenness; and the case was cited of one officer, pardoned by the emperor, whom he had executed. His past connection with Sangwei was detailed, and the fact mentioned that he had accepted from him one hundred thousand taels. Among other evil deeds of his, it was stated that his father Kosi lay still unburied in Canton, and had no reverence paid to his memory. He was an unfaithful minister and an undutiful son, and all men cursed him. These and other charges, urged in a long memorial by a civil official, were supplemented by another memorial from a military official, who exposed the bad military conduct of Jusin, and showed why he should be seriously judged and severely condemned. He was apprehended as the result of this writing. And an attempted rescue by his brothers led only to the death of a few men, and an aggravation of the original offence. He was escorted to Peking; and after a trial in the usual way, he was permitted to commit suicide. His family was ordered into Peking. The markets which he had monopolised in the south were opened freely to the people; and the officers who had served under him were cashiered.

In June 1681, the emperor publicly informed his ministers that the body of Kosi, who had always been a faithful minister, was then at Tingchifoo in charge of Juhiao, who had gone south

to transport the coffin to Haichung in Liaotung, according to a promise made by Taidsoong to Kosi. A secretary and a privy councillor were sent south to meet the coffin, and eight thousand taels were gifted to bury the body in Haichung in Manchuria, and to cover the cost of a tablet to his memory. His seventh son was declared heir of the ancestral patrimony in Haichung, and nominated a privy councillor. Two *dsoling* were created to keep the tomb in perpetuity, and lands were attached to pay the necessary expenses connected with the tomb and its various services. There is now (1880) a beautiful temple over that grave in the city of Haichung. A large stone tablet declares the faithfulness and worth of the prince. Two hereditary *dsoling* look after the tomb, the temple, and the connected estates; and on certain stated days, the descendants of Kosi, in and in the neighbourhood of Haichung,—a large number of people,—meet together to make their devotions, and pay the usual reverence at the tomb of their great ancestor.

Sangwei, now isolated, was to feel the force of the imperial power as he had not yet experienced it; for an order from the emperor to the troops, Chinese and Manchu, in Kiangsi, to place themselves under the orders of the viceroy, reached them just as they received tidings of the submission of Gung Jingjoong and Shang Jusin, who had played their game with much less skill than Sangwei, and whose submission, with restoration to former dignities, was made easy on account of the danger to the state from Sangwei. Dayin also made his submission, going to Fukien for the purpose, and Kiangsi was without war.

Swun Yenling was a Liaotung man, son of Loongswi, who had accompanied Koong Yoodua to the Manchus, had followed him throughout his course to Kwangsi, where prince Koong promised his daughter to his old friend and follower for his son. Both the fathers died in harness. The young daughter of prince Koong was taken to the palace in Peking, where she was educated as, and with the title of, imperial princess, and had a dowry of ten thousand taels given her by the emperor, who gave her away in marriage to Yenling. He had meantime been

nominated commander, and had charge of all the troops of prince Koong, with his headquarters in Kweilin.

When Sangwei revolted, Ma Hiwng, governor in Kweilin, was ordered against him, but revolted to him. Yenling was then commanded to be extremely watchful. But Sangwei was near and Peking far; and the epistle of the former urging him to rebel proved too powerful, and he set up for himself in Kweilin. He put a number of officers to death who would not follow him. Kwangsi was soon wholly lost to the Manchus, and Yenling established five principal posts in the province with two thousand men in each to keep internal order. Sangwei was probably, to begin with, quite satisfied with the position of affairs, for he feared no molestation at the hands of Yenling; and could therefore give his undivided attention to the Manchus on his north.

Hoonglie was prefect of Chingyang, and promised Sangwei, before the rebellion of the latter, that he would not take service under the Manchu government. He was named a commander by Sangwei, and raised a corps of five thousand men from the Aborigines. But once master of these, he, being "a brave and a just man," turned his arms against the rebels. Sangwei was jealous of this man's reputation, and had over a hundred members of his family put to death; but the man himself was beyond the reach of his arm. As soon as he had made himself strong, and especially after the murder of his family by Sangwei, he brought every influence in his power to bear on Yenling, urging him to return to give allegiance. The wife of Yenling joined the argument, and he was at last gained over, and promised that as soon as the main army of the Manchus came near enough he would join it. Hoonglie sent his adhesion to that army at Shaochow in 1677, when Sangwei was weakened by defections from his side on the east coast; and he was immediately nominated by the grateful emperor, governor of Kwangsi. Mangyitoo was ordered with eight thousand men from Shaochow to welcome and support the new adherent; and Jusin was commanded to send a detachment of three thousand men for the same purpose. He not only failed to do so, but

neglected to provide boats to ferry the army of Mangyitoo across the river. Hoonglie was compelled therefore to act alone; and though he was able to do good service he was very much crippled from want of horses and heavy artillery,—to his many prayers for which Jusin would not listen. It was only in the following year that Mangyitoo was able to arrive at Pinglo, 100 li from Kweilin; and he arrived much too late, for he found that Ma Bao and others of Sangwei's generals had marched upon and taken Kweilin, had put Yenling to death, and were now advancing rapidly both by land and water against Pinglo. They attacked the Chinese division of the imperial army; and as the Manchus were wholly unable to support the attacked portion, it was utterly defeated. Mangyitoo had to retire on Woochow; and all the cities taken fell again into the hands of the rebels. In the siege of Kweilin the princess, wife of Yenling, was braver than her husband. She stood on the wall, and with her bow and arrows killed many a rebel. She escaped and found her way to Peking.

Thus through the negligence of Jusin, who was possibly enough wishing to know who should be victor, Kwangsi was added to the rebel dominions, and Kwangtung fell into a state of Chaotic confusion. Detachments were ordered from Chaochow, from Kanchow, and from Chaoching, to support Hoonglie; but he had to hold his ground alone in Woochow. Jusin did at length send a detachment, but only after Sangwei's death, and after Mangyitoo had united with Hoonglie. The rebels had several times given him battle, but had gained no decided advantage. When they advanced to the siege after Mangyitoo's arrival, the two commanders, dividing all their forces into three, attacked with vigour in front and on the flanks. The rebels were unprepared to find so many men opposed to them; and the sudden and simultaneous onset threw them into disorder and compelled them to flee. The imperialists could therefore march on Kweilin. They marched towards Nanning, where the garrison had been vigorously besieged by the rebels for some months. The choicest rebel troops were drawn up in battle array

within their "deer-horn" palisades, while their rear was protected by a steep hill. The imperial van was hurled against their flank, Mangyitoo and Shooshoo with the main army attacked in front, and an ambush was placed behind the hill to cut off their retreat. The onset was fierce, the defence was furious, and the slaughter was enormous. The rebel commander fled with a few score horse. Nanning was freed, and Kwangsi was again at peace. Hoonglie, to whose decision, bravery, and firmness the Manchus were indebted for this victory, had performed the utmost limit of his duty when Kwangsi was freed from rebels; but he now prayed the emperor for permission to go into Yunnan. His desire was granted, while his diligent faithfulness was warmly commended. And we leave him to go back to Sangwei.

As soon as Jusin gave in his adhesion to the Manchus, Sangwei ordered two of his generals against him at Shaochow foo, and sent another general to bring to his authority Yenling in Kweilin. He desired to annex the two Kwangs, for their lands bound Honan, and were as the "lips to the teeth;" and it was of the utmost consequence, now that Kwangtung had become imperial, to make sure of it in time. As long as Jusin had kept a large army of Manchus employed, Sangwei had wisely refrained from any expression of desire on his part for the annexation of Kwangtung. But if he was aggressive, so were the imperialists; for one army, in carrying out the orders to press on Hoonan, began by taking Liwyang, and received the submission of a rebel chief and his fleet at Hiangtan. Moojan was even more successful with Shensi and Kingchow soldiers, who began at last to move; for he took Yoonghing, Chaling, Siwhien, Linghien, Anzun, Hingning, Chunchow, Yichang, Linwoo, Lanshan, Chiahwo, Kweiyang, and Kweitung. Jienchin Wang was ordered to make his headquarters at Chaling. Sangwei was sixty-seven years of age when he lost Shensi, Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kiangsi. His resources were at their last gasp. As the revenues of Szchuen and Hoonan were insufficient to support their own armies, he feared he might be

despised, and therefore assumed an imperial style, made Hungchow his capital, as far as centralising his army there, and from Changsha went thither to live. He ascended the throne, assumed the style of Jaowoo, appointed officials, sent out imperial mandates, established a formal court etiquette, with all the other paraphernalia essential to the dignity of royalty.

Kanghi had at the beginning of the war decided to go in person to the seat of war, and make Kingchow his headquarters. Wang Dachun it was who prevented him leaving his capital, as it was dangerous to remove so far, for none knew what rumours might not at such a critical juncture be raised in the capital. The style assumed by Sangwei apparently roused his wrath to boiling point, for nothing less would suffice than that he should fight out the war in person. An unlooked for event rendered this unnecessary.

Ma Bao and the rebels ravaged the country round Shaochow, but were defeated in October by Mangyitoo, who attacked them on both flanks, drove them back to Lochang, and retook Yinhwa hien. In January 1678, Ma Bao and all the army were recalled to Hungchow for the purpose above stated. In February several officers of Sangwei's were taken in Kwangtung, and pardoned by order of the emperor. Sangwei had enrolled the soldiers of Yenling among his own men. He now, in March, sent a body of cavalry to ravage Kwangsi, and Hoonglie was most urgent in his prayers for help. Mangyitoo was ordered from Shaochow to combine with Hoonglie; but was encountered by Sangwei and defeated at Pinglo, whence he had to retreat to the outer passes of Paochoong. The aid of Jusin was now called in along with Mangyitoo to crush Sangwei, who seemed as if a sight of him paralysed his enemy's army. One of his generals, however, deserted from him, and to encourage imitators was made a marquis, and an important command was given him. The rebels, however, took Pinglo, and threatened Chaowchow, which was well defended by Yadali. But Sangwei's fleet suffered a defeat. In July Sangwei's men ravaged Yoonghing, defeating the imperialist army and slaying its general. They

then crossed the river and camped there. They furiously attacked Pinchow, driving the vanguard on Yoonghing. Yadali had to evacuate Toongan, and the rebels besieged Chiüenchow, Jirtaboo retreating to cover Hinghwan. Marshal Hoo Sijiao was ordered off to protect Chaochow; so that Sangwei left the imperialists little leisure. Yoonghing was again ravaged by the orders of Sangwei, whose army however met a severe check at Yaoyang lake, and again at Liwlindsooi.

Yoonghing was only 100 li distant from Hungchow, was thus at its very door, and to the rebels was a point of first-rate importance, which could not be left without great exertions to take it. Hence the recall of Ma Bao, who was sent to invest the city. Besides the garrison, there was a Manchu army outside the walls to defend this city. Right over against the earthworks of this camp across the river, did the rebels set up their camp. They surrounded the city on three sides, and ceased not from their building labours night nor day. The garrison and army, therefore, prayed for instant and effectual help. In response, none dared move out of Chaling; but Moojan sent men from Chunchow, who marched till, when near their destination, they refused in terror to advance; for Sangwei's spirit, if not his person, was near. The city wall received a thousand serious wounds, which were however immediately repaired with earth by the garrison, who both built and fought at the same time, and incessantly. Twenty days of this constant and harassing work brought the garrison to the very verge of despair; but next day great was their astonishment to see the vigorous besiegers leaving their trenches and quickly departing. For Sangwei had died.

It is reported with all the gravity of imperial history, that Sangwei's last illness assumed the form of madness; that a dog sat on his table; that he could not open his mouth; and that a severe dysentery carried him off. At any rate his departure gave all the necessary weight to the prayer of all the princes of Peking, that their imperial master should not leave his capital; and the immediate decision not to move south, was the greatest compliment Kanghi could have paid to the ability of Sangwei,

who left not a few able generals behind him. But his spirit was now gone, and the incubus of its terrible presence was raised off the Manchu troops. The rebels were frequently defeated, and had to raise the siege of Yoonghing, while Hungchow itself was now in turn threatened by the Manchus. The rebels acknowledged the grandson of Sangwei, Woo Shufan, as his successor in the empire. Shufan came from Yunnan to Hungchow; and as soon as made emperor, with the title of Hoongwoo, he returned into Yunnan again, whither some of the rebel chiefs had urged a retreat of the whole force.

In September the Manchu commander died, and was succeeded in command by the Beira Chani, and Nguating was over the fleet. This fleet was of the greatest importance, now that the provisions of Yochow were brought by rebel ships from Changte. But the imperial fleet was stationed at Chunshan, and the rebels came and went at their pleasure; for as in winter the waters of the lake dried up considerably, the large imperial vessels were useless, while the smaller ships of the rebels sailed whither they would. The imperialists therefore, towards the end of 1678, built a hundred "crow" ships and four hundred and thirty-eight "sand" ships; all of which must have been of small draught, and were capable, in all, of transporting thirty thousand men. Half this number of men was transported across the river from Chunshan, to occupy the Changte road, and to cut off communication thence with the invested rebel city of Yochow; the other half across from Pienshan, Hiangloo, Shanboo, and Daikow, to cut off the Changsha and Hungchow roads. The numerous sails covered a 100 li of water in the winter, and the rebel fleet dared not show face. When two hundred rebel vessels started afterwards with a favourable wind against the imperial fleet, half of them were sunk by the cannon of a section of the light imperial fleet, which sailed much better than the rebels. Yingchi, the rebel commander, suspected some of his men of treachery, and had them put to death, with the result of causing three lieut.-generals, with their vessels, to desert to the imperialists. The garrison of Yochow, in February 1679, finding

themselves isolated from all aid, forsook the city, broke through the besiegers, and forced their way to Changte.

The fall of Yochow caused great consternation among all the rebels, for they believed that now Lurjin also would cross from Kingchow. The rebels of Yiling and Lichow, therefore, submitted, with all their vessels and men; and those of Changte and Changsha fled, burning and sacking as they went. Anchin Wang followed into Hungchow close at their heels.

There was therefore between the imperialists in Honan and Szchuen, no other obstacle than the very difficult passes of Chunloongwan of Chunchow, and Fungmooling of Wookang. The latter place was held by Gwogwei, the former by Hoo Gwojoo. Wookang was attacked by Anchin wang in person, at Fungmooling. Hoonglie, now governor of Kwangsi, attacked in the rear, and the main army for long attacked its front. Gwogwei was at last killed by a cannon shot, and his men fled. They were pursued again and defeated, and Wookang fell. At Chunloongwan the rebels had five camps planted to oppose the imperialists, who pressed long against them, neither side gaining any great advantage, till the imperialists discovered, and marched in by, an unoccupied path. They broke up the rebels and took Chunchow and Yuenchow. Gwojoo retreated to Kweiyang; and the road from Hoonan to Kweichow and Yunnan was opened up. The rebels lost a battle in Sishan of Nanning, in Kwangsi; and this province, with Hoonan, became wholly subject to the Manchus.

Beidsu Laita was ordered into Yunnan by Nanning. He several times defeated the rebels, twenty thousand strong, at Anloongswow, where there was the terrific pass of Shumunkan, whither the rebels retreated. One night a great noise was heard in their camp, and next morning it was discovered that they had been killing each other, believing that the imperialists had penetrated among them. The result was that they broke up. The imperialists followed and seized great numbers, pursuing the flying rebels into Yunnan.

In November, 1679, the troops of marshal Shao Liangdoong and Wang Jinbao, marched forward by two separate roads to

fight the rebels of Szchuen. Formerly the troops of Hanchoong took charge of all the army dues for Szchuen. As since the death of Sangwei the rebels were in disorder, Jinbao found it comparatively easy to take Funghien and Woogwan; and in spite of his exertions, Pingfan was compelled to abandon Hanchoong and fall back on Paoning, pursued by three armies by as many different routes. In February 1680, beside the hills outside the city, the rebel army of twenty thousand was defeated, the bridge seized, and the soldiers went pouring into the city. Pingfan cut his throat and died. Jumao and others were apprehended; and Shwunching, in the surprise of defeat, opened its gates. Liangdoong, passing Liaoyang took Yangpinggwan, crossed the Baishwi kiang river, taking Loongan; then crossed the Mingyooe kiang river and took Chungtu, whose commandant, with over a hundred officials, submitted. Hoo Gwojoo was defeated at Kienchang and Hingan taken by Toohai, while Yoongning and Mahoo fell to another division. The marshal of Hookwang defeated Yang Laijia at Dsoshan, took Kweichow foo on the north of the Yangtsu and Chungching, completing the conquest of all Szchuen. Just then the pirate Jung submitted in the east; but Jan Hoong and others, who had submitted, were again rebelling.

Jin Bao was ordered to remain in Szchuen; Liangdoong to march into Yunnan; and Anchin wang Yolo, with half his main army,—Mongols, Ninguta, and Woola men,—to return to the capital. The emperor met and fêted Yolo at Loogowchiao bridge. A fresh army under the Beidsu Jangtai, the great commander Fixing-the-far, was sent into Yunnan and Kweichow; and as these provinces were very hilly, the Chinese infantry went in the van, the Manchu cavalry in the rear.

Lurjin was then recalled to the capital, his incompetency proclaimed, and the various evils recounted which had been inflicted on his country by that incompetency,—as a city lost here, a province there, for lack of proper precautions against a vigilant and active foe. His fellow-commanders had been left by him to their fate while he was ingloriously idling all his time

in Kingchow, and his most guilty inactivity had permitted the junction of Jingjoong, Yenling, and Laijia, who were then able to bid defiance to the main army, which was kept in constant occupation, while the rebels harassed the country for years. As for merit, not a "foot nor an inch" had he. He and those principally guilty with him, were punished by degradation or otherwise, in proportion to their responsibility. Numbers of other officers who had lost cities by cowardice, or forsaken them in unnecessary haste, were summoned to the capital, and punishment meted out in proportion to their guilt. The emperor, at the same time, expressed his great sympathy with the army which had been so long in the field, and with the people for the unavoidable pressure of heavy war expenses upon them; and he promised both that the former would be suitably rewarded, and the latter relieved of their garrison taxes at the earliest possible moment.

In November the main army of Hoonan marched from Pingyooe on Kweiyang,—Woo Shufan fled back on Yunnan with Yingchi and over two hundred of his officials. While the prefectures of Tsunyi, Anshwun, Shugan, Sunan, &c., were taken by the imperialists in December, their few reverses were inconsiderable. But though their glory had departed and their Napoleon had no successor, the rebels were still far from being despicable or heartless. The imperial army had to be very watchful. Marshal Sanga was ordered to the dangerous passes on the Langkiang river in February 1681, and was opposed by a rebel army of ten thousand men, under the combined orders of Gwohiang, Chiloong, and Wang Whi, who had another army of twenty thousand, with their headquarters on the mountains south-west of Pingyooen. The passes were of extreme difficulty; and on pushing as far as they could, the imperialists, after a most arduous progress, came suddenly against a line of elephants which the rebels had planted in front. They were so terrified at sight of the elephants, that they at once broke and fled, in spite of the bravery of Cha Liwyoong, who seized a red flag and advanced alone against the enemy. Though he was supported, he had to retire,—but the number of slain was

enormous. Two days afterwards, Liwyoong marched in again, and compelled the rebels to forsake the heights, and to retire westwards to Kweichow.

Laita marched into Yunnan from Kwangsi, and united with the Hookwang army at Chüching, after he had several times defeated the rebels. In March he got to Yunnan. Ko Jwangtoo was sent on by Shufan at the head of several myriad of men, infantry and cavalry, with elephants in the van, to a place 30 li from the city, where a desperate resistance must be made to save the rebel capital.

Jangtai was commander of the Manchu left wing, Laita of the right. From early morning till noon was the battle waged. The rebels made five furious charges, and five times were they driven back; the number of slain on both sides was frightful. The imperialists hurled showers of stones from their ballistas upon the front line of elephants, to the sight of which they had got accustomed. The elephants became restive under this attack, suddenly broke loose, turned round and charged their own people, and trampled them down. The imperialists rushed forward at the heels of the elephants with a body of iron-breast-plated horse, and defeated the rebels, taking Gweihwa temple east of the city. They immediately drew their investing lines around the city, scores of li in circumference. In a few months Linngan, Yoongshwun, Taongan, Tali, and other cities, opened their gates. Gwojoo, Gwohiang, Ma Bao, had already been despatched at the head of a large army into Szchuen, had retaken several prefectures on Kienchang, Yoongning, and Mahoo. Ma Chungyin had also again revolted at Liwchow, Tan Hoong and others in the east of Szchuen, and the attention of the imperial army was again divided. On this close investment of the rebel capital, those generals were all summoned back to relieve it. But Liangdoong promptly took them in hand. He divided his forces, and attacking them from several directions so belaboured them, that from death, flight or submission, not a soul of them got to Kweichow. Even the letter which Shufan forwarded at this time to Dalai Lama of Tibet, also fell into imperialists hands.

Liangdoong, being free in Szchuen, now pressed forward to the rebel capital, and on his arrival, he drew the lines of circumvallation quite close to the city walls, for the wide circuit of the former siege had not had the least effect upon the city, though the army had surrounded it for months. Liangdoong dug three trenches and made three bridges, cutting off all access from outside. As therefore their provisions ran done in November, the rebels holding the south gate opened it and betrayed the city. Shufan and Jwangtoo committed suicide. The grand secretary was apprehended with Gwohiang and Ma Bao. There was just at this time a general pardon proclaimed to all rebels who would submit, except to Gwohiang, Gwojoo, Yoongching and Gwodso. All the chiefs of the rebellion then taken were beheaded; the bodies of some were cut in pieces, and the heads of others publicly exposed. Many of the secondary officers and officials were pardoned. Gung Jingjoong and Liw Jinjoong of Fukien had been already put to death, and their bodies were now quartered. Sangwei's men were declared incapable henceforth of bearing arms, and were condemned to be agriculturists. Shufan's head was exposed underneath the gate of Peking; and the old bones of Sangwei, who had at first travelled so far and so successfully in the cause of the Manchus, but whose every movement for years past had caused them fear, were, as a warning, cut up and scattered to all the provinces.

The spoils were enormous. The armies were recalled to Peking, and five million six hundred thousand taels paid them; while all the prisoners, save those guilty of capital crimes, had their prison doors thrown open; and the emperor congratulated himself that now he saw accomplished what he had from a child believed necessary to the prosperity of the country,—the disarming of the three great vassal princes. His ministers were justified in urging him to accept a high sounding title, in reference to and in remembrance of his great victory; but, as always before, he refused. Yet just as Sangwei, with his Chinese army, placed the Manchu imperial family on the throne by Chinese soldiers, so was he himself now defeated, his corpse

desecrated, his family killed or at the mercy of the emperor, only by means of the skill of loyal Chinese officers and by the bravery of Chinese soldiers. The Manchu generals, officers and men, in that sudden patriotic burst of southern China, recall the British bands of soldiers in the Indian mutiny only by contrast. They seem to have exhausted the fierceness of their bravery, and the fearlessness of their heroism inhaled in the air of their eastern mountain homes, when they attained to the possession of powerful empire and the command of immense wealth. The luxurious air of rich Peking seems to have greatly and rapidly unnerved the hardy mountaineers and their sons. And the arms which have best maintained the power and "glory" of the Manchu government in more modern times are also Chinese. Did the Chinese combine against the Manchus, or did those who were not actively hostile refrain from supporting them, the Manchus could not retain their power for a single month. But in the general character of their administration, in their attempts to further the interests of the people, and in their efforts to curb or modify the rapacity of all classes of officials, the Manchus will compare most favourably with any former dynasty of China; and the admirably wise manner in which, from their earliest history, they have shared office, with its power, its influence, its authority, and its emoluments, with the best educated Chinese, has retained them in the Dragon throne for two and a half centuries. This should serve as an unmistakable hint to India, which must ultimately come to be governed by us as China is by the little Manchu tribe.

During this war against the three rebels, which threatened for long to hurl the Manchus off the throne, the Board of War arranged an excellent system of postal communication throughout the whole empire. A clerk with a corporal and ten men, all Manchus, was located at every few miles, and a main postal station established every 400 li: so that, from the extreme west of Kansu, a distance of over 1600 miles or 5000 li, a despatch could be handed to the emperor in nine days, from Kingchow on the Yangtsu in five days, and from Chihkiang in four.

These were so well utilised, that during the war from three to four hundred despatches were delivered daily at the palace from the various armies actively engaged. So efficient indeed is this mounted post even now, that news of the disaster to the British fleet at the Taku forts was spread among the Chinese in Canton before the arrival there of the fastest despatch steamer in the fleet.

To prevent the possibility of such an outbreak again, the emperor abolished the title of prince or *wang* for the south of China; and since that time the title has not been given to any Chinaman, nor is it hereditary even among members of the imperial family. It was also then made compulsory for every official to statedly appear at court; and Manchu garrisons were placed in Foochow, Canton, and Kingchow.



CHAPTER XIII.

CHINA'S ABORIGINES.

THOUGH there has been more than one serious rebellion in China since Sangwei's bones were scattered over the Eighteen Provinces, detailed accounts of them would be beyond our present purpose. For there is no information worth the having from the recital of mere fighting and slaughtering, unless the geography opened up, or the talent displayed, makes it interesting. We therefore give only the barest notice of the formidable insurrections, styled the "Religious Rebellions,"—so called because their root was in the dissemination of some pseudo religious sect. The *Bailien kiao*, or the "sect" of the "white water-lily," was composed originally of studious people who pretended to heal diseases and abstained from meats, for purposes of their own. They composed litanies of their own, and magical incantations,—deceiving the multitude and making rich. Their chief was Liw Soong of Anhui. Having by 1775 fully indoctrinated Honan, this chief went to Kansu to propagate his "magical" religion, sending a disciple into Szchuen, Hoonan, and Shensi.

A man, surnamed Wang in Looyi of Honan, gave himself out to be a descendant of the Ming emperors, and thus set the conspiracy in motion. Immediately before this the sect had a proverbial saying always on their lips, that the "edge of the sword was about to be bared." An attempt to seize one preacher was unsuccessful, but the man Wang was apprehended. As he was only a youth he was not put to death, but banished to *Sinkiang* or Ili. There was an immediate ^{ar}rising; and the district magistrate of Woochang reported, that already the

numbers of slain in the districts of Tsingchow and Yichang were very large.

Just at that time the Chinese armies were fully engaged against the *Miao* (see below). The rebels therefore increased daily, till they threw all Shensi into a state of great confusion. The emperor ordered armies to march; and the viceroy of Hookwang sent one of three thousand men to Tsingchow, but all was utterly inadequate to meet the magnitude to which the evil had spread. In the beginning of the reign Kiaking (1796), we find slight successes of the imperialists largely rewarded, but blame distributed still more lavishly among the unsuccessful. At the beginning of the rebellion, Szchuen had no "religious" rebels. But there were, scattered among the mountains of the north-east of that province, many bands of soldiers, deserters from the *Kinchuen* armies, who lived by robbery. When, however, the White-lily sect found its way, sword in hand, into Szchuen, all these soldier-robbers joined it.

This rebellion spread over an immense surface—Honan, Szchuen, and Shensi—simply because the local authorities had not the sagacity to understand or the ability to cope with and crush the first risings. A whole volume concludes without an instance of a walled city falling before the rebel hordes, or even seriously attacked. This shows the Bailien Kiao to have been only a rabble. But the imperial armies opposed to them were under equally incapable men. For years battles were fought, decisive only in slaughter; and thousands of miles were traversed and retraversed in flight or pursuit; but as if without plan or purpose. Reading the history of this extensive and vexatious revolt, one feels the difference between the mid-age of the Manchu dynasty and the young vigour of its rise, when it could furnish a hundred leaders, any one of whom would have rooted out the headless revolt in a brief space of time. This month we find the rebels overrunning Shensi; but they are driven, or at all events retire, from valley to valley, leaving every village a smoking mass of ruins, passing by every walled city unvisited, and again they take their stand in Szchuen. Here they are pressed

by the imperialists, and begin their rounds till we find them next month in the north of Shensi again. Repeatedly is this game at hide-and-seek played by the rebels and their pursuers, with slight variations, till one at last appeared who had some brains, and earned himself a name and a degree. But how many leaders had been nominated and degraded! In the year 1800, an imperial army of over one hundred thousand men was in action against those rebels, and over one hundred million taels spent in vain efforts to subdue them.

This rebellion of the Bailien Kiao is to this day popularly ascribed to the Roman Catholics; and all missionaries are believed to belong to the magic-working sect, and to be in China only for revolutionary or political purposes. It was so believed at the time when the rebellion was at its greatest; so that the emperor had to give public denial to the general statements, and to say that the rebellion was not the work of foreigners, but had attained its then proportions (in 1800) only because of the incapacity of the local authorities.

As the rebels never ventured to attack brick walls, the villagers, always threatened, combined to protect themselves. The inhabitants of a certain number of villages collected at one village, which they protected with earth-works, and into which the combined villages retired on the approach of the "white lily" hordes. The valour of these hordes can be inferred from the fact that even these rudely constructed and hastily thrown up defences they were unable to force, in the face of such opposition as untrained villagers could show. But the emperor severely blamed the indifference of the dwellers in the walled cities, who had only to lock their gates and look from their walls at the rebels filing past beyond the range of missiles; for they should have gone out and defended the thousands of smoking villages in their neighbourhood. But a volume could not more truthfully delineate the Chinese character, than this one fact; for the very essence of the Chinaman's nature is utter indifference as to the well or ill-being of his neighbour. We do not question the existence



of exceptions, which however are very difficult to find in history or in actual life. The Chinaman faces danger with ease, and death with stolidity; but chivalry as understood and exercised where Christianity finds living examples of its power and nature, has yet to be in the history of China. There is certainly no people who have more thoroughly learned to "mind their own business."

The emperor also said that the war had proved the newly levied soldiers inferior in courage to those of the provincial militia; and that the viceroy's militia was surpassed by the volunteers who dug their own fosse and built their own mud-wall around their native village. He therefore issued orders to have the troops of every district, and of every group of villages, drilled in their native place, and not at the common provincial camp. It is needless to say, that however excellent that plan, when hearth and home were in danger, it has long ceased to be the rule. Those brave villagers were rewarded equally with the brave of the regular troops. Lo Suju, one of these volunteers, was the bravest and most successful of all the opponents of the Bailien kiao. So much so, that at length his name alone was sufficient to gain the victory. Alone he went on two several occasions into the heart of the rebel camp, when it greatly outnumbered the loyalists, fired off quantities of gunpowder to right and left of him, and then retired, leaving the suddenly awakened rebels to fire into each other with vigour till sunrise, when their greatly reduced numbers and complete confusion, compelled them to retreat. The regulars followed where his arm cleft the way for them, and called him Lo Sure-to-Conquer; for he was never defeated, and every stratagem of his was successful. He was there what Hue Yingwei was in the Tang army, but his reward came much more slowly. Certain of the regulars reaped the rewards of the victories planned by the fertile brain and worked out by the heavy hand of this countryman.

When the backbone of the rebellion was broken, the emperor expressed his great pity for those who had been made houseless and homeless, and gave them liberty to cut out farms for them-

selves in the ancient forests of the mountain gullies. He also proclaimed, on the occasion of his ordering the head of a captured chief to be shown round the provinces, that he was not waging war against a religion or a sect, but against men in open rebellion. And let me say here what I have stated more emphatically elsewhere,* that there never has been a purely religious persecution in China.

In 1802, after six years of arduous marchings to and fro, and of much fighting if no decisive battles, the emperor was delighted to be able to grant to Lobao, the Manchu general who had most distinguished himself, the title of the "Terrible Brave Marquis," of the first grade,—and to other officers, grades according to their merits, with other more substantial rewards, for having at length brought peace to Szchuen, Hoonan, and Shensi. He had sent a hundred thousand taels, by high officials, as a present to the soldiers, on the previous year, in consideration of their long continued services. And he honoured the bravery of the volunteers by asking them to incorporate themselves with the regulars. But Lobao said that the bravest of them were countrymen who had their own small properties, and would not join; but there was another excellent army of ten thousand men, composed of vagrants from all quarters, who were glad to take permanent service. The emperor also sent an official to make sacrifice to the gods of the mountains and rivers of those three provinces, and to inform them of the blessed peace. He also sacrificed to inform his ancestors. The four provinces, which had been so devastated, he exempted from the taxation of the seven years during which the war had lasted. The best men of the rebels had, however, fled into the mountains, whence they again issued after they had put to death many bands of soldiers which had endeavoured to root them out. The emperor believed that as they were where Li Dsuchung met his end, they might all similarly perish. But though they did not so perish, this revival was soon extinguished; for the rebels, or rather robbers, met everywhere those earthen ramparts all over

* "Chinese Foreign Policy."

that country through which they had formerly marched without opposition. For the people had throughout all those regions forsaken their small detached hamlets and congregated in large villages, which they surrounded with mud walls.

The author of the "Holy Wars" concludes his long story by saying that Yunchow of Shansi, Yichow of Szchuen, with Hanchung, Hingan, Hwayang, Heishwi, and Liangchow, were anciently thrown into one "Circuit" and placed under a commander, because of the immense strategical importance of that region. Indeed there was an end of the Bailien Kiao rebellion only when after innumerable marchings backwards and forwards over the same ground, garrisons of strong detachments were told off from the army for some of those cities, by which the rebels had always found a loophole. Nanshan and Bashan mountains also continually crop up as "gates" through which the rebels found their way.

Six years after the suppression of the Bailien Kiao revolt, the Fukien and Kwangtung pirates had to be chased off the seas. In 1811, the emperor visited Wootaishan, and the astronomer said that the star which then appeared moving in a direction contrary to the other stars indicated rebellion. And sure enough two years thereafter appeared the rising of the *Tienli* Kiao, the religion or Sect of the "Li" or "Reason" of "Heaven." It was also known as the *Bagwa Kiao*, or "Eight-Diagram Sect." This sect, like its predecessors, obtained much money by deceiving the multitude. Li Wunchung of Honan *Kuhien*, and Lin Ching of Chihli *Taking*, were the leaders.

Wunchung used astrology to deceive his followers, and promised that the "great event" would take place on the fifteenth day (full moon) of ninth moon (October), of Kiaking eighteenth (1713). His followers and believers were counted by myriads. Ching was to act secretly in the capital and to lean on the external aid of Wunchung. They were to strike their first blow when the emperor was on his way back from Moolankiwr, where an ambush would set upon him. The plan was so well laid and the secret so well kept that not a soul beyond the conspirators knew

of it. But the district magistrate of Kuhien, probably seeing something suspicious in the movements of the conspirators of that region who would naturally be less on their guard than those near the scene of action,—instituted a searching investigation which divulged the plot. He sent secret information to Gao Ki and to his prefect of Weikunfoo, and asked for soldiers to be ready for any emergency. But both his superiors regarded the matter as a jest. The magistrate however threw Wunchung into prison, and broke his shank. As the conspirators now saw their plan was discovered, and could not be carried out as originally intended, they rose on the seventh instead of the thirteenth, and three thousand of them broke into Kuhien, opened the prison doors, freed Wunchung, and put to death the magistrate who had exposed them. As soon as news of the premature rising spread, Doongming the Chihli leader, and Kin Hiang the Shantung leader, rose and murdered the magistrates of their respective cities, and seized their cities. When the emperor heard thereof, he gave immediate orders to the various governors to be prompt in their movements to suppress those risings ere they grew as did the last. But he was wholly unprepared for what was taking place at his own door.

Though the plot was prematurely discovered, Lin Ching endeavoured to do the best in his power to play his part. With over two hundred accomplices he entered the inner city of the capital through the Hüenwoo gate,—all hiding arms on their persons. In the city they drank and rioted, and then set out, a certain number towards the east flowery gate, and a certain number to the west, to push simultaneously into the palaces when no such apparition was anticipated; though, with the emperor in Mongolia, it is difficult to conceive what the hopes of the insurgents could be. They had previously secured the services of some eunuchs of the palace; and for mutual recognition were to cover their heads with a white napkin. One eunuch was outside the west gate, another at the east, to act as their guides. The party which entered the east gate was scattered by the guard. But the eighty odd who went in by the west gate,—their eunuch guide

pretending to have come from the *Wunying gwan*, of the *Shangyi kien*, "high literary inn of the eunuch-chief of the clothing,"—suddenly attacked and put to death the gate-keepers; but the guard of the *Loongdsoong* gate ahead of them closed it instantly, and through it the band could not pass. Two had found their way through the east gate during the short struggle, but they were seized and bound by a chief eunuch.

During the squabble the emperor's sons were in the Upper School House, and hearing the noise, the second son instantly ordered a fowling-piece, with which he shot an approaching "rebel" dead,—the second shot killed the next. Another fowling-piece, in the hands of a Beira, did similar execution; and this company, advancing by the *Yangsin* gate, fell back.

Those outside the *Loongdsoong* gate were not to be thwarted by a closed gate, and therefore began, as soon as they could, to set the gate on fire. But they were too late, for every moment now told seriously against them. As they were in the act of firing, the princes and great ministers in charge of the capital collected a band of soldiers, and attacking them from the *Shunwoo* gate, easily scattered them. It is indeed astounding that they should have persisted in their attempt to take the palace, when they had not taken it by surprise. It was all over when the fowling-piece was fired. The various conspirators hiding in the imperial river at Wooying, and around some of the palaces, were apprehended, and so were the eunuchs discovered to be in league with them. It would seem that the conspirators had planned the capture of the palace and the seizing of the capital as the alternative, when the plan for assassinating the emperor had been rendered impossible by discovery. The day was the same (15th). We imagine there must have been powerful wire-pullers behind the scene, and the active assistance of a number of eunuchs would seem to infer as much; and if not, one cannot but feel an admiring astonishment at this mad escapade of two hundred men attempting to seize palaces guarded by thousands of soldiers, and to take a capital garrisoned by myriads.

On the next day the emperor's sons, the princes and great

ministers, sent off a "flying" express to his majesty, to inform him of what had occurred. When he was approaching the capital, a thick cloud was seen to rest over the city; and the august company, being at a great distance from though overlooking the city, uneasy rumour concluded that the rebels had collected from all quarters, and were besieging the capital. They dared not therefore advance. But they ascertained next day that the cloud was one of dust and sand raised by a great wind. On learning that all was quiet, the emperor issued a severe reprimand to the officials with whom he had entrusted the safety of the capital, saying that so dire and strange a misfortune as this had not occurred since or in the Han dynasty;—which was true, as such an event is unparalleled in China. He invested his second son with the title of "Knowledge-Family-Wang," and the Beira with that of "Inner-Prince-Wang;" and at once appointed high officials to take command of armies and hunt down the rebels. Two days after he entered the capital, and the people were only then re-assured. The traitor-eunuchs were broken to death.

Though the viceroy and governors had received early orders, they did not move; and only the continued quarrelling of the salt superintendent of Shantung drove the governor to action after ten days' fight. All those dilatory officials were superseded.

Chihli was soon cleared, and the Manchu troops hasted to Kuhien, where the rebels were numerous, strongly fortified, supplied with a year's provisions, and under strictest discipline. They were besieged for some time on three sides of the city, when the leader of a band of roving robbers went in by the open north side and persuaded Wunchung to move off. As his leg was broken, he could not ride, but was compelled to go in a carriage. The retreat was discovered and chase given. Many rebels were slain or taken. Wunchung was hard pressed, and fearing to fall into the hands of his pursuers he burnt himself to death. His body however was recovered. A mine was successfully sprung at the south-west angle of the wall, and over two hundred feet of wall thrown down; the stones and bricks filled the air, and hundreds of the rebels were killed by the terrific shock. The

Manchu army,—which was a mile clear off the wall, retained for the assault,—galloped up as soon as they heard the report, and rushed in at the wide gap “like ants.” The mine was sprung in the early morning, and a hot fight was kept up till thick darkness fell. At night, three thousand rebels cut through the investing lines and escaped, but no fewer than twenty thousand perished. As many more of the aged, children, and women, were kept alive. With the fall of the city the rebellion was ended, and commander Na Yen had the honour of receiving the titles of Grand Baron and Grand Guardian. The fugitives who had fled were gradually recalled, and five months after its origin there was no living trace of that rebellion.

The history of the Taiping rebellion,—the most serious after Sangwei's with which the Manchus have had to contend,—has been so often written, that even were there greater novelties connected with it than there are, we must have passed it over. It is, perhaps, even more unnecessary to recite the wars of England and France against China,—the former directly or indirectly springing out of the opium question, the latter out of the religious one. It is sufficient to say that the Taiping, the British and the French wars, have given to China the first great push, and jerked her out of her conservative groove of ages. Dearly though she has had to pay for, and whatever may be thought of the causes of those wars, they have done her far more good than if she had been victorious. The west is however still a mystery to the east, and the east is yet far from being properly known in the west.

As this work treats of “China,” we feel it would be incomplete without a notice of the political relationships existing between China and the remnants of those aborigines who at one time occupied every inch of what is now Chinese soil. Equally interesting are China's relations with the Asiatic states bordering her north, her south, south-west and west up to the confines of Russia, but these we must omit. We confine ourselves now to the historical connection of the Manchu government with the *Man*, *Miao*, &c., who still inhabit certain portions of Chinese

provinces. We are entirely indebted to the "Holy Wars" for the particulars given below.

The south-western "barbarians" are called *Miao* and *Man*. They have no "prince," yet there are well defined distinctions between them; the *Miao* having clans with chiefs, and are living in fixed localities. The *Man* are all independent or "unripe savages," whether the *Jwang** or *Li* of the Kwangs, the *Yao* of Kweichow and the two Hoo provinces, or the *Po* of Szchuen. The *Gwo* of Yunnan are savages. Not one of these has a chief; and they are all mutually independent.†

During the Han period, the southern barbarian had chiefs a dozen, of whom Yelang was the greatest; the western barbarians had also a dozen chiefs, of whom Mimo was the principal in Yunnan; and the north of Yunnan was under other twelve, of whom the foremost was Chwngdoo.‡ They were first brought into subjection to the Chinese under the Chow and Han dynasties (twelfth century B.C. to third century A.D.). Since the Tang dynasty (seventh century A.D.), magistrates of their own people have been nominated by China, both prefect, sub-prefect, and district magistrates. During all that time the *Man* tribes held the *Miao*s in subjection. The Yuen dynasty appointed the ranks of *Hüenwei*, *Hüenfoo*, *Jaotao*, and *Anfoo* chiefs, and called those magistrates,—nominated from among the people themselves,—*Toosu*, or "local official."

The Ming dynasty had to camp several hundred thousand men to preserve order in the neighbourhood of Fanchow, Lanchow, Shwisi, and Lichüen; and the aborigines were defeated after much fighting. Then were appointed *Toosu* or local magistrates of the barbarians themselves, to be accountable to the Chinese

* According to Dr. Williams, the *Jwang* live in huts and clothe in feathers and leaves. The same authority locates some of the *Yao* in the north-west of Kwangtung, and some *Po* in the south-west of Kweichow.

† The Chinese state, not without reason, that the Burmese and Annamese are of the same race as the *Man* and *Miao*.

‡ The Han dynasty, after years of warfare, drove the aborigines out of the mid-land plains of China, and compelled them to go to the mountains, as the Anglo-Saxons drove before them the ancient British.

government for the preservation of order. Woo Sangwei and Gung Jimao were ordered to continue the system established by the Ming dynasty.

In 1664 the resources of Yunnan and Kweichow were directed against Ankwun, the leader of a serious revolt in the jurisdiction of Shwisi. He was defeated, and his lands converted into the four prefectures of Kiensi, Pingyuen, Tating, and Weining. In this attack, Sangwei himself marched by Chihinggan, and sent his marshal from Kweichow by Liwkueiho of Tafang, leaving his stores at Sanchaho, thus attacking in front and rear. When the Ming princes were fighting for the preservation of their imperial family, they counted a good deal on the aid of Toosu; but after these attempts were finally smothered, all the Toosu remained quiet.

There was an attempt made by the Ming dynasty to remove the aborigines to some other locality where they could be more accessible and therefore less troublesome, but so serious a revolt ensued under one Loong, that the attempt was laid aside though the aborigines were defeated. The Ming army did not march directly into Yunnan, but first made sure of the aborigines under Szchuen. The dynasty then changed Woomung, Woosa, Doongchüen, and Mangboo tribes, from the jurisdiction of Yunnan to that of Szchuen. Woomung and Doongchüen were in the neighbourhood of Yunnan; Woosa, Junhiwng (or Mangboo), and Fanchow, in that of Kweichow. The Toosu were therefore opposed to the change of jurisdiction, as Szchuen was so far away. Mangboo was converted into the prefecture of Chinhiwng or Junhiwng. Wanli of the Ming changed Fanchow into the prefectures of Tsunyi and Pingyue,—one under Kweichow, the other under Szchuen. The other Toosu were over 2000 li from the capital of Szchuen, and only a few hundred from Yunnan or Kweichow. The nominal jurisdiction was again changed to these two provinces, but the real power was still in Szchuen, to which the Toosu had formerly been compelled to subject themselves. The native Man do not cultivate the ground, but steal and kill animals for food. The border Chinese agriculturists are plundered generation after

generation, and the cabinet ministers have been unable to resolve on any action in reply to the never-ending prayers for help. One can readily picture the situation; for just at the time when the wild Man tribes issued on predatory excursions from their wild mountains, the central portions of Scotland were subjected to the similar raids of the equally wild Highlanders.

At length in 1724, in answer to the repeated prayers of the people, the emperor Yungching sent Artai as governor to Yunnan, with the powers of viceroy, to thoroughly investigate the circumstances. He reported that the Miao and Man were the cause of most serious troubles in Yunnan and Kweichow, to deal effectually with which it was necessary to move the aborigines elsewhere, because their frontiers were far too extensive, so that it was impossible to keep proper watch over them; and their disposition was comparable only to dogs* eating up their neighbours. He confessed that the effort to remedy the evils would be a formidable one; but without it no lasting peace could possibly be secured. He described Doongchüen as 400 li from Yunnan, and separated therefrom by a formidable mountain pass; but distant 1800 li from Chungtu. It was attacked and plundered by Woomung during the previous winter; and the Yunnan army had beaten off Woomung before the Szchuen army appeared on the field. Yet Doongchüen, Woomung, and Chinhiwng, were under the jurisdiction of Szchuen, and not of Yunnan; Woomung was only 200 li further from Yunnan than Doongchüen. He also stated that, from 1714, the Toosu of Woomung oppressed his people; for while the legal tax demanded from his tribe was only three hundred taels, he compelled them to pay a hundred times that sum. Four times each year his people had to pay a small instalment, and every third year a large tax. The small instalments were in cash, the large tax in silver. If one of his sons got married, he permitted none of his people to marry for three years after. If any of his people committed a crime for which death was the penalty, the knife

* This comparison arises probably from the fact, that almost all the aborigines have the character "dog" attached to their name, implying their savage condition.

was sheathed on payment by his friends of a sum of silver,—a few score taels,—but the criminal was thrown into a dark dungeon. The Doongchiüen barbarians, though for thirty years under close Chinese supervision, had not in the least changed their wild habits. On their borders were four hundred li of excellent soil, which the Chinese dared not cultivate. He promised that if those two Toosu were subjected to Yunnan, he would find means of establishing peace in those regions. He stated that the establishment of three prefectures and one lieutenant-general's station would suffice; and these, with the magistrates already under Szchuen and Kwangsi, would make about fifty prefectures, sub-prefectures, and hiens, under Toosu, appointed from Peking. The four prefectures he proposed to call Nanning, Taiping, Sungun, and Tsingyuen. He said that this was the plan adopted by the Sung dynasty when they twice defeated the Man tribes. He added that the border troubles all sprang out of quarrels between the *Toosu* and the *Toomoo*.* He proposed that Kweichow and Kwangsi should have their boundary up to the river *Chiangko kiang*; the region south of the river should be placed under Siloongchow of Kwangsi; and the north of the river under Poongan chow of Kweichow; while Yunnan should make the Lantsangkiang her south-east border; and even then the Miao country would be very extensive. The regions beyond the Lantsang would then be under the Toosu of Chuali, Burma, and Laojwa; the districts on the Chinese side of the river should be handed over to Dienyuen, Weiyuen, Yuenkiang, Sinping, Poor, and Chashan barbarians. When those people had their hands free from internal warfare, they sallied out into the midst of the Chinese lands, creating great disorder; and if pursued they fled to the regions beyond. They never ceased to be a border scourge since the time of the Yuen, down the Ming dynasty, and to that time.

As the emperor had the greatest confidence in the abilities of Artai, he permitted him to carry out the programme which he

* Apparently "elders" chosen by the people themselves; while the Toosu were hereditary magistrates nominated by Chinese government.

thus proposed; and with the title of viceroy over the three provinces concerned, gave him full liberty to solve the difficult problem in his own way. To begin with, the emperor at once placed the three Man regions,—Doongchüen, Woomung, and Chinhiwng,—under the control of Yunnan.

The viceroy began without delay to carry out his plans. Woomung and Chinhiwng were deadly enemies, and this gave him a good opportunity. He degraded the Toomoo of Doongchüen, and sent an army to look after Woomung. The native prefect (Toosu) of each of these tribes happened then to be of tender years, and the command of the army in each case devolved on an uncle,—the one Dingkwun, the other Loong Lienhing. A lieutenant-general was sent to Doongchüen. Dingkwun was called upon to acknowledge himself a subject of China and obeyed. The young prefect stated that Chinhiwng was then, three thousand strong, attacking his people at Loodien. Lieutenant-colonel Ha Yuenshung was ordered against that band, and defeated it several times, driving it back into Chinhiwng. Loong Lienhing was then summoned to submit; and Dingkwun, with three thousand men, was sent to compel his submission. Loong was defeated and fled into Szchuen. A prefecture was then established in Doongchüen, and a sub-prefecture in Chinhiwng, with a lieutenant-general stationed in the former place. This was in January 1727. And in this way was China still extending her borders.

Soon after this apparent subjugation, the Toomoo of Faga of Doongchüen, and the Toomoo of Mijan of Woomung, harried the border; and it took more than a year to seize the former. About the same time the Toomoo of Mijan fled before three hundred men across the *Siao Kinsha Kiang* (Small Gold-sand river). There, however, he was joined by the "Gwo" Man of Shamasu and Liangshan of Kienchang in Szchuen. Former enemies became common friends when the independence of all was at stake; and the pursuers were annihilated by some thousands of the combined tribes. The lieutenant-general and Yuenshung, now a colonel, were sent by three various routes against this formidable gathering. The troops of Kienchang and Yungning were placed

at the disposal of Artai; and he required all, for the various Toosu with whom he had to deal at one and the same time, from the Small Gold river to Kienchang, Shama, Leibo, Twundoo, and Whanglang, —spread over a line of 1000 li. The Toosu of Leibo was seized, and all the Toosu gradually came to terms, and the army under Yuenshung returned. The Toosu of Aloo was defeated with several thousands of his men; and Doongchüen was wholly occupied by the imperial army, and its taxation fixed at twenty thousand *dan* of grain, and ten thousand taels worth of sulphur yearly.

Dingkwun had by his bravery acquired for himself a great name, and he was nominated colonel of south of the river. He had sent his wife and children into the capital of the province; partly doubtless as proof of his fidelity, and partly, we may imagine, for their safety in those troublous times. He himself was sent to Peking, and had an audience of the emperor. His son, Wunfoo, afterwards went back to Loodien to look after his property. When he arrived he found the imperial soldiers acting so riotously there, that he began to plot a rebellion. He soon collected a number of men armed with spears and bows, but no guns. As the imperial officer was anxious only for peace, the rebels were able to take the city of Chinchung. They butchered every soul therein, soldier and civilian. This was the signal for a general revolt, and Doongchüen, Chinhiwng and Liangshan rose to the number of several myriads.

Artai, as in duty bound, sent off a specially swift despatch to the emperor, petitioning to be executed as a false and unworthy official, to have another sent to administer the three provinces, and an army at once ordered against the rebels. The emperor however "pitied" and left him at his post. He lost no time, after gaining this reply, in sending an army of ten thousand men of his own, reinforced by half as many Man soldiers, by three various routes against the rebels.

A band of four hundred of these broke up four thousand rebels and destroyed four forts or stockades; and three days after, fifteen hundred defeated eight thousand, slaying two thousand

and burning their camp. Yuenshung with a thousand men came up with a camp of rebels under Dangbin, containing half of an army of twenty thousand. With a spear in one hand and his bow in the other, the Manchu colonel rushed for the commander who was advancing against him, and transfixing him with the spear, killing another officer with an arrow. The rebels began to move slowly backwards, fighting as they retired to *Chinagang* where several myriads of their friends were spread over a line of 10 li in various camps. Yuenshung waited for the rest of his army, which in all counted three thousand besides one thousand Man troops. With his whole force he pierced the enemy's quarters at night, slaying right and left; but he did not shake them, and both waited the morning light. Various routes poured out long lines of rebels with the dawn, who attacked with fury, but were met with determination. The lazy great guns at length burst their silence and belched out consternation upon the enemy, and a simultaneous rush against their front and an attack upon their rear, threw the rebels into disorder and soon drove them into flight. Eighty rebel camps were destroyed and immense spoil taken. On the same day Yuenshung pushed on to Woohiwng. Henceforth so great was the terror inspired by Yuenshung that the appearance of his banner drove the rebels into retreat. His army was then under six thousand men, yet he divided it in two; one division to go by Loodien into Doongchüen, the other from Loongdoongshan into Chinhiwng. The marshal and lieut.-general with twelve thousand men were ordered against Doongchüen, but they dared not move in among the wild mountains. The rebels occupying Loodien were strongly entrenched in *Sangwan*, the "three gullies,"—the only routes into their lands. These are called, Shadowgwan, Daiwoogwan, and Dagwan.

Artai, fearing that Yuenshung in case of any untoward accident was too far from his base of communications, and much too far away among the mountains, ordered off four thousand of Doochuen men across the river to force their way through those three gullies, while Chinhiwng men were set in motion to swell his

army, for the three gullies were dangerous to meddle with. Szchuen men were at the same time sent against Liangshan. Just then Dingkwun came south from Honan, and was beheaded; —an act which we cannot but regard as unwise and unworthy, though the rebellion had been kindled by his sons. And even they had the justification of wicked conduct by the Chinese soldiers; just as inferior races have elsewhere had the same provocation from British and other European soldiers.

During the spring and summer ensuing (1732), numbers of the Chinese soldiers were struck down by the heat. The malaria which broke out among them and carried off two hundred men, invited an attack from the Gwo tribe of Wei-yuen and Sinping; but the slaughter of over a thousand drove them back again. The army pursued the flying Gwo to the Lantsang Kiang, and in among the mountains of *Mungyangcha shan*. This terrified the rebels, who said that the ancient Han armies never penetrated so far. When the army advanced, the rebels fled into Burmah; when the army retired, the rebels returned and harried the land. The soldiers had to cut open a road to that mountain range, each man carrying a hatchet for the purpose. By this plan the rebel communications were cut in two, over forty stockades were rendered useless, and *Li-wcha shan* was rendered innocuous. Deserters were employed as guides, and the rebels were employed against each other.* This decided the war. It took little time to clear all on the Chinese side of the river; and accounts were quickly settled with all except *Chuali* Toosu beyond the river. Poor was made a prefecture, and Tangchow established; each city was ordered to pay two or three thousand *dan* of grain per annum. The Toosu of *Mungyun* beyond Yungchang presented silver mines. The wild savages of the *Nookiang* brought presents of skin quivers from their country beyond Weisi. *Laogwo* and *Kingmai* kingdoms offered tribute, and Burmah was in terror. *Yenjang*, another territory subject to China, whither criminals are banished,

* The "Holy Wars" again and again recommend, as the best policy of China, this setting "western barbarians" by the ears!

and south of Yunnan, had, before Artai conquered the Miao, thirteen hundred stockades over an extent of country 3000 li in circumference. By the *Tsingkiang* they could sail up north into the Hoo provinces and by the *Tukiang* south into Kwangsi.

Troops were employed for five or six years on the borders of Kweichow, centered at *Kuchung* or Kwangshwun chow, under the former viceroy, to put down the MIAO. Several times were the latter defeated and their forts destroyed, but their leaders always escaped. The governor expressed his opinion that the same leader should not be a third time pursued, but Artai resolved that thrice he should be pursued. He therefore sent a general against him, who took and slew him with many of his followers. He seized at the same time four thousand three hundred bows and catapults, with thirty thousand poisoned arrows. The vanquished were ordered to change their dress, "tail" their hair, to live in houses and to cultivate the ground. Hence can be learned their former savage condition. Under the glow of victory, the west, south, and east of the province were attacked, where the independent barbarians of Kwangshwun, Tingfan, and Chunning had over six hundred and eighty stockades. Besides which, there were the independent Miao of Chunning, Yungning, Yungping, and Anshwun with 1398 stockades, covering a line of over a thousand li, up to the Tsingshwi Kiang, and the borders of Chunyuen of Kwangsi. They touched Hookwang below the "lake," and above they penetrated Kweichow and Kwangsi. The Miao had also their dens for hundreds of li along the *Kiwgu* ho, and the great and small *Tankiang* up to Kuchow; thus, in the heart of those three provinces, there were several myriads of fighting men enemies to the Chinese government.

There were two *Kuchow*, an "Inner" and an "Outer." The "Inner" looked towards Liping foo and is thence 180 li. There lives the chief, elected by the Chinese of that place. Its lands are about 80 li in circumference, with four or five thousand families, and over twenty thousand people; the *Tukiang* and *Yungkiang* flow on the right and left of this district. Circling round Inner Kuchow, and stretching north to south from 200 to

300 li, and the same distance from east to west, is "Outer" Kuchow, about 1200 li in circumference, with thousands of families and over a hundred thousand people,—a region which might have been divided into two or three sub-prefectures and districts. In 1728, eight stockades were taken on the Tukiang to open up communication with that region. Ambushes were laid along the great and small Tankiang, and the camp of the enemy was burnt. The defeated fled to the mountains, where they hoped to take the Chinese army by surprise by means of ambushes. But their communications were cut; and want of provisions compelled them to surrender, after they had sometime lived drinking blood instead of water. They made a covenant on engraved wood, and cut a stone as an oath. The army was then free to march on Tsingshwi Kiang. The men of Kiwguho were defeated, and presented their commander at the Chinese camp. The army then seized a hundred boats of the Miao, in which they crossed the lake; and a market was opened in which the Chinese sold salt and cottons to the natives.

When, after the death of Sangwei, his general, Ma Bao, fled towards the Hoo provinces, the Miao of Kuchow set upon him, took his cannon, shot and powder, and since that time they were reckoned the most formidable of their fellows. They had two chief stations,—one at *Lainiwtingtan* above the river, and *Yoongtoong* below the river. Those places were hitherto inaccessible to the army. But when, in 1730, the way was cleared, a number of Miao boats were seized, and a sudden rush made when the enemy least expected it. In this first capture of an outpost, spears, swords, and twelve thousand bows were taken. The army then started for *Lainiwtingtan* fort, and the first notice the Miao had of the attack was the noise of men and the trampling of horses in their camp at the fifth watch,—just before daybreak. The cannon were taken and four hundred prisoners. But the road to *Yoongtoong* was long, difficult, and dangerous. In that region the Tankiang flows crosswise at a distance of about 50 li from the Tukiang, and as many from the Tsingshwi Kiang. A canal cut between these three would make

them one river, and communication would be opened by which the large vessels of Kwangsi could sail up to the Hoo provinces.

Suling Chow had been long but bootlessly attacked by a lieutenant-colonel from Kwangsi with three thousand men; it now fell by surprise in one night. The same occurred at the Toosu prefecture of *Suming*, before which a Kwangsi lieutenant-general had wasted a year. This series of surprises broke down all opposition, and the border of the three provinces was restored to order. *Yiwyang* was eighteen stages (from 30 to 60 li each) from Chungching of Szchuen, under whose jurisdiction it was placed; but scarcely 300 li from Tungyin of Kweichow, from which its nearest Toomoo was only 100 li distant. The hill-sides were now all burnt down and sown; the good soil, fallow for countless ages, produced rice which grew eight feet high, with five or six heads,—several times more numerous than the produce of the long cultivated lands; while beans grew as large as chestnuts.

Artai was rewarded for his work with the titles of Count and Grand Secretary, and next year (1731) sent to the far west to secure the regions of *Altai* and *Balikwun*, which had burst into a wide-spread and dangerous rebellion.

In 1732-3, there were no field operations against the aborigines; but the garrisons on the Kweichow border, which the Miao covered for between two and three thousand li, had constant skirmishes. In 1735 the grain crops of the Miao failed, and there was again a general insurrection. The neighbouring rebels took *Wangkia ling* of Kuchow, and collected between Taihoong and Tsingshwi Kiang. To increase the difficulty, the governor and Yuenshung, now made marshal, did not agree. The rebels soon discovered the condition of affairs; and knew that while the cities were much undermanned, no more than half the available camp soldiers would be ordered against them. They therefore boldly sallied out against the cities; and a military station, with four cities, rapidly fell into their hands. They burnt the sub-prefectures of Liangchow, Chunyuen, and Suchow, with the prefecture of Chunyuen; and the wide country which

had no defending city walls, was thrown into the greatest terror. The garrisons of Taihoong and Tsing Kiang were again and again snared in ambushes, and all but annihilated. Yuenshung could march only three hundred men to Yanglao military station; but the rebels, hearing of the arrival of the marshal, and believing he could approach only with a large army, dared not march against Pingyue and Tuyun.

So serious had matters become, that in July the emperor ordered the available troops of the six nearest provinces to concentrate on the disturbed locality,—Yuenshung being made commander, and the marshal of Hookwang second in command. The concentrating armies were seen by the Miao scouts, and the rebels began to retreat among their mountain fastnesses. Yuenshung was not long in retaking all the captured cities, and then attacked the Chungan Kiang rebels to clear the way for Yunnan troops to join him. The wild Miao retired to occupy the communications of Taihoong, Tsingkiang, and Tankiang. The eight stockades of Chinese there demanded speedy reinforcements to save them from this increasing peril. There were by this time eight thousand Kwangsi men in Kuchow, and Kwangtung was pouring in provisions day and night. The Hookwang men rendezvoused at Chunyuen.

Yuenshung divided his army into three divisions,—one to march to Taihoong; one from Pakung to protect Liwlo, and to push on to Tsingkiang; and the third by Tukiang to save the eight stockades, the lieut.-general of which had been meantime enticed out by the rebels and slain. But the aspect of affairs had become so serious, that only a terrible blow could calm down the ardour of the rebels; and that blow could not be struck. A picked division of four thousand men was sent against Upper Kiwgu, as many more against Lower Kiwgu, and over five thousand against Tsingkiang,—stretching from Tankiang on the north to Kuchow on the south, west to the eight stockades of Tuyun and east to Tsingkiang and Taihoong, occupying several hundred li. Heavy rains fell and roads were turned to mud. Liwlo fell to the rebels, and Chingfu city soon after. Tankiang

was besieged half a year, and was saved from destruction only when it was on the eve of being starved into opening its gates. The rebels were unopposed, for the various armies continued on the watch in their camps, instead of pushing on and in. The rebels became bolder, and again marched out and burnt Liang, Chingping, and Hwangping. This adverse turn of affairs, in spite of the resources at his disposal, compelled the viceroy to memorialise from Hookwang, taking the blame entirely upon himself, and asking for merited punishment. Artai also petitioned that his countship should be annulled,—for this outbreak told against him too, as if he had left his work unfinished. Both petitions were carried out.

The emperor died in 1735. Several of the chief officers on the scene of action were recalled, and Jang Gwangsu was made *Jinglo* or dictator of the seven provinces. Yuenshung and the other chief officers were to be examined and punished. The new commander at once gave as the reason for the collapse of the imperial attack, that though it was not too strong to begin with, the army had been split up into several fighting divisions and garrisoning parties; while the Miao, civilized and savage, had combined in the common cause. The Chinese losses were enormous. A note states that ten thousand Chinese fell in battle and four hundred thousand died of starvation. Before the aborigines were finally conquered, one thousand two hundred and twenty-four stockades were destroyed, while three hundred and eighty-eight were left standing, seventeen thousand six hundred rebels were slain, and twenty five thousand taken prisoners; fire arms of various sizes to the number of forty six thousand five hundred were taken, with a hundred and forty eight thousand arrows, spears, and other missiles. We can learn the cause of this long, bitter, and determined stand of the Miao, from the urgent advice of Artai recommending that they should not be compelled to shave their heads; they thus fought for independence. He died in 1745.

Since this conquest, there were instituted over the Miao in Szchuen four *Hüenwei*, or arranging and comforting officials; five

Hüenfoo, or arranging and nourishing officials; three *Sub-hüen*; with twenty-three *Anfoo*, or tranquillising and Nourishing officials, or local prefects; thirty-two *Janggwansu* or magistrates; three sub-chiefs; thirty-nine Thousand-family officials; and one hundred and sixty-three Hundred-family officials;—all *Man* officials. To Yunnan was assigned one *Hüenwei*, that of Chuali; four *Hüenfoo*, those of Kiwma, Loongchüen, Kanwa, and Nantien; two sub-*Hüenfoo*; three *Anfoosu*; three sub-*Janggwansu*; four prefects, and four sub-prefects. Under Kweichow were sixty-five *Janggwansu*, with twenty-one sub-ditto. Kwangsi had under its care twenty-six sub-prefects; four district magistrates and three *Janggwansu*. There are several scores more of Toosu between Szchuen and Kokonor; besides others under the supervision of Dalai Lama. In Kansu there are eight *Juhwa*, a rank corresponding to major, with seven assistant and eight acting *Juhwa*; besides ten Thousand-family and twenty-three Hundred-family officials.

The *Janggwansu* and higher chiefs are nominated by the Board of War; and the prefects, sub-prefects, and district magistrates, all aborigines, by the Board of Appointments. Hence we can infer that the former are more closely identified with the aborigines themselves as their chiefs for warlike purposes, and that the latter, being wholly civil, are representatives of law and of the Chinese authority. Each officer collects the revenue and pays it yearly, or every third year. This consists of a fixed quantity of whatever the locality produces,—millet, rice, oxen, horses, skins, clothing,—all of which go to the Board of Revenue. These aboriginal offices are hereditary. The eldest son is always heir. He is nominated at Peking at an early age, and gets thence his seal of office. If the heir dies before succeeding, his son and not his brother takes his place; but a brother succeeds if there is no son. Failing a brother, the widow of the deceased chief or heir, and after her, the next of kin by marriage succeeds. But if there is no near relation by blood or marriage, the chief is elected by the people. A seal of guardianship or regency is given from Peking to a near relation if the heir succeeds while

a minor. But at fourteen he may assume rule himself by petition to Peking. An aged or frail official will have his desire granted when he prays for retirement. An inferior official, deserving well of the empire, is elevated in rank and raised in pay up to the rank of *Hüenwei*; and he is punished by a fine, or by degradation in rank, when he receives no salary.

The Miao of *Wanshan* in the south of the Hoo provinces and stretching into Kweichow, had long regarded the local magistrate as a high official, and the high official they considered as a god,—which was to the well-being of all parties. To assure complete security, the garrisons of Funghwang and Yungswi, Soongtao, Paoching, and Chienchow, among the Miao people, were within easy access of each other.

In 1791, some of the Miao in the neighbourhood of Yungswi, stole some of the magistrate's cattle. Measures were taken to punish the thieves, which however only stirred up a serious revolt. The Chinese colonists had but recently settled there, and the Miao occupied most of the country round about the city. About the same time "Stone-Willow," a Miao of Tungyin foo in Kweichow, was apprehended for agitating the people's minds by magic. His fellows immediately rose and burnt Liang, with the great camp of Soongtao. They were joined by the discontented of Yungswi. The major-general of Yungswi went to reconnoiter with six hundred men, and was joined by the lieutenant-general of Chunkiang, both camping at Yayiw. They were scarcely settled for the night when several thousand Miao burst into the camp and set it on fire; and 100 li were covered by their beacon fires summoning a general rising. The Miao of the regions between Chunkiang and Chienchow hastily responded to the summons, and the Chinese, who had no great guns, were compelled to retreat towards Yungswi. The lieutenant-general was slain in his attempts to check the impetuous charge, and Yungswi was instantly besieged. The aborigines around Chunkiang and Chienchow followed the example and surrounded those cities. The people eagerly joined the garrison of two hundred men in Yungswi to defend the wooden-walled city.

The lieutenant-colonel fled with his men, the civil sub-magistrate was murdered, but the citizens obstinately defended their hearths. Joo Loonga, the lieutenant-general of Kweichow, was besieged in the Chungta camp of Soongtao, and all the Miao borders were profoundly agitated. The viceroys of Yunnan and Szchuen, with their subordinate provinces Kweichow and Hookwang, were ordered at once to combine their armies and march into the disturbed localities. Chungta was speedily relieved and the Kweichow Miao pacified within the month (April). The siege of Yungswi was also raised after a desperate fight against the three thousand picked men sent on that duty. The marshal of Hookwang, with two thousand men, marched from Paoching to the north-west of Yungswi and seized the floating bridge. Several hundred rebels fell, and Whayuen was taken. He became the terror of the Miao who called him "Black Tiger" and "Spotted Tiger."

The main army started from Yungswi for Whangkwa in May. But they had the misfortune to lose a convoy of provisions from Kweichow, the rebels having put to death the escort. Chienchow was retaken by six thousand men, who defeated the Miao with such slaughter that they dared not again cross that way. Chienchow was in the east of the disturbed districts, Paoching in the north, Chunchang on the south, and Soongtao in the west. The Kweichow contingent had marched to Chienchow.

The Miao turned again their force against Yungswi, which they attacked with desperation day and night for two months, but men from Chungtu cut through the besiegers and the siege was again raised. The Miao was then alone; for the Man, of whom they were much afraid, had not then joined them. The main army had taken the stockade of Whangkwa in May; but the Great Wootsaoho, in flood, stopped them for two months, and it was August before they were able to cross and march to Kuchangying. They there took a number of stockades, and among the prisoners were three surnamed *Woo*, who said they were descendants of *Woo Sangwei*. The others of that surname summoned the "far and the near" to their standard, and the

summons was replied to by flocks of recruits. They had little influence over the main current, for the Chinese army surely if slowly pressed on, taking one stockade per month, till they, in May 1796, took Changkishan, only 30 li from Pingloong.

The Chinese had not, as under Yuenshung, divided their army; but while it was able enough thus to press on slowly after a year's fighting, it had at length to confess itself unable to look after all the troubled districts; nor did it feel itself free to detach so many men to its rear as would make the line of communication absolutely safe. Hence the Miao often pounced upon the convoys, and at length took Chienchow again. And by their harassing attacks on the Chinese rear, the army was brought to a stand still, as it had to send off a large force to bring up the provisions. Indeed at length so badly had their situation turned out, that several hundreds deserted to the Miao. The climate too was most trying, and the heat poisoned many, while the heavy rains brought additional trouble. Large reinforcements therefore had to be sent. Chienchow was a second time retaken and Pingloong was besieged in the heat of July. But this favourable turn of matters was shortlived. Those officials at the head of affairs issued a proclamation to the effect that the lands of the Chinese people would be restored to them, the Miao would have all their own lands, the old garrisons would be removed, and the only condition of peace imposed upon the Miao was to give up their arms. Though the proclamation was strongly disapproved of at Peking, it could not be improved; and after another year vainly spent, the army was recalled, twenty thousand of them divided among the various garrisons, with thirty-seven thousand Miao soldiers,—their pay to continue as before. The principal officers were upbraided, because, with the resources of seven provinces at their disposal, they had failed to carry out their commission; they were then degraded. The Miao army was afterwards scattered.

Three years after, the boldest of all the marauders, the Black Miao under Woo Jun, made a plundering raid into the country. Ting Yisiang was at the head of the army which went against

them from the east. He built as he marched and fought; set up forts or stockades of stone wherever he could find it; and congregated the people in large villages,—the houses of which he built of stone, so that they could not be burnt down by the Miao. His plan was successful, and quiet again reigned on the Miao border, which fringed over 700 li of the north, south and east of Hookwang, and 200 on the south-west touching Kweichow.

There was another revolt of Kweichow Miao in 1801; when Ting Yisiang, seconded by the new viceroy of Yunnan, drove them in upon Wanshan, and pushed in after them to if possible finally put an end to those troubles. There, in their own fastnesses, the Miao fought with desperation, and he made no progress. Leaving his main army to attack in front, he made a detour by night with a picked band round and on to the top of the hill under which the Miao were so stubbornly holding on. With dawn he poured cannon shot upon them from the height, while his army pushed with energy down below; and, notwithstanding their desperate valour, the Miao at length gave way,—ending the struggle by flight, but only after their camp was set on fire. Another Miao camp stationed below those, hearing of the flight did not stay to fight. Of the Miao two thousand were left in the valley. Ting was on one occasion exploring with a small band, when he was suddenly surrounded by swarms of Miao several deep, who let fly shot like hail; but as he would not move they became weary of the fight, and went away. In one month he took sixteen forts, with three thousand muskets, spears, &c., and restored Yungswi district to order. This was in 1806.

In all those engagements every advantage was on the side of the Miao. They were hidden among the mountains; their foes were in the open country. They had no fixed abodes, and could move about whither they would, avoiding the Chinese when too numerous to hope for victory; attacking them when a weak side was exposed; while they had every facility for laying ambushes, of which they always took skilful advantage. They ate little,

and could fast long; they dressed lightly, and could endure any fatigue,—in all of which they had great advantages over the Chinese troops. Hence Yisiang urged the employment of trained Miao to hunt down the rebels.

In the jurisdiction of Funghwang Ting there are over eight hundred villages built of stone; the Chinese residents in which are mostly trained soldiers, who till their lands, and are ready to defend them. Chienchow neighbourhood has ninety stone-built villages, containing eight hundred fighting soldiers. There are fully forty such villages in the neighbourhood of Paoching; and ten stone villages under Kuchangping Ting, round which the Miao are very numerous. Yungswi has over one hundred such villages. Up to the year 1808 was this process of building stone villages carried out, till there were established over one thousand villages with one hundred and twenty thousand *mow* of land under cultivation by those military villagers and their families. The eight thousand soldiers were joined by over a hundred thousand “wandering” Chinese families. But the soldiers with their families own most of the land. There were six free libraries and one hundred free schools established. The Miao of Hookwang also entered these schools, and petitioned to be permitted to compete for literary degrees. In 1811, the same process was going on; nor has there been any subsequent attempt at final conquest. Yisiang was made governor of the Ting and surrounding regions, and had suitable rewards granted him because of his valorous defence and successful administration.

Among the mountains forming the boundary line—where Hoonan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi meet, on the confines of the four sub-prefectures of the first-named province, called Hung, Yoong, Chun and Kwei, of Lienchow of Kwangtung and Chuenchow of Kwangsi, on the north of *Wooling* or the “Five Ranges”—dwell the wild people called YAO, of savage habits, and destitute of any form of government. They live in the narrow glens and among the precipitous mountain gorges of that wide region; and are in disposition of a savage, fierce and lawless nature, refusing to have any intercourse with the Chinese.

They seize by force, and the Chinese take from them by deceit. They despise the Chinese magistrate, and often act with rough rudeness towards him; and their Chinese neighbours, always encroaching, have long sowed the deeds of past hatred and future troubles, by their openly avowed desire for and attempts to secure the extermination of the savages.

Taking advantage of the grand meetings of those Yao in their gatherings to celebrate the worship of "heaven and earth," their Chinese neighbours of Hoonan and Kwangtung several times went in among the mountain hamlets, destroyed their grain, and took away their cattle. The spoilers privately gained over the magistrate and Yamun underlings, so that the wronged Yao had no redress. This hardship at length, in January 1832, roused them to fury, and Jao Jinloong stirred them up to rebellion. He sent Jao Footsai, a man of considerable abilities, highly esteemed by the Yao of Yoongchow, with three hundred Kwangtung Yao to join their fellow-clansmen of Tsiwchoong of Hoonan; and a band of between six and seven hundred marched against and burnt *Lianghokow* "Two Ports," and killed fully twenty of the men who had plundered them. The district magistrate of Kianghwa, with a lieut.-colonel from Yoongchow, marched against them with seven hundred men. But the Yao had become more numerous, and one thousand of them were posted between Changtang and Kiachoong. To counterbalance this increase, a lieut.-general and a sub-prefect advanced with several hundred men; and the lieut.-colonel was therefore able to defeat the Kiachoong rebels, taking many of their "dens," and slaying three hundred of their army. He advanced and destroyed many hamlets; the Yao falling back on the hills *Wooshwiyao shan* of Lanshan range,—having increased to treble their first numbers. The army at length feared a surprise in their post of observation, and retired; giving the rebels the opportunity to issue out of their mountain fastnesses, and ravage Ningyuen neighbourhood.

The movement had now assumed such proportions that Peking heard of it, and orders were issued to the viceroy of the

two Kwang to exert himself to crush it. At the same time the army posted in Lanshan prayed for reinforcements, and the marshal himself marched with over five hundred men for Lanshan. To escape the bad roads caused by the heavy rains, and to outwit the rebels, he avoided the main and commonly used road, taking a byeroad into the mountains. His design to take the rebels by surprise failed; for when he was entangled in a narrow, bad road at Changtang, he was in a moment surrounded by the waiting and watchful Yao, and not a single man of that force escaped to tell the tale.

Jinloong was at the head of the scattered Yao of Bapai, combined with those of Kianghwa and Kintien; Footsai commanded those of Changning and Kweiyang, occupying another line of road; and Jao Wunfung was commander of those of Sintien, Ningyuen and Lanshan on a different route, each with between two and three thousand men, and supporting each other.

The Kweichow marshal was ordered into Hoonan to occupy the place of the slain. Hoope troops were put in motion southwards, and the Yao borders were surrounded by a force of fully ten thousand troops. The Chinese armies had been hurriedly collected, and were not drilled nor drilling, nor had granaries been provided for them. Though numerous, they were therefore useless, and soon replaced by the men guarding the Miao and Man, who were summoned from the military settlements and stone villages mentioned above. The neighbouring cities were also ordered to drill their proper contingents. The sub-prefect of Kweiyang fought the army of Footsai, defeated, seized and beheaded him, slaying three hundred of his men. In a second battle he slew six hundred more. The men under Wunfung therefore melted away to less than half their first strength. But as the Sintien army had not come up, these marched out upon, attacked and took that city; slaying the district magistrate. The neighbouring officers who could have prevented that catastrophe did not move, and were therefore punished. The officers in command of the campaign were ordered to entice the Yao out.

into the plains, for that there they could be easily defeated, as they were hill people.

In April, Lo Sujü, the marshal of Hoope, arrived at Yoongchow. As the Yao mountains had many routes southwards into Kwangtung, he set the main army to watch those from Sintien, to prevent the rebels escaping southwards. The attack was then made by the only route into their mountains on the north or Kweiyang side; the west being watched at the same time. The rebels, who numbered about five thousand men with half as many women, were thus forced eastwards on Yangchuen of Changning, whence they had an exit by the river route, or by the land road. There they determined to make a stand in a fort of theirs, sending the non-combatants away. Lo got information of their position, and secretly sent messengers to the north army to push on and join him. Then, though the heavy guns had not arrived, he immediately besieged them, resting neither day nor night. When one of the Yao appeared outside or above the fort, he was shot with arrow or ball; and some scores of Chunchang men scaled a hill commanding the fort, and killed first to last about a thousand of them. The siege had not lasted a month, before the Yao "pretended" to sue for surrender, though they only desired to gain time to be able to flee. But Lo would give no terms, only pressing the siege the more closely. One of the gates was at last seized; and after a desperate encounter there, the Yao cried for quarter, which however was not granted, and fighting went on till six thousand of them were slain. There survived only about nine hundred men, who took up their quarters in a large house in the street, against which, however, Lo would not direct his guns, hoping to take alive Jinloong, whom he believed to be inside. But a fortnight after the fight it was ascertained that Jinloong, at the head of one thousand men, had made a desperate effort to cut through the besiegers, and in the conflict had been shot dead. When this was ascertained, the whole of the survivors were made prisoners, and among them Jinloong's sons, wife and daughter, with several scores of the men who had first risen in arms.

Lo had a two-eyed peacock feather granted him, and he with other officers had appropriate titles bestowed; Hoope was praised for its energy, and Kwangtung was blamed for its negligence. Though Jinloong had fallen, another Jinloong had two thousand men in Lanshan; who, however, soon disappeared before Lo. Another body of two thousand Yao penetrated into Kwangsi to plunder, but were repulsed.

The viceroy and marshal divided an army of six thousand men to march by three converging roads into the Bapai region. The Yao, terrified, sent messengers to offer submission, who approached the viceroy on their knees. He, however, ordered the chief to be beheaded, and most of the others were also put to death. This gave the courage of despair to those in the mountains, who determined to sell their lives dearly. The Yao mountains were there 400 li in circumference, and all the roads uneven, among narrow gullies with precipitous mountain sides and thickly covered with slim bamboo trees. The viceroy and his six thousand pushed forward among those difficult paths, desirous apparently of imitating marshal Lo in his exploits. But he was suddenly beset from all sides; many scores of officers and over one thousand soldiers were killed, while the rest found safety in flight. The Chinese lay around the mountains watching the roads, but dared not penetrate, fearing the fate of the viceroy's army; while the Yao, also wise and wary by experience, would not go beyond the shelter of their narrow ravines. For a score of days not a Yao was to be seen. A proclamation of pardon failed to make them appear, and only foreign silver coins and cotton clothes tempted a few to present themselves. They would not trust themselves in numbers, however; only three or four came out at one time, and no more than a few hundreds in a dozen days. War was thus impossible, no side daring to act on the offensive; and with the exception of three thousand men left to receive the submission of the Yao, the rest of the armies was sent away, and the Yao were left to themselves.

For his faithfulness in contradicting false memorials sent by officials desiring to hide the extent of the danger and their own

inefficiency, in bringing injustice and truth to light, and for his diligence in bringing the Yao to submit, Jiangun had a three-eyed peacock feather granted him, with the title of Goong (duke); while viceroy Li and his marshal were banished to *Sinkiang*, or Ili, or Kuldja.

The most remote source of the noble Yangtsu Kiang river rises almost right west of its mouth at Shanghai, but at a distance of twenty-four degrees of latitude. It, the Whang Ho, and the Bramapootra rise in the same vicinity. That remote stream flows from Soongpan, through "Outer" Tibet, under the name of *Tsoojin swi*, passing by Dangpa, and entering the Yunnan border through the lands of a *Toosu*. This deep and rapid river is called the *Da Kinchuen*, the Great Gold Stream. Another stream rises in the neighbourhood of the waters of *Dsanna*, and is called the *Siao Kinchuen*, the Small Gold Stream. After their junction they were known of old as the *Yoshwi* of Ningyuen foo; and at Whilichow as the *Kinsha Kiang*, the Gold-Sand River,—which is the name now given to the united streams in the south-west of Szchuen. Another name given to the united river at Whilichow, and often met with in Chinese history, is the Loo Kiang.

The *Da Kinchuen* is deep, extremely rapid, and in the centre a continuation of whirling eddies, across which passage is secured only by means of hide-covered boats, drawn by hawsers. The hills along both streams produce gold, hence the name of the river,—Kin or Jin being gold. The Wanshan mountains are covered with luxuriant vegetation, and the grounds cultivated by the aborigines produce oats and buck-wheat alone. The people live in rude, stone-built houses, and the nine *Toosu* or local officials appointed by Peking, are mutually hostile.

In the end of Kanghi's reign, the *Toosu* Jialubaneifoo at the head of his men followed general Yao Joongchi against the Yangdoong tribe of Tibet, and by his bravery acquired great renown. His grandson Solobun was created *Anfoo su*,—a grade higher than *Toosu*. He assumed the title of *Da Kinchuen*, making the old *Toosu* Juwang, *Siao Kinchuen*, to whom he wished to give his

daughter Agoo in marriage; but Juwang displayed no eagerness in his suit. It was probably on account of Juwang's refusal to consummate this marriage that Solobun drove him out of his district and took possession of his seal of office. The viceroy of Szchuen interfered, probably at the prayer of Juwang, mustered forces, and Juwang was restored to his native place. In the following year, the viceroy sent a major-general to make a treaty; but instead of giving a treaty, Solobun attacked and drove him off. The viceroy therefore prayed for permission to attack Solobun.

Jang Gwangsu, who was now viceroy of Yunnan and Kweichow, and who had won his fame in successfully solving the Miao difficulty, was ordered to attack the haughty Solobun. He was to march through Szchuen, to go beyond *Meiyogwan* border, and absorb the army of Juwang who was camped there. His brother Liang was nominated second in command. He divided his thirty thousand men into two armies. One had to march westwards through Szchuen to attack the stations on the west of the Great Gold Stream, among the *Gungtanga* mountains, towards which there were three various routes. The other had to march through the south of Szchuen, to attack the forts of *Luwoo wei*, where Solobun stationed, and *Haryai*, where his nephew commanded; to each of which stations there were two routes, and a detachment was to march forwards along each of the four. The rebels occupied several hundred li on the west of the river. As the roads were dangerous that year, on account both of the nature of the ground and the numbers and vigilance of the foe, he did not order a march forward, but prayed for an additional ten thousand men.

Next year, when they did advance, they were repulsed along all the roads. One major-general and a lieut.-colonel were murdered by their own soldiers who deserted to the enemy; and we have seen that many deserters also then fell into the ranks of the "White Lily" rebellion. Only one officer, a lieut.-general, gained any credit in that campaign, for he took Siling. Because of this failure, the grand secretary, Goong Nachin, together with the veteran commander Yao Joongchi, was ordered from the capital to the Szchuen army. The latter marched from Dangba against

Luwoo wei, and Jang from Siling for Haryai, against whose walls the lieutenant-general who took Siling and a colonel fell when fighting on the third day after arrival there, and Jang dared not thenceforth press the siege, but instead treated with the rebels;—and it will be remembered that it was his *treating* and not his fighting which pacified the Miao. Both he and Nachin were ignorant of the art of war, and a bitter quarrel between the two commanders did not improve matters. This indeed relaxed the bonds of discipline, and the soldiers became a rabble.

The young lady Akow was formerly intimate with Liang, whose scheme it was to have her married to Juwang; and we can hence infer the reluctance of Juwang to the marriage. Liang was as ignorant of the soldier art as his brother, but his close intimacy with Akow had the greatest influence on the campaign; for he naturally learned every plan from his brother the commander, and he as naturally informed his true love Akow of every move and proposed move of the troops, his brother all the while being entirely ignorant of this state of matters. Hence the rebels were never taken by surprise and never beaten; hence also three summer months passed and autumn came on, but not an inch of progress had been made. So disorganised had the Chinese become, that when they were attacking *Ladishan*, three thousand of them retreated before a dozen rebels who came rushing down the hill slope against them. So utterly barren was this second campaign, even after the accession of the grand secretary and the formerly victorious commander, that despatches arrived from Peking upbraiding Joongchi for having so sadly deteriorated. He exonerated himself by reporting that Jang still retained the command, and had advanced by the two routes of Siling and Kiasu, though Haryai lay between them, while if Dangba were attacked and taken, Luwoo wei, only about 50 li distant, could not hold out;—that Jang had reported the men told off against Dangba at ten thousand, but when escorts and store garrisons were deducted, there was an effective army of no more than seven thousand men, while Jang refused to listen to the officers who prayed for an addition of three thousand men;—and lastly, that

Jang was under the influence of a traitor. As soon as this memorial reached Peking, Jang was summoned to the capital, where, as his statements and replies were very unsatisfactory, the emperor angrily ordered him to be executed. Nachin was also recalled, and the first act of his successor Foohung was to behead both Liang and Akow, thus cutting off the possibility of communications with the rebels.

In February 1749, Foohung reported to the throne, that only on arrival at the camp did he ascertain the true state of affairs; that by listening to the advices of a traitor, camp had been harassing camp, and post annoying post; and that not a single division of the army on any one of the ten routes on which they were scattered, could move a step ahead. The army had lost all energy, and was incapable of fighting; and over a thousand men had fallen without the shadow of an object. Such indeed had the *morale* of the army become, that the first thing to be done was to dig a ditch and build a fortification round the camp, to assure the men of a rallying point. On the mountains around were over three thousand stone forts, taking which by siege would occupy more than three years. The local troops were so useless, that the only service for which they were capable, was that of acting as guides, while all the fighting would devolve upon the Manchu troops. Advance by the river was impossible, for both banks were most skilfully fortified. Jang and Nachin had each taken a fort, and then further divided their forces. He concluded by stating that on the arrival of the new commander, the rebels had put forth their utmost strength to build ever so many new forts, ignorant of the plan which he was now proposing to carry out,—that of massing the troops.

The disgust of the emperor on receipt of this memorial was so great that he ordered Foohung to lead the troops at once back to the capital. Foohung however did not act on this order, expostulating that the rebels if left in their then prosperous condition and untamed arrogance, would certainly fall upon Chinese soil and do infinite damage; better far, he argued, crush them first and then retire. And without

waiting for further instructions, he and Yoongchi combined their forces, though the order to retire was not countermanded. They marched immediately, and the great shout of the whole army outside his camp was the first intimation which Solobun had of the fate of his daughter and spy, and the approach of the Chinese army. He hurriedly sent messengers to Yoongchi, praying him to accept of his submission; but he was afraid to venture himself into the Chinese camp. To remove suspicion, Yoongchi rode into the midst of the rebel camp attended by a few followers; and the rebels on seeing him, shouted for joy and made an oath of fealty. Solobun and his son went out next day in a skin boat, and *kowtowing* before an altar, swore henceforth to be faithful subjects. Thereupon an unconditional and universal pardon was published, and the rebels on hearing thereof rejoiced greatly, and offered incense in gratitude to their gods, *Fo*, of gold. The two commanders were ennobled, and the emperor caused a stone fort similar to the "terrible Kinchuen forts," to be built on Hiangshan, in the capital.

But though peace was by this sudden and unexpected inroad thus happily obtained without blood-shed, there were so many petty insurrections by Solobun's nephews, and such constant irritation on the border, that Kienlung, in 1771, was roused to an angry determination, that Small Gold Stream must be punished at last. He therefore sent an army, whose general wasted a half year on the border of the lands in question, not daring to advance a step beyond. He was recalled to the capital, degraded, and "permitted" to commit suicide.

The grand secretary, Wunfoo, was ordered from Yunnan to Szechuen, and president Gweilin was sent to replace Artai, who had been located there for years. Wunfoo marched westwards by Wunchüen; Gweilin northwards from Tatsien loo. They were both ordered in the first instance to avoid any sign of hostility against Great Gold Stream, whose "faults" were meantime to be overlooked. Their first duty was thoroughly to chastise Small Gold Stream. In June, Gweilin sent forward three thousand men by *Moloonggow* gully, giving them five

days' provisions. They had well advanced when the rebels slipped behind them and shut them in. It was impossible for them to retreat, and they were attacked in front. Caged in as they were they could only die, and Gweilin left them to their fate. Though well aware they were thus cut off, he lay still when he could easily cut his way through and bring them off. The result was that only three hundred of that detachment escaped,—they finding an exit by the river. Gweilin was at once superseded, Agwei taking his place. The rebels were then pushed with such vigour that they were compelled to send the non-combatants to Great Gold Stream, they themselves making for *Dimooda*, the stronghold of Juwang; who however closed his gates against them, and they had to steal into Great Gold Stream by the gully of *Meiwogow*. The commanders then ordered the army, for some unknown reason, against *Dimooda*, and took Juwang.

They had still their main work before them, but had meantime given proofs of capacity sufficient to warrant the hope of a complete conquest. They had to decide their plan of operations, and fix upon their marching routes. Foohung had marched from Meiyo of Small Gold Stream, and in five days reached Haryai. Another route, starting from the bridge of *Weichow Kiao*, making a circuit of the enemy's territory, took twenty days to *Luwowei*. In the centre, between these, was the frightful route taken by Joongchi. There were still three more possible routes besides that by *Abo*. They decided to take these latter routes. Wunfoo marched in by *Goongha*; but after advancing some distance, found the route protected by invulnerable defences, and he was compelled to stand still. Agwei took the route by *Dangha*, and Fung Shuna that by *Chosujia*. They started in the spring of 1773,—leaving a strong garrison in *Dimooda* to look after Small Gold Stream. The commanders again imitated the policy of Jang, for a large proportion of their twenty thousand men were occupied in holding scattered forts; and though secret memorials to that effect were sent to Peking, exposing the dangers thereby incurred, the emperor gave them no credence, trusting in the ability of his generals.

The rebels sent a few men to spy out the condition of the main army, by surrendering themselves as deserters. As soon as they discovered the compelled inaction of that army, they sent a large force by a circuitous route against Dimooda, surprised, and stormed the place, annihilating the garrison. They also discovered that Wunfoo had neglected to secure his rear; he doubtless believing attack thence impossible. He had ten thousand in camp, besides several thousands who were standing guard over the stores. These latter were suddenly and without note of warning attacked from all sides; and when in their terror they fled to the camp, Wunfoo would not open the gates for them. This sign of indecision or of fear caused a general terror to seize the whole camp, and the sight of the gathering hosts around entirely unnerved them. So sudden was this attack that the army was wholly unprepared to resist, and Wunfoo was shot dead. The army was reduced to three thousand men. Small Gold Stream fell again into rebel hands. The scattered garrisons, hearing of the fate of the main army, abandoned their posts in terror, fleeing where and as they could. When Agwei heard of the disaster, he ascribed it to treachery similar to that of Liang and Akow, and had the natives in the vicinity of his camp all slain, or driven away. He also took possession of all the hide-boats on the river.

The emperor heard of the tragedy while at Zehol. He sent for the grand secretary Liw Toonghüen, whom he had left in charge at Peking to consult with him as to what should be done. His frank opinion was that the army should never have been sent to Gold River; but having been sent, it must be made to succeed at all costs. The late commander had joined Agwei in stating that one Manchu soldier cost there as much as three local men; but when matters had gone so badly, the emperor ordered south two thousand of the best Manchu fire-arm troops, and two thousand Kirin and Solon men.

In November, Agwei held the west route, Mingliang the south, and Shuna that by which he had marched against Yijia. Agwei now sought to join the others; and pushing in by *Akshu*,

he marched on, fighting day and night for five days, when he got to Meiyo, which he retook. Mingliang seconded him by way of *Marli*, and all Small Gold Stream was recovered.

It is easy, in the light of subsequent events, to question the propriety of seizing Juwang and taking Dimooda in the beginning of the campaign; for that proved the design of a thorough conquest of all the region, as Juwang had been in the former war so friendly with the Chinese. It is still less difficult to condemn the public execution of Juwang, which at this stage took place in the public execution grounds of the capital, on the ground that "those barbarians, ignorant of mercy, and of an untameable disposition, must be hunted down like wild beasts." We hear the same argument in support of similar conduct by people calling themselves Christians; but though it is more disgraceful to these, we must blame the Chinese for conduct utterly immoral; and immoral conduct in politics will always turn out to be impolitic, whether the transgressor be a Manchu or a British official.

The army was therefore now again massed together, and was to march against Great Gold Stream. On their way to Luwoowei, the mountains of *Lobowashan* formed the key. Against them, therefore, Agwei threw his strength, sending three detachments to converge upon the rear of the mountains by three various routes, while three others attacked in front. The mountain on which the main body of the rebels was firmly camped, is called *Namooshan*. But it was difficult to attack them there. Fung was ordered to attack *Yisi*; while in July, a bye-path was discovered which led to *Saipungpooling* Pass, commanding the rear of *Namooshan*. While the rebel army was wholly engrossed by a general attack on their front, Hailancha was detached by the bye-path, and was successful in occupying *Saipungpooling*, whereupon the rebels were compelled to abandon *Namooshan*; but made for the much more formidable *Sasujialing* Pass, where they determined to make a stand, as it was very steep,—the west side being particularly precipitous. Two stone strongly-built forts made advance by the Chinese army impossible.

After the most careful preparations, the army was divided into ten detachments, to march by as many routes, and make a simultaneous attack on all the forts; while Hailancha, with six hundred "dare-death" soldiers, was told off to scale that terrible west side, and take the enemy in the rear. So unexpected was any attack from that quarter, that they easily entered the fort, and exterminated the small garrison. The fate of this supposed impregnable fort threw consternation into the garrisons of all the forts in the neighbourhood; or, as the Chinese author says, the news "stopped their breath." With the flood of victory swelling the hearts of his soldiers, and fear possessing the enemy's lines, Agwei pressed on *Swunkadsoonglei*, the chief outpost of Luwoowei. The men there were so terrified, that they cut off the head of their chief, of his wives and concubines; sending them to Agwei with a prayer for pardon. He however referred them to Peking; and this refusal to grant them peace again roused them to the bravery of despair. A hundred plans he tried, but failed in them all.

Below the strongly fortified *Yirbasha*n, and above the equally impracticable hill of *Yoongkabo*, there was another hill, *Mogasha*n, which though strongly defended was scaleable. The whole army was therefore massed against this central post, and the hill was taken by storm; the Chinese camping on it, distant only about 20 li from Luwoowei. The men on the inaccessible hills above and below, when thus isolated and their communications cut, abandoned their posts. Detachments of Chinese took possession; the enemy retiring to another hill. But as it was cold December, the Chinese quartered in their conquest. A vigorous attack in spring drove the rebels back still further, they taking up a new position on *Langkasai*; and the two main divisions of the Chinese army found themselves separated only by the river.

For Mingliang had been as successful on the south route as Agwei on the north, having taken seven forts at Yisi; marching from *Changliang*, and forcing the *Langgoo* valley up to the west bank of the river. He proposed to cross and join Agwei, to march the combined army at once on the

stronghold of the enemy before new forts could be built. But before he could move, heavy rains began to fall; which continued, as is common there, falling for scores of days at a time. The river was converted into a roaring, impassable torrent, and the ground into a morass; for rain, snow, and deep mud are the rule there, and fair weather the exception. It was not before the middle of May that the first clear weather permitted the crossing of the river. Then Agwei sent detachments to Mingliang, under Fookangan and Hailancha, with orders to march at once on *Jiaswojin*, where only old men were ascertained to form the garrison. The troops on that side were immediately sent forward, divided into six detachments, each clearing the way before it, till in a short time all the natives within 20 li of the river were exterminated or fled, and all the forts were taken.

Agwei was not idle, for he moved forward in June and took Langkasai on the east of the river, drawing up within a few li of Luwoowei, and there he seized the temples *Kwunsailama* and *Lagoolama*. He rested there till August; and well he might, for then, when he moved to Luwoowei, he found it built of thick walls, surrounded by very strong forts,—on a small scale, like the forts M. Thiers had raised around Paris. Its west touched the bank of the river, and its east rested on the base of a hill of eight gradients, on each of which was a strong stone fort. The south was protected by wooden barricades, with stone forts at short intervals, for the space of a li, leading up to the main out-fort of *Jwanchinglow* tower. Towards this south the main attack was directed. The barricades were taken, and the stone forts fell. Next the bridge was seized to prevent escape, while Mingliang occupied the west side of the river to prevent any succour thence. Then at midnight of full moon of September, several out-stations were fiercely attacked and taken, after a fight which lasted till morning. The main out-fort *Jwanchinglow* on the south was then forced, and the flying rebels were all drowned in the river. This chief obstacle, preventing access to the main stronghold, was now entered by the Chinese, and Luwoowei was in their hands.

Next month the wooden city and stone forts of Sili were attacked, to force the way to Haryai, where Solobun's younger brother commanded. Cannon balls were showered into Sili like hail, the army drawing nearer and nearer raising wooden barricades for shelter at every step. When quite near the city, they took advantage of a wind blowing into the city, to hurl into it quantities of burning material, attached to arrows from their cross-bows,—and in a short time Sili wooden houses were level with the ground. Following up this success, a fortified hill was taken in December, whereupon there was only between the army and Haryai, the strong hill of *Margooshan*, which commanded Haryai. Many of the chiefs and women, therefore, came out to submit; but Solobun and the principal men were still at large.

Mingliang had meantime been busy on the west of the river. He had taken *Yoosai*, and drew up before *Urtishan* hill. Finding an opportunity when the garrison was unprepared, he stormed and took the fort. He took up a new post against *Yüyawoogooshan*, but finding his own resources inadequate, he prayed Agwei to send him reinforcements, which the latter could not spare, as his hands were more than full before Haryai. But when the rebels west of the river heard that Haryai was invested, they retreated, after they had begun to attack Mingliang in front and rear, and were hotly pursued by him and another on different routes, till, when he got to *Marbang*, the two divisions united, and all opposition gave way before them. These divisions were therefore free to join Agwei, with whom they united in January; the whole army now pressing on Haryai. They invested it all round, cutting off communication with the river, and firing their great cannon day and night. The commander at last sent out his elder brother to offer his submission;—his mother and sisters had already surrendered. He feigned sickness as the reason why he did not go himself; but Agwei would not receive the brother. The siege was close, flight was impossible, and only one termination of the siege could be expected; therefore, rather than wait the inevitable

storm, the commandant and Solobun came out with all their men, numbering only two thousand, and peace was restored in Gold River.

In the remarkably short space of eight days, the "Dew-cloth" reached Peking to the infinite joy of the emperor, who, in gratitude, offered sacrifice to the national lares and imperial ancestors, giving a new title to the empress,—beginning *Lu*,—in memory of Luwoowei. Agwei was created "the Upright, the Strategist, the Warlike and Brave Goong;" and all the ministers had a merry meeting over it, at which more spirits were drunk than was good for them.

This was in February 1776; the conquest of that gold district, of about 1000 li in extent, having occupied five years, at a cost of seventy million taels; while twenty years before, the armies of the same emperor traversed and conquered twenty thousand li of Djungaria, and the Mahommedan tribes of Central Asia, at a cost of thirty million taels. Kuldja, which Russia is retaining from the Chinese in contravention of her own distinct promises, is part of this Djungaria.

We gain some interesting particulars regarding these brave tribes, from a treatise on "War" in the "Holy Wars," which we give in the order of that treatise.

The armies of Szchuen regarded the natives of Gold River as the best soldiers ever seen. Their land is poor and cold, and they fight always among the mountains. They eat *Baogoo*,* Buck-wheat, bitter herbs, beef and mutton. They are of an ardent temperament, fierce and fond of gain. There were two training camps established after the above conquest,—one at Great, the other at Small Gold Stream,—each of five hundred men, and each man receiving about ten taels per annum. These are never at rest. They drill in spring and summer, and in autumn and winter they chase the game on the mountains. They heed not the frost and the snow, but they fear the heat of

* "Parcel-grain," which must be maize, so called from its cobs; but the usual name is *Baomi*.

the "Inner Land."* In the summer they therefore withdraw among the shadows of the mountain forests. When those men are required for military service, a notice of two months must be sent in advance of the time when they are needed.

They have all tiger-skin caps, ox-hide shoes, and on their bosom they wear a small Tibetan image, as a charm. They sling their musket on their back, and bestow round their loins their sword, roasted rice, dried food, and twenty or thirty catties of gunpowder. They climb hills of any kind with the greatest ease, and mountain passes are to them as level ground. In marching they must hold the van, as they are ashamed to be in the rear; they go to the rear only when it is necessary to cover a retreat. With their heavy and strong musket they hit the bull's eye from a great distance, and rarely do they miss it. They begin their musket practice as soon as ever the camp is pitched. By day they use a small pebble as target, by night a lighted stick of incense.

When they hear of an enemy, they march in the van, ten men doing the duty of a thousand. When nearing the enemy, they start ahead of the main camp at a distance of from 30 to 60 li, and in bands of thirty or forty men. A hundred of them hurry on by night to the enemy's camp, each with his musket; and with the first streaks of dawn, they begin the slaughter of the enemy, killing each his dozen of men, seizing grain, oxen, sheep, horses, or whatever property they can lay hands on, and fleeing with this when the enemy has prepared to fight. When fighting in rocky hills they go by threes, and when the enemy hurls large pieces of wood or rolls masses of stone against them, they dexterously hide behind a rock till the missile passes, and then rush on again. The rebels are so much afraid of this band, that they always retire when they hear of the approach of the Gold River contingent. The bravest are rewarded, like the Chinese army, with "buttons," peacock feathers, and the title of Batooroo, or "the brave."

* This proves those regions to be of considerable elevation, as the summer there is cool though in a latitude which in China rarely if ever sees frost or snow, while the summer heat is very great.

In 1837, a thousand of these men were attached to the main army, their rations costing only half of those of their Chinese comrades. Their chiefs petitioned to be allowed to raise a thousand men annually; and the "Holy Wars" would have at least three thousand of them enrolled in the main army of China. The Chinese author adds that if they were well trained in great numbers, while costing less than half the ordinary troops, they would render the army invincible; two of them eat the food of one Chinaman, and one of them is in battle equal to ten Chinese. He therefore strongly urges the Manchu government to employ them as regular troops.

In addition to the aborigines known as Great and Small Gold Stream there is another wild tribe on the north and north-west of Yunnan. It stretches from the military station of *Yuekun*, by *Abien*, *Mabien*, and *Leibo* to *Kienchang*, where its southern limit ends. It occupies north to south 1300 li, and east to west from 100 to 400 li of country, among the mountains of *Wanshan*. On all sides of it are precipitous mountains and primeval forests, and the mountains shutting it out from China are extremely difficult to cross.

This tribe grows *Baogoo* or maize, oats, *Koochiao*,* turnip, and red rice; but their chief products are oxen, sheep, and horses. They are themselves bad tillers of the ground, and get Chinese to do it for them. There is much waste land there, which, with the extreme cheapness of food and firing, tempts many Chinese thither. Those natives who live among the valleys with these Chinese are called ripe or civilized barbarians; the others living among the uncultivated mountains are the unripe or savage barbarians. Their speech, clothing, and head gear are entirely different from the Chinese, while their food they eat mostly uncooked. A hundred roads lead out of their lands and these have numberless branches among the glens, opening up everywhere among the mountains.

In winter they dwell in caves, natural or artificial, in summer among the forests. Their rooms they always make of planks of

* Said to be a spiny kind of sun-flower producing edible but bitter seeds.

wood. They are a black * people, and make plundering forays into Chinese soil in bands of from a hundred to a thousand. They seize Chinese and make them prisoners, but these can be redeemed by a payment of salt or cotton cloth. But there are great numbers of Chinese among them, enslaved to till their grounds. The blacks are least numerous in the valleys, but they are lords, their white Chinese slaves being far more numerous. A short residence among them changes the Chinaman into one like themselves; hence those Chinese are called, as distinguished from their owners or landlords, white barbarians.

This tribe numbers, all told, several hundreds of thousands. An expedition to tame them would be of great expense because of the difficulty of the roads and the fierce bravery of the tribe. They however have no firearms, only using wooden bows, small arrows, and a short, sharp sword. Their women join in the fight with great shouts. It would require, the "Holy Wars" estimates, ten thousand men to conquer them,—the Gold Stream contingent being of the number. This army could advance by five different routes, and it believes that the opening of the gold, silver, and copper mines, common among their mountains, would cover the expenses of such an expedition. But on account of the great cold, it would be impossible to move men that way in winter.

This chapter on the Aborigines of China will present us with a fair picture of the manner in which the Chinese have spread and occupied the extensive country now known as China. The Chinese began long ages ago, a small people, delighting in agricultural pursuits, but surrounded by tribes of nomads stretching far away from their side. They necessarily came in contact with those tribes immediately surrounding them. They had grain and diligence, which soon necessitated literature and civilisation, and which produced wealth in clothing, in money, and in material comforts such as nomads could never secure for themselves. That contact in such conditions led to inevitable collisions. The Chinese were often defeated and doubtless more often and justly

* Malays and Indians are called black by the Chinese, and we imagine these mountain tribes cannot be nearer black than the Indian is.

opposed in their aggressive movements; though these have all been by the plough, and never by the sword except under compulsion. But their increasing civilisation created a sense of superiority; their habits of diligence led to a persistent perseverance which the uncertainties of a nomadic life made impossible; and their labour in the soil and their house dwellings attached them to localities, which their interests and their feelings made dear to them, while nomads found no clinging attachments to any place in particular. Hence in the long run the Chinese were always victorious; and from the desire to be freed from annoyance, as much as from the compulsion of defeat, the nomads would abandon plain after plain, and forsake mountain after mountain, before the ever encroaching plough of the Chinaman. The Chinese began this kind of career long before the Anglo-Saxon; and we cannot but be particularly struck by the wonderful similarity of the emigrating growth of these two peoples, which have so much in common, and which with China won to Christianity, will be more similar still in the future. Much injustice we know was suffered by the nomads at the hands of the pushing Chinese colonist; just as much injustice is often inflicted by our western colonists upon the aborigines whether in New Zealand, in Kaffir land, or in the American States. Every new dynasty has extended the Chinese frontier, by adding new districts, shires, or counties, to its predecessor. We found Sangwei creating new prefectures and districts in the regions west and south of Yunnan, and we find here an extension resulting out of the hard fought Gold River wars. The Chinese empire was never more consolidated than under the present Manchu government. Nor do we see how the Chinese are to be confined within their present limits, or why they should not continue to spread till they come into contact with people who cultivate the soil as diligently and fruitfully as themselves, and whose intelligent industry is not much inferior to their own.

The Manchu armies have marched westwards through central Asia, penetrating the lands of the Kirghiz oftener than once. Northwards they have several times crossed the wild arid wastes of Shamo to the borders of and into Siberia. Across the frightful

passes guarding Tibet, with their everlasting snows and terrible precipices, they have gone and twice crushed the armies of Nepaul. Twice they penetrated Burma, and traversed Annam. From the recital of the story of these campaigns, though minutely detailed in histories, we refrain ; for our purpose is served when we have described the Rise and Progress of the petty Manchu tribe of Hotooala and the extent of its empire, and explained the various causes at work among the Chinese which made that extraordinary career of unheard of conquest a possible one. The historical facts related imply and unfold the principles of action potential among the Chinese better than any general statements ; and as the Chinese are now, the good and the bad, the patriotic and the selfish, exactly what they were then, the reader can himself understand the mode in which the Chinese will probably act and how they should be treated. If Russia had ever any serious designs upon the liberties of China, she is five years too late. China was deeply humiliated in 1860 ; she bitterly resents the humiliation and has ever since been taking steps to occupy her proper place among the nations. This she will assuredly do if no internal convulsion bar her present path. Then Russian conquests in a Chinese direction shall have ceased ; and if we persist in our opium policy,—a policy which attracts the scorn of all nations and the indignant resentment of national humiliation for the Chinese,—we shall have to fight for it. Terminated that policy must be ; much better were it destroyed by our own sense of justice, by our own feelings of morality. The influential future of China as a heathen nation will be a curse to the world ; only Christianity can make it a blessing.

CHAPTER XIV.

MANCHU IMPERIAL FAMILY.

NOORHACHU had two full brothers, Shoorhachi and Yarhachi, a step-brother by the number-two wife of his father, named Bayala; and one Moorhachi by a third wife. Noorhachu had five wives, apparently all at the same time; for the mother of Daishan, always called the first Beira, was sent for to live in Liaoyang, when the new palace was built there. He had besides a number of concubines. As a piece of curiosity we give the names of his wives and sons. His first wife's maiden name was *Hahanajaching* of the family of *Toongjia*. She bore two sons, Chooying the elder and Daishan afterwards Jangjing Batooroo. His second wife was *Gwundai Chafoo*, who bore two sons, Manggoortai and Duagoolei. His third was *Munggoojieje Nala*, daughter of Yangjinoo king of Yeho, who bore one son, afterwards the "emperor" Taidsoong. His fourth was *Abahai Nala* of Woola, who bore three sons, Ajiga, Dorgun, Dodo. His fifth, *Yirgunjolosu*, had one son, Abatai. The concubines had six sons, Adai, Yanggoo, Daita, Baibaboo, Taibaboo, and Hailaimooboo.

The eldest seems to have died young, for we find him march against Doonghai in the end of the sixteenth century, after which his name drops out of the history. His younger brother is always called first Beira, Amin is always second Beira, Manggoortai third and Taidsoong the fifth in order is always the "fourth Beira." The word Beira is the name of a bird which soars higher than ordinary birds, like our lark; and was given metaphorically to the sons of Taidsoo, but apparently not before the death of his eldest son. Taidsoong is called the eighth son

in the *Doonghwaloo*; so that there may have been other sons born who died in infancy, but the probable meaning is, that of all those sons mentioned above, he was born the eighth. It was beneath the dignity of Manchu history to state how many daughters were born among these wives and concubines, and we know there were daughters only because sons-in-law are mentioned.

Of the sons, Amin was the first to get into disgrace. It was when Taidsoong marched through Mongolia, down through the passes north of Peking, and against that city. Though he failed to take Peking, he seized a number of cities east of it, and among them Yoongping, where on his retreat he left Amin to garrison it and command the garrisons of all the other captured cities. But the sight of a Chinese army of two hundred thousand men threw him into a state of terror, in which he put to death all the Chinese who had deserted to the Manchus, took the valuables away out of the city, recalled all the garrisons of the other cities, and viâ Tsunhwa fled in fear for Mookden. In his eager haste he left his rear unprotected, and only a small portion of his men got into Mookden. He was examined, judged by his peers the Beiras and great ministers, and found guilty of sixteen great crimes, for which they demanded against him sentence of execution. The sentence was however commuted to perpetual solitary confinement. His family was taken from him, and his slaves, cattle, and property confiscated. Shwoto, second in command and an "imperial" son-in-law, was degraded, and his family taken from him. All the chief officers were found guilty and punished, each in proportion to the responsibility of his office,—a sentence the spirit of which is worthy the imitation of all civilized nations.

After mature deliberation, it was agreed that the sons of Taidsoo's concubines, his nephews and his younger brother, his sister and his queen's sister, and some other relatives, should be freed from the obligations of vassalage, i.e. they were placed on a footing of equality with the imperial family proper as far as compulsory state service was concerned. It was on Chinese

new year's day, 1636, that the sons of Taidsoo's step-mothers were called Aga;* and the descendants of the six ancestors, or all the descendants of Hingdsoo, the great grandfather of Noorhachu, were enrolled Gioro and ordered to wear a red sash. This is called the imperial Clan as contradistinguished from the imperial Family, which wears a yellow sash. They might abuse each other, but it was made a criminal offence if they abused their ancestors. This shows that the Manchus, and even the imperial family thereof, had already learned the Chinese form of direst abuse, that of vilifying each other's ancestors!

It was in this year that Noorhachu received the posthumous title of *Taidsoo* or the great ancestor, and his tomb east of Mookden the name of *Fooling* or the "happy tomb." The mother of the "emperor," who had died, was also granted her posthumous honours. At the same time all the Beiras were nominated "Family Wang," *Chin Wang*, or "Prince Wang" *Kün Wang* after the example of Ming dynasty. Then, too, was the style "Daching" "The Great Clear" dynasty chosen for the Manchu rule, as the Chinese reigning family had chosen the style "Daming" "The Great Bright," which probably suggested the other, as *Liao*, iron, suggested *Kin*, gold.

It was in December 1648, at the solstitial sacrifice, that the canonization of the ancestors of the young emperor took place. The emperor then worshipped Taidsoo with the same homage as that given to Heaven; and his four ancestors were also then "invited" to the post prepared for them in the imperial ancestral temple. But important though this event was, the emperor did not go in this instance in person, but sent a great minister instead, to worship heaven and earth, the ancestral temple and the national lares. At the solstitial worship to heaven, a paper is burnt, on which are written, among other things, the names of all those executed during the year; thus informing *Shangdi*, the lord of the emperor, that justice has not been neglected throughout the year.

On the paper burnt at this particular sacrifice, the following

* *Agoo* is the "son of the emperor" or "brother."

was written:—"The heir and son of heaven, and the minister * of heaven, presumes to distinctly and fully report to *Hwang Tien Shangdi*, that as long as the sun continues to rise it is of the utmost consequence that the rites proper to this day be carefully observed; and to report the same to our ancestors of everlasting virtue, rivalling that of heaven, and which will increase in splendour as the years roll on. On this eighth day of the eleventh † moon of the fifth year of *Shunchih*—1648—we sacrifice to heaven towards the south ‡ unpeopled land.

"We pay equal honours to our ancestors Taidsoo, and his four ancestors who founded the dynasty, who are now hereby canonized:—The first, prince Gaodsoo Dsai, to be emperor Jaodsoo Yuen, his queen to be empress Yuen; the second, prince Dsungdsoo Ching, to be emperor Hingdsoo Ju, his queen to be empress Ju; the third, prince Dsoo Chang, to be emperor Jingdsoo Yi, his queen to be empress Yi; the fourth, prince Kao Foo, to be emperor Hiendsoo Hüen, his queen to be empress Hüen. And we declare it to be of the greatest importance that sacrifice be offered to all these; and we do hereby solemnly enact the duty of such worship, in order that others may follow our example and worship their own ancestors with due reverence, that we may be thus complete and display a perfect heart."

A paper of the same tenor was burnt at the ancestral temple and at that of the national lares; and in the plenitude of his mercy there was proclaimed a universal amnesty to all criminals, and a reduction of taxes to all the people. The young emperor gave his empress-mother one grand title after another; and with the proclamation of the honour there was always a more or less

* All these terms are applicable only to the emperor, as the vicegerent of heaven, ruling over all the earth by the authority and in the name of heaven.

† Chinese month is lunar, the first day being new moon, and the fifteenth full. The new moon of our February begins the Chinese new year; and the new moon of December begins their eleventh or solstitial moon.

‡ The temple of heaven is a magnificent building in an immense enclosed space of ground, on the south side of the capital. The most potent, spiritual, or ethereal influence, the *Yang* or positive principle, resides in the bright, life-giving south; hence the temple is south of the city, and the emperor worships facing the south.

general amnesty. But we shall now examine as we can into the domestic relations of this grandly imperial family.

Human nature is precisely the same in China as it is in places further west. We find everywhere men grumbling and growling over the division of a spoil, in the eager acquisition of which they were most harmoniously united. And the family of Noorhachu were no exception. When Taidsoong died, his brothers nominated two of themselves guardians or regents for his child-son, the emperor. These were Jirhalang, one of the oldest, and Dorgun, one of the youngest of them. Dorgun seems to have been far the abler, the more strong-willed and ambitious, of the two; indeed he would we believe have assumed empire had he secured a sufficiently powerful support from some of his brothers. But as each of them had as much right as he to the crown, jealousy, if no other motive, would suffice to prevent his nomination. The child-nephew was created emperor, with two uncle-regents. Jirhalang seems never to have been permitted by his younger brother to assume any of the duties of the regency; and ever after the entry into Peking, Dorgun was the only acting regent.

This ambitious conduct could not but cause ill feeling on the part of his brothers. The first indication of division in the family was the refusal by Dodo, uncle of the emperor, to act as assistant regent;—he was nominated to the post after his successful campaign against the Mongols in autumn of 1647. After this refusal, the prince Jun Chin Wang, a younger full brother of the regent's was appointed to the post. In the beginning of the following year, several high officials, apparently creatures of the regent, combined to accuse prince Jirhalang of various crimes, which on examination were found proven and deserving of death. A sentence was passed against him of degradation from Chin Wang to Kün Wang, with a fine of five thousand taels. He was soon removed from the possibility of doing harm, by his appointment to the supreme command of the army operating against Hookwang, in the remote south. Prince Soo Chin Wang was also found guilty of crimes deserving death; but his sentence

was mitigated to perpetual imprisonment, and to the confiscation of his wives, family, and all his possessions. One reason for his crime may be found in the fact that, nearly two years after, the regent took to wife one of prince Soo's concubines. But his fancy roamed more widely still, for a few months later he married the princess daughter of the king of Corea.

The regent's power would be all the more firmly established after his two older brothers were thus shown to be so completely under his control. He was emboldened therefore, at the period of canonization mentioned above, to assume a more potential title. Instead of "emperor-uncle-father-guardian wang," he conferred upon himself the title of "emperor-father-guardian wang," and it was made a stringent law that every memorial transmitted to the emperor should be thus addressed. Without actually vaulting into the throne, he could not be nearer it. When he had thus isolated himself still further in his imperial greatness, he went, soon after the news of the fall of Canton before Kosi, beyond the border to hunt in the Mongolian wilds. He was there a month when he took ill and died at Kulachung, at the age of thirty-eight. His body was brought back to the capital. On the ninth day after his death, the young emperor met the coffin 5 li outside the *Doongju* gate, and knelt before it, presenting three cups of spirits, and weeping bitterly.

Next day, all the great ministers formally reported the sad event, and two days thereafter the emperor said:—"When the late emperor departed hence, all the princes and great ministers agreed to elect the late regent as emperor. He resolutely refused the honour, and nominated us to the throne. As regent he made peace in the far and the near, and he has united all the land again into one empire. His virtue is unsurpassed; his merit is full and complete: a thousand years will not produce his second. On the miserable ninth day of twelfth moon of 7 of *Shwunchih* at eight p.m., he ascended to be a guest above. Our heart is full of sorrow. The imperial rites of China and of the world shall be paid to his honour. *Wookoo!* alas! his kindness and justice to and for us were so great, we can never repay him.

His was like the kindness and glory of Heaven. No sorrow can be greater than ours, for we are as one fallen into and forsaken in the sea."

The emperor was then twelve years old; but with the new year he assumed the reins of government into his own hands, at an earlier age than that of the Grand Monarque. Six days after the above lamentation he styled the late regent:—"The perfect in virtue, the restorer of government, the increaser of patrimony, of unmixed merit, the pacificator of the people, the framer of good laws, the perfectly honest-hearted, the upright emperor." He also placed a tablet in the ancestral temple in honour of the empress-mother:—"The filial, correct, upright, reverential, virtuous, good, single-minded, meek, assistant of heaven, companion of the emperor." The tablets to the memory of the regent and his chief wife were placed in the ancestral temple at the same time. Honours were to be paid to these equal to what were given to the emperors; and a universal amnesty was proclaimed. In the proclamation then issued, reference was again made to the unselfish declinature of imperial power by the regent, and to his able and disinterested administration of public affairs for seven years.

But from these pleasant dreams of sorrow the boy-emperor was roused by a bomb-shell thrown into the midst of the court. Sooksaha and others joined in penning and handing to the emperor a formal accusation against the late regent of treason of the darkest kind. It appeared that he had got made an eight-pieced* imperial yellow robe, had prepared a chain of eastern pearls, and a rug of a black tiger† skin. He had sent two *Goosa*, or chiefs of Banners, to camp at Yoongping, preparatory to seizing the throne; and when he went to hunt,

* The emperor's court robe has eight circular embroidered pieces, on each of which are two golden dragons.

† In eastern Mongolia there is an animal of a very dark grey colour, called the black tiger. Its body is three feet long and one foot high, of a uniform colour, lives among the remoter mountains, is difficult to approach, and its fur is said to be of little value commercially. The tiger of the text seems to be strictly reserved for imperial use.

he pressed the emperor to go with him, to have him in his power. The emperor declined to go and the regent died.

These serious charges were ordered to be investigated and were found proven. The emperor commanded the register of the late regent to be handed over to prince Sin. The register contains a list of all the family, slaves, and properties of the possessor of the register; and the register was the only title to all those subjects. A few days thereafter there was an imperial proclamation, stating that all the princes and great ministers had formally denied any effort on their part to nominate the deceased regent to the throne; his own full brother, whom he afterwards nominated assistant regent, being the only great official who desired the regent to succeed to Taidsoong. They also accused the regent of ignoring the co-regent, his older brother, of habitually taking the seat of Taidsoong in the private apartments of the emperor, so that he might be the more respected and feared, of murdering prince Soo and taking his concubine, of ordering all documents to be addressed to the "Father-guardian-regent," instead of the emperor, and of violating all the principles of propriety in introducing his mother's name into the imperial ancestral temple. Professing that even the mention of such treachery deserved the death of the speaker, the princes and ministers bowed to the ground in asking that just judgment should be rendered. A servant of the late regent's gave corroborating testimony to all the main charges, and the emperor at last clearly perceived that the regent had indeed been intriguing for the throne. He therefore declared to Heaven and earth, the ancestral temple and national lares, that both his mother and the regent would be driven forth from the ancestral temple, their titles abrogated, the sacrificial honours abolished, and the proclaimed amnesty withdrawn. Justice was rendered prince Soo, inasmuch as his heir was reinstated into his father's rank and possessions, and other similar changes were made.

Five years after, a friend of the regent's dared to send the emperor a memorial calling in question the justice of the

sentence then passed. He declared that though all the princes had established for themselves an excellent reputation, that of the regent surpassed them all. The regent had continued faithful to the oath made to Taidsoong, and had emphatically opposed those who had desired to make him emperor. When he was in Peking, and the young emperor in Mookden, who could have prevented him had he desired to attain to supreme power? He was the first to meet and reverently to escort the emperor's carriage. His meritorious conduct should not have been forgotten, for there was no one to find him blameable up till the moment of his death. Then they condemned his actions, abolished his dignities, and in a pitiless manner broke up his family. No one could excuse his conduct in taking the concubine of prince Soo. But the merit of his general conduct was infinitely greater than the heinousness of this particular crime; and when he was judged, it should have been as a near relation. After showing that the design of the regent in possessing the various illicit articles in his house, was to present them at some time to the emperor, he concluded by saying, that "at the present moment, if the lands are not drowned by floods, they languish with drought; and what is that but the hurricane and lightning call to repentance, for is it not the doing of the unavenged spirit?" But the result of this minister's interference, seconded though he was by a powerful man, ended only in disgrace to both. For after two months' serious deliberation, the princes and great ministers decided that both were guilty of crimes deserving death,—which sentence the emperor commuted to banishment to Mookden. The emperor had previously, however, intimated his grief at observing the tomb of the regent falling to ruins and the walls crumbling down for want of attention. In spite of the great crimes, he ordered the tomb and its enclosing walls, together with the regent's dwelling house, its rooms, doors, and walls, to be thoroughly repaired, and the posts painted black. This occurred after the younger full brother of the regent was degraded several degrees, and from Chin to Kün Wang. And then the able if ambitious regent was permitted to rest.

In the beginning of 1651, prince Ying was found guilty of several crimes, and condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Two months after, he was found to possess four swords. The fact was evidence of improper designs, and the princes decided that as prince Ying had forfeited his life long ago and been spared only by the clemency of the emperor, who had provided three hundred women to wait upon him, and prepared everything he could desire, he was proved unworthy of such mercy by the possession of those four swords, and must in future be restricted to four women and his needful clothing, his food being provided by the proper Board; while all his other people, cattle, gold and silver should be confiscated. The restraint of his confinement seems to have irritated to a great degree the spirit of this Manchu prince, and he threatened to set fire to the gate and prison, making use of other threats and similarly wild language. The princes again deliberated in winter, and declared that he should be no longer permitted to live. The emperor therefore issued the necessary orders, and the prince committed suicide.

We may here notice a curious circumstance connected with the marriage of this boy-emperor. The Chinese emperor has always three empresses. There is a chief empress who occupies the principal palace, and she is called the Central Palace. The second empress occupies the palace to the east of the central one; she is usually the mother of heir-apparent, or has charge of him, and is called the East Palace. The third occupies the palace west of the central one and is called the West Palace,—each being named from the palace in which she lives. The chief empress is the first, who is chosen and married while the emperor is still a boy, and is usually several years older than he. After he is of full age he can choose for himself any and as many additional wives or concubines as he thinks fit. Besides the three palaces, there are six enclosures (*Yuen*), in which there are nine *Bin* or wives, and eight *Fei* or secondary wives, to whom are usually added hundreds of concubines. We are informed that the *Goongkwun* or chief lady of the harem has the oversight of all these imperial concubines. When the emperor

desires a new wife or concubine, all the great officials are ordered to write down the ages of their unmarried daughters; and they are usually delighted to have a daughter within the harem. From this list a large selection of young ladies is made, who are brought into the capital. Arrived there, they are carefully scrutinised,—beauty being an essential, but not the only essential requisite; and the principal duty of the *Goongkwun* is to ascertain that the young beauty possesses all the qualifications. This explanation is needful in order to understand the following.

In September of 1653, the emperor consulted with the Board of Rites regarding marriage. In ancient times, he said, the marriage of the emperor was considered a matter of gravest importance. The emperor should therefore choose his empress from a great distance, so that there would be no danger of troubles arising from her partiality for any particular persons at court. But his own empress had been chosen by the late regent, and chosen just because she was a near relative. The emperor had not chosen for himself, nor had the *Goongkwun* examined. Yet he could not say that the excellencies of his empress thus chosen, were of such a character as would entitle her to a place in the ancestral temple. He had therefore reverently informed the empress, his mother, that this empress was dethroned by him from being empress to be a *Fei*, and that she was removed from the palace to a side dwelling in a *Yuen*.

In February 1661, the emperor nominated the great ministers, Bai Soni, Sooksaha, Wobiloong, and Aobai, as guardians to the heir-apparent, to be at his “left hand,” and to guide him in public affairs. A few days thereafter he died in *Yangsin Dien* palace.

We have but few facts from which to infer the character of him who was the first emperor of the Manchu dynasty. He was elected to the throne when yet a child, and the real ruler of China was his uncle, the regent Dorgun, who retained the sceptre with a firm hand up to his death. The emperor was, from the earliest dawn of intelligence, placed under the best instruction, and while yet a little child was drinking in

Confucianism. One or two instances will show that he had learned the theory, if he did not carry out the practice, of Chinese ethics. A censor, on one occasion, drew his majesty's attention to the great importance of wearing the imperial robes and head-dress when giving audience or sacrificing. He replied that every dynasty had its own particular practices; but that the first duty of the emperor was to reverence Heaven, his next to love his people; for these duties were of infinitely greater importance than the style of his robe or the nature of his crown.

Soon after the death of the regent, when the young emperor assumed control of affairs, he said one day that all high officials drew imperial attention to grave matters throughout the empire, which matters did certainly demand the minutest consideration; but that not one had touched upon imperial faults, though it was impossible that the myriad daily acts of imperial government could be perfectly free from clashing with men's minds, or trespassing against Heaven's laws. This silence could not arise from his own faultlessness, but from the backwardness of his ministers. Yet though he could not compare himself with the great emperors and kings of the past, who were surrounded by men who spoke out imperial faults with perfect freedom, he was anxious to follow in their footsteps. He therefore declared his ministers bound to speak out when they saw anything remiss in his conduct, and to suffer no fault of his to escape uncensured. Even if, when the advice was given or the censure made, the emperor appeared to oppose the prayer of the memorial, the matter should be again and again referred to, till it received the consideration it deserved. "Thus," he concluded, "I may be able to examine myself, repent, and, with new strength, walk the straight path, that all the empire may find peace. If the minister speak out with propriety in his faithfulness, he shall be exalted, and not blamed even if he speak in bitterness. Let all the ministers know my mind."—Wonderful speech, entirely Confucian, from a young absolute emperor of about fifteen years of age. We shall see presently how it was carried into effect.

As if to take immediate advantage of this proffered immunity, a Manchu supervising censor of the Board of Works drew his majesty's attention to the case of a great minister of the Board of War, now some time in prison, waiting for examination, because he had offended his majesty. The prisoner was in danger of serious illness from the severely cold weather; and the greatness of the honour which he had formerly won for himself made the present shame of wearing a lock on his neck beside the public thoroughfare all the greater. He declared that the case was not one tending to the glory of the empire, nor in accordance with the known clemency of the emperor. The emperor replied that when any minister, Manchu or Chinese, was afterwards accused of covetousness or other wickedness, his case would be handed over to the Board of Punishment to be examined and sentenced upon on the spot, and thus make imprisonment previous to examination unnecessary.

The year 1653 began with a long continued drought, which threatened further famines; and the emperor proved his entire subjugation to Chinese teaching by again calling upon the ministers to declare his faults, on account of which such sufferings were coming upon his people; he also proclaimed a mitigation in the punishment of all prisoners. This drought of early summer was succeeded by floods in July. The emperor—stating to the Privy Council that rain had fallen uninterruptedly for months, till the whole country was one great ditch, “fuel dear and rice like pearls,” and many of the people perishing under their own falling houses—grieved all the more for the sufferings of the people that the blame was entirely his; and said that to understand his faults, he must examine his own mind and fear the commands of Heaven. The Boards were ordered to carefully investigate into all cases of distress, and all officials were commanded to be faithful and just in their public duties.

A supervising censor drew his majesty's attention to the fact that the *Chienching*—“Heaven Clear”—palace was being built anew by the emperor, and the work had been going on for

months. Lightning had destroyed the gate of the temple of the god of Agriculture, and the deluge of rain had ruined the crops and undermined houses and tenements. The censor had carefully investigated the Five Elements, and found that Earth cannot rule Water, hence Water riots unrestrained, Earth is endangered, and Wood floats. The emperor's building is a business of Earth and Wood, and the mind of Heaven is manifestly expressed against it. And in reply to the prayer of the minister that the works should therefore be discontinued, the emperor said that the reasoning was correct. But there was no stoppage, as another Manchu censor prayed a month after that the palace works might be stopped; and wished the emperor to desist from establishing a Yamun for the eunuchs. The emperor said that the memorial was in order, but in reply he would say that though he was establishing a Yamun for the eunuchs, he would be master, not they; and as the materials for the palace were already all collected, it was necessary the works should be carried out according to original intentions. But so serious were the calls for money that the former regent-uncle, with all the Beiras and princes, agreed in supporting the prayer of the censors; and at last the emperor agreed to stop the works and to distribute the money among the poor.

It is perhaps proper to explain that the Five Elements are, in Chinese teleology, regarded as the root of all things. They are Metal, Wood, Water, Fire, and Earth, whose ceaseless action and re-action, by affinity and repulsion, by combination and separation in proper and improper proportions, produce the endless variety of life and death, health and disease, in the animate and inanimate world. In any given human disease, the native doctor learnedly descants on the inadequacy or superabundance of some element which disturbs the natural equilibrium of the normal condition of the body, thus producing disease; and all medicine is administered to supplement or reduce the offending elements. But, however ludicrous the theory may appear, practice does not produce a large proportion of mistakes. This is not however the place to enter on this curious subject, which we

commend to the new lights now investigating the origin of life. In connection with this subject it may be said that Hegelianism is much older than Confucius in China. The notion that the existence of all being and visible things are produced, educed or evolved out of the unknown and invisible is the most interesting statement in one of the oldest of Chinese classics. "The limitless produced the great beginning, the great beginning produced the positive and negative principles, which produce all things."—"There is nothing new!"

We may also state in reference to the eunuchs, that though the young emperor was beginning to give them an independent position again, and might, had he lived long enough, have re-established them in somewhat of their old power, the opposition of all the ministers, and especially of the Manchu members, was so thorough and watchful, that every attempt at the resuscitation of the power which had been so ruinous to the late dynasty was emphatically put down as soon as made, and the eunuchs ceased to struggle for the power dear to their kind. But the labour and expenditure connected with the palace, if stopped for a brief interval, went on as before. Kaishung, a censor, reported, on the authority of a servant up from Tungchow, that boats were being employed by his majesty to sail to Yangchow, there to purchase girls for the imperial harem. But his Board found him guilty of listening to slanderous stories and disreputable charges against his majesty; while he was ignorant of the amount of furniture required for the Chienching palace. He was transported to *Shangyang poo*, to ruminate over his mistake. Even in 1657, the chief censor had again to pray that the labour going on at the palace might be at least delayed; as it was not of pressing importance. Thus did his majesty carry out his good intentions.

But worse than this neglect of the advice of his best servants, was his actual breach of faith: for we find, amid the warm discussions on the palace buildings, one censor pleading for the recall from banishment of some high officials, whose only crime was that of giving unpalatable advice, who were left in exile

when other ministers guilty of other crimes were recalled ; but the emperor would only remit the matter to the princes and great ministers, who must necessarily, in such cases, do what would please him. In 1657, the chief censor prayed that the cases of those ministers should be considered, who had been banished, degraded, or reprimanded, because they had spoken of floods, droughts, or tumults ; which prayer was again sent to the Boards. And in 1658, when a proclamation of an amnesty recalled many ministers sentenced because of public crimes, a censor petitioned that the same pardon might be extended to those officials whose fault was but one of speech. But the emperor angrily declared that this censor was only ambitious to secure himself credit by means of the amnesty ; so that he ought to be himself punished. The case was handed to the Board, which obsequiously decided that the censor should be banished ; which sentence the emperor remitted. This put a stop to prayers for those who had been guilty of finding fault with or deprecating the imperial conduct. So that, making all allowance for too great liberty of speech on the part of the censors, we cannot fail to see that the emperor was more wilful than dignified in his conduct, and that his manner of fulfilling a promise is another "trust not in princes." One lesson, however, he learned ;—for when, thereafter, drought, flood, or earthquake was threatening the anger of heaven, he always ordered the ministers to be truthful and the officials to be faithful, instead of generously undertaking the responsibility of all the guilt. The summons to repentance was invariably issued on the occasion of every extraordinary phenomenon of nature ; not only when those dreadful famines occurred from drought, flood, or locusts, but even in cases where the strange or disastrous phenomenon was very narrow in its field of action, or very remote in its place of manifestation. In 1663, soon after the accession of young Kanghi, a "black wind" broke suddenly upon a village in Liaotung, blowing down over a couple of hundred houses, and killing more than five hundred people. In January of next year, a censor drew official attention to a comet

which had appeared two months before, pointing north-west. For more than fifty nights had this comet been seen, during which period it had crossed twelve of the twenty-eight constellations, ceasing not to give out its feeble light; but virtuous conduct and truthful words would convert the threatened calamities into blessings. In recommending the spirit of the censor, the emperor ordered a reformation in all services, to be in accord with the will of heaven. But still the comet did not withdraw its baneful presence, or shorten its withering tail; for, in April, there it still was in the constellation *Gwei* or Pisces—the fifteenth constellation—whither it had moved its way from *Yi* or the Crater, where it was in November. Its tail was, in March, “five feet long.” In April, a universal amnesty was proclaimed, which seems to have been more successful than the call to reformation; for the comet ceased to appear on the records thereafter. In January, Venus had produced a white vapour “thirty feet” long; and in April, she appeared by day. In May, a great darkness suddenly fell upon the village of *Taipingtun* while it was yet mid-day. A tremendous noise like thunder was made by a stone which descended out of the sky, breaking in two as it fell on the ground; when it was found to weigh several hundred weight. In June, hoarfrost destroyed every green thing in the neighbourhood of Shansi capital, covering all with its deadly white for three days continuously. Just before the amnesty was proclaimed an earthquake, causing a rumbling noise, shook the capital; another, with loud noises, terrified the city of Yangkiang in Kwangtung; and Changte foo, in Hookwang, was similarly visited two months after. These were all so many calls to repentance, addressed by heaven to official China; and each was louder than its predecessor in demanding honesty in all offices, civil and military.

In 1652, we find his majesty seriously relating a dream to get its interpretation from the grand secretary Fan. He had dreamed that the bearers of flying banners, and the blowers of horn, bowed down to heaven, and immediately came against

them several arrows of the enemy, which the emperor caught in his hand. Then five men appeared, acting as familiar acquaintances, and saying that they were giving the emperor secret aid. The courtier interpreted the seizing of the arrows to indicate the apprehension of the rebels; and the bowing to heaven and the secret aid were said to be good omens. So dreams dont go by contraries there!

The third son of *Shunchih* had been willed his successor. This son is known in history as the "Emperor Holy-Ancestor, As-Heaven-Great-Fortune, Brave, Wise, Reverential, Careful, Forgiving, Filial, Respectful, Steadfast, Truthful, Correct, Peaceable, Meritorious, Virtuous, the Great Perfectly Benevolent." His mother was a daughter of a duke of the first rank, and was fourteen years old when she became his mother in April 1654. Her temple posthumous title is the "Empress Filial, Peaceful, Merciful, Gentle, Honourable, Beautiful, Respectful, Loving, Meek-so-as-to-reach-Heaven, Nourishing-the-Sacred." And the deceased emperor was nominated the "Emperor Equal-of-Heaven, Distinguished Fortune, Brave, Intelligent, of Supreme Literary Powers, of Great Virtue, Peacemaker, Celebrated, Most Benevolent, of Unblemished Filial Reverence." These titles are given as specimens of posthumous titles, and to show the qualities to which the Chinese and their eastern imitators attach most value. Many of the epithets in the longer titles are reduplicative; but the length of the title shows the degree of esteem in which the deceased emperor was held by his court; for the title is invariably posthumous.

The emperor had felt seriously unwell only five days before his death, when he called in two grand secretaries and the heir-imperial to "Nourishing-the-Heart" Palace, where he was dying. He nominated the four guardians, who, on the death of the emperor, made an oath to heaven. A similar oath was made by all the princes and great officials, on the fifth day after the enthronement of the young prince, whose reign is styled *Kanghi*, and a universal amnesty was proclaimed. The enthronement took place in the beginning of the year after the late emperor's death.

As a matter of course there are in any imperial house in China many events which are never made known, and there are some things recorded as historical which never did take place. This gives occasion to a good deal of curious speculation, and to endless stories among the people,—much of which may be true, much false. For the Chinese are not the apathetic people they are generally represented; but are full of curiosity, and too full of credulity,—a credulity, however, which is very considerably modified in the large body of literary men whose studies teach them critical scepticism. Among other subjects spoken of by the literates of China with bated breath, but intense interest, is the succession of Kanghi to the Manchu throne. It is a subject which may well prompt questions, and rouse curiosity. But as an illustration of Chinese credulity, we shall relate the story of the death of Shunchih and the accession of Kanghi, as related by some Chinese literates.

A Mahommedan, who was at one time marshal of Goobeikow, was an intimate friend of the emperor Shunchih. He renounced the world and devoted himself to religion, in order to become transformed into a *Shaihai*,—the Mahommedan equivalent to the Chinese *shun* or god. The emperor asked him whether, if thus transformed, he could be seen. He replied, “If your majesty see a flower of gold, you see me.” He then retired to a monastery, where he died. In the guise of a beggar he returned to the capital, carrying a parcel under his arm. He encountered a censor, to whom he said he had come to pay tribute to his majesty. “Whence?” asked the censor. “From *Wootaishan*,” was the reply. Next day the censor presented the tribute; and the emperor, on opening the parcel, found only a flower of gold. He considered it neither valuable nor beautiful, and regarded it carelessly, till he suddenly recollected his lost friend. “Whence came the tribute-bearer?” he asked. “From *Wootaishan*.” “Of what country was he?” “I did not enquire,” replied the censor. The emperor determined to go to *Wootaishan*, and went, taking his ministers with him. When they were ascending the second of the five *tai* or steep mountain sides,—rising one

above the other,—the path became impracticable for horses. The emperor, therefore, then got into a sedan chair, called *Pa-shan-hoo*, "Scale-the-Mountain-Tiger," borne by two men. When they reached the top, they found the chair empty, and Shunchih was never more seen on earth!

In the north-west corner of the present city of Liaoyang, is the finest pagoda in Manchuria. It is in memory of the *Hwai Wang*, Koong Yoodua, who was so serviceable in laying the foundations of the present dynasty. When Taidsoong died in Mookden, *Hwai Wang* was commander in Liaoyang. Taidsoong had loved him as a brother, Chinaman though he was. When the regent, at the request of Sangwei, was about to attack the robber Dsuchung, he consulted with *Hwai Wang* as to who of them should command the army; and their consultation resulted in his saying, "Whoever was commander, the other must be regarded as an equal, and not as a mere minister." When Shunchih was seated on the throne in Peking, *Hwai Wang* was ordered into Peking; and the style of the epistle led him to exclaim, "Is then the compact ended?" He went to the capital, but refused to make obeisance, demanding instead that the former agreement be carried out. For his contumacy he was beheaded; and all his relations slain. But his quick-witted young wife said, "It is an old law that one stroke must not kill two persons;" she was saved alive, and in a short time thereafter gave birth to a son. She was herself introduced afterwards into the emperor's harem; but her son, because not the emperor's, was sent to a man of the surname of Wang, and had that surname given him.

When the emperor Shunchih disappeared, he left no son. The princes and ministers were in the greatest perplexity; for they feared they could not avert civil war, whomsoever of the imperial Manchu house they might choose to succeed. They therefore decided to elect the boy Wang, and did so under the style of *Kanghi*. Shortly after his enthronement, Kanghi dreamed that he saw before him a man all bloody. On the morrow he told his mother, describing to her the man's

appearance. She uttered not a word, but wept bitterly. He pressed her for a reason for her conduct, and she at last replied, "you are not a son of the *Ching*;" and then related the preceding story. Kanghi became extremely angry at the recital, and would have issued orders immediately for the extermination of the Manchus, but that his mother forbade him even to seem to know the story of his origin. But when Kanghi was to be married, he would have none of the many ladies brought as applicants for the honour. He was then asked the kind of lady who would be acceptable, and he said, "one exactly like my sister,"—who was the daughter of Shunchih. At length Soni replied, "let her be sent to my house, called my daughter and then given him." And thus he revenged his father, by marrying the daughter of Shunchih, who believed she was married to her own brother. A Manchu, himself a magistrate and a literary man, informed the writer that it was the universal belief that Kanghi married the daughter of Shunchih, his own sister, and also corroborated the currency of the story that Kanghi was a Chinaman and not a Manchu; but no Manchu will of course grant the truth of the curious tale.

According to the Annals, prince Koong fought long and well for the Manchus in the south, and committed suicide because he was unsuccessful in holding Kweilin against Li Dingwo. His only daughter was educated in the palace in Peking, called an imperial princess, and given in marriage to Swun, who afterwards became a noted rebel, and was slain by Sangwei. But the story given above is as gratifying to Chinese pride, as it is illustrative of Chinese credulity,—for they always wind up the story by saying that the present dynasty is Manchu only in name, but Chinese in reality. The following facts will, however, explain the existence of so curious a tale.

Shunchih was the ninth son of his father, and born in February-March 1639. He became emperor in 1643, his style beginning next year, when he was five years old. *Kanghi* was his *third* son, and was born when his father was fifteen years old. But just half a year before this birth, the boy-emperor

had, for some reason, degraded his empress to be concubine. She could not, therefore, have been the mother of Kanghi. He declared that "he had not himself chosen, nor had the keeper of the harem examined,"—a statement which seems to imply that this degraded empress was his only wife. Yet within seven months from that degradation, he was the happy father of his *third* son. Out of these facts, it was easy to weave a curious story. But to us it is of any value only as illustrative of Chinese character.

According to the Annals, there were the usual wonderful appearances at the birth of Kanghi, to manifest his coming greatness. When somewhat grown, the favoured child had an air of majesty; his thoughts were lofty, his words correct, and all his acts according to the rules of propriety and reason. From the age of four he was fond of study, and had only to scan the line with his eye in order accurately to remember it. His father asked him at five years of age, on what his mind was bent; and he replied, that when old he would follow his father's example. At seven he ascended the throne;—and when his mother enquired what his wishes were, he replied that he desired only to see contentment rule all under heaven; that the people might live, be merry, and enjoy their possessions in the happiness of peace. Whether or not the child-emperor was so early imbued with these fundamental principles of Confucianism, his life was certainly spent in well-meaning endeavours to secure the peace and comfort of his people; and Chinese history, or any other history, does not present many rulers surpassing this one in his efforts to rule for the benefit of his people. He was a worthy successor to the abler founders of the Manchu dynasty. He proved himself capable of ruling through his ministers, instead of permitting them to rule through him. When Sangwei roused that terrible storm against the Manchus, he was the first in the capital to know of it, and informed his ministers,—showing that he was eagerly active himself, instead of ordering his proper work to be done entirely by deputy, as emperors usually do in China. He showed that he possessed military

capacity, by the strategical importance of the various points for the occupying and strengthening of which he gave instant orders. He crushed an insurrection which sprang up violently and suddenly in the capital; and when, in the ninth year of the war, the Manchu armies were flagging, he urged them to a difficult task by reasoning from military science. His mind, however, though fitted for the rôle of the conqueror, delighted more in conferring the pleasures of peace upon his people. And it was from his earnest desire to relieve his people from some of their heaviest burdens, that he originated those measures which resulted in the war of the three rebels. He was also an ardent student; but his delight in pursuing literary studies was not of the mere pedant or literate, nor of the dreamy philosopher; for on one occasion he said, in a conversation with his great ministers,—“He is the man of true knowledge who lives a good life, though his acquirements are so limited that he cannot explain even the rudiments of mental philosophy;” and at the same time he taunted his officials with their readiness to write or speak in praise of the virtues, while they were so slow in practising them. He also warmly censured and punished the highest officials, when he discovered them guilty of oppressing the people, or of permitting their followers to oppress them.

He was often grieved over the serious ravages of the Yellow River. He made many attempts to discover the real nature and cause of those ravages, and the possible means of averting them. But after years of painful but ineffectual efforts to discover those from his ministers, by means of special commissions and otherwise, he at last resolved to go in person to, if possible, see the evil for himself. His first journey southwards appears to have been in 1684. When passing through the classic ground of west Shantung, he loitered several days about Tsinan. He went to the top of the famous Taishan mountain, writing, in a book kept in the temple at the top, the two characters “Cloud-Peak,” as his idea of the nature of that steep and high hill. He scaled several other hills in the neighbourhood; and at the tomb of Confucius the “First Preacher,”—he performed the “Three

Kneelings and the Nine Prostrations" in honour of the sage. This is the Chinese highest conceivable form of reverence, the sign of the deepest veneration and adoration; and coming from the Manchu emperor, it must have been peculiarly gratifying to the literary Chinese. Again in 1689, did he find it necessary to visit the scenes of the destructive overflowing of the river. He passed through Tsinan, having left Peking in February, and got into Soochow and Hangchow three full weeks after. He crossed the Tsientang Kiang, went to the tomb of the famous king Yü, at which he sacrificed in person, performing the "Three Kneelings and the Nine Prostrations," and writing his name in the temple book. At Nanking, as he was returning, a native of the district presented him with a book, containing the secret of long life, called "Tried-Gold-Nourishing-The-Body." He returned the book to the author, saying that he did not believe in such things. He went thence to Tientsin by boat; so that the canal was in good working order. He got south to Hangchow again in 1698, on the same errand. For the same purpose he started in the winter of 1702, and was gone several days, when news of a serious illness of the heir-apparent brought him back. He said that next year he would visit the work on the banks of the river, and he fulfilled his promise by a careful inspection of both banks in spring. He spent a night at Yangchow, and climbed *Kinshan*, when crossing the Yangtsu. When returning from Hangchow, he sent a grand secretary to sacrifice at the tomb of the founder of the late dynasty, outside Nanking. In the winter of the same year, he went round by Taiyuen, returning by Honan foo. In early spring of 1705, he got as far south as Hangchow, and examined all the *Juyin* and *Siwtsai* to ascertain their poetical power; he found two worthy of mention. In Soochow a similar examination discovered fifty three respectable poets, and five in Nanking. When here he visited the tomb of the founder of the Ming dynasty in person, to show his respect. During his next visit, in 1707, he acceded to the prayer of the "army and people" of Hangchow, who besought him to remain with them a few days. He had expressed his conviction, from what he had seen, that

the Yellow River, on whose account these frequent journeys were made, would not much improve till a canal united the lakes and the *Hwai* river. During the preceding dynasty the *Hwai* ran with great force, and the River with a slow current; while they were now exactly reversed. He had also on the way, and not for the first time, seriously to condemn the manner in which the superintendent of the river works performed his duty; and Ashan, who was still viceroy, had his share of the blame.

All his journeys were not so placid as these made southwards. The early Manchu emperors spent much time in hunting. But in 1689 the emperor had to march an army in person, and perform the very difficult task of crossing the great desert of Gobi. Just as the Taiping rebellion enabled Central Asia temporarily to throw off the Manchu yoke in recent years, the greater rebellion of Sangwei, which strained all the resources of Peking, and long threatened to overmatch them, permitted Hardan of Ili,* or Kuldja or east Turkestan, to begin an independent career, which his bravery and ability soon made a famous one. He had gone from victory to victory, engulfing one portion after another of the Eleuths and more remote Mongols, so that Kanghi was compelled to go against him in person. The nature of the danger which he threatened to China, may be inferred from the fact that when Kanghi heard of his defeat, he was so greatly rejoiced that he gave special and grateful thanks to heaven. He was on his way against Hardan again in 1697, when he heard of the rebel's death, and ascribed it to the interposition of heaven on his behalf. He ordered a history of that northern rebellion to be written out; though he would not accept the special title of honour, which the prince and ministers offered him, and which had been frequently proffered and rejected before.

One incident showing the emperor's desire for popularity, or to please the people, occurred in 1694, when the temple of Heaven

* This is the bone of contention between Russia and China now. As might be expected, Russia is the guilty cause of the contention. China cannot but persist in demanding the Russian Court to fulfil its engagement to withdraw.

was built. An officer of the body-guard recommended the formation of two side paths on which the sentries could always walk, and by which alone the populace should be permitted to go; thus leaving the central avenue always free. The emperor said that the temple was for the benefit of the people; and of what use was it, if they were forbidden to walk within its grounds? If the soldiers had the power to keep the central avenue clear of people, they would soon drive them off the side paths.

A eunuch killed one of the people, and the Board of Punishment was at a loss how to act in the matter. The emperor said that no leniency should be shown to a eunuch guilty of crime. The eunuchs of the ancient Han and Tang dynasties were of a mild and gentle disposition, not mild and intractable as those of modern times. Eunuchs were of a disposition different from ordinary men; they resembled women, &c., &c. There was, therefore, no shelter in this emperor for that imperial vermin.

If the emperor thus proved himself so much interested in the welfare of his people, as to be ready to undergo much fatigue and trouble for their benefit, he was not careless regarding the comfort of the ministers who waited upon him and did his bidding. He said on one occasion that the Ming dynasty, for whose founder he always professed the highest esteem, kept the officials and ministers waiting a long time outside the gate before admitting them to audience; but that he had always considered it of great importance to attend punctually at the very minute appointed. He saw, however, among the officials several who had attained the ripe age of sixty, and some who were considerably older. These he would exempt from necessary attendance at so early an hour; and promised to give them free access at a time to them more convenient for presenting their memorials, or for stating their case. Thus they could take care of their aged persons, yet not be negligent in their proper business. This solicitude will be best understood, when we mention that the emperor always gives audience at daybreak.

Kanghi is praised as a most filial son, because, great emperor though he was, when the aged empress-mother died after a few

days' illness, in 1717, he conformed to the most formal etiquette of deep mourning, by wearing common cotton clothing or sackcloth. Twenty-seven years before, when she attained her sixtieth birth-day, he had made her a number of presents, worthy of mention because of their significance, if not on account of their value. First in importance was *Weiping* of carved stone, or wood-work, with designs in relief, and fixed in a stand; it represented "Long-life-without-limit-Heaven-granted." A flower was given representing "Long-life-as-you-wish-with-Peace;" a pair of flowers, meaning, "Tortoise-crane-extended years,"—the equivalent of "Long-life." He also presented of red coral fourteen hundred and forty *fun*, or twelve lbs. weight; one foreign clock;* one picture, representing the palace of the immortals of Long-life mountain; one thousand-years foreign mirror; one hundred-flower foreign mirror; eastern† pearls; nine strings each of coral beads; golden amber and "Resisting-the-wind-precious-stone;" nine fur robes; nine pieces of heavy satin, and nine of light; nine pieces of flannel; nine parcels of each of four varieties of fragrant incense; nine times nine of several kinds of precious stones; the same number of pictures of the *Sung*, *Yuen*, and *Ming* dynasties,—of bundles of incense, of large handkerchiefs and of small ones, of (ounces of) gold and of silver, and of pieces of satin; six horses ready saddled; a myriad grains of rice out of the imperial store, to prepare the "Myriad-kingdom-rich-grain-repast"; and fruits and various other things followed. It will be observed that these presents are all metaphorical as well as substantial. The number *nine* is translated by Dr. Williams in his excellent dictionary as the "highest," "perfect." The Chinese do regard the odd numbers as superior or *yang*, and the even as inferior or *yin*; yet ten is their ordinary expression to denote perfection; for as the Chinese have always used the decimal system, their "ten parts" make a "complete" whole. We therefore

* These foreign things were all got from the Jesuits.

† The pearls, anciently of Corea, and now of the Amoor and Songari, are considered the largest and finest in the world.

prefer to regard the number nine here as expressive of imperfection or incompleteness, as representing the wish that the term of years would be ever incomplete, and extended without limit. We have elsewhere noted that the emperor never bestows the highest possible honours upon any of his ablest and best servants till after death; for, it is said, if any servant gets the highest possible reward at any one period of his career, how can he be rewarded for excellent service subsequent to such honours? The number nine here may have the same significance. The occasion demands very handsome gifts; but the emperor wishes to convey the impression that his filial affection has not yet exhausted itself, or reached its utmost limit.

On New-year's day, a few years thereafter, his ministers presented Kanghi himself with saddled horses, satin, and a large variety of other things. But he refused to accept any of them; because if he did receive these, every official of the empire, from the highest to the lowest, would consider it his bounden duty to follow the example. But at their earnest request, he did retain the long-life *Weiping*, which was beautifully written.

The emperor knew something of proportion, and measures both of length and capacity. Once when discussing with his ministers a new work on arithmetic, where it was affirmed that the diameter of a circle was to its circumference as one to three, he affirmed that proportion to be incorrect; for that with a diameter of one, the circumference would measure 3.141; and that this fraction made a great difference when the numbers were large. This remark gave rise to a learned discussion on proportion among the exalted company.

When his majesty was at Yehol in 1711, he said to his ministers that the *degree* in the heavens corresponded to that on the earth; and that, therefore, the earth could be measured by observation of the heavens. He also then stated that a degree, in the *Chow* period, measured 250 li; but from the lengthened foot-measure of modern times, it measured only 200 li. He did not, on another occasion, contradict an assertion by one of his ministers, that the *Yi King* was the basis of all

measurement, and that western nations had a good method of calculation called *Arjoobar* (Algebra?), which was, however, originally borrowed from the east. Yet again, a certain president said that he could not understand how it was that in May, at *Heiloongkiang*—the Amoor—the day was so long and the night so short. The emperor was at no loss to explain it, by the fact that the sun was then north of the equator. He also seems to have established observatories over the country; for we find him comparing meteorological reports from the various provinces. He found that on the first day of that report, the wind was from north-west in Peking, and from south-east in Shantung; and he praised the accuracy of the ancients who said that, “if you pass the corner of a li, you find a change of wind.” The ancient books were also proved correct, which stated that thunder was not heard at 30 li distant; while modern cannon could be heard 200 or 300 li; for cannon fired at *Loogowchiao* were heard at Tientsin. He had also found those statements correct made by the ancients, who affirmed the existence in the extreme north of ice scores of feet thick; and that even summer could not thaw it. Another ancient statement was found accurate which mentioned a *Sishoo*—West Rat—of a myriad pounds weight; for a body was then discovered as large as an elephant, and with tusks, which however were yellowish. The Russians spoke of an elephant which burrowed underground, and died when exposed to wind; and the emperor declared that this was the *Sishoo*. The ancients again declared that all the “mountain-veins” of China originated at Kwunlun,—which name, scholars agreed, used to be anciently written *Kooloong*, or the Dry Water Shed;—which is certainly a good name for the Pamir Steppe. The emperor also stated that he had been studying geography for more than thirty years, and was now for the first time acquainted* with the ‘mountain-veins’ and the river-courses.

In the year 1707, Kanghi had already been emperor for forty-five years. His son, who had been nominated heir-apparent,

* For this knowledge see Appendix “Yellow River.”

and on account of whom he returned back when on a southward journey, was discovered applying himself to the use of magical means to ascertain how soon he would become emperor. Whether because of the frequency, or the notoriety of such conduct, it was made known to his father; and as the emperor believed it so serious as to demand publicity, the whole court was thrown into a state of consternation and confusion in the end of that year. The emperor entered a tower within the palace grounds, called to his presence all the princes, ministers, and civil and military officials, and then summoned the heir-apparent. When he came, his father commanded him to kneel down, and then, with flowing tears, declared him unfilial,—one who had forgotten the merit of his ancestors, and was now driven into utter wickedness by a heart full of iniquity and lawlessness. He then ceased speaking, but wept and sobbed most bitterly,—forbidding the unfilial son to come near his person. By sacrifice he made known this unfiliality to heaven, earth, the ancestral temple, and the national lares; after which he sent the undutiful son from the palace of the heir-apparent to an inferior one.

Two months after, in December, this son was proclaimed no longer heir-apparent. For resorting to magical rites and his lawless conduct, he was degraded from being a *wang*; he was to be confined to the palace whither he had been sent; and the *dsolings* or divisions of the three Banners, formerly called his, were withdrawn from under his orders. The emperor also nominated some princes and high ministers to investigate and deliberate upon the matter. They did meet; but the only resolution to which they could come, was that the matter was one altogether too high for them. This message they sent to the emperor by the hands of his eighth son. He would not accept it; but declared that as the crime was so great, and as the heir's mother was not to begin with of the most exalted rank, the wickedness must be clearly revealed.

There was, apparently, an attempt on the part of some of the chief ministers to recall the sentence against Yun Yi, the

degraded heir-apparent; for in February 1709, the emperor summoned together the imperial sons-in-law, the privy councillors, the Manchu and Chinese great ministers, and the presidents of all the boards, in order to discover who had originated the movement which had resulted in a general petition handed him by his eighth son to respite Yun Yi. Chinese-like they declared that no one in particular originated that matter, but that they all took spontaneous and simultaneous action in it. But if they were cautious, so had the emperor been; for he had previously discovered in secret the object of his quest. He now declared that he thought it passing strange that they should have all pursued one path, and independently of each other; but he was sure there must have been a privy councillor at the bottom of this matter; and he suggested that Ma Chi was probably the originator of the movement. Ma Chi, however, made a solemn statement, that he was wholly unaware of the matter before the ministers had taken their simultaneous action. The emperor then called upon privy councillor Jang Yüshoo, who mentioned that Ma Chi had said to him that all the ministers had agreed to pray for the restoration of Yun Yi. The privy councillor was probably saying now in public only what he had more minutely declared in private. The emperor said that the conduct of Ma Chi in thus privately influencing ministers, proved a nature ready to develop into treason, and it was proof of his eagerness to secure the good-will of Yun Yi; so that if Yun Yi became emperor, he would have full power to carry out his own will as supreme minister. Several of the princes who thus discovered his majesty's desire, decided that Ma Chi deserved to be beheaded. The emperor would not be so severe, but sentenced him to a less disgraceful death. For several days in succession, the emperor had the ministers before him, bitterly upbraiding and severely reprimanding them for their hypocrisy. He declared that he had now discovered their real desire to be very different from their expressed wishes; for while wishing him "myriad-years" of life,—a period longer than had elapsed

since the five emperors,—their words were false as were their hearts, which really desired his death, and for their falsehood they all deserved to die. Two continuous months of such imperial scolding, imply that his own mind was not quite decided as to what should be done to his unfilial son, and show that he was hurt by the petition in favour of his son, as indicating a want on the part of the ministers of a sympathy which he was eager to obtain to support him in dealing severely with the son, who had been discovered wishing for his father's death.

To prevent all such plotting for the future, and to close the question of the succession, he nominated Yun Yung heir-apparent, and performed the usual sacrifices. The choice was an unfortunate one; for in October 1712, he summoned all his sons together, and said that Yun Yung had been insane ever since his elevation, requiring men to watch him, and that all had now ceased to hope for his recovery. Next month the vermilion pencil wrote that Yun Yung's condition was such that no hope could be entertained of a change for the better, and that it was therefore necessary that he be confined in Hienan palace. An official was sent to make sacrifices, and to publish this sentence. Months passed without further action, and a censor at last petitioned the emperor to nominate his heir; but received the reply, that it was too serious a matter for him alone to decide; and the ministers were called upon to consider it. This resulted in nothing; and in 1718, Tienbao, the *Kientao* member of the *Hanlin* Academy formally prayed that the degraded heir be re-nominated heir-apparent, for that this prince was of a superior character and an excellent disposition, delighting in the society of good men; and no man could for a moment compare him with a madman. He was supported in his prayer by his father. But the prayer greatly irritated the emperor. In deference to the imperial anger, Tienbao acknowledged himself guilty of crime and craved the death which he deserved. The emperor ordered the Boards to examine the criminal, and to judge the crime with severity. The Boards were

apparently slow to act, and, a month after, the emperor, in reply to an appeal from a president, sentenced Tienbao to death, and his father to the loss of his wife and family, who were confiscated to the emperor's use. The sentence was thus severe because Tienbao was guilty of conduct which had reached the climax of unfaithfulness and unfiliality. The lack of faithfulness in a minister and the want of filial conduct in a son, are in Chinese law the most heinous of all crimes. Some time after this event, the emperor took credit to himself, before all the ministers, in that he did not put his son to death, as did the emperor *Woo* of Han, in similar circumstances. The latter did afterwards bitterly repent that deed; but as for himself, he had never done anything which had ever caused him regret.

His large family of sons by many mothers, could not however continue a very affectionate one, especially while the succession was an open question; for each would have his own clique of followers or flatterers who would do the idle young princes no good. The fourteenth son was made, doubtless from such reason, commander *Help-the-far*, and was sent to command the army against the *Eleuths* in the remote west.

In the midst of these family troubles Kanghi's long reign was drawing to a close. In the middle of the eleventh moon of the sixty-first year of his nominal, or the sixty second of his actual reign, he took suddenly and seriously unwell. He felt that his end was near; and therefore at midday he ordered the presence of his fourth son, his third, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth and thirteenth sons, with the president of the Foreign Office. To these he said that his fourth son had always displayed a character so honourable and conduct so good that he was the best fitted to succeed to the throne. The fourth son was therefore declared heir; and seven hours thereafter this emperor, the most remarkable of all the Manchus actually ruling in Peking, breathed his last.

Except the facts given above and the long speeches found in the Manchu annals, we have no accessible sources of information whereby to judge of Kanghi's character. That he was a capable

general is proved in the prompt and accurate steps he took, first to stem and then to drive back the formidable insurrection of Sangwei; and his bravery was manifest in his long and weary expeditions against the Eleuths under Hardan. His care for the wellbeing of his people was evinced in his determination to disband the feudal armies of the south under Sangwei and his princes, in the frequent and considerable reduction or remission of taxes where the harvests were bad, and in the frequent and large grants of grain scattered over all the north of China, Liaotung, and Corea, when these places were in actual want of food. It was proved by the earnestness of his determination to grapple with the Yellow river difficulty, in which, however, he was thwarted now by a "covetous" anon by an inefficient administrator; and as inefficiency was not rare while malversation was much more common, each year's deliberations and efforts left the Yellow river where they found it. He was earnest in his desire to further real learning, and to preserve the purity of the literary graduation examinations; and the number of beheadings of high official examiners, the degradation and various punishments of others, proved at once the great corruption of the court, and the serious endeavours of the emperor to alleviate if he could not abolish the evil. His love of literature is also shown in the large number of separate works undertaken at his request; as well as in his own diligence in study from his boyhood to his old age. He was not averse from the idea of publishing his own learning, for the volume or two of the annals filled with his speeches, serve rather to indicate his speech-making propensities, than give the actual number spoken or their length; the geographical portion of the *Appendix* on the Yellow river, is from one of his speeches on the subject. We believe he was a much better and more able ruler than James I., but in many respects, and especially in his tendency to speechifying he was a complete parallel.

After the southern half of China was restored to Manchu rule, the emperor had time to discuss other matters, and we find him, in 1683, dilating like another Solomon James, as was his delight

and his wont to do, on "Propriety" or "Reason,"*—*Li*, as it is in Chinese, "What is according to Reason." He asked the grand tutor whether the name *Li* was given to this branch of philosophy in the Sung dynasty, and the grand tutor replied, that Propriety or Reason was in the heart of every man; that the celebrity of the literary schools of the Sung consisted chiefly in explaining and illustrating what had always been in every man's bosom. The emperor said that what was in daily need, and what should regulate all action, was just this *Li*; but that though ministers always spoke of and appealed to *Li* in their speech, their actions were not always in consonance therewith. All day long they could discuss the philosophy of *Li*, but their conduct reversed their words. "What, indeed, is the philosophy of *Li*?" continued the imperial censor, "It is even this, that though his lips are perhaps unable to explain, the man whose conduct is correct, has the true knowledge of *Li*." "Example is better than precept," says his Chinese majesty of two centuries ago, to large numbers of our reasoners and writers of the present day, "who say but do not."

He was not ostentatiously fond of flattery, for up to the last he invariably rejected the frequent offers of honorary titles. His logical powers were not very great. Indeed though they have had their Socrates and Plato, the Chinese Aristotle and Bacon have yet to be born; and as a people, they have largely developed that insight which westerns often declare serves women instead of logic. An incident will prove Kanghi's lack of logical accuracy. Chihli was at a particularly critical part of the season suffering from a drought, which, if continuous, would produce a famine. The emperor was then at Yehol, where he spent most of his summers, and here there was also a drought. The emperor prayed for rain, and rain came upon Yehol. He ordered the officials in Peking to pray for rain, but though they obeyed, no rain came. They reported their failure, and in order

* The common phrase now, after stilted M. Arnold, is to say "Right Reason"; we were not aware there was a "Wrong Reason." The Chinese "Propriety," is equivalent to the "Reason" of the Stoics.

doubtless to flatter him they contrasted the effects of his and their own prayers. He wrote back a long message severely censuring them; for their want of success in reality proved that their care was for the emoluments and honours of their own office and not for the people,—as was proved in their neglect to go in person to the temples to pray. He was anxiously solicitous for the welfare of his people, and therefore went in person to pray for rain and heaven had heard him: had they been anxious and proved their anxiety by praying personally, heaven would have heard them also. Now according to Chinese moral and political philosophy mere officials count for nothing in the moral government of China, for heaven smiles and frowns according to the merits and deeds of the emperor alone. All the people are his “naked” children, and by his merits they prosper, and by his evil they suffer; and if the people of his capital lacked rain it was, according to Chinese teaching, the fault not of the officials there, but of the ruler wherever he might be. But we are not eager to quarrel with one of whom we can say, would that all Chinese rulers resembled him. For whatever his failings or self-conceit, it is through his wise rule that the Manchu reign has been transmitted down to our own time, and that it has, compared with other dynasties, so well guided this gigantic empire.

His successor was his fourth son, whose reign is styled *Yoongjung*, or as some write it *Yungcheng*, and who was born when his father was over twenty-four years of age. We need not describe the supernatural appearances which declared him at his birth the heaven-appointed ruler,—in spite of which, as we have seen, all were to the last moment ignorant of his probable succession. This new emperor was the unfortunate possessor of twenty-two brothers, all of whom might be supposed to consider him as doing them an injustice, by ruling in their stead. But as China is not Turkey, and as fratricide is one of the foulest of crimes, the emperor had to find or make a *modus vivendi*. Two of his younger brothers he created *Wang*, but another, already a *Wang*, whom he found very intractable, he found necessary to degrade from his wang-ship.

The emperor sacrificed at the ancestral tombs when the *Kokonor* districts were again restored to peace; and about that time the Board of War reported that the emperor's brother, *Yun Wo*, was beyond the northern border, refused to appear at court and was desirous to be commanded to remain at *Kalgan*. The emperor ordered prince *Yun Ji* to consider the matter, and his consideration resulted in the finding that *Yun Wo* should be ordered to appear at court, and then be sent on a distant embassy. He was asked to reconsider, and his second finding was that the offending brother should be deprived of his wang-ship, be condemned for ever to private life, and be placed under the supervision of the chief of the imperial clan. The emperor then declared that *Yun Wo* had always displayed a perverse disposition, was violent in his conduct, and sought to compel all others to his will. *Yun Ji* had been formally asked to judge the case because his influence was very great over the offending brother, whose conduct had been already condemned by all the great ministers as deserving degradation. The emperor exhorted *Yun Ji* therefore himself to reform and to cause the two brothers to reform also. One of these was *Yun Tang*, who permitted his attendants the wildest license in *Hochow*. Another was *Yun Ti*, the fourteenth son, already mentioned as a commander, and against him various crimes were alledged. *Wo* went into the capital and pretended sickness to avoid seeing his brother the emperor, and proofs were multiplying in number and importance showing a desire on the part of these four brothers and a growing clique, with which the powerful and influential Jesuits* were deeply implicated to dethrone the emperor and set up another brother in his stead. Without reciting the long story, suffice it to say that when their complicity in such a plot was fully discovered, the four brothers were, one after the other, degraded from their rank of prince, then had their family names changed to ordinary Manchu names; and lastly, after a long interval they were banished to various places. Messages came gradually to say

* See "*Hüe's Christianity*."

that two of the four had sickened and died. The superior of the Jesuits, we learn from M. Hüc, suffered exactly the same fate. Several years had however elapsed between the first steps caused by the disloyal conduct of the brothers, and the last necessitated by their discovered and increasing guilt. For the first few years of this period the emperor brought all possible means, privately and publicly, to bear upon the young princes to cause them to offer an easy allegiance; but each step widened the breach between them and made estrangement all the more thorough. The grudge of disappointed ambition may have originated a feeling which gradually grew to plans of open rebellion. Yet though this emperor is believed by Chinese literates to have had more than sufficient grounds whereby to condemn his brothers of rebellion, he has and will continue to have affixed to him the name and the stigma of fratricide. If his father found it difficult to decide the fate of the son who had been nominated his heir, and had to make speeches many and long to convince his officials and especially himself as to the justice of his conduct, this successor had a still greater difficulty as to the fate of his brothers, and extremely long and very numerous were the speeches to the assembled princes and officials, in which he proved a hundred times over the base ingratitude to their father of the erring brothers, and the heinousness of their crimes against their ancestors. These speeches, their character, their frequency and their length, prove the sacredness of family life in China, and the horror with which even an emperor was compelled to regard an act of fratricide, which in the circumstances would in many western lands have been regarded as thoroughly justifiable.

After the "sickness" which carried off the two brothers, a thick veil is cast over the palace, the only signs of life being the nomination of the fourth and fifth sons of Yungcheng as *Chin Wang*. On the thirteenth of his reign, in September, he took seriously unwell, sent for two of his imperial brothers, the two grand secretaries Wortai and Jang Pingyü; and to them he handed his testament in his own hand, making the fourth son heir-imperial and appointing him his successor, to begin his

reign under the title of *Kienlung*. He nominated the two wang, with the two grand secretaries, guardians. He died immediately, and was buried two and a half years after. He did not see the reconquest of the central Asian provinces, which a flood of insurrection had swept into an independent condition. These were recovered under his son, who reigned as long as Kanghi, and conducted imperial affairs with discretion, wisdom, and success.

His successor was another strong ruler; but as the annals close at the grave of Yungcheng, we do not feel at liberty to pry particularly into the imperial chambers. Suffice it to say that since Kienlung's departure, the throne has been always in possession of a minor mentally, and for a large proportion of the time, of a minor physically. It is unnecessary to say, that under an absolute government, that land has woe sufficient whose prince is a child. With a strong man at the head of affairs, aided by able ministers whom he could control, and active judges well paid, but dismissed as soon as fraud was discovered, China would be one of the most powerful, as she is even now one of the most wealthy,—perhaps upon the whole the most wealthy,—of all the nations of the earth. The recent successful termination of the campaign in central Asia, has compelled westerns to believe China living still. That life can and will become more active and potent than some people would desire; and it were well if westerns prepared against the day of a strong China, by hastening her conversion, by all means in their power, to Christianity, which alone makes for righteousness and peace.

A step further removed from Carlyle's clotheless king, is one with a palace. Imposing buildings are essentially necessary to that artificial greatness which society in all ages and countries demands for the head of the state; and the "gullibility" of mankind has both necessitated and awed itself by the external trappings which imply a grandeur, which often does not exist in the draped regal figure. Noble buildings, gorgeous surroundings, and interminable etiquette intended for stateliness, are all the more needful to a royalty to which often, if stripped of them, little

dignity or greatness would remain ; and society deceives itself by the customs and regulations imposed by itself, and especially by the stately brick and mortar cemented by itself, into worshipping solemnly and reverently before a temple, in the innermost shrine of which a "monkey is enthroned as god." Certainly no monkey would ever be mistaken for a god, were it not for the extrinsic magnificence which shuts it away from the "gullible." What is true of all nations of men, is found in China developed beyond other nations ; for Chinese etiquette is more thorough and complete than theirs. It does not fall within our province at present to describe this imperialism, this state and belongings of regality in China, beyond what crops up in the histories which we are fully illustrating.

In the Palatial city, besides many minor ones, there are three chief palaces, of which the greatest of all is the central one. At each side of the main entrance into this palace, the Ming dynasty had built a porch or hall, where the various officials and ministers waited his imperial majesty's summons to the early twilight audience,—each having his own position in one of the halls according to his rank. These halls were burnt down by the "robber" when he was compelled to vacate the palaces which he had hoped to make his home. A censor complained of the lack of dignity caused by the absence of such halls, where the ministers could be separated according to their several grades ; and prayed the emperor, in the beginning of 1645, to be pleased to order the Board of Works to rebuild handsome halls, on the former foundations, which would inspire reverence by their imposing dignity. The emperor was graciously pleased to hand over the matter to the proper authorities. But so slow were the operations of the Board of Works, that the first emperor passed away without them ; and the new "emperor" child complained, in June 1661, that the Reception Halls—*Chaofang*—were not yet built, and said that this was neither respectable nor respectful. They, and many another palace, were afterwards built in the "forbidden city" of Peking by this same emperor ; but of them we shall not speak.

If it is true that in the west, "uneasy lies the head that wears a crown," it is not less so in China, when the monarch is one who would rather not think of death. This is so, notwithstanding the rare immunity from murder or violent death, which the history of China gives to her long lines of rulers. It is only that care for the life of the monarch which could have evolved the particular laws about the palaces and the imperial city formed by those palaces, called in poetic language, "The Purple Forbidden City."

As in duty bound, and according to the moral code so characteristic of China, those laws begin with the ancestral temple of the reigning family, and the tombs of the deceased emperors. This first law we give in full, and it shall serve as an example of the other laws, the titles of which only shall be given to show what precautions are taken.

Any man who, without sufficient reason, enters the gate of the ancestral temple, or of the mountain tombs, shall be beaten one hundred blows; if one such man is within the gate of the national lares, ninety blows; if he stand in the gate, but has not passed through, his punishment is, in each case, a degree less severe. The guilt and punishment of the gate-keepers are equal if they were aware of the person's design; but if unaware, and taken by surprise, their punishment is three degrees less.

The idler who passed through the Mid-day or South gate, the West Flowery or East Flowery, or the Terrible War gate into the Purple Forbidden city, was subjected to one hundred blows; and one year's banishment in addition, if he passed through the gate leading to any palace; while strangulation was his sentence if he entered the enclosure of the emperor, empress, empress-mother, or empress-dowager's palace. This law applied to him who pretended to be one of those whose names were registered as belonging to the gate through which he had passed. The man who belonged to the gate, entering without his certificate of identity was punished with forty blows.

Any man except the night watchman was strangled who was found inside those imperial gates carrying any edged weapon of

or above one inch in length; and the gate-keepers knowing of his intention were equally punished, but less severely if they were surprised.

The watchman of the palaces, or imperial city gates, who was not at his post when he should be, he who sent a substitute in his stead, and the man pretending to be a substitute, were all beaten in various degrees. And so was the watchman or gate-keeper who appeared to report himself and then retired. A similar crime at the city gates was one degree less heinous. The officer who knew of the offence was equally guilty; but less so if he was unaware. The driver of a cart or carriage failing to present himself on the day ordered, was punished in proportion to the delay caused by him; and the sentence was more severe in the case of an officer so offending; strangulation being the fate of the latter if he fled with the carriage. The Manchu so absconding was sentenced to banishment to Heiloongkiang.

The officers of the imperial guard and the army guides, could advance or retire in their carriage by the side doors on each side of the main south gate, and the roads therefrom to the imperial bridge. But heavy beating was the penalty of any other official, officer, or private person found obstructing the roads or blocking the bridge; but it was permissible to cross those roads. The guards allowing such obstruction were equally or less guilty according to their knowledge or ignorance of the intention of the actually guilty. Beating was the penalty of the rider who did not dismount at the stone slab ordering him to dismount, and of the guard who permitted him. If a labourer engaged to do any work within the palace grounds sent a substitute to do his work, they were both punished and the pay confiscated.

The gate-keeper had a list of the names and a written description of the persons of all workmen employed on the palace grounds; and a daily inspection took place between three and five o'clock in the afternoon, to see if all and the proper men were there; and the man refusing to answer to the calling of his name was to be strangled. The man who should go

outside and went not, the man already under accusation of crime who went in, and the officer who neglected to remove the weapons of the guardsman accused of crime, were all variously beaten. The man on the list of gate-men who entered, or went out by night when he should not, was punished heavily; and the man not on the list, entering by night, was beaten two degrees more severely, and strangled if he carried any kind of dangerous weapon. The gate-keeper had to enquire and note the name, designation, title, destination, and business of any official or servant passing through the gate.

The person found firing arrows, balls, or stones in the direction of the ancestral temple, or the palaces of the national lares, was variously punished from one hundred blows to beheading.

The guardsman found without his weapons, or at a post not his own appointed one, was beaten; and a degree more severely if he was an officer; the immediate superior of the offender was also involved in the punishment. That man enrolled a member of the guard, whose relative had for any reason been put to death by law, was to be beheaded, as well as the officer appointing him, if aware of the circumstances. The law applied to the gates of the capital as well as to those of the imperial city,—and was evidently intended to prevent any scheme of revenge. But his majesty might appoint such a man, or he might be enrolled, if the officer before appointing him informed his majesty.

Whoever, in carriage, on horseback, or on foot, pierced through the line of guards was strangled; if the same took place in the remote wilds,* the punishment was a hundred blows for the private or official so breaking through, and of the guard if aware, but the latter were three degrees less severely punished if taken by surprise. Strangulation was the fate of him who pretended to have a statement to make as his excuse for pushing through; but if he had an important statement to make he was blameless. The keeper of cattle pushing through the guard

* Apparently any place outside the capital where the emperor might happen to be.

line or entering the imperial city, was beaten eighty or a hundred blows.

The idler entering the guards' camp was equally guilty with him who entered the forbidden city; and the gate of the commander of the guards was fenced by the law applying to the palace gates. Beating of greater or lesser severity was the punishment of climbing on or over the walls of the imperial city, the capital, the prefectural or other city; or the walls of a duke's palace, or a magistrate's residence. The gate-keeper who, though closing, failed to lock the city gate, was subjected to a graduated punishment, as he happened to be keeper of the imperial city gates, gates of the capital, or those of a provincial city; and also if he opened or closed the gate at any other than the appointed times.

Any person moving about in the capital after the three strokes of the first watch (eight p.m.), and before the three strokes of the fifth watch (two or three a.m.), except on account of sickness, birth, death, or mourning, was beaten a number of blows, increasing with every watch; much aggravated by opposing the watchman attempting to seize him, and amounting to strangulation in case of wounding the watchman, and to beheading if the watchman died of his wounds. The bannerman was also beaten if causelessly outside the city walls by night. And this is the divinity that hedges the king of China.


CHAPTER XV.

OFFICIALS.

THE Manchus began their career a contemptibly small clan, under the control of a young chief, who had so little to do in transacting the legal business of his "state," that it would have been absurd to think of delegating any authority to inferior officials; for the smallest departmental magistrate in Liaotung had a population under his care many times larger than that under the Manchu chief. But his rapid conquests quickly increased his magisterial business with the extending country acknowledging his sway. He had therefore to nominate his sons, then other magistrates, to take charge of the more petty magisterial work. This delegated authority was abused from the very first, and bribery began its course even then. That course is not yet run out, nor has it lessened in bulk, but has rather like a stream springing in the mountain tarn, ran on widening and deepening, till further deepening was impossible; for such grievous oppression as Turkey has had to endure, or as exists in Russia, cannot be enforced in China without revolution. With the extension of territory it became still more difficult to restrain the various officials from preying upon the people. It is no wonder then that the young dynasty found it a task utterly beyond its powers to do any more than reduce the amount of that official corruption and magisterial oppression, which luxuriated under the tropical atmosphere of the Ming dynasty, and brought it ignominiously to a suicide's grave. Indeed, as will appear further down when treating of the salaries of officials, it is impossible or extremely difficult for an honest man to hold office in China, unless, like the members of the British Parliament, he has independent private means of his own.

As the Manchu power originated in a small mountain hamlet and by the abilities of a petty chief of a hundred soldiers, the first few officials were necessarily military. Each soldier as he marched to the fight or the hunt was called "one arrow." Each ten such had an officer called *Niroo*,* from the name of a peculiar arrow for hunting; and the ten collectively received the same name. As the succession and rapid conquests of the infant power added lands and multiplied subjects, the *Niroo* became a body of three hundred men, at which nominal number it remains at this day, the officer being called *Dsoling* in Chinese, taking the fourth rank. This officer however had no civil jurisdiction, the chief himself being lawgiver, lawyer and judge. But his rapidly extending jurisdiction made it impossible for him to overtake all civil business. He therefore instituted in 1615 a series of courts. Five great ministers were nominated as judges to oversee and apply the laws. Under them were ten *Jargoochi*,† who composed the outer or lower court. A case was always brought first to the *Jargoochi*. If they could finally decide the case,—well; if not, they had to lay it before the Five. If these could not decide, they reported in turn to the *Beiras*,‡ the sons of *Noorhachu*, who, in cases of difficulty, appealed to him. On every fifth day the fifteen had to present themselves before *Noorhachu* and report.

Next year all the ministers, civil and military, agreed to call *Noorhachu* the "Nourisher of the Kingdoms," and presented him with the title of the Brave and Wise emperor. But adulation was not the only desire of the Manchu chief. He probably found a good deal of underhand dealings among the newly appointed judges, for he commanded the five judges, when

*  *Niroo*, an arrow.

† *Jalgun*, "decree," is the nearest word in the Manchu Dictionary.

‡  *Beira*, the Chinese "*Minghwang*," a "bird which flies very high,"—

hence applied to the chiefs of clans or the sons of kings.

about a year in office, henceforth to decide every case in their public judgment hall. He forbade any judge singly to try or decide any case, and thus prevent any trouble by a dissenting people. He ordered all petitioners to make their petition before the judges in the public hall, ordaining that if any suitor laid his case privately before any judge, the suitor should be flogged. At the same time he enacted that if a Beira or great minister were guilty, or accused of any crime, he must bind himself a prisoner,—for no inferior could bind a superior,—and must hear with reverence the sentence of the court, which must always decide according to justice. If any refused to obey the court, his disobedience increased the heinousness of his offence. But in a serious case a delay of five days for thorough investigation was necessary before decision.

When we remember that the community was composed of proud warriors who had learned to know how to subdue all enemies and to crush down all opposition, we need not be surprised either that a wise ruler like Noorhachu should strive earnestly to secure even-handed justice by which alone he could cohere into a compact kingdom so many discordant elements composed of numbers of formerly independent clans for ever at war with each other, or that he found it difficult to apply his laws. The few original Manchus might feel aggrieved at being placed on a level with the men whom they had defeated, and with those whom they had carried captive from remote parts. Hence arose the necessity for decided steps to prevent oppression and extortion by the original officers, who naturally regarded their conquests as so much spoil; and hence too we can learn how difficult it must have been for Noorhachu to enforce his own laws. The difficulty arising from official venality which he attempted to overcome within the first year of their institution of civil judges has followed like a shadow the Manchu power up to the present day; and seems inseparable from Chinese rule.

After the grand victories over the Chinese forces at and around Sarhoo, with the subsequent large additions of territorial aggrandisements, there seem to have arisen many sad, loud



causes of complaint by the people ; for in 1620, the extraordinary device was resorted to, of ordering all who had a case specially for the eye of his "majesty," to write it out and paste it up on either of the two large trees flanking the road, just outside the city gates, through which Noorhachu daily passed. These he carefully read, and into them he strictly examined, giving his decision according to the evidence ; and henceforth there were no complaints heard from the people of the want of access to their lord. This very much resembled a common habit now existing of attaching to a stone and throwing into a Yamun, papers containing accusations against the powerful, who could not be openly attacked with safety. Though these are anonymous, the magistrate is bound to act on them and investigate. A late governor of Mookden prohibited the custom ; we know not with what amount of success. Popular magistrates also take a monthly, or bi-monthly parade, when any man with a grievance may present himself, and, without fee, have his case examined.

Immediately on the death of Noorhachu, in 1626, when Mookden became the capital of a large kingdom, whose affairs grew to great magnitude and importance, additional officials were created. Eight chief bannermen, who could deliberate civil or military affairs along with the Beiras, were nominated. Namoochin was nominated Goosa Ujun,* or chief of the yellow banner ; a son-in-law of the "emperor," of the bordered yellow. Another imperial son-in-law, of the red ; these have always been the three chief banners. The bordered red, the blue, the bordered blue, the white, and the bordered white, had each one *Ujun*. When these, with the Beiras, agreed upon any measure, they memorialised the "emperor" upon it. They could transact business at any time, nor were they restricted to any place. In war, each was to have command of his own banner. To these there were sixteen assistants nominated—two from each banner. These were not to carry arms,† but to

* *Goosa*, a banner, and *Ujun*, lord or master.

† This must mean to "command army," for they all fought, and one of them was soon after sent with Daishan against Mongolia.

assist the higher officials in their deliberations, to look after the laws, decide civil cases, have charge of the prisons and of petitions or complaints in law. They were therefore properly the legal assistants of the Eight. There were sixteen others nominated as military assistants to the Eight: who were to lead out the armies and command garrisons, whenever there was occasion. When these returned from their military labour they could assist in transacting public business. Each therefore of the Eight Goosa had four subordinates; two whose business was civil, but who could be called upon to take charge of a body of men in war, and whom we find employed in garrisoning Lanchow and other of the cities taken in Chihli in 1630; and two who were specially military, but could when necessary take part in public business.

The four Beiras were ordered in 1622, alternately to take the charge of presiding over public affairs for a month at a time. The office was apparently one not much sought after; for, seven years after, the inferior Beiras were ordered to take a month in rotation. It is conceivable, however, that the real reason why these were introduced, was because they were becoming restive under the exclusion; and one of them, Dorgun, was certainly actuated by ambition. There were, however, no regular reports made of the work done, till Noorhachu, in 1631, issued three circular letters to the two chief beiras, the ten beira councillors, and the eight great ministers, ordering them to transact public business with uprightness. Thereafter all the beiras and ministers began to give regular reports of work done. This jealousy and suspicion on the part of the "emperor" was doubtless well grounded; for the imperial family have not been noted for clean hands even up to the present day.

Hats with a special knob, commonly by foreigners called "buttons," were distributed to the ministers and officials in 1636, in order to be able at a glance to distinguish the rank of the wearer. The emperor's officials had a plain gold knob. A brilliant pearl was given to each of the monarch's sons-in-law, and to the members of the imperial family not beiras; and a

variety of precious stone was added to the gold knob of Goosa Ujun and the commanders of the Mongol and Chinese contingents. Thus began the custom of the Manchus of denoting rank by a knob of precious stone or gold, which is now as often flint-glass of various colours, and brass. This knob on the top of the circular hat is as good as possible a means of showing one's rank at a glance, however curious it may appear to a foreigner; and is much more conspicuous than the stripes of our own officers. In 1668, the Dootoong or Goosa Ujun was



Knob or Button, actual size.



Knob on Official Hat.

ordered to be preceded by an umbrella and staves when he went out in his chair; the Toongling of the guards and he of the van of the guards were ordered to be preceded by the emblems of their post; and the Foodootoongs and vice-presidents had emblems to precede them. But it is said that only in Yungching's reign were the knobs employed to differentiate all the nine grades, both civil and military.

The secretariate was, also in 1636, called the *Neisan-yuen*, "Inner Three Courts;" one called *Neigwoshuyuen*, "Inner

History Hall ;" one the *Neimishooyuen*, "Private Secretariate;" and one the *Neihoongwunyuuen*, "Inner Despatch Office."

When Mookden became the capital of the Manchu kingdom, and when the term Manchuria might be applied to almost all the lands at present included under that name, public business had increased so much that the former courts were wholly inadequate to overtake the multifarious work now thrown upon them, especially as they do not seem to have had any special departments beyond the division into civil and military. The monarch therefore, in the summer of 1631, borrowed from the Chinese their departments, and instituted the Six Boards of Appointments, Revenue, War, Rites, Works, and Punishment. With the exception of the first, they are still in full operation in Mookden, the *Peidoo*, or second capital of the Chinese empire. The six presidents were Beiras,—each with two councillors called *Chungjung* and *Tsanjung*. Thus each board consisted of three chief members, but had necessarily a staff of clerks and attendants. The duties devolving on each department is sufficiently indicated by its title. Every official and magistrate had his special duties clearly defined at the same time; for the haphazard manner in which all kinds of business were transacted by one or two bodies of men was not calculated to expedite matters. Yet the division of labour does not seem to have been perfect, for in 1638 there was another definition of its precise business given to each of the Boards, to the Censorate, and to the court of Judicature. The number of the members was also assimilated to that of the Peking boards. Besides the Beira president, there was one *Chungjung* or vice-president; a "Left" and "Right" *Tsanjung lishu* or councillor; a *Foolishu* or assistant-councillor; and a *Jooshu* or secretary;—six members of five grades. The names have been partially changed, but the number of grades is now what it was then. The Beiras went all into Peking, and the Boards of Mookden have remained what they then were; for ever since they have had only a vice-president as chief official.

The three royal private secretariates were instituted just before the six Boards; but the latter had precedence, as we

learn from a memorial of a grand secretary, who, in the end of the year 1644, complained that the Boards which had precedence of the secretariates in Mookden, were made second in rank, and had only silver seals of office; the *Toongjungsu* was then third, the *Janshufoo* fourth, and the *Hanlin* Academy stood fifth. The emperor granted the prayer of this petitioner, and re-established the order which had existed in Mookden.

In August 1648, there was instituted a Chinese president for each of the six boards, and a chief censor for the censorate; and in the following summer, a Chinese *Jooshu* or secretary was nominated to each of the fourteen offices of the board of Revenue. But though nominated to office, the Chinese occupied a very secondary position; and even as late as February 1653, we find the emperor complaining to the privy council, that ever since he had taken personal charge of imperial business, there was not a single memorial handed in by a Chinese official, but all by the Manchu officials; and he ordered that, as all officials without exception were his "heart and bowels, his hands and feet," whenever henceforth any petition or memorial was to be handed in by any one of the Six Boards, the Censorate, the office of Transmission, or the grand court of Revision, all the vice-presidents—Chinese as well as Manchu—should present and discuss it; the privy council was ordered to command all the great ministers to respect the emperor's feelings, to faithfully perform each his own work, to permit no excuse and seek for no apology to neglect any duty.

This commingling of Chinese and Manchu officials of equal rank and powers, was necessarily one of great difficulty. There was no considerable lapse of time since the conquest, and no oneness of habits and customs to make the one forget he was a conqueror, and the other that he was a vanquished slave. The Normans were compelled gradually to admit the conquered Saxons to some share of power, and have continued to exist only by yielding; and England has never, since that day to the present, introduced a measure to remove any vestige of the slavery introduced by the Normans, except under compulsion.

But the Manchu conqueror from the very beginning admitted the Chinese into office,—into military first, and gradually into civil,—from the highest to the lowest posts. There were Chinese princes created, grand secretary, presidents; and wherever there was a high Manchu official, a Chinese was placed at his side. Not only so, but the emperor dismissed one of the two Manchu presidents of each Board. Quite possibly the efforts of the emperor to amalgamate the two nationalities, led the Chinese officials to believe that he was more favourably disposed to them than to the Manchus. It is certain that the Chinese were incomparably better scholars than their conquerors; and as, according to Chinese usage, literary ability is the main avenue to civil office of all kinds, the consideration shown them by the emperor gave them grounds to believe that they could have a great deal more power if they only demanded that to which their literary talents entitled them. Hence one of the diviners drew up an elaborate paper, in which he argued that Chinese officials should supersede the Manchus in all the boards and yamuns. This paper was laid out in the privy council offices, and thither the emperor went to read it. After perusing it, he said to the grand secretary, Hoong Chungshow, that this paper was anything but what it should have been; that he himself manifested no partiality, but loved all his people without distinction, and he was therefore astonished that the Chinese party should have given expression to such a sentiment. Besides, if any could demand priority, the Manchus had certainly the first claim. Just after this he completed the complement of Chinese officials, by nominating one to each of the three departments of the privy council. We are certainly astonished at the impertinence of the diviner, who was banished shortly after; and we cannot too highly commend the wisdom which planted the small Manchu stock in Chinese soil, and has made it grow to so great a tree; for it is impossible to believe that the reigning family could now be Manchu, but for the wise policy of giving a fair share of all offices, high and low, to the Chinese. This example we highly commend to our Indian

authorities; though we believe that for the stability of the throne, the Chinese now hold far too large a proportion of both civil and military chief offices. In 1878 there was not a single Manchu viceroy or governor in the eighteen provinces of China.

In addition to the Six Boards, which may be called the executive of the Chinese empire, there are several other offices, the most remarkable and important of which is the Censorate, whose members get the name, in Peking, of "mad dogs," because they are always snarling or biting. Their grand business is to *censure*, to find fault where fault is to be found, all over the empire. Their office and duty bind them to blame the follies of the emperor, to proclaim the faults of the executive, to check the desire for unnecessary change; and their eye should roam over every province and glance into every Yamun in the eighteen provinces. Theoretically there never was a better addition to the executive of any government anywhere; but though it very often performs its duty well and nobly, it is sometimes silent where it should speak out, and acts when inaction were more beneficial; and most of them, like other high officials, are incorruptible as long as small temptations are offered. Yet though their duty is thus to publish all abuses by memorial to the throne, the censors are not exempted from penalties justly or arbitrarily inflicted upon them. The chapter on the "Eunuchs" gives evidence sufficient of the difficulty with which the censors have to face their duties; and they often suffer severe sentences from offended majesty. Thus if they serve the part of the public press in the west, they are under even a worse "libel" law or custom; and the early history of the Manchus gives numerous examples of censors sentenced to banishment or exile because of freedom of speech in executing their duty, when criticising imperial action. And in 1677, Kanghi ordered a censor to be whipped a hundred lashes,—a still greater degradation than exile.

Besides the *Doocha Yuen*, or what we might call the General Censorate, there are other special censors; some called supervising censors, as those attached to each Board, important public office,

and to each province; and some roving censors, who are commissioned to go from place to place with a special business to discover whether public affairs are satisfactorily attended to. It is their duty to see that no judge lazily permits an accumulation of cases, to prevent extortion of the people by the tax gatherer, or oppression by the soldier, and, in short, to see that no wrong is done the people in name of law or by its administrators. Several times do we find censors remonstrating with the first Manchu emperor for building his palace at immense cost, when the people were suffering from the claims of war and the devastations of famine.

The censors were naturally Manchus to begin with, though a few Chinese were nominated immediately on the settlement in Peking. The general censorate was first filled up with Chinese officials, then the boards, and gradually all the provinces; and the chief offices in the capital, with the capital itself, had their Chinese censors side by side with the Manchu. So numerous were the nominations, that in the drought of 1653 twenty supervising censors were retained and a larger number dismissed. But in 1666, when a new emperor arose, an additional Manchu and Chinese supervising censor was nominated to each Board.

When the Manchus entered Peking, they found that a large proportion of the necessary ministers and officials of all kinds had disappeared, most by flight, some by suicide and others hiding their shame in seclusion. But as many officials as accepted Manchu rule, were retained in their respective offices held by them formerly. Other fast friends, or useful men, were put by the regent into some of the vacant posts; but many offices went a begging for some time. To begin with, all the appointments were made by the direct nomination of the regent, who was either guided by his own personal knowledge or listened to the recommendations of friends. But this manner of nomination could not always continue.

The chief anxiety of the regent was however, not how to get filled up the long list of officials necessary to a settled government, like that of the late dynasty in its glory; but how to

meet the demands of those on his hands, and to supply with necessaries the large armies he was pushing in all directions. For we saw that at the fall of Peking the Ming emperor had emptied both the private imperial treasury and the public one; and what could be carried away was gone with Dsuchung. We can hence understand that it was very difficult for the regent to find the immense sums required by him.

In December 1664, we find that, whether from imperial instigation, from conscientious convictions, or from some other reasons, the *Jang Yuen* or president of the Hanlin, who was also chief diviner, joined the other diviner, the head of the *Gwodsujien* or national library and of the sacrificial wine, in praying to have the office of diviner abolished; and their resignation was accepted. It was possibly a knowledge of a desire on the part of the regent to cut down expenditure, which caused a great deal of excitement in court, and these resignations seem to have stimulated the uneasiness. At all events, within two months of the resignations, an official gave expression to the general excitement of the official mind, in a vigorous memorial to the throne; in which he stated that during the preceding summer, the unsettled state of public affairs emptied the Yamuns, but that the flight of the robbers gave a favourable opportunity for filling up all official posts to the ends of the earth. But how could these appointments be made, when, for the sake of a present economy which would be future loss, the number of office-holders] in the capital was at that moment only half of what it had been. Your stupid minister* says that all those ministers already dismissed should be at once restored, to prevent the hands of the government from being afterwards hampered from want of men. Every new comer should be nominated to that post for which he is best adapted. To discover the best man for each office, every able man known to the government should be put into some office, every facility afforded, and every obstacle removed out of his path, in order that he might prove the man he was; thus could good men be always at

* "My humble opinion" of the west.

hand for every emergency. The saving of a little money by reducing the amount or number of salaries was scarcely befitting the dignity of him who received all the tribute of the "four seas;" for why should *he* grieve over the expenditure of a pint of rice or a peck of grain? . . . Better complain of too many officials, then afterwards lament the lack of talent. With divided counsels the smallest affairs become difficult; unity of purpose makes the most difficult task easy. The Ming dynasty had two presidents for all the boards and yamuns; not because they could muster courage to say "no," but because the one official was a check upon the other, and malpractices were impossible. It was easy, when prince and people were of undivided mind, to establish a precedent for the future; and the interests of myriad generations, and not alone of those now living, should be the guide to their choice. This eloquent appeal concludes by stating that to lay down a foundation for future well-being, but especially to avert future danger, the memorialist had so minutely entered into the "outs and ins" of the question and went "round about it." We heartily commend the warmth and arguments of this Chinese statesman to those politicians of England, who sneer at the parsimony of the statesmen who desire to save millions a year to the heaviest taxed people on earth.

The "emperor" felt the sneering if he was not convinced by the arguments of that paper, and said that the officials dismissed were sent away, not because of love for money, but because they had not been properly appointed. And he decided that the principle enunciated might be carried out, while he ordered the heads of the various boards and yamuns to be able to give satisfactory reasons for every case of dismissal in the future. The office of diviner, of *Taipoo* and *Shangbao*, were already abolished, but whether finally or not, depended on the deliberations of the Board of Appointments together with all the other boards and yamuns. Thus the officials gained the day; for, as in all countries, there are more who are eager to eat up and increase the national revenue, than there are who desire to decrease taxation and husband the resources of a nation; and

they will always, as in this case, raise the sneer of niggardliness, meanness or "cheese-paring," against those who strive after a wise economy. Often has the same sneer or the fear of the same sarcasm driven private people into poverty, bankruptcy, or dishonesty; for it is a disastrously potent item in social life. Are nations anything else than combinations and aggregations of individuals; and may not the false shame which tends to ruin private persons help in crippling nations? The tax-consumer was earnest, the tax-payer indifferent in 1874, and we see the result in the British expenditure of 1879. At all events, the official sneer changed the saving policy of the Manchu regent into one of office-filling which now hangs a heavy load upon the skirts of the dynasty, as the same weight dragged down the Ming dynasty. Did ever any nation perish, before the needless accumulation of selfish official leeches had sucked out her life blood?

Soon after, the saving propensities of the regent were sneered out of existence. Grand Scretary Fan Wunchung urged that (1) it was proper that expectant officials of the Hanlin should be appointed to posts as they fell vacant, and (2) that there should be a set form of memorialising the throne for the whole empire. As to appointments, the three first in literary rank in the Hanlin, the *Siwjan*, *Biensiw*, and *Jientao*, should have priority over all others. The memorial also prayed that any official sent away on government business, or retired home to nourish his parents in age or sickness, or to mourn their decease, should be employed, if he returned within the period of leave allotted to him, in the rank with which he retired, but put last on the list for vacancies if he exceeded his leave. Leave of absence, on account of sickness, should be classed with "leave exceeded," to prevent applications for leave on false grounds. An official beginning public life again, after the termination of a sentence of degradation, should commence from the rank to which he had been degraded. The provincial judge could report the termination of leave of absence for whatever cause, if the official desiring to be reinstated in office was of the third grade or above; but if under that

grade, the official should present himself in person at the Hanlin to give notice of the termination of his leave. This memorial is interesting chiefly because it reveals the then existing state of matters by its prayers for a change;—a change however which is as much cried for to-day as then. Notwithstanding the theory of Chinese political life explained in the introduction, nepotism and purchase had a good deal to do with the appointment to offices then, and have much more now. For though the Hanlin members are the cream of Chinese literary men, their wealth is greater in titles than in office; as they are now the exceptions who have office conferred upon them because of mere literary talent if unaccompanied by wealth. But it shows that the Hanlin had a good deal to do with receiving the names of applicants for office. This inference is justified by the change of the authority to nominate officials from the Hanlin to the Board of Appointments, which was made after the famous case of Minghia was terminated in 1654; the change was prayed for by this same grand secretary. But the nominations continued to be imperfect; for we find the senior chief censor praying, in 1660, that, as the capital was of the utmost consequence to the emperor, the officials nominated to office in it, should be selected with the greatest care and should be men whose character as men of honour, above all meanness, should be unquestionable. A further change was made in 1661, when the old rule was abolished which had called in all the *Jinsu* or doctors of the Hanlin to deliberate with the officials and ministers on whatever affected the common weal. The “doctors” have never regained the place which the first Manchu emperor gave them, and can sit in judgment on national affairs only when they have painfully attained to the post of minister of one kind or other. Up till 1664, even the officers of the army below the ranks of commander were nominated by Board of Appointments, but henceforth the nomination fell to the Board of War.

The manner of nomination, whether through the Hanlin Academy or the Board of Appointments, continued to give dissatisfaction; chiefly because new men were nominated to

higher posts over the heads of men already in office. This has always and in all powerful nations been productive of bad feeling. The man of ability is often compelled to remain in obscurity, though the government is aware of his talent, because some mediocrity happens to have entered the service a few years before him. The able man will smart under the degradation of serving under the orders of one unqualified to teach him, and the senior will growl if the junior is placed over him. But the public interest is greater than the feelings or the rights of either or both; and public interests alone should decide this question. The feeling was such, however, in official Peking, that the emperor had to ask the Board of Appointments to draw up a graduated scale of what should be the order of promotion; but the Board had the difficult task assigned it of making a selection of a few names from among which the emperor would be free to choose. And, indeed, upon the whole, the Chinese government has, up to its ability, employed the best men for the most important posts; though these best men must usually open their way with silver keys.

The Board decided that if a grand secretaryship were vacant, a president of one of the Boards should be nominated, or a vice-president, or an assistant grand secretary,—giving certainly a wide choice. All the various officers were thus classified, and to this classification the emperor agreed, as well he might; for though there was a narrow field from which to choose, it was amply sufficient to pick out the best man; and the list shows that seniority might go for very little, unless the senior were the abler official. If the junior is undoubtedly superior in talent, he is made to rise quickly from step to step, till he mounts far above his seniors, even if that junior began life as a humble table-boy or body servant to a private gentleman, as did the late prime minister and grand secretary Wun Siang. This rule holds more decidedly in the army; though in both civil and military employment few offices are obtained by any ordinary mortal, or usually by an extraordinary one, unless he is well weighted with silver shoes.

Chinese law forbids the native of a district from holding the judgeship of that district; when therefore the literate is appointed to a magistracy, he is sent elsewhere, and usually to some district at a distance; nor can the native of a province become governor of that province. The object of this rule is to sever the judge in his judicial relationship from his family ties, which ties might be supposed to bias his judgment. If he is promoted, he goes with his new rank to some other region, perhaps from Mookden to Taiyuen, or from Peking to Canton. It was not however till 1653, that the emperor intimated to the Board of Appointments that henceforth there would be a regular rotation of office over all the empire, including the capital; so that by frequent mutual exchange of similar posts, the most capable men could be sifted out. This system of rotation has been so universally carried out, that three years is the longest term during which any official, except the highest to whom the rule does not apply, can hold office in one post. Changes are arbitrarily made by the governors of provinces, whenever they choose: for example, the district magistrate of the city of Mookden is almost never longer than a year in that city. The chief reason for the numerous changes of the present day, is in the desire to get friends into those districts out of which most can be made. Changes often occur on the petition of the office holder, if he has serious misunderstandings with his superiors or the people. Sometimes, when the magistrate himself is the cause of great bitterness on the part of the people, he is not only sent away from his post, but degraded from all office. We have known such cases, but it always required men of considerable influence, though in private life, to bring the guilty magistrate to justice. The people can do it, however, and the possibility prevents the impecunious or grasping magistrate from acting as he would sometimes like to do.

An affectation of humility is demanded by Chinese etiquette, even more than among ourselves. Hence, in social life, the difficulty in getting one of two equals to take precedence; and the universal custom of offering what the offerer would fain

keep, and of declining to receive when the person declining would be delighted to accept. The same rule is carried into official life; and when the man who has striven by all means, literary and monetary, to gain a post, has it offered him, he has to decline it, as one unworthy of occupying it. This notion of the demands of politeness seems to have been carried to even greater extent under the Ming dynasty. The regent was much annoyed by this dissimulation, and demanded more straightforwardness; but no one dared to set an example: so much is the fashion of etiquette lord of men.

But in July 1647, Yoongji, president of the Court of Revision, was nominated to be vice-president of the Board of Works. As usual, he at once declined, as being unfit for the post. This gave an opportunity for the imperial rebuke aimed at all officials: "If you really do desire to accept an offered post, yet once and again declare that you do not wish it, you are guilty of lying affectation. Henceforth, such declinature will be acted upon, and the man shall never be promoted. As to Yoongji, we have long known him as one whose mind was not devoted to his proper work; he is, therefore, now for ever dismissed from all office, and degraded from all rank." We can understand that this was a serious blow to affectation, which when carried to excess is disgusting in the east or the west. That affectation of declining office arose at court from the example of the illustrious men of old who had to be dragged forcibly from the loved privacy of their quiet learning, to the trying duties of public life; and from the honour awarded to such, and to others in more modern times, who would prefer a lower post with its comparative ease, to a more public and higher one, with its immensely greater difficulties and anxieties.

We have already noticed the efforts of the regent to reduce the number of officials on the civil list. In January 1652, a censor drew his majesty's attention to the fact that great ministers were unable to judge of the time when they should properly retire from office; and thus the way of promotion was blocked against able men who were holding inferior offices. He

prayed the emperor to tell the high officials that they should not be covetous of office, of eating the emperor's bread, and of sitting in his seat; the aged and infirm should retire; those who had frail parents should not neglect to establish a reputation for filiality; but should go home to attend upon them. He also petitioned the emperor to issue a decree, forbidding the higher provincial authorities from filling up all vacancies with their own or their secretaries' friends. The emperor soon after intimated to the Board of Appointments that all aged or infirm officials seeking relief, should be permitted to retire; which was a gentle way of telling them what they should do. A curious case was got rid of in this way in the end of 1656, when a supervising censor accused the newly-appointed governor of Hookwang of having, when governor of Peking, given the diploma of *Tsankiang* to a robber. The case was one which may have been difficult to substantiate, and the censor prayed that he might be relieved of the office because he was old, infirm, and of no marked abilities. The matter was sent to the Board of Appointments, which had made the nomination, and they decided that as he was now anything but robust, the nomination should be recalled; and recalled it was.

China is not the only place where compulsory resignation is resorted to; and when the proper test, that of the public welfare, is applied, there can be no question as to its propriety. But, on the other hand, many officials have desired to retire from public business in Peking, who have been compelled to stay. In the summer of 1715, Liw Gwangdi, a grand secretary, pleaded hard, long, and eloquently, for leave to retire to put his affairs in order, and be at peace to prepare to meet death. His memorial was a very long and touching one. He had been in Peking for ten years without a day's absence; and for that period had not seen his family or home. During that time his eldest son and his wife, with Gwangdi's own wife, had died, leaving a boy-grandson, who was incapable of transacting business. He was now seventy-four years of age, and according to the saying of the ancients, he could expect only decrepitude and weakness till

death came. His memorial secured him, not retirement, but an absence of two years, after which he must return to the capital. Just before that, the emperor, himself an old man, feasted at the palace all the old men of Chihli, between sixty and ninety years of age.

Degradation from office to a lower, or to private life, is common enough, and for a great variety of reasons. One curious case was that of Toohai, a Manchu president of Board of Punishment, who, because "he despised his own office" and showed contempt of the emperor's goodness, was declared deserving of death, but sentenced to degradation from all office, and had his name struck off the Banner list. Another was the case of an official of Board of Appointments, who had been nominated to go as scrutinising official to Honan, where he slept in brothels and took bribes. Because he thus disgraced his office he was degraded from all rank. Another case was that of Chun Julin, who was found guilty, by Board of Appointments, of crimes laid to his charge. The emperor, in passing sentence upon this Manchu official, decreed that he had been on a previous occasion found guilty of crimes for which he had been banished to Mookden, whence he was afterwards recalled with undiminished rank; his present crimes, of supporting cabals and taking bribes, were therefore more heinously aggravated because they manifested so much ingratitude for the former mercy shown him. He escaped death, but his property was all confiscated, and he, his family and parents, were banished for ever to Mookden. Other cases will be given below when bribery is treated of. But if many officials were justly degraded and fined or banished, many suffered, not because they were guilty of the crimes alleged, but because they had made themselves obnoxious to higher officials. The case of Jang Yi, who suffered death in this way, will appear further down. Many who were sent to banishment or exile were recalled, when the truth of their innocence of the crimes laid to their charge became known. This shows, what is well known to those acquainted with China, how miserably imperfect is the law on

the matter of evidence; yet as we were writing this, came the confession of the man Peace, in England, to the murder of a person, for which another was undergoing punishment.

If it was difficult for the emperor to discover the truth of what was passing in his own palace, it was much more difficult to determine the truth or falsehood of what was said to occur in the provinces. Ashan the viceroy of the two Kiang in 1704, accused the governor of Kiangsi, with a few prefects and a number of district magistrates, with acting not according to justice, and his representations resulted in the summary dismissal of all the officials named by him. He was soon after accused of acting on the instigation of a man who bore a grudge against the governor and whose false statements Ashan had believed. He was therefore declared to be unworthy of his post, for he had deceived his majesty into doing an injustice. The boards found all this correct, and decided that while he should be degraded, all those wrongously dismissed should be restored to their former posts; and that the official who had imposed upon him should be degraded. The emperor agreed that, with the exception that Ashan shall be left in his office, the memorial of the boards should be strictly carried out.

Fine is the lightest and most common mode of punishing offending officials. There seems to have been great irregularities in this punishment during the period of the first Manchu emperor, who, just before his death, drew the attention of the boards to the injustice of applying the punishment of *shu hei lo wei lo*, regardless of the antecedents or rank of the party fined; for when a light fine was imposed on a great official, or a heavy one on a small official, there must be injustice. The boards were called upon to deliberate on the subject, and they found immediately after the emperor's death, that the presidents of boards were of both first and second grades, vice-presidents of second or third, senior secretary of third, fourth or fifth grade, junior secretary of fourth or fifth, and councillor of fourth, fifth, or sixth grade. So that the ranks differed of men occupying the same office and drawing the same salary; for rank was given

by the emperor as reward, or withdrawn by him as punishment, while the duties of the office continued exactly the same, independently of the increased or degraded rank; and the emoluments did not change, for they were paid out by the boards and yamuns. They therefore decided that the penalty of *shuheiloweilo* should be in relation to office and not to rank, and that it should consist of a deduction of ten per cent. from official salary; and recommended that this rule for the boards should be made applicable to all great officials. To this the "emperor" agreed.

The miserable salaries of Chinese officials, inadequate to meet a tithe of the expenses which all officials from the smallest to the greatest are compelled to incur, necessitates impecunious magistrates to eke out their incomes by extortion in one form or another. There are certain perquisites attached to offices, and there are legal charges which can be made against litigants, but these are too small to meet the demands of any but the purest minded magistrate, one of whom may be found among fifty. Direct extortion is however as difficult, if not impossible, in China as in England; for though the needful incomes of the official world, from the lowest to the highest, are augmented by bribery, it is almost always bribery by litigants or applicants for office. It was to meet the growing abuses arising out of this second source of bribery that the emperor agreed, in 1660, to the memorial of a supervising censor, which prayed to have intimacy between the greater and smaller officials forbidden, and to prevent the giving or receiving of congratulatory or other presents. It is needless to say, that the censor's memorial and the emperor's order were so much effort thrown away; as, but for these "presents," the incomes of the higher officials would leave them to starve for eleven months in the year.

In June 1651, began the remarkable case of Chun Minghia, president of the Board of Appointments. This year was the third after the institution of Chinese presidents to the board, and he was one of them. He was accused along with his board, by the outer roving censor, Jang Yi, of seeking their own private

ends in their appointment to offices, instead of striving after the public good by inducting the best men. All the boards were ordered to investigate the case, which, from the rank and power of the parties impeached, they were compelled to do from policy rather than by law. They therefore decided that the dates of the faults complained of were prior to the proclamation of universal oblivion; while besides there were no proofs forthcoming. They declared, too, that Jang Yi must have been actuated, not by a desire to exalt righteousness, but to damage the characters of high ministers, of whom he was envious; for he had refrained from mentioning this case when he was "Inner" censor, and broached it only now when made Outer roving censor. They therefore decided that he was deserving of death. And die he did; for no censor, outer or inner, could so easily put down bribery.

In April of next year, the emperor showed that he had repented of his sanction to the sentence against Jang Yi, for he ordered the proper interment of the body, and sacrifices to his memory. He had doubtless received private information sufficient to warrant him in believing that Jang Yi's conduct was not groundless. A private secretary of the Inner Hanlin memorialised against the conduct of the emperor, on the grounds that the dead man had been already publicly executed. This secretary did all he could to gain the all-powerful Hoong Chungshow to his side. He was therefore degraded on the spot.

As far as public action was concerned, that quashed the case; till, in the early summer of 1654, grand secretary Ning Wanwoo, whose name proves him a Manchu, accused Minghia, who had meantime become a grand secretary, of forming cabals, plotting rebellion, and harbouring designs difficult to fathom. Minghia was charged with hating the Manchu custom of head-shaving, and the Manchu fashion of hat and clothing. He had said to the other high officials, that if peace were to be retained in the empire, the hair must not be shaved, and the style of garment must not be changed. But the memorialist had no difficulty in believing that the empire could be retained, and

affirmed that the close fit of the robe and the narrow Manchu sleeve,* were convenient for the soldier or the huntsman. Minghia desired the soldier's sleeve widened, and the sash made more capacious, only to weaken the arm and hamper the movements of the Manchu soldier. He went on to accuse Minghia and his son of conduct so outrageous, when living at their home, that the respectable literates and people hated and avoided them. They took possession of the gardens of duke Gwo in Kiangning or Nanking, which were valued at a hundred thousand taels, and were redeemed out of their hands at a cost of three thousand taels, subscribed by the local officials. His son Yechun took forcible possession of the wife of one who had been a member of Board of Appointments during the Ming dynasty; he outraged all propriety and decency by going out in a large sedan chair, preceded by an official umbrella, as if he were an official; he interfered before the tribunals in behalf of criminals, from whom he had taken bribes. Jao Yensien, though incapable for any post, was made a high minister. The emperor assigned their different ranks, and the order of attaining office, to the members of the Hanlin; but Minghia retained or dismissed at his pleasure, arrogating all power to himself. A relation of Minghia by marriage, when Taotai of Chihkiang, made a false charge against a Siwtsai, of being an adherent of the late dynasty; he confiscated the properties, and put to death many of the friends of the accused man; he reported the governor of Chihkiang guilty of taking bribes, and with Minghia's power had the governor degraded. Minghia confiscated and received possession of the degraded governor's properties, but informed the governor that for a certain sum of money he would have him reinstated; and though that happened "eight years ago, it is still unfinished." The *Tanhwa*, or third in rank of doctors in the Hanlin, went south on leave of absence, borrowing one hundred taels from Minghia, which he repaid with other five hundred taels to the wife of Minghia, when he got to her

* See p. 34. But the Manchus have, within the last few years, adopted the enormously wide Chinese sleeve and the loose robe.

southern home. Minghia was not sure of the repayment, and therefore believing that the Hanlin member was cheating him, he appointed him to a provincial post; but on receiving a letter from his wife, he wrote saying that he would be reinstalled in the Hanlin. Another official, a relation by marriage, falsely accused a high minister of appointing officials on his own authority. The board pronounced the charge groundless, without even going into examination, and degraded the false accuser by a grade; but Minghia changed the sentence to a fine of six months' salary instead. The memorialist and his fellow grand secretaries had drawn up a book, in which was to be written down the name in full of every actor of an important work done, the actor to write the statement of the work himself; but Minghia obliterated one hundred and fourteen characters,—the names of members on those public records; and it was difficult to discover any reason for such conduct. The emperor had ordered the privy councillors to inform the memorialist that he must look after the boards and higher offices, to ascertain whether or not there were any cabals, and to take notes of whatever he saw or knew. He had written that "Minghia would persist in wearing a singular dress, and in saying that the new must be changed to the Ming style," that "it was dangerous to have him lurking among the ministers," that "it was my duty to carefully scrutinise whatever took place," and "how could his treachery be permitted to be consummated,"—these four sentiments Minghia had blotted out. He declared that Minghia was plotting; that his disposition had been carefully noted; and lest the memorialist should be afterwards blamed for negligence, "your minister now raises his hand to heaven and earth."

This accusation has been taken down pretty fully, because of its interesting picture of the times, and of the manner in which bribery is carried on in high places. We shall see other modes of bribery in the few cases to be noted below. Meantime we shall take leave of Minghia, when we say that all the Boards and "Ching" had to examine the case; and as the accuser was not a

weak censor, their examination found every charge proved, and Minghia was strangled.

His son Yechun was examined some time after, on the alleged faults committed by him during his father's lifetime. He was found guilty and deserving of death; but the emperor saved his life, commuting the sentence to a severe beating and banishment to Mookden; whither he was followed, soon after, by the governor of Szchuen, accused by Sangwei of evil practices, extenuated to some extent by previous good conduct.

In 1689, another case cropped up which is illustrative of the customs of the times, and worthy of recital. The assistant chief censor accused Chienhiao, late president of Board of Punishment, of malpractices. There was a counter charge made against the censor, of making false accusations. Discussion followed which produced a memorial from the censor giving details. In the end of this memorial, among other charges, he stated that Chienhiao had lent out a hundred thousand taels at three per cent. per month interest,* and that capital and interest were repaid lately, amounting to a hundred and sixty thousand taels. He then, with the original capital, opened a pawnshop† in Da Kiangkia street. He had sent ten thousand taels to his house by an official going in that direction. A magnificent house, with splendid and extensive gardens attached, was being built by a friend of his, but with his money. Precious gems from all quarters, gold and pearls‡ from the eastern seas, poured in upon him. He had sent a younger brother to various provinces on some pretext; but in Honan especially the people were

* To know this charge properly, let it be understood that there was a late enactment against magistrates engaging in trade, or lending money to those engaged in trade; while they were also forbidden to lend to or borrow from any of the people under their jurisdiction.

† Pawnshops in China are like banks in England. They demand more capital than any other shop. They lend money, from a sixpence to a thousand pounds, on the security of articles given in pledge, and at the rate, in some places of two, in some of three per cent. per month. They never lose, for they rarely lend more than half the actual value of the pledge, which lapses to the shop, or becomes "dead," as the Chinese call it, at the end of two full years of interest unpaid.

‡ Eastern pearls are most highly valued as at once the largest and purest.

grievously oppressed by his extortions. He bought one house in the capital for over six thousand taels, another for five thousand five hundred; he bought ten thousand *Ching* (each sixteen English acres) of land; and the number of newly built houses purchased by him, in Rope-man Lane, Half-cut Lane, and Cross Street, were beyond number; besides houses and lands, difficult to estimate, in Soochow, Taitsang, Hwunshan, Woohien, Changchow, Changshoo, Wookiang, &c. The censor was upbraided because he did not draw attention to this matter earlier; but the president was degraded. From this case we can learn that a presidency was a good milch cow.

Ho Li, viceroy of the two Kiang, escaped for many years, by his great abilities, the fate which his rapacious extortions should have early brought upon him. But a "hawl" of half a million taels, accepted by him at literary examinations, was too heavy and brought him down. In May 1714, his mother went to the capital to complain of him, of his younger brother, of his son, and of a youth adopted as a son by his wife. Since Li's degradation, they had all left their mother's house, crossed the Yellow River, west of which they now lived, oppressing the people most cruelly; and as no one dared raise their voice in accusation, his mother felt compelled to act in the name of justice against her own son. Board of Punishment found Ho Li guilty of unfaithfulness and unfiliality to an extreme degree; that he should be cut in pieces, his wife strangled, his son and brother beheaded, his adopted son transported to Heiloongkiang, and their property confiscated. The emperor decreed that Ho Li commit suicide, that his wife follow his example, and that the other findings of the Board be carried out. It may be added that the emperor had found it extremely difficult to believe the accusers of Ho Li up to the very moment when sentence of degradation had to be passed; and the lenient sentence of suicide may have been dictated by a lingering affection for an old favourite and able minister.

As fertile a source of official incomes, and sometimes a more cruel one than bribery, is the malappropriation of public moneys, grain, and fodder, as will appear in the chapter on

“Taxation.” This form of filling empty official purses is as common in the west as in the east, and we shall notice only two notable cases. The year 1703 was the second very hard season for Shantung. The emperor was deeply grieved at the great distress and the famishing condition of that province, and forwarded large sums of money to purchase food for the very poor. The governor, notwithstanding this assistance, had to report bands of famishing men traversing the country, and already had several hundred men been slain by them. But immediately came accusations against the governor himself; for it was said that the money sent by his majesty to feed the poor had all but melted down on its way, and that only a small fraction of it had reached its destination. Investigation made the case no better than it was reported; and the governor was degraded, because he had not taken a strict account of the moneys from all the prefectures and districts. In all cases of famine, the same story has to be told in China. Even in the frightful famines which devastated north China a few years ago, the large sums of money put into the official hands to feed the famishing had a large proportion clipped off on the way; for it passes through at least half-a-dozen grades of officials ere it reaches its destination; and there is a deal of glue attached to money passing into Yamuns, even when it is to save lives from famine, and when twice as much would scarcely suffice to keep them in life.

For many years towards the end of Kanghi's and the beginning of Yungching's reign, the internal strife of the imperial family overshadowed every other matter; and the evident struggle in the family of Kanghi over the succession, caused ministers to overlook as unworthy of notice the quarrels and accusations usually so common. But in 1722, began the famous case of Nien Gungyao, who had been nominated viceroy of Szchuen and Shensi as the reward of his bravery in quelling the insurrection of the Lama monasteries west of Kansu. But with his viceroyalty came an accusation against him, afterwards proven, of having falsely charged a man with crime when he was governor,

and of other evil practices. His viceroyalty was abolished, his Great commandership of Singan recalled, and he was sent as commander to Hangchow, there to give proofs of repentance. The governor of Shensi declared it altogether unreasonable to permit him to act as viceroy; for he had, during his short term of office, given out over a hundred thousand passports to merchants, thus defrauding the revenue by smuggling on a great scale. He had besides sent a district magistrate to buy all the teas which had not paid duty, by which he pocketed over fifty thousand taels; and from smugglers he had received twice as much. While these statements were being investigated, the emperor charged Nien with causing the viceroy of Chihli—then newly instituted—the Mongol princes, the emperor's son-in-law, and other officials, to dismount and kneel before him. For all this he was put on a trial which occupied much time, and the account of which we have condensed from a volume.

Li Weikun, who was the first viceroy of Chihli, and President of Board of War, with a suspicious haste reported that he had in former times very few dealings with Nien, and that lately even those rare transactions were broken off. The emperor, however, said that this statement was contrary to facts, for that the governor of Singan was never five days without seeing a messenger from the viceroy of Chihli; and so ostentatious were those visits that every eye had seen them; and added that this was a fault which demanded attention. Another count added to the charge against Nien, was that he had employed as body servants the men who had been penally sentenced to the ranks.* The Dootoong of the Han Kun army advanced another heavy

* The "ranks of the army beyond the border" are the Chinese equivalent of the Siberia of the Russian dabbler in politics; and the commander, partly perhaps from a commendable pity, and partly to attach to himself men who had been sentenced to servility from high office, took them under his protection as servants. The charge would never have been noticed had he not been down on his knees by the blows already given him; and as there was, or was believed to be, a plot in the imperial family to dethrone the new emperor and set a brother on the throne,—in which the Jesuits too were implicated, and whence began persecution against them,—that charge of undoing the sentence against political prisoners would be all the more serious.

charge against Nien, declaring his avarice an unbounded one, which led him to appropriate three hundred thousand taels from the allowance for provender for beasts of burden, and four hundred thousand taels from the rations of the army, with lesser ones of a similar character. And Nien was ordered to answer these charges.

Board of Appointments, which had been made judge, decided that his viceroyalty should be taken from Nien, but his dukeship left him because of his services to the state. This finding displeased the emperor, who said that the board must reconsider this decision, for the crimes of Nien were too serious to be thus lightly punished. He added that Nien and Loong Kodo had been implicitly trusted by the late emperor; high and low had regarded them as men of unquestioned integrity; while all the ministers honoured them by consulting them on every important question. Yet both had been guilty of great and numerous crimes. Mercy was good, but must not be universally and invariably shown. Justice must sometimes be manifested; and from the manner in which leniency had acted in the past, the wise should learn that severity was necessary in the future. "The road on which carts are always capsizing, must either be abandoned or mended," alluding to the increase of corruption during the mildness of the two first years of his reign.

The Board was a whole year before they could decide, for all that time Nien was nominally in office. But the emperor then degraded both Nien and Loong from their high office, and the Board immediately found that the crimes of Nien were high as the heavens, so that heaven and earth must conspire to take his life. They advise, therefore, that he be instantly called into the capital to answer for his crimes. The case had been before the Board for two years; and had Nien been able to kick against Yungching, and raise the standard of rebellion in favour of another son of Kanghi, the Board would have been longer before they could see his crimes. For it was uncertain how such an attempt would have ended. But as soon as Nien was gently degraded, and removed from his viceroyalty so softly, without

any effort on his part to retain it, while all his offices were declared suspended, the Board suddenly opened its eyes to the crimes of which he had been guilty.

The emperor, without waiting for the replies of Nien, recalled the gifts of the Dragon throne, the yellow girdle, the two-eyed peacock feather and all other honorary gifts. The documents transmitted by the emperor, marked by himself as to how Nien should act, were also recalled. His commandership was taken away, and he was degraded to the rank of Jangjing, fifth grade, but bereft of all actual command, and ordered to do penance in Hangchow. After this sentence all the Boards yelled and howled at him, as Chinese curs rush from all directions against a screaming dog rolling in the dust. They recommended that his fifth grade be taken away, and himself executed as he deserved. The viceroy of Chihli again foolishly raised his voice to increase the din against the man to whom he had cringingly knelt at the very time the crimes were being perpetrated. He declared Nien neither a faithful minister nor a loyal subject &c. The emperor was greatly offended at this epistle, and replied to it by ordering the viceroy, whom he degraded, to build the storehouses at Tientsin out of his own private resources, and added that when that work was finished the Board of Punishment would inquire into his conduct. The emperor was aware that immense quantities of the malappropriations of Nien were hidden away in Paoting, the city where lives the viceroy, who therefore knew intimately of the conduct of Nien.

Nien was seized in winter, and brought to the capital; probably meantime new charges of even a graver nature had oozed out. All the princes and Boards found Nien guilty of five great crimes:—1st, He employed the Taoist priest Jow Loo and others, to plot an insurrection, and he was plotting in the dark; 2nd, he changed the imperial mandate with his own pen; 3rd, he left unmolested a man of Chihkiang, who had gone west and acted most outrageously against the people; 4th, there were found in his house twenty-eight gold coats of mail, four thousand quivers, cannon and other balls, and other illicit

articles; and 5th, he had murdered over eight hundred principal merchants.* In summing up his ninety-two sins, the sum total of his malversations was found to mount to three millions five hundred thousand taels; over a million sterling. The court composed of the greatest men, the highest rank, and the most brilliant talents to be secured in all China, found him guilty according to law of crimes for which he should be beheaded. His father, brothers, sons, grandsons, cousins and nephews of and above sixteen years of age should be put to death. All under fifteen, with his mother, his wife, concubines, his sons' wives and concubines, should be given to the public ministers as slaves. The emperor, remembering his excellent services at Kokonor, ordered him to look after himself—i.e., commit suicide; but his son should be beheaded, as well as the priest Jow Loo. His other male relations of the age of sixteen were declared free from the penalty of death, but transported to Heilongkiang. The emperor then made a long speech, addressed to Nien, recalling the goodness to him of the late emperor; saying that he had read of many unfaithful ministers in ancient times, but of none to be compared to him; and accusing him of regarding his own relations as of no more value than so much straw, as he could risk their life so lightly. Half a million taels were found in his house, which was searched during the examination. Three years after, the son of Nien was pardoned and recalled from banishment. We may therefore infer that his other male relations, if ever actually sent, were also recalled. After this, history relates degradation of officers for want of success, and of ministers for venal courses; but there is nothing new to throw additional light on the relations between prince and minister, or the inter-relations of officials.

† Besides ordinary bribery and malappropriation, the direct or indirect sale of office is often resorted to for money. No magistrate of any grade can enter upon his office without spending more or less money; but this is not so much a buying

* This last was apparently when abetting smuggling; these merchants being unable to afford to smuggle, as they had too great a stake.

and selling as a necessary "present"; for the man must be fitted for his post, or no amount of money could purchase it. But a censor had to memorialise the first Manchu emperor on the sale of office. He even declared that sub-prefectures and district magistracies were sold; that is, given to men unfitted for the post for certain sums of money. He said that those who had been the "greedy caterpillars and wild roughs" were now assistants to the district judges; and though the rank was but low, it entitled its possessor to be called the "father and mother" of the people, and by it he could issue orders, arrest and imprison men. He asked how men destitute of literary degrees could be nominated to office, if the intendant or prefect had not received their money? He then gave instances where such "ravenous caterpillars" apprehended men only to frighten them into giving money; and the emperor agreed to his prayer, and ordered governors and viceroys to examine into that state of matters.

Officials too weak to face danger, or too avaricious to be particular as to the source of gain, have, in all ages of Chinese history, found connivance at robbery by private bravadoes a lucrative fund of easily acquired wealth. The following extraordinary story has often been, and is now, imitated, but perhaps rarely paralleled; and will serve to explain how far connivance at robbery can go by men whose office demands of them to protect the public. Board of Punishment was informed, in 1653, that the great robbers Li Yingshu and Pan Hiowun were living not far from the capital, where they had been causing disturbances for many years, being so powerful and wily that the soldiers dared not face them. Yingshu was apprehended on other minor charges; but when under examination it appeared that he was the famous *Hwangbiao* Li Sanyuen, under which name he had been guilty of most serious crimes during the Ming dynasty. "The fish had then escaped out of the net, the wild beast had burst his cage;" for, at the very moment when he was known to be always aiding in their schemes, and shielding in his house hosts of robbers and thieves, he was the intimate friend of

high officials. As many of his men as he desired were enrolled as *yayi* or detectives; and the power thus in his hands was rewarded by costly presents by robbers from all directions and distances; for there was none of them he could not injure, and none of them he could not save. To the merchants from the southern provinces he declared publicly that he could be of service to them, and gave them privately to understand that their lives were in hands,—which was probably true. Hence they all had to pay him large sums in black mail. The taxes on all imports by the *Tsoongwun* gate were under his control, and only a small proportion ever found its way to the public treasury. The amount of taxation he increased at will; the man who refused to pay was killed, and no one dared mutter vengeance on the murderer. Large numbers of lives were thus sacrificed.

Hiowun gave himself out to be a horse-dealer and informer against robbers. The informer business he could easily carry out by giving such notice as would lead to the seizure of whatever robber did not acknowledge his chieftainship, and by informing where a band of robbers were at work, at the same time giving the robbers timely warning to get out of the way if serious measures were taken for their apprehension; for if friendly robbers had no hiding-place of their own, his house was open to them till they could go forth in safety again. He picked out the best mules and the fastest horses, his drove consisting of from forty to two hundred superior animals. These were always sold to robbers, who would naturally give the highest price for what was more to them than any other implement of their trade. The robber mounted on one of these was therefore “like a tiger which had grown wings.” Hiowun was in intimate relations with the district judges. The accused made “presents” to him to act as their advocate. According to the amount of the present did he represent the case to the judge, who had to listen to his voice, and men were liberated or destroyed by his word, whether the decision was or was not a righteous one. Many officials, civil and military, were on drinking terms with

the two great robbers; but onlookers dared not even observe the relationship. He was in short a Chinese Fisk.

The Board decided that "the crimes of those two men are innumerable, their wickedness such that imagination could not conceive a greater; all men within the bounds of the empire proclaimed them worthy of a myriad deaths. Therefore Li Yingshu and Pan Hiowun, with their sons and nephews are herewith ordered to be beheaded."

Li Yunchang, the senior secretary of Board of War, was also accused, because that he, whose office entitled him to directly address the emperor, recognised Li Tienfung, nephew of Yingshu, as his own brother, and the son of Tienfung as his own son, whom he employed as an official; and had thus shielded both from the above sentence when it was passed. Though declared guilty, they were permitted to escape the penalty; but an imperial threat was published, warning all officials to avoid such friendly relationships with robbers for the future, on pain of suffering death along with the robber.

But that proclamation did not much mend matters, for next month a supervising censor had to memorialise that the robbers must have a refuge somewhere into which they hide as "birds to a nest." The owner of "this den is either a man who has lost all sense of fear and is utterly wicked, or a chief among the detectives, entrusted with the charge of arresting robbers. These had power enough to make the evil seem good, and influence strong enough to shield the robbers." He therefore recommended that all robbers afterwards seized, should be examined as to this protector; and if he were a chief of the detective force, he should be at once apprehended and handed over to the Board to deal with him.

When the emperor went into the secretariate, he asked of the grand secretaries how it was that Li San the Hwangbiao, who was one of the common people, had so many houses and rooms outside and attached to his dwelling-house, all in such perfectly beautiful order. Chungshow replied that those rooms were divided into offices for six Boards; and any business to be

transacted, or any man going on business, went direct to the proper Board. Regulations were most carefully laid down, and most strictly enforced. The emperor said, that if a common man could so act, outraging all propriety, it was heaven itself defeated him; and asked, since Li San was so great a scourge to the people, how was it that not one of the ministers had dared sooner speak out? The censors, Ning Wanwo and Chun Julin, were both silent when the question was put; and when the latter was directly questioned, he said, "Li San was a man of tremendous wickedness. He is executed; let the matter rest. Had he not suffered, Julin's days were numbered; and who is regardless of his life and family?" Minghia, whose story is given above, said, throwing responsibility off himself, "Li San was a man of extreme wickedness, but one censor had sufficed to bring him to just punishment. Your minister is an unworthy great minister; but to discover rebellion, and nip secret treachery in the bud, is not the province of your minister. Li San, besides, had private communications and secret spies everywhere, and swift vengeance overtook the first breath of accusation. All men love and cherish their own life and family." From this story we can infer the state of Peking in the early years of Manchu rule, when their armies were taking cities and winning battles in the south. The tiger might run down his game, but his own body was covered with blood-sucking vermin. It is not so very many years ago since the chief of an army of robbers was making the house of the brigadier-general of Mookden his headquarters year after year, till the fact became too notorious to be any longer connived at by the highest authorities of the province.

One other incident of official corruption, explaining the mode of extortion in common use will suffice to complete the heartless list. In the preceding history, it was seen that Swun Kowang was defeated in 1657 by his former colleague, Li Dinggwo. The vanquished man fled to the Manchus by whom he was created Yi Wang, "upright prince!" He was invited to the capital and as he was passing through Chihli, Jang Hüensi, viceroy of Chihli, Honan and Shantung, went to *Shwunte foo* to welcome the

newly made prince. He returned to his palace and cut his throat. The wound was not immediately fatal, for he was able to pen a memorial to the emperor, in which he said that "ever since your criminal minister, Jang Hüensi, took office, his mind was straight as an arrow to rightly perform his duty. Whether himself pleased or offended he never thwarted the will and desires of the people. The distinction between the right and the wrong belonged to heaven; his desire was to see universal peace and harmony. But who knows how difficult it is to walk the straight road? At present all men envy him, and all the people are like madmen; and he has sought, in this eccentric manner, an honourable death, only because of oppressive grief. This body must die, and better now than afterwards when falsely accused of crime. Your minister is guilty of ingratitude for the heaven-high, earth-wide favours of your majesty. Henceforth he is like a vanishing cloud, or spilt water. If the emperor ever remembers his minister and his toil for him, let him think of him kindly. He prays the emperor not to punish his family, and in the grave he shall ever give thanks for the imperial mercy. *Woo-hoo* alas! alas! your minister has to leave the present life, but he may become your majesty's horse or dog.* Your minister's family is not wealthy. They have no good lands and fine houses; for, ever since your minister's nomination to office, he has not dared to accept of a cash from an inferior official; because he would then offend against your majesty's clemency. He is come to this pass because men have brought it upon him; but it is the will of heaven."

The emperor ordered the assistant chief censor to hasten to make all necessary enquiry into this peculiar case and to report. The report was handed in next month and was to the effect that when the viceroy visited Yi Wang, he was guilty of overlooking the proper etiquette, for which he was taken to task by a Hanlin secretary. His consequent shame had been for a time so overwhelming that he had lost self control, took a small knife and cut his throat. The emperor decreed that as the viceroy

* In transmigration.

had been appointed to his post by the emperor, any business turning up should have been stated to the emperor; but to commit suicide, was to forget the spirit which should actuate a great minister; as however, the past of the viceroy's life was remarkable for purity and painstaking carefulness, he would be punished now only by the reduction of two degrees of his "honourable-mention" rank.

The viceroy was deeply wounded at finding censure where he had hoped to receive sympathy, and in the following month he so far "recovered the serenity of his mind" that he could detail the real facts to which the censure had probably driven him. He stated in this memorial that he had been guilty of breach of etiquette, but it had been under compulsion. When he first called to pay his respects, the officials around Yi Wang refused to see him; and after seeing, they treated him with contempt, acting in a manner wholly unbearable. Thrice did he call, and thrice asked how he should act. Then secretary Ma Loji blamed him for his pertinacity, after he had formerly blamed him for breach of etiquette. But it gradually oozed out that all the blaming was in order to extort a "present." He was informed that generallissimo Hoong Chungshow had met the train in the far south with handsome presents. Chi Chuabai reproved the viceroy for coming empty handed, and urged him to make presents of camels and mules. But he was determined to die rather than be guilty of bribery and thus violate the instructions of his majesty. They therefore threatened that when they arrived in Peking, they would report him to the emperor as guilty of rudeness; and said that the emperor would not forget it. He therefore believed that death was his fate at any rate, and he preferred to die before the charges were actually made against him. Such extremity was the cause of his hasty action.

The emperor was greatly incensed by this story, and said that Ma Loji had reproved in order to extort money, and had dared to reproach a great minister; he was guilty of most hateful conduct, and the Board must immediately deal with the case

and judge it severely. The viceroy was still living under his shame; but it became so unbearable that he hung himself in a temple three months after his first attempt at suicide. The minister whose hands were clean would however have little sympathy at court, and, except the young emperor, not one could say a good word for him. But the emperor stripped Chuabai of his censorate, and of all the honorary degrees already conferred upon him, and Loji was similarly served, because they had received bribes on the way from the various officials, prefects and others, passed *en route*, and for endeavouring to extort money from the viceroy. Jaoloong, president and secretary, lost his presidency and all his grades of honour, for his connection with the case. They were however permitted to retain their actual office;—they were degraded in rank, but not in pay or work. Yi Wang was far too useful to have the breath of suspicion whisper his name; and the others were dealt with so leniently because of their connection with him.

An incident, which began to excite public commotion in court in the end of 1666, will illustrate the manner in which the wires are pulled around the dragon throne. When the first emperor was on his death-bed, he nominated four imperial guardians or regents to young Kanghi. Two of these, Aobai and Sooksaha, the latter being of the bordered yellow or imperial banner, quarrelled and became bitter enemies. When Dorgun, the regent, was degraded, his properties, which should naturally have gone, when confiscated, to the bordered yellow banner to which he had belonged, were given to the white banner; and other lands were given to the bordered yellow at the extremity of the possessions of the right wing; for the lands were distributed in the same order as that occupied by the various banners in battle. This arrangement had gone on satisfactorily for twenty years, till the rupture broke out between the guardians, when Aobai, who was of the white banner, determined to upset it. He ordered, or desired, grand secretary Soonahai, vice-president Lei Hoo, governor Wang Dunglien, and viceroy Joo Changdso, to meet together and consult upon the matter. Their con-

sultations resulted in a memorial to the throne by Changdso and Dunglien, who prayed in December 1666 to annul the law compelling the properties of the bannermen to lie together in military order, because the arrangement was inconvenient and greatly hampered liberty of action.

In the following month the Board of Punishment found Soonahai guilty, in spite of mature consideration, of committing a grave blunder on the land question; found the two memorialists guilty of endeavouring to mislead his majesty; and decided that each of the guilty should be whipped a hundred lashes, and their properties be confiscated. The Board had neither the power nor the will to hint at the mainspring of the whole. But the emperor ordered the body of guardians to examine into the cause of quarrel between the two guardians. The two guardians, not implicated, reported that the matter was serious, and should be severely punished. The emperor passed over Aobai, but confirmed the sentence of the Board confiscating the properties of the three ministers.

In August of the next year, the emperor assumed control of affairs himself, and proclaimed an amnesty for seventeen kinds of crime. Just then the grand baron, grand guardian, and privy councillor Sooksaha, prayed for the post of Keeper of the Tombs. The other guardians demanded to know what offence had been committed against him that he should so slight his own office. The princes and high officials accused him of twenty-four crimes for which he deserved to be cut in pieces; and, at the same time, declared that though the emperor had graciously permitted Aobai to retain office, he continued to act in such a lawless manner that he and his sons should be cut to death, and his uncles, brothers and nephews beheaded. They also pronounced other officials, great and small, deserving degradation of a more or less severe degree. The emperor agreed to this memorial; but the end was not yet. The subject was doubtless again and again discussed; till, in June 1669, formal accusations were again made by the princes and great ministers. The emperor, in a long paper, gave as his reason for having delayed sentence, the hope

that so aged a minister as Aobai would repent of his tyranny over the people, and his other evil conduct; and he upbraided the other guardians and high officials for having permitted him to go on his wicked way without publishing his wickedness. Kang Chin Wang, with the other princes, had at last proved thirty crimes against Aobai; twelve against Habiloong, who should have prevented him; twenty-one against Ananda and Banboorsi of the imperial family, who had shared his guilt; twelve against his son Namofu, and six against his nephew Saibunda. To even a superficial glance, the number appears to set forth the gradations of guilt rather than the nature of the crimes charged against the criminal; the truth being that all the individual instances adduced are arbitrary; some being generalised classifications of crimes, others particular acts of crime, and the total number of the crimes serves, even without examining into the merits of each count, to give the opinion of the judges with regard to the proportionate guiltiness of the various offending parties; though, it need scarcely be added, each count is carefully set forth.

The emperor could not bring himself to pronounce sentence of death on Aobai, who had long been a minister under, and had been nominated a guardian by, the late emperor; but he dismissed him from all office and seized his slaves. Some of the accused were saved from the extreme penalty because they had been ministers of reputation under the late emperor. Banboorsi was strangled. Namofu escaped death, but was degraded. Saibunda was sentenced to beheading as well as four others, all of whom had formed a dangerous and criminal clique. Many others were punished more or less severely according to their degrees of criminality; but Sooksaha was reinstalled in his former posts. Thus Chinese regents proved to be not much unlike English ones.

But if there has been, in all ages of Chinese history, a good deal of bribery and corruption among officials, it differs in degree according to the character of the reigning monarch. Extensive though the gangrene of official corruption is at the present day, with the example set in the highest places, it is not equal to

half of what it was for the last century of the Ming rule, when the eunuchs lorded it over the land. This corruption is not peculiar to any one class of officials either high or low, nor yet is it universal in any class high or low. The family of the late prime minister, Wun Siang, is very poor, but might be exceedingly rich did he receive the "presents" which would come pouring upon him, had he opened his hands to them.

† Officials are found among all grades of magistrates who are of unsuspected honour in this matter, and these are known to and highly esteemed by the people at large. To incite to faithfulness to duty, and to honesty in it, there is a certain number of faithful and honest officials of former dynasties, honoured by the reigning dynasty with honorary sacrifices. In the beginning of 1652, the Board of Rites and all the chief offices were ordered to make enquiries whether there were any, and how many, of the officials of the last Ming emperor who were faithful to the death, and did die rather than acknowledge the robber when Peking fell and their prince had died; for it was most improper that the memory of such should perish. After careful investigation, it was found that sixteen great ministers,—grand secretary, presidents, &c.,—had committed suicide when the capital fell. The emperor made grants of lands, the revenues of which would be sufficient to make sacrifices in perpetuity for these faithful men. Any man is at liberty to decline office if he so chooses; but after having accepted office, the official is bound to serve his prince with the utmost fidelity. If the prince is such a man as deserves to be dethroned, that is the concern of heaven, who will raise up the instruments; but those who have once "eaten the bread" of the prince are bound, not only not to raise their hand against him, but to die for or with him, if they would be considered faithful to their name of minister. It is unnecessary to say that the easiest mode of gaining the epithet of "Faithful" is by successful war. Hence warriors, as a rule, occupy the prominent seats of honour in the pantheon of faithful ministers. It appears that sometimes a mistake is made; for in 1660 we find a censor saying that the emperor "has always worshipped, or honoured by sacrifice, the

ancient ministers of good reputation. But one of those so honoured, Pan Yinmei of the Sung dynasty, though he was deservedly esteemed for quelling the troubles of the south, failed, when at *Hiaku*, to prevent Wang Sien from abandoning the pass of *Chunkiakku*, and because Sien had withdrawn, Yang Jiye and his eight sons all fell in one day, in a vain attempt to stop the Kitan, who after that became the terror of the Sung men. Jang Dsun, another Sung minister, was thrice made commander by his emperor. He was first defeated at Fooping Pass, which caused the fall of Shensi; a second time at Whaisi, giving the magistrates in charge no alternative but revolt; and a third defeat at Fooli made it impossible for the Sung ever afterwards to reconstruct their empire. He also refused to be on good terms with Yao Fei, the only man feared by the Kitan, but petitioned, notwithstanding his proved incapacity, for the post of commander-in-chief. Sacrifices to these two should therefore cease; and the emperor agreed. This will illustrate what we have elsewhere stated, that the innumerable temples of China are raised chiefly for the reason for which we in the west build monuments; merely to keep in remembrance the memories of men who have been useful to their sovereigns, or beneficial to their country; and there is little more intended by the sacrifices made there, than there is when we bind chaplets of flowers on the head of a statue or throw bouquets at its feet. The number of gods in China to which prayer is offered and petitions presented,—which is our idea of worship,—can be counted on one's fingers. To the great bulk of their gods the Chinese no more bow down in *worship*, than Protestants do to Paul or Augustine. The canonisation of the Chinese emperor is therefore totally different from that of the Romish "emperor," as the pope is called in China; for the former canonises in order that able and faithful ministers may be honoured, the latter that pious, or so-called pious, men and women may be prayed to. And whoever heard of the pope who would dethrone from canonisation one who, though long worshipped, was proved to be unworthy, or even never to have existed?

Another mode of honouring able and useful ministers is to heap upon them a string of posthumous honorary titles. Hence no man while living ever can exhaust the totality of honorary titles at command of the court, for some are always retained to consummate the faithful man's character as he is borne to his funeral. This has been a practice carried out of old in China; and several instances of it occurred in the "History of Corea." But it would appear that the generality of officials ceased to be designated by their titles after death; for a supervising censor of the Board of War memorialised, in 1655, that it was desirable that all officials, civil or military, great or small, should be considered after death of the same rank as that possessed by them when they died. The subject was first subjected to the criticisms of the Board of War; after which it was agreed to and recorded in the "red book."

When we give the following memorial of a censor relating to official salaries, it will be at once apparent how official corruption was a matter of necessity to the great majority. But let it be premised that besides the money salary there is an allowance of rice supposed to be enough for the consumption of the family of the official, the quantity being proportionate to the rank of that official. There are also small fees to which judges are entitled from litigants, but they are such as would scarcely pay for an English lawyer's clerk. The memorial referred to was presented to the emperor in 1669, when the high taxation demanded pressed so hard upon the provinces then suffering from a succession of short harvests, that many memorials were presented to the emperor pleading for a reduction of taxation. The censor said that reduction of taxation was just then impossible, for though official salaries had been somewhat increased since the death of the first Manchu emperor, they were still wholly inadequate. The viceroy had a yearly salary of a hundred and fifty-five taels; the governor of a hundred and thirty taels; the sub-prefect of eighty taels; the district judge of forty-five taels. This last was somewhat more than three taels per month; and the support of his family and his horse, in the quietest possible manner, would

cost at least half a tael per day; so that his month's pay was sufficient for only a few days of the most common fare. Depending wholly on his salary, he had over twenty days in the month when he would have nothing to eat; was he to die of starvation? Thus the superior officials were compelled to act covetously in order to live, and to receive or force from the inferior officials sums of money which they in their turn demand from the judges, and these must live, even if the people cry out against their extortion. The censor therefore, instead of agreeing to a reduction, prayed for an increase of salary sufficient to meet the moderate wants of government employés. The emperor remitted this memorial to the Board of Revenue; ordering the Board at the same time to refrain from taking the lands of the people and their houses to give to the soldiers. This Board soon decided that to decrease official salaries was simply to drive the officials into taking more from the people; therefore reduction was impossible.

Up till 1652, every official drawing up a memorial for the government, did so in any manner which he thought proper. Where so many memorials from high ministers were daily received, this chaotic state of official writing caused a good deal of confusion, which grand secretary Fan Wunchung endeavoured to reduce to order by praying the emperor to issue orders to have a uniform system adopted over all the empire. His desire seems to have been granted; for in the autumn, the emperor complained to the secretariat that though a model had been given to the Board of Rites, memorials continued to come in on papers long and short, wide and narrow, and differing in many particulars from the model; and ordered the secretariat to inform the Board of Rites to issue strictest orders for uniformity. This uniformity was explained more fully next year, when, besides the size of paper, it was ordered to begin all memorials with the official title of the writer, then mention his name, then give an index of the subject or subjects of the memorial, and lastly, illustrate these subjects in detail. Those who read the few of those memorials which are published in the Peking

gazette will know that this rule is observed up to the present.

A volume of the Kienlung laws sets forth the duties of officials and their conduct to their superiors; warns against neglecting, without sufficient cause, to attend his majesty's levee, and teaches the manner in which they are to receive his majesty's exhortations. They are commanded under penalties to study the laws with diligence. If the officer in charge fail to transmit his majesty's letter, one hundred blows is his punishment; and it is equal for similarly neglecting the letter of the heir apparent. He who destroys an imperial rescript, or any officially stamped Yamun letter is beheaded; and various punishments, from one hundred blows to strangling, belong to him who destroys any memorial from an official. He is beaten ninety blows and banished for two years, who loses an imperial warrant, decree or stamped letter; for losing an official's memorial the penalty is seventy blows. But if the loss is by fire, flood, or robbery, and through no fault of the officer in charge, he is blameless.

A memorialist to the throne, writing so as to mislead, whether intentionally, from ignorance, or carelessness, as in using one character in appearance much like the proper one but with a very different signification, is subject to a graduated punishment according to the error. Care must be taken also as to whether or not the subject is one which should be transmitted to the emperor.

Every ambassador or messenger or envoy sent on any public business is bound to report himself and wait his majesty's pleasure, within three days of his return, on pain of punishment more or less severe.

It may be interesting to note the grades and numbers of the official staff over this large empire of China. The emperor is the fountain of all authority and the centre of every office. Around him clusters the NEIGO or Privy Council, through which all imperial business reaches the emperor, and through which he transmits his decrees and sentences upon the memorials presented him. Beyond the Neigo is the concentric wider circle of the

six Boards. Memorials are sent from the provinces to one of the Boards; the Board sends to the Privy Council; a grand secretary presents it to the emperor; and it is returned in the same way and lodged with the proper Board when the emperor decides upon it. The emperor never or very rarely initiates; he takes action only upon a memorial from one of the Boards, or of the three Law Courts.

The *Neigo* is composed of four grand secretaries—two Manchus and two Chinese—who alone rank first class of first grade; one president from each of the Boards; vice-presidents and secretaries from Board of Rites, in all six Manchus and two Chinese; four Manchu, two Mongol and two Chinese assistant secretaries; ten Manchu, two Mongol and two Chinese readers; with many inferior officials, as those for registration and stamping, for binding and stitching, and large numbers of scribes. In the Privy Council there are twenty five imperial seals, each for its own distinctive purpose. They are of various sizes, shapes and colours of jade, except one of gold and one of fragrant wood. The twenty third is used for stamping all documents relating to foreign affairs. There are ten seals in Mookden the second capital, six of various colours and sizes of jade, three of gold and one of fragrant wood.

The rank of each Board is in the order in which it stands, that of Appointments being the most important. It however does not appoint any of the primary or secondary officials in the imperial family or imperial clan offices. In the offices of this Board there are one Manchu and one Chinese president; one Manchu and one Chinese senior and the same of junior vice-president; three Manchu one Mongol and one Chinese senior secretaries, two Manchu and two Chinese junior secretaries; with one Manchu and two Chinese councillors. Each of the six Boards has two presidents, a Manchu and a Chinese; and four vice-presidents, two Manchu and two Chinese. Each Board has more than one office. The following tabular form gives all the superior officials connected with each Board, except those belonging to the Board of Revenue over the treasuries and stores.

The majority of the secondary offices are held by Manchus, the presidents and vice-presidents alone being equally divided with the Chinese. Mongols are represented on all the Boards, and if their number is small it is as large as their importance to the state can warrant.

Board of	Senior Secretaries	Junior Secretaries	Councillors	Junior Councillor	Custodier	Writer
Appointments	13	14	11	5	2	73
Revenue - -	33	53	29	6	2	119
Rites - - -	12	14	9	4	2	38
War - - -	18	16	10	5	2	78
Punishment	38	44	36	6	2	124
Works - -	22	25	21	4	2	86

The Censorate is composed of one Manchu and one Chinese senior grand censor or chief censor, of the same rank as the president of a Board,—the second class of the first grade; two Manchu and two Chinese junior grand censors, and fifteen supervising censors over the various Boards and public offices in Peking; with twenty-eight Manchu and twenty-eight Chinese censors to look after provincial affairs.

There is the court of Judicature and the office of Transmission, which, with the Censorate and the Six Boards, constitute the grand court called the Nine Ching. All these officials, however, we shall not enumerate; and we shall also omit those connected with the inferior departments of Religious Ceremonies, Banqueting, Kitchen, Grand Equerry, the Imperial Family and Clan Offices, the Hanlin, the National College, the Board of Astronomy, the Temples to Heaven, Earth, Ancestors, National Lares, and the Various Tombs.

The affairs of each of the eighteen provinces of China are conducted as if it were a separate kingdom. The province is supplied with a staff of officials of all needful kinds, who administer justice, collect taxes, pay public accounts in perfect independence of all the other provinces. Sometimes two, and in one case three, provinces are grouped together, though the

connection is often more nominal than real. These groups are each under the care of a *Dsoongdoo*, governor-general, or viceroy. He has supreme control over the civil and military officials of his viceroyalty. His rank is the first class of the second grade; but if he is a president of one of the six Boards, he possesses the rank of that office,—the second of first grade. There are eight viceroys proper,—Chihli, Kiangnan and Kiangsi, Fukien and Chihkiang, Hoope and Hoonan, Shensi and Kansu, the Kwang, Szchuen, Yunnan and Kweichow. There is an official of viceroy rank over the grain tribute; and over the canal there is one in Shantung and Honan, and another in Kiangnan; making in all eleven officials of *Dsoongdoo* rank. Besides these, there are Governors of provinces subordinate to the viceroy in Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Kiangsoo, Anhwi, Kiangsi, Fukien, Chihkiang, Hoope, Hoonan, Shensi, Kansu, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Kweichow; making sixteen in all of the second class of second grade. Besides these, there is a provincial judge and a provincial treasurer in each province. Another official of the first class of fourth grade is called *Taotai* or intendant; of whom there are fifty-three over all the provinces, some of them with one duty, some with another.

All the above officials have superior spheres of action, and are located in the provincial capitals. But besides its capital, the province has a large number of walled cities, to each of which is attached a large country population. This walled city resembles an English county town, and is the seat of the judge or magistrate for the district attached to it. The magistrate is called a *Chihkien* or *Jukien*; the district over which he is magistrate, including the city where his headquarters are situated, being called a *Hien*. His duties comprise those of the English county judge, or the Scotch sheriff, together with the authority of chief of police; for though there are no perambulating police, there is a considerable number of detectives connected with the *Hien Yamun*, or court houses. The magistrate's dwelling-house is invariably within the large enclosure surrounding the *Yamun*. This *Yamun* includes the lock-up

and prison, as well as the judgment hall. This *Hien* magistrate is the lowest of all the officials nominated by the Board of Appointments; his being the first class of the seventh grade. Above him in rank, though not always superior in authority, is the *Chihchow* or *Juchow*; the magistrate of the secondary or *chow* city, which sometimes rules over two or three *hien*. This magistrate rarely differs in anything from the *hien*, but that his rank is the second of the fifth grade. Besides these, there is the primary rank of cities called *foo*, the magistrate of which is of the second class of the fourth grade. Every *foo* city has a *hien* magistrate to transact the ordinary *hien* duties; for the *Chihfoo* or *Jufoo* occupies the post of superintendent over several *hien* cities. He can pass more serious sentences than can the *hien*, and there is an appeal open from the *Juhien* to him. Sentence of death can, however, be passed only by the governor, who is again over the various *Jufoo* of his province as the *Jufoo* over the *Juhien*. The present government has added considerably to Chinese territory, especially in the south-west. It has increased the number of the three grades of magistracies. The *Chihlichow* or *Julichow* are all recent creations of cities of the *chow* rank. To ascertain the total number of walled cities, or what might be called counties, the number of *foo* is excluded; for every *foo* includes a *hien*.

CHINESE WALLED CITIES.

	Chihli	Shantung	Shansi	Honan	Kiangsoo	Anhui	Kiangsi	Fukien	Chihkiang	Hoope	Hoonan	Shensi	Kansu	Kwangtung	Kwangsi	Szechuen	Yunnan	Kweichow	Total
Foo - - -	9	10	9	9	8	8	13	10	11	10	9	6	8	10	11	11	21	13	186
Chow - -	16	11	6	6	3	4	1	—	1	8	3	5	8	7	15	11	31	14	150
Chihlichow	6	—	10	4	3	5	1	2	—	—	4	6	3	3	1	19	—	—	67
Hien - -	118	96	89	99	61	51	76	62	76	60	64	73	44	80	47	112	33	34	1275
Totals - -	140	107	105	109	67	60	78	64	77	68	71	84	55	90	63	142	64	48	1492

Excluding therefore the rich, extensive, and rapidly growing regions of Manchuria, China can boast of about fifteen hundred walled cities.

The judge of the *hien* is chosen from among those literary men who have successfully passed the ordeal of at least two great graduation examinations. We shall not here attempt to describe all the process of examination, but content ourselves by giving its most salient features. The Chinese youth may pick up his education in any way accessible to him. He may strain his eyes over those curious characters, in the dim light of the small oil lamp, after his day's toiling labour is over; he may learn at the poor little school of his native hamlet; he may be taught in the more expensive or secondary school of the talented graduate teacher who is famous for the number of his pupils who have taken degrees; or he may get all his instruction from a tutor under his father's roof. The examiner has no more to do than to test by a series of similar examination papers the amount of knowledge possessed by the large number of youths before him, whether they are the sons of the highest dignitaries or of the poorest peasant. The where and the how such knowledge was obtained have nothing whatever to do with the results of the competitive examination.

An easy preliminary examination by the district judge or *Hien* weeds out some of the intending competitors by eliminating those whose literary attainments are shown to be of so poor a nature that they could not possibly have the least chance of passing. These youths with the meagre learning are sent back to study before venturing again to apply. Those who pass this preliminary examination present themselves before the examiner appointed by government to be examined in writing on the various classics—Moral and Political Philosophy, Poetry, History, Cosmogony, all of which date considerably further back than the Christian era.

This examination is competitive; for however large the number of candidates and however excellent their talents, only a definite fixed number from each *hien* can obtain the degree of *Siwtsai*,—a degree somewhat like our master of arts. A further term of three years is then passed in study before the graduate can become a candidate for the second degree of *Jüyin* or M.A.

with honours. This second is necessarily a more severe examination than the first, though the subjects are still the same classics. The number who can in a province obtain this second degree is also a fixed number, and the degree is gained by competition among the *Siwtsai*, as the *Siwtsai* obtained his degree by the competitions among untitled scholars.

Only after a Chinaman attains this second degree is he capable of receiving the lowest magisterial office—that of *Chihhien* or district judge. It is in choosing from among these potential judges those who are to become actual judges that the influences of favouritism and bribery enter; for it is no injustice to the graduates left in private life that their fellow-graduates have become officials. The right of choice by the government is absolute; and the reasons why one is chosen from among his equals need be known only to the chosen and the immediate nominating officials. Yet a considerable proportion of the official class in China are men whose parents are among the very poor; and if a labourer's son distinguishes himself he is sure of office.

Seeing it is impossible for any man, whatever his rank, social position or influence, to gain one of the magistracies of those fifteen hundred cities, unless he has previously taken the second degree, and seeing also that this post is open to the son of the poorest labourer who possesses the natural talents, and has managed to secure, in any way he could, the knowledge requisite to obtain this degree, we can understand how it is that learning occupies so high a place in Chinese estimation. We can also perceive why learning has been and is so assiduously pursued by all classes, and understand how it is that the Chinese stand out so prominently as the most intelligent and talented people of Asia; for office conferred for at least twelve hundred years only by competitive examinations could not have failed to greatly influence the mental capacity of China. All the higher grades are supplied from the ranks of *Chihhien*. Learning gains the post of *Chihhien*; administrative capacity opens up the way step by step from *Chihhien* to prime minister of China.

CHAPTER XVI.


THE ARMY.

THAT state of Chinese political existence corresponding to the middle ages of Europe, terminated for ever with the establishment of the first imperialistic dynasty, that of Tsin, which subdued all China in the third century B.C. For the eight or nine centuries preceding that time, known as the period of the *Chow* dynasty, the armies of the feudal states, into which China was in reality broken up, never moved during the time of spring operations, nor in autumn till their grain was safely housed in the garners. It was only at fixed periods of the year, when the men were at leisure, that they collected together as an army; and drill had its certain terms. There was therefore no public expenditure for an army; each man having to assist in protecting the state which permitted him to cultivate a portion of its land. The armies were therefore in reality self-supporting militia. Their commander was then known as *Kiangshwai*, "soldier-leader." But Tsin emperor established first a few garrisons and army stores. Standing armies were set afoot afterwards, when one permanent camp was made on the north of the capital, another on the south, to be ready for emergencies.

We have in the beginning of our history seen the origin of the Manchu soldiers, their slender resources, the paucity of their number, and the undaunted bravery which dared any danger while following their persevering and valiant young leader. We saw also the remarkable ease with which they swelled up their ranks, and the extraordinary rapidity of their wild-fire progress. The Manchus were then divided into tens. They hunted with the bow and arrow, each in his own "clan." Each man had one "arrow," and ten bow-men were under a leader; both the

ten and the leader were known as a *Niroo*, the name of the kind of arrow with which they hunted. But as they became quickly so numerous, the *Niroo*, in 1601, was made to number three hundred men; the leader of whom was called *Niroo Ujun*, *Ujun* meaning *lord*. He is sometimes known as *Niroo Janggin*, the latter being an old Chinese term for an officer of the fourth grade. He is now more frequently called a *Dsoling*, also a Chinese name. Over every five *Niroo* was appointed, in 1613, the *Giala Ujun*; and a *Goosa Ujun* was over five *Giala Ujun*. Each *Goosa Ujun* had a left and a right, or senior and junior *Meirun** *Ujun*. In 1660, the *Goosa* was named *Dootoong*, and the *Meirun*, *Foodootoong*; names which continue to this day. The number forming a *niroo* is now but half of three hundred; nor has it been more since Peking was entered, though it has varied somewhat.

Up till 1613 the Manchus were divided into four banners—yellow, red, blue and white; but they had become so large an army, that for efficiency in manœuvring they were sub-divided into as many more—bordered yellow, bordered red, bordered blue, and bordered white,—a division which has remained in force till the present day. The bordered yellow is the first in rank, for it is imperial; the yellow is next, and the bordered white third. In marching, when the country was wide, the banners marched apart in parallel columns; when narrow, they marched as one army. The front ranks fought with long spears and large swords. Good archers were behind the first lines; and the best archers never dismounted, but always galloped to the spot of greatest danger. Every man, officer and private, according to his rank and merit, was rewarded immediately after the battle if he acted well his part. Up to the time of their entry into Peking, the Manchus never received any pay, but cultivated their own grounds, carried their own provisions, and supported their own families. They thus lived and fought as



* *Muirun*, the shoulder, an assistant.

did the ancient Chinese, and as every dynasty has done which, from without, has conquered the wealthy China. This will account for the love of a comfortable private life, out of which the Manchus had to be driven by the force of will of their powerful rulers in Mookden, before they became standing armies and garrisons in China proper.

The Chinese terms, afterwards synonymous with the above named officers, were—*Showbei*, or captain, or Dsoling over three hundred men; *Yowji*, *Tsanling*, or colonel, the Giala Ujun over five Dsoling; and the *Dsoongbing*, *Dootoong*, or Goosa Ujun, or lieutenant-general over five Tsanling, and head of one of the eight banners. The men under a Goosa Ujun, therefore, numbered, in 1613, seven thousand five hundred men; and the total Manchu army was then sixty thousand men.

Of these there were many Mongols, and Chinese not a few; but there was no distinction between them. Very soon after the great battles around Hingking, there were three hundred and eight Manchu Dsoling, seventy-six Mongol, and sixteen Chinese, in all four hundred,—the number of men allotted to each being a hundred and fifty, or half the former number.

The ranks, however, were so rapidly filled up and extended by means of voluntary accessions and conquest, that, in 1635, the Mongols were separated from the Manchu banners, under eight banners of their own. They had then sixteen thousand eight hundred and forty men thus separated. In 1637 the Chinese contingent was divided into two wings, and in 1642 they were detached into a separate army of their own, then numbering twenty-four thousand five hundred men, also divided into eight banners. This was a full year before the entry into Peking. These three were henceforth called *Man*, *Mung*, and *Han*,—the first being the Manchu, the second the Munggoo or Mongols, and the third the Chinese. That division continues to exist to the present day. The *Han Kün* or Han army being distinct from the Chinese proper consists solely of those Chinese who joined the Manchus on the east of Shanhaigwan previous to the great battle in which the power of the robber Li was

broken, and before their entry into Peking. They are called bannermen, and their women do not bind the feet. All high officials, though really Chinese, are also enrolled under one or other of the eight banners of the *Han Kün*. But the ordinary Chinese troops, or the *Loo* army, though far more numerous, are not called Han Kün, nor regarded as so closely allied to the Manchus. The Han Kün have certain privileges, more than the Loo, but less than the Manchus; but they are not what they once were. These three armies—Man, Mung, and Han—could always be relied on as belonging to the one “family”; and each banner of each army could be handled as if it were an independent army; thus being so many army corps.

The discipline and efficiency of these troops, as well as their bravery, were, to begin with, of an order much higher than those of the Chinese soldiers. For reasons which we cannot possibly understand, the Manchu rulers of China have permitted or ordered Chinese military officers to drill, or have drilled, their men in western tactics, and arm them with the best attainable western weapons. Hence all the best drilled and armed troops in China are Chinese under the command of Chinamen. What the result is to be of this unwise policy of the Manchu rulers it is difficult to say.

The Manchu troops were, from an early period, divided into active or marching troops and garrison troops. Of the former, there were sixty thousand always prepared for service; which, with forty thousand Mongols, were an ever-ready compact army of one hundred thousand men. The Manchus were almost all drawn from the lands between Hingking and the Japan sea; lands now to a large extent in Russian hands. Not one of them belonged to the regions beyond the Songari, or those north of a line drawn from Ninguta east to the sea. When the Tatars north of the Songari were conquered, the bands of men afterwards attached to the Manchu armies were kept distinct, as they are to this day, as the Solon detachment, the Sibo detachment, &c., and have never been amalgamated in the banners, though they are of the same race as the Manchus.

The garrison army of Manchus was located chiefly in the cities of Liaotung and Liaosi, under their Dsolings. When there was no pressing military duty, they tilled the ground, lived in villages, practiced the bow and arrow, and hunted at the proper season. If their services were suddenly called for, each man instantly mounted his horse, and they formed in line as their swelling numbers were on the way to the rendezvous;—they were therefore in fact a well trained and efficient reserve. The Chinese, who tilled the fields by their sides, were forbidden to carry arms of any kind.

The army which attacked Ningyuen so unsuccessfully was one hundred and thirty thousand strong, and an army of fully a hundred thousand was almost always moving in some-direction from Mookden to Ningyuen, Kingchow, Corea, some portion of Mongolia, or into the northern provinces of China.

In every army, or every division in active service, the Eight Banners were equally represented. On level ground the banners marched abreast, on dangerous, narrow, or hilly roads they marched banner after banner and in as many lines as the necessities of the case demanded. They kept their shields and muskets interlocked like a wall in front of them. Light horse of the fleetest rode at each flank. The van, armed with fire-arms, were the first to move outside the "Deers' horns,"* and formed in line to march before the men next to follow moved out of their place in the camp. In returning, half of the van, in battle order, brought up the rear.

When a dash was necessary or sufficient for piercing the enemy's lines, Solon men were unequalled; they also made excellent garrison soldiers. "But for steady endurance no soldier was approachable to the old Manchu, whose mind was always fixed, and whose courage was of the highest order." This we can imagine as the result of a long course of victory,

* These were formed of pointed poles, heavy below, light above, thrust through a strong beam, at right angles to each other, forming so many St. Andrew's crosses, five feet high; the openings between them being only wide enough to admit of the passage by squeezing through of one man. This was rampart sufficient for a camp.

secured by unquestioning and complete obedience to leaders whom they fully trusted.

From an incident in the reign of Kanghi as related in the *Annals*, we learn a remarkable custom established by Noorhachu. If any man supplied with a horse an officer of or above the rank of a Foodootoong, who lost his horse in fight, he was after the battle presented with a horse and a suit of clothing; if the officer so presented was a Tsanling or Dsoling, the lender received a horse; and for a similar service to a common soldier a cow was gifted. This we learn because the law on the subject was changed in 1664, as the president of the Board of War said that such reward was insufficient in the time of Kanghi, when horses and cattle were so much cheaper than thirty years before. It was then decreed that the man who supplied a horse to an officer between the rank of duke and Foodootoong, who lost his horse in battle, would receive the reward of one hundred taels; if the officer so supplied was of any rank between a Tsanling and a common soldier, the reward was sixty taels and twenty taels for so supplying a common soldier. The only interpretation of this is that some one, not a soldier, lending a horse during the continuance of the battle to one whose horse was killed under him, was thus rewarded. For if the horse were gifted to the man who gave his own away, the reward of a horse or a cow would be no reward at all.

In the same indirect manner we ascertain that the Manchu troops at first had their wives with them when on garrison duty, or located in a camp; for in 1655 they were forbidden to take their wives with them to camp at Woochang. During the marching and fighting of the enormous armies which the Manchus, with slender monetary resources, sent abroad over China, it was impossible that there should not be more or less cruel oppression of and exactions from the people, at which we need be the less astonished when we remember that far greater enormities were just then committing in France and Scotland in the name of religion. The cries of distress found their way to Peking, and the emperor, unlike his western brethren, was eager to prevent

all such oppression. Many of those who directed attention to the abuses, were punished because they were in their turn accused of making false charges; and to discover the truth among this crimination and recrimination, the emperor appointed a special supervising censor to investigate the condition of Kwangtung. He reported a wretched state of matters arising from the improper selection of officials; the reiterated claims for unnecessary taxes; non-payment for labour on public works; the indefinite number of men so employed; the seizure of ports by individuals who made them a private monopoly; taxes imposed by private people; and the destruction of the large trees. The censor concluded that as Kweichow and Szchuen were then tranquil, a prince should be sent to the Kwang provinces to "protect and cherish" the people, and give them rest. This was in February 1659; and in April, Sangwei prince Tranquillizing-the-West was ordered to govern Yunnan, prince Levelling-the-south Shang Kosi to Kwangtung, and prince Pacifying-the-south Koong Yoodua to Szchuen. But if it was believed that this move would improve matters, the rebellion of the three rebels proves how sadly misplaced was the hope. In 1663, the marshal of Honan advised the erection of a public hall in every city, where the civil and military authorities should meet every fifth month to consult over the differences which might arise between the soldiers and people. The Board of War endorsed the advice and the emperor agreed to it. Hence it would appear that the ordinary tribunals were powerless. Again, in 1683, when the retired viceroy of Kiangsi, who had been acting during part of the war, returned to Peking, the emperor strongly reprimanded him, because he had not prevented his soldiers from plundering the people, "especially after the conclusion of the war," and took away, or "took him down" as the phrase is, five degrees of merit. Other officials were blamed for the same indifference to the welfare of the people. In 1660 a Manchu minister prayed the emperor to issue strict orders forbidding the Manchus to destroy the markets, and from taking forcible possession of articles. This is still a common

grievance. The nature of it is that the man who has the power,—soldier or robber,—takes an article for which he gives only his own price, and not that of the owner.

In 1653, Hoo Jang was sent to Canton as chief commissioner of the revenue (Hoppo). After his arrival there, he despatched a memorial to Peking, stating that he heard of riotous conduct on the part of the two armies of the princes Gung Jimao and Shang Kosi,* that they took forcible possession of the wives and daughters of men of distinction; and that they had taken possession of the Fantai's offices &c. The princes were put on their defence. Jimao reported that when the army began the siege of Canton, it was with the determination to take it or die; that they were nine months in the trenches, during which they ate in the mud and slept in the rain; they were cut up by cannon, and attacked with edged weapons with such frequency that it was difficult to calculate the immense numbers lost; so that when at last the city fell, the soldiers were so furious that the eating of the flesh and the stripping off the skin of the citizens would be insufficient to appease their anger; and if among the immense numbers seized there were some honourable women, how were they to be distinguished, for the city contained only people in league with rebels? To the other charges, of taking forcible possession of revenue offices &c., a distinct denial was made, though it was acknowledged that for a brief space after they entered the city, the public offices were used as barracks, till provision was made for the soldiers. Hoo Jang was degraded, but the reply of the commander shows clearly enough what was implied to the conquered. Indeed the mode of conducting the Taiping war, and the manner in which the two recent Mahomedan rebellions on the west of China were drowned in the blood of whole cities, need only be known to understand what defeat means, when Chinese troops are victors; it is, as of old, *vae victis*.

* Meadows, in his Chinese and their rebellions, sees a reason for the wholesale massacre of Manchu families by the Taipings, in that sack by the Manchus of Canton; but there was not a single Manchu in the army which took Canton, either the first or second time.

One other feature connected with the army, was brought under imperial notice by chief Censor Toolai in 1655, when praying to show true love to the people by saving them from oppression and danger; one form of which was that bannermen very frequently took possession of lands not belonging to them, declaring lands belonging to their neighbours to have been made over to them. That was sometimes done with the concurrence of the land owner, that he and the soldier might share the taxes due to the imperial treasury; and not one of the people dared raise his voice; thus his majesty was "deceived above and the people plundered below." He also prayed that the Board of Revenue should ascertain accurately the exact number of individuals in every bannerman's family and grant lands accordingly,—the usurped lands to return to the real owners. "Thus" he concluded, "the people, who are as dead men, will become alive, and the reduced taxation will be restored."

Hence we see that grants were proportionate to the size of a Manchu's family; for every male enrolled as a Manchu was then and is now entitled to an annual income in money and grain, whatever his profession or mode of life,—the only condition being that he must be able to use the bow and arrow, and practice it a certain number of days annually. He becomes a "man" at thirteen years of age.

The number of the men under the Manchu flag was greatly augmented, immediately on their passage through Shanhaigwan and their victory over the robber. Sangwei's army was incorporated intact, and many others joined at Peking. One army marched into Shansi, another into Shantung and a third south to the Yangtsu, each of no less than fifty or sixty thousand men. There could then be no fewer than two hundred thousand men in the field; while garrisons used up as many more. In 1645, no less than two hundred thousand cavalry submitted; but half of them were dismissed to till their lands again. In the reign Kienlung, there were six hundred and eighty one Manchu Dsolings, two hundred and four Mongol, and two hundred and sixty six Han Kun in Peking alone;

there were eight hundred and four Dsolings in various outside garrisons, making in all a total of about two thousand Dsolings, each of whom had however no more than eighty or ninety men. Each Dsoling had twenty horse; but the Han Dsoling had forty-two; the total horse in the Man and Mung armies was seventeen thousand seven hundred; under Han Dsolings eleven thousand seven hundred and twenty.

The Manchu conquests to the north of them kept within the right hand side of the Songari during the life of Noorhachu. It was his son and successor who first led an army into the country of Solon, north of the Nonni. Some Solon people paid "tribute" in 1635 in the ninth year of the young monarch's reign. It was probably the fact that these proved themselves admirable horsemen and capital archers, which led to an expedition being immediately sent northwards to summon to allegiance the various clans which had not put in an appearance. This expedition brought back over seven thousand men. But next year Kortsin Mongols overran Solon; and the chief, who had joined the Manchus, was sent back to protect his lands. An army was sent north in 1640, which returned with over three thousand captives. Possibly Solon men, though "their speech, riding, and manners, were like the Manchu," much preferred their own liberty in their own wilds, to Manchu refinements and slavery in Mookden, hence orders were sent to the Kortsin chief,—also a vassal of the Manchus,—to suppress a rising disaffection in Solon. The Mongols put down the disaffection, taking nine hundred prisoners.

The chief of the family of *Meirjula* gave in his allegiance to Kanghi in 1671, and the name of the district was at that time changed to *Meirgun*, called "New Manchu," and placed under forty Dsolings. Eighteen years after, another expedition took Locha, formerly occupied by Russia, with all the country up to the river Kerulun and Hinganling mountain range. The Kortsin Mongols also revealed themselves again, and the Sibos and Gworcha peoples on both banks of the Nunkiang, with the Dahoor people, over fourteen thousand men, gave in their

adhesion. Dahoor is another name for Solon, both of which names are applied to the people living between the Argun and the Chingchilikiang, both rising in Hinganling, the latter flowing 90 li north of Heiloongkiang city into the Amoor, the former 1770 li north-west of the same city. Solon is five or six days' journey, or about 200 miles north of the city of Heiloongkiang, the same east of Saksa city, taken from the Russians, and 1400 odd li from Chichihar city.

Beidoona or Petuna, and Chichihar, were then erected into fortified cities, with a Foo Dootoong at Hoolunbeir, and Dsolings in each, under the orders of the Tatar general of Heiloongkiang. The "Holy Wars" state that the Liao dynasty sprang in Hoolunbeir, and that their Shangking was there. But this statement we cannot think correct, for their Shangking, by the cotemporary measurements from Yoongping, must have been on the Siramuren or Liao, just before entering Liaotung territory—(See *History of Corea*). Yet it is not impossible that the Solon people are descendants of the Liao dynasty, which was broken up by the Kin, and fled in various directions—(See *Corea*).

Outside the eight Manchu, Mongol, and Han (Chinese) banners, there are the regiments of Solon, Sibo, Dahoor, Woolunchwun, Gworchu, ninety-seven Dsolings, each with three hundred men. Their customs differ from the Mongols, for they, as well as Yili men, have a fixed abode; yet they were not enrolled under the banners of Noorhachu and his successor. But none of the clans east of Ninguta and Sanhing have Dsolings.

It was discovered early in Manchu history that ten Corean soldiers were not equal to one Mongol, nor yet ten Mongols to one Manchu; inasmuch as the Manchus were perfectly united by the similarity of their speech, clothing, dwellings, lands, and products; in their fortifications, archery, hunting, and manners. In order to sustain and perpetuate this *esprit de corps* it was that Noorhachu ordered the creation of a national Manchu literature, distinct from that of China and Mongolia; and the Mongols and Chinese who early attached themselves to his fortunes, were each divided into their own eight banners.

Hence also when Sibó, with Gworchá north of Beidoona, and Koorka east of Hwunchwun, entered the service, their own names were retained to distinguish them from the Manchus.

On the entry into Peking of the Manchus, the privy councillor Hogo was left with the two wings of the Manchu army to occupy Liaotung,—probably because the rulers were not quite sure as to how the war would terminate; and it was well to be sure of Liaotung. It was in 1662 a Tatar general was nominated to Mookden, and another to Ninguta, who was changed to Kirin ten years after to prepare against the Russians. In 1683, when Ninguta men defeated *Locha* or Russia, a Tatar general was appointed to Heiloongkiang, and then for the first time were the “East Three Provinces,”—Shungking or Liaotung, Kirin and Heiloongkiang,—heard of. The Manchus drove the Russians across the Amoor, as they are apparently preparing to attempt to do again. According to the statistics of 1758, the number of “soldiers” were:—In Mookden, nineteen thousand two hundred and seventy-six, with three Foo Dootoongs or brigadier-generals, four Chungshow Wei and two Fangshow Wei; in Ninguta or Kirin province, fourteen thousand three hundred and ninety-two men, under five brigadier-generals, one Hieling, two Dsolings; in Heiloongkiang or Tsitsihar, eight thousand five hundred and fifty-seven under three brigadier-generals, one Dsoongwan, and one Chungshow Wei;—in all, including Manchu, Mongol, Han, Solon, Sibó, Gworchá, Barhoo, Dahoor, and Woolunchwun men, forty-two thousand two hundred to defend the Manchurian provinces. The number was reduced to thirty-five thousand four hundred odd, under Taokwang.

The *Lingtsooi* were picked horse in the capital, each Dsoling having five each; in all, five thousand five hundred and fifty-five picked cavalry. There were one thousand three hundred and ninety tradesmen, as bow-makers, saddlers, &c. Each dsoling had two men, forming the *Chienfung* or vanguard; in all, one thousand three hundred and sixty-two Manchus, four hundred and eight Mongols. Kienlung established a corps called the *Jienzooi*, or ladder-men, of whom there were two

thousand also belonging to the vanguard. Another corps of equal numbers was that of the *Chinkun*, or body-guard, or "watchmen." Larger than these was the *Hookun*, or imperial guard, or "rear guard"; each dsoling having seventeen men of this corps. There were eleven thousand five hundred and seventy-seven Manchus, and three thousand four hundred and sixty-eight Mongols in the Hookun. Out of it was taken the guard of the *Yuen ming yuen* palaces built by Yungching.

The *Hwochi* or "fire-arms" numbered six to one dsoling; and all the gunners of the outer and inner cities of the capital numbered one thousand nine hundred and thirty-six. Of these, the Chin kun were not under the control of the banners, but of the privy council. Among all these varieties of imperial guards, there was not a man of the Han kun; they were all Manchus and Mongols; the Han kun had different duties and camps. The capital was then garrisoned by a force of Man, Mung, and Han troops, numbering over one hundred thousand, with over twenty-seven thousand four hundred men of a reserve.

There were twenty-five camps outside the capital, with a total of eight thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight. The *Sinkiang*, or Mahommedan western boundaries (conquered by Kienlung over a period of five years, and at an expense of one million taels per annum; the Kulja part of it is now in dispute between Russia and China) had eight garrisons with fifteen thousand one hundred and forty men. The Chinese provinces had twenty garrisons occupied by forty-five thousand five hundred and forty men; one thousand four hundred and nineteen men guarded the imperial tombs at Peking; there were eight hundred and fifty foresters and seven hundred men to look after the Kirin border. In all, outside the capital, there were garrisons of the three kinds of banner men of one hundred and seven thousand seven hundred and sixty; and including the capital, there was a total of over two hundred thousand bannermen.

Besides the three bannered armies, there was, as there is, the Solon division, the Dahoor company, with that of Barhoo, Chahar, the Eleuths, and Sibo. They are not included in the

eight banners, and were all nomads before they were subjected by the Manchus. There were ninety-seven nomad dsolings in Heiloongkiang province, Chahar had one hundred and twenty, and besides these there were other fifty dsolings,—all of nomadic peoples. Kirin people enlisted at pleasure, as there were no dsolings. It was reported to the emperor in 1691, that the *Ding* of Chahar numbered two hundred and twenty-six thousand two hundred and seventy, of whom one-seventh belonged to clans related by marriage to the imperial family. Every third man of these *Ding* was bound to appear in arms at the summons of the Peking court. This term *Ding*, applied to a nomadic people, includes every man able to carry arms.

The Chinese troops proper were, from the beginning of the Manchu dynastic rule, entirely distinct from the three bannered armies; as much apart from Han Kun as from the Man and Mung banners. They were and are known as the *Loo-Ying*. They were divided into cavalry, garrison troops, and fighting troops; the latter two divisions being infantry.

There is one small officer called *Waiwei*, much like a sergeant, attached to each Chihhien or district magistrate over the empire. His duties are, with his twenty men, to be always on the move among the villages forming the district to which he is attached, to see that there is no disturbance. If there should be legal difficulties or serious brawls he can judge and settle minor cases; but as he is usually illiterate, he has to employ a scholar of sharp wits, who goes with him, and whom he consults; but he alone is responsible. He is thus a sort of inferior police magistrate. These *Waiwei* are all mounted.

The Chinese troops or Looying of the various provinces were, in Chihli, forty-two thousand five hundred and thirty-two men; Shantung, twenty thousand one hundred and seventy-four; Shansi, twenty-five thousand five hundred and thirty-four; Honan, thirteen thousand eight hundred and thirty-four; Kiangsoo, fifty thousand one hundred and thirty-four; Anhwi, eight thousand seven hundred and twenty-four; Kiangsi, thirteen thousand eight hundred and thirty-two; Fukien, sixty-three

thousand three hundred and forty; Chihkiang, thirty-nine thousand and nine; Hoope, twenty-two thousand seven hundred and forty; Hoonan, thirty-five thousand five hundred and ninety; Shensi, forty-two thousand nine hundred and sixty; Kansu including Ili, Balikun, Urumchi, &c., fifty-five thousand six hundred and nineteen; Szchuen, thirty-four thousand one hundred and eighty-eight; Kwangtung, sixty-nine thousand and fifty-two; Kwangsi, twenty-three thousand and forty-eight; Yunnan, forty-two thousand five hundred and forty-nine; and Kweichow, forty-eight thousand four hundred and ninety: in all, six hundred and sixty-one thousand six hundred and fifty-six.

That there was under Kienlung, in camp and garrison, a grand total of nearly a million soldiers is very probable; but not one-third of that number was ever collected together under Manchu rule. The border provinces have necessarily large numbers of men more or less thoroughly trained to arms, because border troubles are incessant; and from the north of Kansu, along the western and southern frontiers of China, there are many semi-independent tribes which would certainly make an effort to take the wealth of the Chinese cities of the province next to them were they not always kept in check; and though frontier difficulties are not blazoned abroad to the world, in one place or another there is always more or less serious fighting. Yet those men, numbering nearly seven hundred thousand, were not regarded as an army fit to meet regular armies. They rather resembled so many armed police, or provincial militia; and their duties consisted, as now, in keeping the peace of their own province, or section of a province; for in Chihli there were four distinct headquarters, three in Shantung, six in Kiangsoo, &c. Those were therefore local troops. The imperial troops have always been distinct from the provincial. Their field of action may be the neighbouring city or the remotest boundary. They may be said to represent a grand reserve, always ready to march where the emperor finds the local forces unable to cope with the troubles of their province. These imperial troops are the regular army, supposed to be thoroughly drilled, and are better



found than the local forces. This army is therefore the sheet anchor of the dynasty. The troops are inspected every spring and autumn; and a grand general review is made every fifth year, when those found worthy are advanced; the unfit, the covetous, and the feeble cashiered; but if those become feeble had formerly won a creditable name, they were still kept on.

Colonel Gordon may be said to be the founder of the existing imperial army; for it was he especially who proved the superiority of native troops drilled as westerns drill, over the native troops educated under the old tactics. The present imperial army is mainly that of Li Hungchang, lying at Tientsin, and drilled at first chiefly by English-speaking officers. This drill, with foreign arms, is spreading extensively; but what is very remarkable, is that this new drill, with these new fire-arms of precision, with ever so many Krupp guns, are by the Manchu government placed almost exclusively in the hands of native Chinese, under Chinese officers; while nine-tenths of the Manchu troops are mere pensioners of state, exercised with the bow and the arrow, but unacquainted with the use of fire-arms. How this curious state of matters will end, or why it exists, it is difficult to say; but it certainly looks to a foreigner pregnant with future trouble. The army, at the present moment masters of Kashgar and threatening to attack the advanced Russian posts, is another drilled and equipped like that of Tientsin, but having no immediate connection therewith. As its commander, Tso Tsungtang, is a viceroy, as well as Li Hungchang; and as his successes in the far west have, for the time, at the least raised him to a level in popularity with Li, the Manchus may not unreasonably believe themselves perfectly safe between the two; for these two successful commanders will hold each other in equipoise. Meantime Manchu and Chinese are united by a common hatred of the western.

The pay of the Chinese army has always been partly in grain, partly in money. We learn from the "Holy Wars" that the pay, in the period Yungching, was four taels per month for the Chienfung, Chinkun, Hookun, Lingtsoui and the best artisans;

and three for the secondary artizans who were cavalry ; two taels for the Lingtsooi of the infantry. A man had, besides twenty-four *Hoo* or bushels, each five *Dow* of grain per annum. The cavalry of the three camps of the capital received two taels per month, and the infantry one and a half ; garrison troops had one tael per month ; each of those men had, besides, five *Dow* of rice per month. This is the pay of the common Manchu soldier at the present day, but twenty per cent. sticks to the fingers of the various paymasters, and the Manchu soldier receives only eighty cents per month instead of a hundred. The garrisons and camps of the provinces were paid the same sums of money as are paid to the capital camps and garrisons, but received only three *Dow* of rice per month.

The pay in silver of a *Tidoo* or general, was equal to eighty of the Chinkun, or three hundred and twenty taels ; of a *Dsoongbing* or lieut.-general, was equivalent to sixty of the Chinkun, or two hundred and forty taels ; of a *Fookiany* or major-general, to thirty ; of a *Tsanling* or colonel, to twenty ; of a *Yowji* or major, to fifteen ; of a *Doosu* or captain, to ten ; of a *Showbei* or lieutenant, to eight ; of a *Chiendsoong* or ensign, to five ; and of a *Badsoong* or sergeant, to four. The *Badsoong* commands fifty men, and the lowest officer has ten under him.

When the three rebels were finally overthrown, Kanghi distributed a donation of six and a half millions of taels among the Manchu soldiers, each family receiving several hundred taels. Not very long after, as much more was divided among them. The emperor Yungching made frequent presents to the Manchu soldiery, usually consisting of an extra month's pay. They would be glad now, did they receive their regular pay, or three hundred thousand taels per month without any extras.

There are five degrees of merit, accompanied by as many grades of rank and pay, open to the Manchu soldier in actual fighting, in the capture of prisoners, in scaling or taking forts, cities, camps, or ships. The money grant ranges from a hundred taels to thirty taels. The size of the captured city or ship decides the prize given, and each of the five men first in the

capture have their graduated reward, according to the post each occupied as first, second, &c. The Chinese soldier in the same circumstances is also similarly rewarded; the first of the five is made a *Yowji*, whatever his previous rank; the others become *Showbei*, *Chiendsoong*, &c. The various rewards in grants of money, or in rank and pay, are carefully noted in the governmental dictionary of the Manchu dynasty; and all conceivable positions and cases are provided for.

Under Shunchih, the first Manchu emperor, there were eighty thousand Manchus under arms, each of whom is said to have cost an average of a thousand taels and a thousand dan of rice per annum. Each soldier *Kia* represented several tens or even hundreds of able-bodied men *Ding*. In the time of Kienlung, there were several hundred thousands of *Ding*, and under Taokwang there were several millions. The greater proportion of the lands belonging to these, within 500 li of the capital, was in the hands of Chinese cultivators, the Manchus themselves not caring to work their own lands. Within that area no Chinese were allowed to settle up to the period Kienlung. Those "several millions" were stowed away somewhere in or around the capital, no one knew why or where; but constituting a burden which the land was unable to bear; for they were neither scholars, agriculturists, labourers, merchants, soldiers, nor citizens. The army expenditure of Han and Tang dynasties was well known; but never before was it heard that a huge multitude of men existed only to be fed by the public. Immense tracts of land were lying waste in Liaotung, Ninguta, Heiloongkiang and other places, but it required memorial after memorial to get some of the idle Manchus sent to cultivate those lands. There were several myriads again sent to Hoongchungdsu, 70 li beyond *Dooshukow*, and on 100 li further to Kaiping, the Shangtu of Yuen dynasty. Some more myriads were sent to cultivate the lands beyond Kalgan, 70 li to Hinghochung, and 100 li further west to Sinpingchung. There were, in the beginning of this century, over ten thousand Manchu soldiers between Zehol, the ancient Daning Wei, and Kweihwa and Swiyuen on the west, the

ancient Li Wei and Chow Wei, while Chahar was occupied as pasture.

An earnest and eloquent appeal was made to scatter the Manchu families hanging on in the capital, many of whom wished to be tillers of the ground. It was recommended to purchase a hundred *mow* of land for each family, and let them settle down to work in Liaotung and the other places above mentioned, where Mongol families might join them. They could from all those places rapidly converge on the capital if occasion demanded their presence, while their continued inaction enervated, enfeebled, and discouraged them. The Han Kün was also recommended to be disbanded among the Chinese people out of which they came, and thus the enormous drain on the resources of the country, which was being uselessly thrown away, would be stopped.

At that time the various princes, Beiras, and other Manchu nobles had three thousand three hundred and thirty-eight *ching* of public lands in their possession; and all the Manchus had one hundred and forty thousand one hundred and twenty-eight *ching*, or a hundred times as many *mow* in their unalienated possession; for these lands are really entailed. The Sibo garrison of a thousand men in Ili had twenty four thousand *mow* of arable land granted them in perpetuity. That land ran on both sides of the river for 200 li; and they had new lands thereafter granted them.

Whether or not it has resulted from the arguments of the "Holy Wars," the modern condition of the Manchus is different from that of a generation ago, for in Manchuria there are myriads upon myriads of Manchus working their own farms. But still every adult man receives his yearly government allowance; and notwithstanding the numbers comfortably working their own farms there are scores of thousands in Mookden in exactly the same condition as that deprecated by the Holy Wars;—"existing" on the yearly pittance of the government, every one hoping for something to turn up; but the many are too idle and the few too ambitious, to till their own lands, which have, by mortgage, mostly fallen into Chinese hands.

The standing and active armies of the Manchus have been less in number, but of greater expense, than the armies of former dynasties. The Ming army which marched into Annam is said to have been several hundred thousands strong; the Manchus overcame all Annamite opposition with eighteen thousand men. The Ming armies against Pochow and Loochuen, were over two hundred thousand; the forces sent by the Manchus to subdue the Miao and the Man of Yunnan and Kweichow, were between twenty and thirty thousand men. The Manchus have never sent as many as a hundred thousand against the western lands of Central Asia, and seven thousand men took Kokonor (Chinghai). Hwojijan was taken by thirty thousand; and twenty thousand penetrated Burma. But Kanghi had four hundred thousand troops actively engaged against Woo Sangwei.

But the large figures of former dynasties are explained in another portion of the "Holy Wars." It has been said that about twenty thousand men sufficed, in Kienlung, to conquer Annam; but they were called three hundred thousand. When Jihar threatened to bid for Chinese empire, he had thirty thousand followers, but these were reported as a hundred thousand; Jung Chunggoong had a hundred and seventy thousand, but they were called a million. Thus *Yunglo* of the Ming sent an army against Annam, given out to be eight hundred thousand, whereas it was in reality little over fifty thousand; and when another Ming emperor is said to have sent half a million men across Shamo, it must be remembered that the Woo emperor of Han dynasty sent no more than a hundred thousand, divided into two armies. So that the nominal armies set in motion in China, have differed considerably from the actual ones. We might add that the experience of Li Dsuchung would seem to imply that camp followers and servants were also included in the sum total of the army.

Besides the cost of supporting the men, there was a large expenditure for cattle. Kanghi had a hundred and sixteen thousand eight hundred and thirteen horses in three camps, to guard the capital, and eighty-six thousand and ³/₄ twenty-one in

outer garrison barracks. Each horse was allowed nine *Dow* of *liao*, which is a mixture of pulse and millet, for a winter month, and six for a summer one, with thirty bundles of straw; representing an expense of two and a half taels. Besides these, there were feeding on pastures beyond Kalgan or Jangjiakow, Dooshukow, and at *Dalingho*, a hundred thousand horses, sixty thousand oxen, and two hundred thousand sheep, their excellent pasture costing nothing; if fed on Chinese soil, ten thousand taels per day would not suffice to keep them. The Liao, Kin, and Yuen dynasties, had also their pastures beyond the border, but the Ming were too much afraid of the northerners to trust any cattle so far north.

Though the horses belonging to his majesty were extremely numerous and very hardy, they were unfit to carry anything beyond the great sandy, gravelly desert of Gobi, where the camel alone could be employed as beast of burden. This bactrian should have his two humps covered with padding to keep his burden off his skin, and with the same object his back should be protected by a saddle; on hilly and gravelly ground his hoofs should be shod with leather shoes, and to save his nose* he should be gently led. He carries fifteen *Dow* of rice.

When Yungching sent an army against the western barbarians, he had a cart made five feet long and two feet wide, with one driver and two men on each side to help. Five carts were called a *Woo*, twenty a *Chung*, one hundred a *Dooi*, and a thousand a *Ying* or camp. In attack two *Dooi* led the van, three brought up the rear, and the other five surrounded the commander. By day the carts were laden with and carried the grain, by night they were arranged in a circle round the camp, forming a wall. But one commander, advancing in that order, suffered a fearful defeat. Such carts, says the "Holy Wars," should be in such order that they could serve as a rallying centre for the infantry, and admit of the passing and repassing of cavalry; and always on level ground. Woolanbootoong of Jwunhar, advanced against

* The Mongols thrust a small piece of wood through the gristle of the nose, to which the string leading the animal is attached.

the Chinese with bows and arrows, employing camels as a covering wall; for that battle order was believed invincible. But the Manchus crossed the river, attacked and soon broke up the camel-line in front with their cannon, while the cavalry and a portion of the infantry wheeled round the hill, attacked the rear, and utterly defeated them.

The army sent by Kienlung against Sinkiang was out five years, costing annually three million taels, of which Kansu supplied the large half. The men were also those of Kansu and Shensi, besides Manchus and Mongols. The western and north-western foes were the easiest vanquished of all the enemies of the Manchus. The Manchu troops sent down from the north against Woo Sangwei, cost thrice the amount spent on the same number of Chinese local troops; and it was said that each Heilongkiang Manchu cost as much as ten Chinese. The aborigines of Kinchuen mountains, on the other hand, cost only half as much as an ordinary Chinese soldier; and in battle he is equal to ten Chinese, from his ardent, fierce, and fearless nature. They were the most difficult to overcome of all the foes encountered by the Chinese. As soldiers in the Chinese army, they stand at the head of the best soldiers,—and are rewarded by buttons, peacock's feathers, titles of batooroo, &c. Rebels never wait an attack by them.—(See *Kinchuen* in "Aborigines.")

But the "Holy Wars" complains of the silence of the Manchu state papers on the defeats sustained by their generals, while so eloquent on their victories. When marching against the three Ming princes, the Manchu commanding princes dared not move beyond Hoonan. The Beira Doonga was defeated in and driven out of Shensi, losing the whole province. Viceroy Jin Gwangdsoo and general Shooshoo, dared only look at the frontier of the two Kwangs and retired. Jwunhar was long unopposed, and often victorious. The frightful catastrophe at Foordan was unmentioned, whence only a couple of thousands returned of an army of nearly ten times that number. The almost equally crushing defeats of Hotoongbai, Eleuths, and Kalawoosoo, were also unnoted. The *Tsandsan* commander was able to do nothing in

Burma, nor Wunfoo in Kinchuen; while the generals patched a peace with Burma by making money payments; and Zooi Hung was helpless in Taiwan; yet all these failures were passed over in silence.

The "Holy Wars" devotes a chapter to the composition of an army, from which we extract the following:—A man of first class literary ability is not necessarily a good general. The grand secretary Jang Tingyü should have kept his lines at Foordan; but advanced to battle, and was therefore utterly defeated. Liw Toonghün retreated on Balikwun from Hami, when he should be making forced marches against the rebels of Kansu and Shensi. We pass over many other instances to notice the exception of Li Jufang, governor of Fukien, who hurried to prevent the rebel Gung, and fought to the death. When marching against Chahar, Kanghi urged on the army, with promises of large rewards if they were successful. A very brief space brought the war to a successful termination, for "each man fought as if he were a hundred men." When Jwunhar was on his triumphant progress towards China, Kanghi ordered the grand secretary, Li Gwangdi, to head the army against him. The grand secretary turned pale, and the emperor laughed, saying he would soon stop their march; he went in person and did stop them. The Manchu generals were uneducated, very few could write Chinese; yet they conquered China. The strategy of one successful Liaotung officer in the period Kiaching—who conquered in every battle he fought, whether in Nepaul or Taiwan, against the southern Miao or the northern Liaotung robbers—was to attack a short line with a long; to march by a road which the enemy would not suspect, and to attack when the enemy was unprepared. When nearing the enemy he camped about 20 or 30 li distance; and marched at midnight, to take the enemy by surprise with the first streaks of day. If he ascertained that the enemy was aware of his plan of attack, he sent bodies of men by round-about ways to attack unexpectedly. He always marched in battle order, and was never taken by surprise; and if unexpectedly he came up

with a foe, he ordered an attack on the instant, while the enemy was still unprepared. Jushow, a lieut.-colonel of Kanghi, defeated several thousand Eleuths at Hami with two hundred men. A major-general of Yungching's defeated several thousand Miao with four hundred men in Yunnan; and with two thousand overcame several myriads of Miao at Woonung. Another major-general, with two thousand men, successfully resisted twenty thousand Eleuths at Balikwun. One officer, with one thousand six hundred men, drove the enemy from Ili to Balikwun. Jushow repeated his exploits again and again at Kokonor.

In regard to an army, therefore, the choice of general is of first importance; drill and discipline are the second grand requisite. As to men, the southern Chinese are said not to equal the northern; nor can the northern Chinese approach the men beyond the north border. The "Red-haired"* sailed their ships without let or hindrance in the outer seas till Jung Chunggoong fought and took Taiwan. Jwunhar trampled down all Chahar, till Yoong Chin Wang in a fierce battle defeated them with terrible slaughter. Hence can be seen, that the strength or weakness of an army is in the general rather than in the army. There never has been an army always victorious; but there have been generals who never lost a battle.

The Ming largely employed the aborigines of the south in their armies,—the Lang troops of Kwangsi and the Miao of Hookwang, Yoongshwun and Paoning, who were successful in nine out of ten battles.

A mode of discipline, said by the "Holy Wars" to be an ancient one, is recommended for modern armies. Of local troops, every ten had a Head, every hundred a Chief, every five hundred a Badsoong, and three thousand under a Tsankiang formed a *Ying*. If a *Ying* fled the Tsankiang was beheaded; the Badsoong, Chief and Head suffering the same fate if their respective bodies fled. But if a *Ying* fled and the Tsankiang died fighting, five Badsoongs were beheaded; if the Badsoong's company fled but he died fighting, ten Chiefs were beheaded;

* Dutch; but often applied to all Europeans.

and ten Heads were executed if the Chief whose men fled died fighting; and the Head dying in battle was avenged by nine of his flying men losing their heads. Thus the "Holy Wars" concludes: "Flight would be more terrible than the fight."

On declaring war, the Manchus have always worshipped and sacrificed in the *Tangdsu* or Ancestral Temple, and the Temple of Heaven, which is considered of more importance still. The emperor himself prays in the Ancestral Temple and at the Temple of Heaven, beseeching heaven to aid his arms. On the eighth day of the fourth moon (May) the emperor worships and sacrifices to all the gods at the Ancestral Temple. The special god of Whandien of the Ancestral Temple is called *Niwuhan Taiji* Woodoobun Beidsu, which is apparently one Mongol and one Manchu name. The "abode" of this special god of the Ancestral Temple is in the south-east corner thereof. Thither, on the first of every moon, goes the *Neigwan Ling* alone; and doffing his hat, throwing off his jacket, untying his girdle, he enters and kowtows to this god. There is a *Ma Shun* or "Horse-god," also located in the Ancestral Temple; and he is sacrificed to when the horses require especial care. When Noorhachu began his wars, he made his oaths to heaven in this temple (Tangdsu); and when his relations sought his death, it was in Tangdsu they made their oath. The Tangdsu is therefore the oldest and most revered place of worship of the Manchus; but we cannot trace the origin of the god *Whandien Beidsu*.

The laws of Kienlung are particular enough on the subject of the army. The Chinese armies are composed of volunteering recruits; but the three bannered armies are bound to serve generation after generation. Hence there is a most careful census taken of the Man, Mung, and Han families every fifth year, when every son above four* years old had to be registered. Failure to return a complete list of the family involved the head

* In Chinese, always at least one year younger than by western calculations; for the child's birth year is its first year, and the child is two years old with the first new-year's day after its birth.

of the family in a punishment of a hundred blows. Every family with lands is compelled to give at least one member to the public service. The head of a family, not himself subject to this conscription, reporting as a member of his own family a man belonging to another family subject to the conscription, or if having such a man in his family, he did not report him, he was equally guilty with the man who had given an imperfect return. The only exception was the case of an uncle, brother, or nephew hiding the conscript in his house; but the exception was valid only on condition that both families lived in the same compound. This was to give a certain latitude of excuse to natural affection. The penalty was not decreased even though the man in question was in actual public service; so that the utmost importance was attached to a correct census. The unregistered man, subject to service, who arrived at manhood or sixteen years of age, and reported himself as a child or as an old man, or pretended sickness or infirmity to evade service,—was beaten by a punishment graduated according to the age and number of the members of his family.

The *Li* Headman,* neglecting to report any individuals or families, without his *li*, subject to service, was beaten more or less severely in proportion to the numbers unregistered,—rising from thirty to a hundred blows. The district magistrate, in the same circumstances, was only two degrees less guilty than the *Li* Headman; and if he had taken bribes to retain silence, his punishment was trebled. In every instance the man or men unregistered, were at once to be notified as liable to serve.

The laws relating to the actual army begin by ordering the officer in charge of an army, division or patrol, to give immediate information to his superior if any rising took place in his neighbourhood. Such superior had also to at once forward the information to his majesty, if the occasion demanded a greater force than was in the vicinity. But though information to the chief local commander was essential in any case, there was no

* See *Taxation*. A child is any one under sixteen, an old man over sixty, both in Chinese style.

necessity for him to send on express to his majesty, if the local troops were sufficient. If the superior failed to act as the occasion demanded he was subject to degradation and to be sentenced to the private ranks of a border army.

That officer was to be severely punished, even if he lost nothing, who neglected to send for urgent aid from his commander, when he found himself opposed by a body of the enemy too powerful for himself alone. The express "flying" courier was to be sent from the commander to the governor or viceroy, and thence to the Board of War. Degradation was the penalty of the officer failing to carry out this order; and if, for want of such information, the army, or portion thereof threatened, was defeated, the officer or official responsible for the omission was to be beheaded.

Among the regulations is one providing for foes surrendering. Such should be sent on at once to the capital; and if any man from love of plunder, killed the surrendering, or oppressed and harassed him, he was to be beheaded. News of a captured city should be sent to the commanding general by a "flying" courier.

Beheading was the penalty of revealing the imperial policy to the rebels; and a punishment, severe in proportion to the nature of the document, was his who opened any cover to or from the army, if he were not the person to whom the cover was addressed. Punishment varying from blows to beheading followed the revelation by an inferior officer of what he had learned from his superior; while the lightest punishment was coupled with cashiering, and the offender could never again be employed.

Whoever, in the capital or elsewhere, belonging to the army or the people, was secretly in league and friendly with any foreigner, and revealed any important matter to him, was banished to the border army; and an officer so guilty was cashiered.

The commissariat has always been carefully attended to in China. If the officials in charge of commissariat failed to distribute such at the proper time, they were sentenced to a hundred blows; and were beheaded if, on account of their

neglect, the army suffered disaster. The commanding officer, failing to march on the day ordered, was to be punished with seventy blows for the first day's delay, the punishment increasing with every three days' delay. The punishment was a degree more severe if the officer maimed or seriously wounded himself or falsely reported sickness. But the penalty was more serious if the enemy was at hand, being a hundred blows for one day's delay and beheading for three days'. Sentence however could be avoided if, before passing it, the officer acquired great merit, and thus atoned for his crime. The penalty of advancing before the date appointed was almost equally severe. This was needful to secure simultaneous action by different armies, or different sections of an army which had to march by various routes. The skill, the regularity, the punctuality with which the various widely separated detachments, which a few years ago recovered Kashgar, were concentrated after months of independent marching, elicited the admiration of European military critics.

The private who got another man, by hiring or otherwise, to occupy his place, he himself retiring, was severely beaten as well as his substitute; a garrison soldier suffering two degrees less. But the case might be overlooked if the substitute were the son, grandson, younger brother, or nephew of the soldier. The old, the infirm, or the sick soldier, was freed from camp life, by application to his superior officer. A doctor appointed to the army, hiring another to supply his place, was punished with a hundred blows, his substitute suffering the same; and the hiring wages were confiscated. The man employing his slave as a substitute was, with his slave, beaten a hundred blows, and the slave was confiscated.

If the commandant of a fort or city failed to hold out stoutly, and suffered the city to fall into the enemy's hands, he was beheaded; so was the watchman on an elevated post, who could see, but failed to give notice by "flying" courier to the threatened city or fort, of the approach of the enemy. Those taken by and guiding the enemy in their predatory incursions into the country, were beaten a hundred blows, and sent to serve in the

furthest army. The first to flee from an engagement, or retire from a siege, were beheaded. The commanding officer was punished in proportion to the damage done, if the enemy rushed into camp and plundered cattle, clothing, or grain, or wounded or killed men, if such attack was due to the want of proper sentries. The officer who misled the government by a false report; who from secret envy or private vengeance wrote falsely in a way damaging to his commander; or wrongously blamed another for his want of success against the enemy, was beheaded. To preserve the peace with the bordering tribes, it was enacted that the officer in command of a post to protect the frontier, who sent a band of men across the frontier to steal men, or pillage goods, was beaten a hundred blows and cashiered, and sent as a private to the nearest army. The officers of the marauding company were beaten one degree less than the commanding officer, but the privates escaped punishment. But if a company went privately, unknown to their commander, the leader was beaten a hundred blows, and his followers ninety; the leader was beheaded, if they happened to wound a man; and in each case all the men concerned were sentenced to the ranks of the furthest army. If their commanding officer did not take measures to prevent such marauding parties, he was beaten, but not otherwise punished. The capture of a city, after the defeat of its rebel holders, was beyond the action of this law. The soldiers who plundered any portion of the country under their charge were beheaded, and the commanding officer beaten eighty blows, because he did not prevent such plundering. It is needless to say how ineffectual was this law in practice, depending for its fulfilment on the character of the officer in command of every separate detachment. If the commander,—Wang, Beira, or of other rank,—burned, destroyed, injured, or plundered the property or person of good citizens, on pretence of their being connected with rebels, he was judged by court martial; even if of the Imperial Clan, he was to be severely punished. If the guilty officer was under the rank of *Tsandsan*, “great minister,” he was punished a hundred



blows without such court martial. This was the lowest sentence.

The commanding officer of a camp was to be beaten for neglecting regular practice; and the commandant of a fort for failing to have in readiness garments, mail, arms, and staves. And he was to be beheaded who lost a city because he had by his oppression alienated the citizens, thus rendering it impossible to hold out in the city. A long law against such conduct in Shansi and Shensi, would seem to imply that such oppression had been common there. Fukien is then singled out for its mobbing propensities,—mobs stopping markets, closing the literary examination halls, beating magistrates; and the magistrate who neglected to strictly examine into such mob-acts was sentenced to severe punishment.

Then follow minute laws as to seizure of the horse of an enemy and its disposal,—it being forbidden the captor to sell such horse beyond the army ranks. There are severe laws against selling, giving away, damaging, or losing any army material. The punishment in case of damaging was more severe than that of losing or abandoning; but when arms were lost on the battle field, there was no punishment. The civilian who had mail of man or horse, musket, cannon, flag, banner, title, girdle, or any other article strictly belonging to the army, or any weapons such as are used in the army, together with the private maker of such article, was punished, by degrees varying with the number and importance of such military articles in his possession; but a maker was not punished for possessing an unfinished weapon, because this was proof that there was no design of using it. But bow and arrow, musket for an official, besides fish-spears and harvest-hooks were beyond the limits of the laws. The law against forging of cannon is worth quoting, as it shows the importance attached thereto. Whoever, officer or private, magistrate or people, forged a "horse"-cannon, or other large or small cannon, was to be beheaded, with the smith engaged in it; his wife and children, with his property, were to be confiscated; and the master of the nearest house on each side of the place where such

forging took place were strangled, together with the *Li* Headman. The civil magistrate and military officer over that district were cashiered, and their immediate superiors were to be strictly examined. It is difficult to ascertain whether this law had ever occasion to be enforced; we imagine not, for where cannon have been forged to war against the government, good care has been taken to chose a "smithy" where there was no risk of being seen by government officials.

The natives of places infested with robbers or wild beasts were allowed to possess such fowling-pieces as were in use in the army; but the name of the owner had to be engraved on the piece and the possession registered in the district magistrate's office. The possession of an unregistered piece brought heavy punishment, which was also decreed against the soldier who oppressed the people on the ground of possessing contraband arms, or in pretending to search for such. These strict laws to keep the Chinese population unarmed are in full operation still, and they show the fear of the rulers of the possibility of rebellion; but the laws are not peculiar to the Manchu dynasty in China.

The person firing his fowling piece in a quarrel and wounding another man was sentenced to banishment,—the Manchu to Ninguta, the Chinaman to cultivate light sandy soil in Yunnan, Kweichow, Szchuen, or the Kwang. This law was made specially applicable to Formosa. Severe punishment was inflicted on the person possessing gunpowder, saltpetre, or sulphur in any quantity; and his next door neighbours, knowing of the existence of this contraband article, were also heavily punished; but the informer, though originally implicated, was pardoned. The owner of a boat carrying it, was equally guilty with the principal, if he knew what he carried; less so if he was unaware. Even the labourer producing saltpetre was sentenced to punishment if he had in his possession at one time more than ten catties. The aboriginal Gwo, Miao, and Man of the south were also prohibited from carrying weapons, under the same laws as the Chinese.

A petty officer giving leave to one or more of his men to go

beyond 100 li from his post to buy, or sell, or till the fields, was punished in proportion to the number of men gone; and more heavily if he received a bribe. The man who gave shelter to the soldier in his flight was also punished. If as many as three men who went beyond the border on leave were taken or killed by the enemy, the officer who gave them leave was to be strangled.

No duke, marquis, or other nobleman could immediately give orders for any army to move. If such order happened to be given, the first offence might be overlooked, and even the second forgiven; but in the event of a third, the commander who obeyed the order, and the chief official of the palace of the nobleman who issued the order, would be beaten one hundred blows, degraded, and sent to the ranks of the furthest army.

Desertion from the army was punished with beating for the first offence, and strangling for the second. His comrades who knew of the desertion and gave no information, the man who hid him and the Li Headman of his hiding-place, were all variously punished. A garrison deserter was one degree less severely punished if the garrison were in Peking; two degrees if in any other place. The headman and all concerned were punished, as in the case of the army deserter. But a deserter was pardoned if he returned within one hundred days. Punishments were more recently modified to sentence of transportation to Heiloongkiang, or other remote place, instead of strangulation. But the crime of desertion was aggravated by taking away a horse or other article belonging to the army. Special laws were passed for Kwangtung, where many robbers enlisted in order to desert; or probably to escape close pursuit, and wait better days. The officer in charge had to publish an accurate and full account of the deserter's appearance and age.

If any soldier perished in the army, the magistrate of each district through which his family had to pass to their home had to give them travelling expenses, under severe penalties. If the widow of a soldier, private or officer, had no son able to support her, half her late husband's pay and half the grain

allotted to a soldier would be paid her. If the dead man left no widow, but had an old father or mother or grand-parent dependent on him, the same allowance was made for them.

If a Manchu is compelled by age to retire from the ranks, and has no friend to support him, he is allowed a tael per month, and a *hoo* of grain is added if he displayed bravery in action. The family of a man killed in battle is allowed annually half the pay he had when living. An officer retires on full pay if disabled in action, or has made a reputation for bravery; but the officer is paid only half pay who retires for light reasons.

CHAPTER XVII.

TAXATION.

THE nominal taxation of China, or that which goes to the government direct, to be employed by the emperor on public expenditure of all kinds, is derived mainly from three great sources. These are Poll Tax, Land Tax, and Gabelle or Salt Tax. The remaining two taxes, those on tea and those derived from customs,—mainly inland,—are of comparatively small importance. There is no excise tax; and there is here ready to his hand a source of enormous income when the Chinese Napoleon appears,—if indeed he will find it necessary. The sums now annually contributed to the imperial exchequer by the European and American employés of the Chinese government, consisting of customs dues derived from foreign goods of all kinds, or goods brought into any open port by foreign vessels, do not come under our present notice, for they are of very recent origin.

Indeed the Gabelle is, in Chinese history, but of yesterday, and if we go much further back, we find no poll tax,—the land tax serving all purposes. Before money began to circulate in China, and when nothing was bought, but everything bartered, officials of all kinds had lands given them in proportion to their rank to support their dignity, and their salary consisted of so many bushels of rice a year, varying in number according to the office and state of the official. The soil on which any Chinaman lived belonged absolutely to his imperial majesty. But as his majesty could not himself cultivate the soil and feed the people who were his “infant children,” the lands were divided from the earliest times into square li. Each of these squares was subdivided into nine squares. Each of the eight surrounding

squares was given to a nominal family or Hoo, without counting the number of heads or "mouths" which might chose to live on it. Those eight cultivated the central square in common, and the produce of this square was the portion of his majesty, and represented the taxation of the population. This ninth for imperial use formed the only title by which the eight cultivators held their lands; but it has ceased to be the title to lands for very many centuries, and Sir John Davis is wrong in his inference that the landlord is not absolute owner of his land. Thus the yield of a ninth portion of the arable soil of China—then little more in size than a couple of its present provinces—was nominally reserved for taxation. And this was certainly ample, for it was not till about a couple of centuries before the Christian era that China established its first standing army, and the Chinese soldier sowed his grain before he was called upon to encounter a foe in summer, and had his grain safely housed for a year's supply, ere he began his conquests in winter. He therefore was self-supporting, like the feudal barons, who held their lands on much the same terms as the ancient Chinese. The ninth went therefore to support the civil officials, and to purchase military and other necessary public stores; and possibly to supplement the income of military superior officers.

The Chinese li, in round numbers equal to one-third of an English mile, was early made the standard of taxation and military service, and it has continued to be the standard to the present day. We have seen that anciently the li was divided into nine portions. It was afterwards divided into the even decimal number, so dear to Chinese,—into ten *hoo* or families. The increase might be made; for the li itself was elongated. As we have seen this difference between the ancient and modern li questioned, we may give the authority of the learned emperor, styled *Kanghi*, who spent much of his life on geographical studies. He shows that the measure of a degree was 250 li in the *Chow* period—twelfth to fourth centuries B.C.—and in his own, 200 li; thus making the li of the *Chow* period twenty-five per cent. less than that of his own in the seventeenth century.

The li was the standard of taxation for the land-tax; and when after money began to circulate and the poll-tax was established, it was on the same old basis of ten families to the li. And as the poll-tax stands at the head of Chinese statistics now, we mention it first in order. In passing, it is well to note that this poll-tax was instituted in lieu of scutage. Every Chinaman was anciently bound to spend so many days' labour for the public service, whether in raising public buildings, or making or repairing roads, &c. But when China became larger, it was found to be generally better to have hired labour. Hence the poll-tax, which was paid by those freed from scutage, to be used in paying the hired labour.

By the laws of Kienlung, every li was divided into a hundred and ten families or *Hoo*; but only ten of these were called *Ding*, who were the subjects of the poll-tax. These ten represented the whole li, paying for the whole, and afterwards getting each family's particular share. The remaining hundred families were divided into ten *kia* or "mailed men," for they were bound to provide, or provide for, ten soldiers. Over the li was a *Li* Headman, and a *Jooshow*, who was head of the nominal ten "mailed" men; there was also, and is still, an assistant Li Headman. The Li Headman was alone directly responsible to the official tax-collector for the poll-taxes of the whole li, as in the "village" system of India. He transacted for his li all ordinary public business; and practice makes him much like what a Justice of Peace is in Britain,—an inferior judge who may settle ordinary disputes; but though his opinions and decisions are generally respected, he has no legal authority to pass any sentence of "pains and penalties." The Li Headman is also chief of, and responsible for, the ten *kia*. He has a register for his whole li, in which he keeps a list of the *Ding*, and which is renewed every tenth year. Besides such register for every li, there is a chief registrar, who makes a "map" of so many li registers. The widower, the widow, the orphan, and the "lonely," who pay no taxes, are outside the hundred and ten families. They are inscribed on a list by themselves, and called

“Odds.” Each district has a general register for all the li under its control; the prefecture for all its districts; and the provincial capital for all the prefectures. When the provincial register books are filled up, they are sent to Peking, to the Central Board of Revenue, which literally means the Board of Households,—the prefecture and district cities retaining a copy.

The man personating a Li Headman, an assistant Headman, or a Jooshow, and on such pretence oppressing the people of any place, was sentenced to be beaten a hundred blows and to banishment.

Though the *Ding* is head of a family, we have seen that every family has not a Ding. The Ding retains the register, on which is inscribed the name of every person belonging to his tithe of the li, which register is legally an absolute necessity. Every Chinese subject should be named in the register of his native tithing; and in certain circumstances slavery is the result of the inability of a man to show this proof of freedom. The Ding has no proper corresponding term in the west;—conscript being the nearest in meaning. Ignorance of the meaning of this term has been the cause of ridiculous mistakes and difficulties in estimating the population of China. The Ding is the arbitrary poll-tax unit,—ten to a square li, or ninety to a square mile of cultivated soil. The magistrate demands ten poll-taxes for the li from the headman; the headman arbitrarily chooses any ten men to be the Dings of his li,—each of whom is responsible to him for a tithe of the tax; and the Ding again shares the one poll-tax with all the families connected with him and on his register, whether these be one or twenty. If the nominated Ding disappears, the headman nominates another from the same tithe of the li. The Ding represents a varying number of persons; and herein consists the difficulty of determining the actual population of China. He may represent five married men with families of their own; he may represent as many as ten, twenty, or thirty such independent families; but if one large family of twenty or thirty adult males lives in the same compound,—a patriarchal state, which is the normal condition

of China,—and if this family has a fair proportion of wealth, the tax-collector or headman demands taxes for two or more *Ding*.

The unit poll-tax is about one tael. Hence it is seen what a small amount each family has to pay. The family of any official is exempted for three generations from poll-tax; and the family of a graduate is free also. But Sir John Davis is incorrect in asserting positively in his “Chinese,” that the poll-tax was for ever abolished by the present Manchu dynasty during and since the time of Kienloong; nor can we understand the origin of the mistake, unless it be that then it was ordained that land-owners alone should pay the poll-tax, all landless ones being free.

The land-tax is entirely distinct from and independent of the poll-tax; the latter depending on the number of *Ding*, the former on the lands under cultivation. This land-tax is always calculated, and generally paid in kind. The amount is about a shilling per English acre. Thus it will be seen that the Chinese are perhaps the lightest taxed people on earth. But all who know China are aware that the legal tax is not all that China has to pay for the support of her armies and the dispensation of justice. Were a thoroughly strong government at the head of honest officials, the former giving largely increased salaries, the latter rendering a faithful account of all their receipts, the present light amount of taxation would meet all demands upon it. But the miserably small allowances made to officials of all grades compel them to dishonesty even to live; and there is thus a great waste of national resources, besides much hardship to individual private civilians, though China is, upon the whole, not subject to such hardship. It is when men, generally in an angry passion and thirst for vengeance, throw themselves into a Chinese Court, that they begin to get “fleeced;” there is no case, or if any extremely few cases, of official oppression of people who do not enter the *yamun*. An occasional tax collector may attempt to extract more than the legal dues, but he is easily resisted if the people quietly combine to do so. He is generally satisfied with the share of the legal taxation which he fails to account for, but which is well known; and a district is a “good” one or the

reverse in proportion to the excess of the legal sums collected from the Li Headman, over the sum total demanded by the emperor from that district. We know of one such district in which the magistrate has a yearly excess of between £6,000 and £8,000 sterling; and yet he collects only the legal sum from each individual landlord. The official salary of that magistrate is little over £20 per annum, with grain allowances of perhaps double or treble that amount,—the whole of which however is insufficient to meet one month's expenditure. Yet the highest authorities in the empire are aware of the excess, and therefore appoint, to this and similar posts, only magistrates who are specially favoured.

Before passing on to the historically descriptive portion of this article, we may quote a law of Kienlung's which makes the register of the Ding the ultimate appeal in a case of alleged simulation; for it gives the decisive proof of one's proper calling. If any person, whether belonging to the army or the people, practised posting, gymnastics, medicine, divination by the eight diagrams, theatrical plays, and as such, or as a "labouring" or handicraftsman, entered any house, the family register was appealed to as proof of his professed calling. If he was acting a part, he was degraded to the common ranks of the people if he belonged to the army, and if a civilian, he was degraded to be an artizan. But if extenuating circumstances could be proved, the punishment might be commuted to eighty blows. The official who connived at his escape from this penalty was equally guilty with the offender. This law was passed to prevent social disturbance and evil conduct. If such an offender falsely pretended to belong to the army, he was beaten a hundred blows and sentenced to serve in the ranks of the army of the utmost frontier.

All who have travelled in China must have wondered how its loess soil, rich though it be, could support the population which swarms on its surface. Especially is this true of the south, where population is so crowded that human labour is cheaper than that of four-footed beasts of burden, and is universally

employed instead. Manchuria is as yet not quite so over-stocked with humanity, for men are not employed there to drag the plough, nor women to draw the circling millstone. But even in Manchuria, one scarcely passes through the end of one village ere he begins to enter the next; not by the main roadside only but in all directions; and the small clumps of trees which surround almost every house, seem, when clad in their summer fulness, and seen from a somewhat distant eminence, to be an unbroken forest. Any estimate of China's population which would give an equal, or a smaller proportion to every square mile of arable land in China than to England, must be laid aside,—spite of the two facts that England does not wholly supply her own bread and that China does; for if England were cultivated as China is, she would support her present population; but any English soil cannot support the same number of people as the same quantity of Chinese soil can and does.

Yet, though we reject unhesitatingly, as unworthy even of consideration, the smaller estimates of China's population, we are not so bold as to be logical and arithmetically strict in calculating that population by the figures which her laws give when coupled with her available statistics. We have already seen that each li legally supports a hundred and ten families who pay poll-tax, these being represented by ten *Ding*. We have also stated that experience sometimes shows one patriarchal family—consisting perhaps of a hundred or more individuals—rated at two *Ding*, and a *Ding* sometimes representing as many as twenty or more distinct families; while there are many individuals and many poor families exempted from the poll-tax, and therefore excluded from these poll-tax *Ding*.

During the Manchu or *Ta Tsing* period, recorded in their annals there are general statistics given for several years. In these the first item is always the number of families, under the title of *Hoo Kow Yin Ding*. The laws interpret *Hoo* by *Kia* or family, and *Kow* (mouth) by *Yin ding*, “man-Ding;” and the sum of the poll-tax in each case proves that the legal *Ding* is signified by the four words of the title.

In 1653, when all the eighteen provinces were not completely opened to the Manchu tax-collector, there were fourteen million four hundred and eighty-three thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight *Ding* or poll-tax families. These cultivated four million thirty-three thousand nine hundred and twenty-five *Ching* of land, each equalling in round numbers sixteen English acres; thus giving an average of a fraction less than four and a half English acres to each *Ding*. In Liaotung—where only a single main crop of millet can be gathered in one year, though an inferior pulse crop is always reaped after wheat and barley—two-thirds of an English acre of average soil will comfortably support an ordinary poor peasant family of five individuals. It would therefore be abundantly sufficient in the Chinese provinces, where two good rice crops and a third of pulse or vegetables may be gathered every year. Supposing every family of five individuals, or of two, or of three, had half an acre each, that would give just about the legal proportion of families to the *Ding*, and the fourteen million would be multiplied by nine, if not by ten; thus yielding over one hundred and forty million families, as such are estimated in the west. This, however, is a calculation without allowing on the one hand for many families who hold large landed properties, and on the other, for the families under the *Ding* who have no land whatever, nor for the numbers employed in merchandise; for the law gives the *Ding* ten *nominal* householders, not ten real land-owners. Yet even a hundred million families would give a population greater than the commonly received estimate.

Again in 1682, after the nine years of internecine strife which had divided almost every province in China into two hostile and mutually destructive parties, when almost every city-moat was a grave-yard for countless numbers of the contending hosts, the statistics declared the restored empire to contain nineteen million four hundred and thirty-one thousand seven hundred and fifty-three *Yin Ding*, and five million five hundred and twenty-three thousand five hundred and sixty-eight *Ching* of land; showing one-fourth more of arable land and fully one-third more of families than the preceding.

In 1691, the numbers were twenty million three hundred and sixty-three thousand five hundred and sixty-eight *Yin Ding*, and five million nine hundred and thirty-two thousand six hundred and eighty-four *Ching*; again producing the same result. In 1703, they were twenty million four hundred and sixteen thousand three hundred and eighty *Yin Ding*, and five million nine hundred and eighty-six thousand nine hundred and ninety-three *Ching*. And again in 1714, we find twenty-four million six hundred and twenty-two thousand five hundred and twenty-four *Yin Ding*, and six million nine hundred and fifty thousand seven hundred and sixty-four *Ching* of land. There is a curious item added to the statistics for this year, that of one hundred and nineteen thousand and twenty-two "Living Ding," which we take to mean poverty-stricken families exempted from poll-tax—*living* but not *paying*.

But there are two facts which throw us back again into chaos, spite of the apparent light of those figures; and before mentioning them, it must be noted that the family and the *ding* are never asserted or inferred to be of any *statistical* but of *financial* value. The governor of Shantung prayed for a large reduction of taxation, soon after the Manchus entered Peking, on the ground that in Shantung not one-third of the former arable land was cultivated; and if taxes were collected at the normal rate, the very small proportion of families then actually in Shantung, compared with the number set down in the tax-collectors' books, would find it absolutely impossible to meet the demands made upon them. But if taxes had been always levied according to the number of acres of land actually producing grain, or according to the actual number of families, this prayer would have been unnecessary. The emperor Kanghi gives conclusive evidence on this point, where, in 1682, he meets the complaint of the governor of Honan against heavy taxation, by stating that taxes were then, as they had always been, levied *by the li*; counting one hundred *Ching* to the *li*, and ten *kia*, "mailed men," or *Ding*. Here we have it stated that the *family* is a nominal "quantity," and that taxation takes no note of how

many families are on a li of land. The li and not the actual number of families is the basis of the poll-tax as well as of the land-tax. According to this statement each *Ding* has ten *Ching* or one hundred and sixty acres, and therefore each family one *Ching* or one hundred *mow*, or sixteen acres of land; which again, we know from observation, is at least ten times what an ordinary peasant proprietor, in comfortable circumstances, possesses: so that five million *Ching* of cultivated land is sure, on the lowest possible calculation, to represent fifty million families, which of itself would give nearly three hundred million of a population to China; without taking into account the swarming populations of her many cities, nor the artizans and hired labourers of the country, which would very largely augment that number. But even the *Ching* is an unsteady factor; for both the Shantung governor implies and the emperor states that it is the arable li and not the actually *cultivated* li by which the taxgather estimates; though, on the other hand, it is true that the severest legal penalties are attachable to the owner of land once cultivated if he neglects its cultivation; and that in practice such neglect is as rare as it is undesirable.

The history of Liaotung may throw a little light on this vexatious question. The demands of China drained all Liaotung and Liaosi of their available able-bodied men at and subsequent to 1644. The fine, rich loess lands of both the Liaos were a desert for many years after; and the following figures, the first and last of a series, bear distinctly on our subject:—

	Ding.	Direct Tax.	Land.	Direct Tax.
In (1) 1661	3,952	Tls. 592. ⁸⁰	48,165 <i>mow</i>	Tls. 1,444. ⁹⁶³³
(2) „	1,605	321. ⁰⁰	5,600 „	168
(1) 1734	23,444	3,516. ⁶⁰	1,278,960 „	13,135
(2) „	23,680	4,730. ⁰⁰	1,410,870 „	14,916

(1) is Liaotung, in which Liaoyang was the first prefecture, and Mookden the second; (2) is Liaosi, under the prefecture of Kingchow. The “direct tax” after “Ding” is unquestionably poll-tax; that after “land” is as clearly a money tax, directly

charged per *mow* of land ; for besides this tax there is another, in kind paying of *dan* fully double the number of taels.

Here we have actual *Ding* and actual land ; but the proportion of tax was probably less than that over the rest of China, in order to encourage immigration. Each *Ding* in Liaotung appears to have cultivated a fraction over twelve *mow*, or about two English acres, in 1661 ; and fifty-five *mow*, or about nine English acres, in 1734. Each *ding* of Liaosi cultivated about three and a half *mow* in 1661, and slightly more than his neighbour of Liaotung in 1734. Now, the number of *mow* allotted to the Liaosi man in 1661 is just the quantity of land—about two-thirds of an English acre—which one head of a family is now said to be able to cultivate, without other help than his family can give, and with which he is said to be able to support his family. That *Ding* is therefore not a representative one; but the *Ding* of the year 1734 is unquestionably so, for he has of actually cultivated land more than ten times that quantity set down to him; an amount of land which he himself could not possibly cultivate. The *ding* of 1734, therefore, represents the legal ten families.

It is important in considering this question of statistics, to note the double “Direct Tax” of Liaotung; for in the general statistical accounts there is no such division, and therefore the sum yielded by “Direct” money taxation is no criterion of the number of *Ding*. We shall, however, now give the full statistics of China for the years already referred to above, in order to have all the data, ascertainable from history, under our eye.

Year	Hoo or Ding.	Land— Ching.	Direct Taxes.	Grain— Dan.	Straw— Bundles.	Tea— Bihang or Yinhang.	Salt— Yin.	Customs.
1653	14,483,858	4,033,925	Tls. 21,261,383	5,638,711	5,216,840	37,178	3,740,623	Tls. 2,122,012
1682	19,431,753	5,523,568	26,331,658	6,341,394	2,298,163	159,215	4,356,150	2,761,258
1691	20,363,568	5,932,684	27,375,164	6,950,281	2,083,465	157,453	4,335,860	2,697,751
1703	20,411,380	5,986,993	27,390,669	6,968,673	2,081,688	157,476	4,319,475	2,690,718
1714	24,622,524	6,950,764	29,893,262	6,831,666	4,046,274	341,424	5,099,805	3,741,124
1753	38,786,228	7,055,962	29,573,154	8,340,216	5,145,578	378,597	6,384,231	4,324,005

The following table, giving the census of all the provinces for the year 1753, will be interesting to the reader ; and is inserted here also for the other reason that its figures will be frequently referred to.

CENSUS.—TABLE OF TAX-PAYING POPULATION, TAXES, &c., OF KIENLUNG, 18TH YEAR, 1753.

	Families.	Adults.	Ching of Land.	Tax in Money.	Tax in Grain—Dan.	Straw—Bundles.	Garrison Lands—Ching.	Money Tax on do.	Dan sent to Peking.	Salt—Yin.	Value.
CHITLI,	3,071,975	9,374,217	657,192	Tls. 2,411,286	101,229	94,404	...	Tls. 56,018	...	966,046	Tls. 600,394
SHANTUNG, ...	4,539,957	12,769,872	971,054	3,346,257	507,680	...	22,001	59,111	348,778	550,000	245,688
SHANSI,	1,779,247	5,162,351	329,586	2,970,266	169,246	...	9,999	17,991	...	426,947	429,382
HONAN,	3,029,528	7,114,346	722,820	3,303,080	248,865	...	7,253	37,035	219,874
KIANGSOO, ...	5,478,287	12,618,987	689,884	3,371,334	2,153,021	...	11,597	45,860	1,726,889
ANHUI,	4,136,125	12,435,361	338,121	1,688,000	845,248	...	11,857	14,903	566,276
KIANGSI,	2,185,195	5,055,251	479,271	1,879,810	899,632	...	6,456	44,316	770,132
FUKIEN,	1,127,746	4,710,399	128,271	1,177,899	168,453	...	7,845	17,897	856,739	946,485	397,342
CHIKIANG, ...	3,043,786	8,662,808	459,788	2,812,449	1,130,481	...	1,742	52,700	132,403	704,698	737,705
HOOKWANG } HOPE	1,756,426	4,568,860	566,913	1,108,153	286,554	...	2,416	3,248	183,743	1,685,492	2,179,264
HOONAN,	1,664,722	4,336,332	312,288	1,163,063	277,641	...	512	70,426
SHENSI,	1,033,177	3,851,043	252,371	1,530,970	168,453	...	39,236	28,575	...	39,400	8,980
KANSU,	1,002,518	2,133,222	177,831	257,723	503,476	5,051,174	107,205	100	...	72,688	20,416
SZCHUEN, ...	750,755	1,368,496	459,147	659,075	14,329	...	135	1,877	...	115,135	89,536
KWANGTUNG, ...	1,241,940	3,969,248	328,833	1,257,286	348,095	...	5,272	8,516	...	538,522	468,787
KWANGSI, ...	943,020	1,975,666	87,401	382,597	130,375	...	1,997	44,974	...	65,610	113,782
YUNNAN,	371,284	1,003,058	69,500	153,750	230,848	...	5,915	261,643	...
KWEICHOW, ...	629,835	1,718,848	25,692	100,156	154,590	7,615
Total,	37,785,553	102,828,365	7,055,963	29,573,154	8,340,216	5,145,578	241,418	503,547	4,754,834	6,372,666	5,298,891

Besides the items mentioned in the provincial table, there were derived from other sources, four million three hundred and twenty-four thousand and five taels from Inland customs; five million seven hundred and four thousand catties of copper; three million eight hundred and forty-one thousand nine hundred and fourteen catties of "white" or inferior, and seven hundred thousand five hundred and seventy-one catties of "black" or superior lead, both from Hoonan and Kweichow; while "barbarian" and other vessels brought two hundred and eleven thousand seven hundred and twelve catties of lead to Canton. Reed taxes produced ninety-eight thousand two hundred and fifty taels; and tea, in addition to bulk in kind, produced sixty-five thousand three hundred and thirty-six taels in money. The total imperial income for 1753 would therefore be about eighty millions of taels, or twenty-three millions sterling. But besides these direct taxes, there are many charges connected with the provincial and central governments; just as in Britain, we have enormous expenditure connected with our courts of law and lawyers' fees, which are much heavier in proportion to population than the similar payments necessary in China.

Though there is a most tempting approximation between the families or *Ding*, and the "direct taxes," giving slightly over a tael to each family, we must at once dismiss it, for it does not in any way help to bring us to what we ask. The "direct tax" is unquestionably the sum of the two taxes, "poll" and "land," already referred to above, and which are kept apart in the history of Liaotung. Of one thing only can we be certain regarding those figures, that the number of *hoo* corresponds neither with what the legal *Ding* should be, nor yet with the actual family; the number is much too large to admit of its being multiplied by ten for the householders of China, while it is much too small to be for a moment regarded as the number of actual Chinese families.

The great imperial dictionary states that the census should be taken of the Chinese people every fifth year, and that every hundred individuals should be counted as ten *Hoo*. The *Kow*

or "mouth" is there stated to be every Chinese male over sixteen, and under sixty years of age,—thus corresponding to our term able-bodied man. This *Kow* is made the basis on which the poll-tax rests. It was ordained in the fifty-second of Kanghi (1713), that the imperial mercy forbade any addition to the number of *Kow* as returned two years before. It was again decreed, in 1724, that those adults only should be called upon to pay poll-taxes, who were owners of land; and that landless adults should be exempt. It was also reordained that though the census must be taken every fifth year, the number of poll-taxes on lands already occupied should not be increased, but that any new lands opened up should be subject to a poll-tax, in the same ratio as the old lands.

The total number of Families given by the great imperial dictionary is fully one million more than the summation of the above table yields. It is difficult to say whether this discrepancy arises from an error in addition, or from a misstatement of the number of families in Fukien, where the proportion of adults to families is fully four to one, while in the majority of the provinces it is only two to one,—three to one being the largest. This mistake is perhaps the more natural of the two, inasmuch as the numbers 1, 2, and 3 are merely horizontal lines, placed one above the other, while 7 and 8 are totally different figures incapable of confusion; and the accuracy of the sum total must have been carefully tested. However, it matters little for our purpose whether we take the total of the dictionary, which is nearly thirty-nine millions, or that of the summation of the individual provinces, which is nearly thirty-eight millions of families. The summation of the "adult" column agrees with the sum total of the dictionary. It may be stated that the numbers given for the province of *Shungking* or Liaotung, which were then scarcely equal to the present number of inhabitants in the one city of Mookden, are not included in the above table.

It will be observed that, by the proportion of "a hundred individuals" to ten families, the number of families would make

the population of China in 1753 about three hundred and eighty millions; while, according to the rule of 1734, and the laws of the present dynasty published in the reign Kienlung,—only land owners are included in that number. Again, though the number of male adults between sixteen and sixty should be perhaps scarcely regarded as equivalent to the term “able-bodied” in the west,—which term is said to include a fifth of western populations,—yet four individuals may be considered as not too great an average to each of such adults. This would give much the same result as the families, making the population slightly more than four hundred millions. There were then fully one hundred and twelve million English acres under actual cultivation in China; and to sow, weed, and keep these in Chinese style a number of men is required, as we have seen, in round numbers equal to a hundred million families. Thus whether we look at this matter from the point of view of the households, the able-bodied men, or the cultivated acreage of China, the result is much the same. Though these figures from the statistics of Kienlung are more satisfactory than those of Kanghi, we are still unable to do any more than give a very rough approximation of the population of China; and as the result of our unsatisfactory search we can only decide that the ignorance of those who give to China a population only half that of India, or even no greater than India, deserves no other answer than ridicule; and that the men who have believed the population of China to be little if any less than four hundred millions are near the truth. In conclusion, we may state our belief that the population of China proper is, at the present day, little if any greater than it was in 1753. For the Taiping and other rebellions, together with recent famines, devastated large tracts of country which were fully tenanted in the reign Kienlung; and the agricultural resources of the country were as fully taxed to feed the population under Kienlung, as they can have been since, while there has been no new industry created to support additional populations anywhere. Yet for centuries there has been an increasing number of Chinese moving quietly across the northern,

western, and southern frontiers, and by their intelligent industry producing food for scores where their lazy nomadic predecessors found it difficult to feed units; thus enlarging the territories and increasing surely, if slowly, the numbers of the Chinese.

Besides the poll-tax, every land-owner has to pay a land-tax. This land-tax is levied on all grain-producing lands; the acreage of which in 1753 was over one hundred and twelve million. But there are certain lands which were wholly exempt from taxation. These were chiefly the lands originally gifted by the Manchu conqueror to the leaders and soldiers of his armies. In possession of the Manchu magnates—Wang, Beira, Beidsu, Goong, and commander—were 13,336 Ching, or about 210,000 acres; and the smaller officers and soldiers owned 140,128.⁷¹ Ching, or about 2,250,000 acres of such gifted lands, all in China proper. These lands were held by what we might call feudal tenure, as they were, and still are, inalienable; for though lands *purchased* by Manchus can be resold, like the lands of any Chinaman, the lands granted by the emperor belong absolutely to the grantee and to his succeeding family, and must on no condition be sold out of the family. Yet the law is evaded to the detriment of the owner, by a mortgage often less than half the market value of the land, but one which is virtually a sale; for in general the owner is rarely able to redeem the land. Within a radius of a large number of miles from Peking, all the arable land was at first divided for political reasons among the Manchus, when they entered the Chinese capital; while the sandy and lighter soils were formed into commons for pasturage. Though the law against the sale of imperially gifted lands is as binding as ever, equally so with the English similar law of entail, it will be found that perhaps the largest proportion of these lands near Peking are now again in Chinese hands, by means of mortgage and lapsed titles. These lands were appropriated from the Chinese precisely as the Normans took Saxon lands, and for the same reasons. Every Manchu who was owner of such gifted land was bound to military service; and he is nominally bound thereto to this day. But this law of

entail applies only to the minute proportion of soil in Manchu hands, and has no bearing whatever on the millions of *Ching* belonging to the Chinese, or bought by the Manchus from the Chinese. We are not aware whether this exemption from taxation is universally abolished; but much of the entailed lands of Manchuria pay taxes only slightly less than the lands held by the Chinese. — This change was possibly introduced when the Manchus became so numerous that only a small proportion of them could be employed as soldiers; just as feudal landowners in England had to pay taxes when standing armies were introduced.

Besides the Manchu entailed estates, the Kienlung laws declared exempt from taxation the lands attached to the temples, to the tombs of literary men, and to the direct descendants representing the four learned sages,—Confucius, Dsungdsu, Yen-yuen, and Mencius; besides certain lands in the provinces—in all, embracing many scores of thousands of acres—set apart for the support of literary poor men. This land is either given to these literary men to cultivate, or rented out for their benefit; and its design is much like that of our University fellowships. This is another instance, if any more were requisite, to prove the high esteem in which literature is and has been regarded by the Chinese, and especially by the present Manchu dynasty.

The grain-tax is estimated by *dan*, each of ten Chinese pecks, considerably larger than ours,—rice, wheat, and pulse are included. Nearly half the grain-tax is sent into Peking, the larger half being retained for provincial use. Fully two-thirds of what goes into Peking is stored in thirteen grain stores for the soldiers, who receive only about a tithe of their pay in money; that is the Direct Tax. A certain proportion, called the Necessary Tax, goes to the princes and officials, and is laid up in two grain stores. A fixed quantity, called “white grain,” is set apart, in one store, directly under the Board of Revenue, for the use of princes and ambassadors from foreign states; all of whom are, of course, tributary to China. The straw is for the horses, and is issued as hay.

This grain suffers from shrinking, leakage, damp, and other causes. To ascertain the exact quantity on hand, the grain in these stores is measured every fourth year. Besides the stores in the capital of both money and grain, every province is bound by law to have a certain sum of ready money always on hand, and a certain quantity of grain. This legal quantity in the eighteen provinces amounts in the aggregate to thirty-four million *dan*. But if the surplus grain does not exceed the amount of surplus money, the stores are very empty. The situation and aspect of these stores are of great importance, as provision has to be made against summer heat and winter cold and rain. Each province has, therefore, its own special mode of storing according to its climate and products. Honan and the various provinces north of its latitude produce dry land rice; but the greatest portion of the products of those northern provinces are the various millets, with wheat, barley, and pulse of many kinds. To the south of Honan, the land produces only rice of one kind or another.

The grain of these stores is always good; because the newly thrashed grain is stored, and the grain previously stored is given out to the soldiers and officials. It is thus mostly renewed every year. If the grain has become heated, seven-tenths are given out, and three-tenths spread out to dry; but only half is given away if the grain is perfectly sound. This "cooling" or exposure to the fresh air is an annual operation; and in connection with the process, there is a great deal of dishonesty and speculation. The superior officials sell large quantities of good grain to the smaller officials at a large reduction in prices, report that damaged which they have thus sold, and make rich by dishonesty. But in China, where official salaries for the year are insufficient to meet the expenses of a month, is it wonderful that such and similar conduct is general, when we know what takes place in Russia, and in some other places where Christianity has been long established, and where officials receive respectable incomes?

A good deal of the grain tribute is used up in paying expenses, and allowing for waste by the way. There are allowances for

carriage, for stone and lime buildings under Board of Works, which are payable out of the taxes of the province. Then for shrinking on board the transport boats, for straw mats and wooden boards to protect the grain, and for the soldiers and officers of the army guarding it *en route*. The allowance to a boat for each hundred *dan*, one of which weighs one hundred and sixty catties, from Shantung or Honan to Peking, is five taels and five *dan* of rice; the other provinces have more or less allowance, in proportion to their distance from the capital. There were, in 1754, seven thousand transport vessels for the Grand Canal; of which three thousand and eighty-four belonged to Kiang and Anwhi. These vessels are ninety Chinese feet long, and carry four hundred *dan*; but those south of Hoonan are ten feet longer. These are imperial vessels, requiring to be repaired annually, and replaced every tenth year. When the water in the canal was too shallow to admit of their passage, light boats had to be hired from the country people. They started with their cargoes in the tenth moon (November); and in the end of the eleventh moon (December) the grain had to be stored in the capital. Those vessels were bound to sail 40 li per day when going with the stream, and 20 when against the stream. An officer had always to go on before to give information of the approach of the grain fleet to the magistrate of the district, so that the canal should be always clear. The government has for several years back largely utilised foreign steamers to carry its tribute rice; and now the Chinese have themselves a considerable fleet of steamers, which have a monopoly of that lucrative traffic, from the southern provinces to Tientsin.

The land-tax was originally all in kind as we have seen, and it will ultimately no doubt be all in silver. The tax in Manchuria is about sevenpence per English acre for Manchu land, and about one shilling per English acre for Chinese owned land. This tax amounts to about one-hundredth part of the rent in the north of China; and the rent is from five per cent. upwards of the purchase money, though ten per cent. is the most general

proportion. It will thus be seen how extremely light the land-tax is in China as compared with any of our European countries. But so far has sub-division of land been carried where there are no entail nor any primogeniture laws, that even this fraction is a consideration to the majority of the peasant proprietors. Hence there were laws framed from of old to guard against false returns, and the following are the main features of the land-laws of Kienlung, which are still binding.

The man who gave a false return of his grain-producing lands was beaten for any number under five *mow* not reported; the punishment increasing by every five *mow* up to a hundred blows; the lands in question were also forfeited* to the crown, till all the deficient taxes were refunded. The same punishment was his who falsified the condition of his land, describing high lands as low,—for high produces more than low or marshy grounds,—and also his who conspired with a government agent in giving fraudulent returns. The Li Headman was similarly punished if he knew of the fraud. To prevent fraud on the one hand and injustice on the other, lands subject to damage by water were surveyed every fifth year, dry lands every tenth. When the agent who worked lands purchased by a member of the Imperial Clan, failed to pay up the taxes which those lands had paid in the hands of its former owner, the proper authority had to examine that agent. If he was supported by his master, the proper *yamun* had to deal with the case; and if the agent refused to listen to the local magistrate, there was appeal to the viceroy or governor, who would see that the agent was severely punished.

If a member of any garrison or camping army, or a member of the *Dsaohoo*,† purchased lands belonging to any of the people,

* Sir George Staunton, in translating the Manchu laws, erroneously represents this forfeiture as absolute, instead of conditional and temporary as it really is.

† See *Slaves*. The lands granted by the emperor, and originally belonging to the imperial clan and the Manchu troops, were exempted from taxation. A petty officer often conspires with the landlord to defraud the government; the plunder being equally divided between the two. In 1655, the chief censor complained of a falling off of income from taxes, because so many bannermen professed to own land which did not belong to them.

and neglected to pay the taxes formerly paid by that land, the Headman was responsible for the tax, and the lands were forfeited to the government. If the returns for a li were falsified to more than two hundred *dan*, the offender was sent to the ranks of the army furthest beyond the frontier.

When the growing crops were, or were said to be, destroyed or damaged by flood, drought, hoar-frost, hail, or locusts, the district collector had to give a true and faithful account thereof. The chief collector had to visit the reported district in person, and carefully examine. If after he had failed to personally examine, error was discovered, both chief and local collectors were to be beaten eighty blows. If the chief collector, from careless observation, reported the blasted as ripe or the ripe as blasted, he was, with the other implicated party, to be beaten a hundred blows and degraded,—for in the one case he oppressed the people, in the other he deceived the government. The Li Headman and the head of the “Mailed-men,” were equally punished; while the punishment was heavier still if bribery had been exercised. The man who falsely reported his growing crops as blighted, was punished like the man giving a false return of his lands; while his property was made guarantee for the payment of the proper tax in full.

When pleading for a remission of the land-tax, the amount of grain in the public granaries should be taken into account, and the prayer to the emperor be founded on this knowledge. Such prayer was to be presented in the sixth moon (July) if it referred to the summer harvest; in the ninth if it was for the autumn harvest, for thus the proper Board would have time to consider.

Various punishments are then mentioned as due to an official, whose original property is exempted from taxation, if he neglected to pay taxes for lands purchased by him after he became an official; and to the headman and tax collector if they knew and failed to report, or did not properly examine into the case. Then provision is made against selling, or taking forcible possession of, lands or house belonging to another; against taking forcible possession of hill common, of lake or pool,

of a tea-garden, a reed-plot, or of gold, silver, copper, lead, iron, or other mines;—an official guilty of any such crimes was to be reported to the emperor, who himself would pass sentence. The man was punished who failed to cultivate with grain, mulberry, hemp, or other useful produce, but left waste any portion of land belonging to him which was formerly reported by the headman as under cultivation. He who by stealth sowed and reaped on any portion of the lands of another was beaten from 30 to 80 blows, and the punishment increased by two degrees if he had the property in trust. This law applied to encroachments on public or imperial commons,* or lands around camps, barracks, forts, or walls, and to stealthy occupation of lands beyond the border.

We have many particular laws on the same or similar subjects, and on the sale of houses or lands, all of which should be registered in the office of the district magistrate, and a tax paid by the purchaser, at the time of registration, of three per cent. on the purchase-price. Because of this tax, transfers of both houses and land are common without such registration. These private deeds are called "white papers," because they want the red stamp of the magistrate. "White paper" is not only not recognised by the yamun, but the property so purchased is legally liable to confiscation, and the seller to severe punishment. The most common evasion of the law is by a falsification of the price, the real price being sometimes fully ten times that named in the document sent to the yamun. There are laws against the

* Yet we are informed that in Manchuria thousands of acres of what were formerly imperial pasture grounds have now been gradually occupied by the people; but because they were some years in possession before it was officially known, and because the occupants would suffer loss and make disturbance if dispossessed, the high officials have left them undisturbed; and such occupancy has been made valid by taxation. On the other hand, we know of one wealthy man, and owner of large landed properties, who was on speaking terms with prince Kung, who is now shut up in confinement on the charge of having appropriated a portion of the imperial pasturage adjoining his property. The charge is one trumped up by two high officials—formerly his friends, latterly his foes,—and though the highest court in Peking has proved the charge incorrect, so great is the power of his foes that he cannot get free.

falsification of the price, but it is easily understood how difficult it must be to apply them.

We now pass from the laws to the Manchu historical notices of the taxes of China.

In June 1653, the Boards of Works, Revenue, and War reported that taxation, whether in money or grain, was now reduced to, and collected on, a uniform plan throughout the empire at one and the same time, and that it was spent out gradually as necessity demanded. The emperor agreed to their prayer that this plan should continue to be always carried out. In 1669, the emperor agreed that, as soon as the public service would admit of it, the prayer of a censor would be put into effect, which desired that taxes on the summer crops should be collected in July, and for the autumn crops in October or November. This seems to imply that taxes were then called for in advance; nor is it unlikely, when the straining circumstances of the times are taken into account.

The doctrine set forth in Milton's apologetical paper on the execution of Charles First,—that a tyrant has ceased to be a king, and that the execution of a tyrant is not the putting of a king to death,—is one which has existed and more or less influenced all political action in China from the dawn of its history to the present. The emperor is absolute, because he is emperor; but the emperor is appointed by Heaven, and appointed for the good of his people; he therefore ceases to be emperor in the sight of Heaven as soon as he ceases to govern for the welfare of his people. The will and pleasure of Heaven is manifested in raising the rebel to the throne already vacated by tyrannical deeds; and the tyrant, though the descendant of an illustrious line of rulers, is a usurper of the throne he holds. This political creed of China is, without a doubt, well calculated to check such excesses as would rouse the people to a state of mind which might declare rebellion not only justifiable but dutiful. Perhaps from policy, possibly from subjection to the universal creed, the rulers of China have almost always remitted, wholly or partially, the taxes of those districts of the empire which suffered from a

failure of grain crops, and have, in the more serious cases, sent large sums and much grain to the afflicted districts. This has been especially true of the Manchu government, which, in point of numbers, is so weak compared to the people over whom it rules. From the first year of Manchu rule down to the terrible, but not rare, famine which ravaged north China during the past few years, there has been scarcely a year in which a larger or smaller share of the taxes due to government has not been remitted in some or other district of China.

During the years of serious warfare which succeeded the Manchu entry into Peking, the resources of the treasury must have been often strained, yet remissions occur again and again. In 1688, a marquis proposed an increased taxation, and the emperor expressed his serious displeasure at a proposal which would injure the people. But the prayer of a censor, in the following year, for a reduction of taxation, because of the deep poverty of the people, could not then be granted, as was shown by other memorialists, who mentioned the miserably small allowances made to the various officials (see *Officials*).

It was reported to the emperor Kanghi, in 1705, that he had remitted taxes to the amount of sixteen million taels during the past two years; and he replied that it was his delight to relieve the poor, ever since the crushing of the rebellion of Woo Sangwei gave him opportunity. He ordered an account of all the taxes remitted since his accession to the throne (1662), and the amount summed up to ninety million taels. He remitted arrears of two and a quarter million taels, that same year, in the southern and south-western provinces. But the provinces which suffer most from flood or drought, and therefore have always had most taxation remitted, are Shensi, Shansi, Shantung and Honan.

In 1648 the emperor mentioned to the secretariate that the Board of Revenue had formerly reported an excess of expenditure beyond the legal limits, by all the Yamuns great and small, civil and military of the provinces, thus needlessly oppressing the people; that though orders had been issued to stop that excess of expenditure, the same complaints continued to be made;

and he ordered the secretariate to thoroughly and at once investigate the circumstances and report to him without delay.

The Board of Revenue proposed in 1669 that the various provinces should have always on hand a net sum of about eleven million taels; four and a quarter for posting and Yellow River embankments; three and a quarter for the army and its matériel; and three and one third million always in reserve. Indeed every province, and every official and magistrate in every province, is supposed to have a reserve in the treasury of the capital, prefectural, sub-prefectural and district cities; but these were long ago emptied by the English wars.

Even in 1709 there was complaint made to the emperor that the reserve treasures which should have stocked every governmental treasury in the empire, were exhausted. The emperor Kanghi, in one of those long speeches in which he delighted to indulge, accounted for the deficiency by the dishonesty and prodigality of the officials in charge. He also stated that at that moment he had a reserve in the treasury of fifty million taels; that there was no army drain nor public works going on, while the working expenses of the palace and public offices were carefully looked after to prevent an increase; when therefore with a remission of taxes last year of eight million taels, there was so good a surplus on hand in the capital against emergencies, much more easily could the provincial authorities make and retain the surplus demanded by law.

At the same time he mentioned one or two interesting items of expenditure. He stated that the expenditure in the Ming imperial palaces was enormous, amounting to several million taels per annum. Of *Makow* charcoal there were several scores of millions of catties burnt every day. It was called *horse-mouth* because at each end of the three or four feet long pieces of charcoal a "mouth" was cut. It was pure white, without a stain of any other colour, and Kanghi himself used it on that account in burning the yearly winter solstitial sacrifice to Heaven; but nowhere else and at no other time.

He stated also that in the time of his predecessor, there were

nine thousand ladies in the harem, and over one hundred thousand eunuchs; but that the ladies in his palaces were not more than four or five hundred! The expenditure in his own palaces was, at first, over seven hundred thousand taels per annum for kitchen expenses; this he had reduced by a tithe. The expenditure in the Foreign Office *Lifan Yuen*, for entertaining ambassadors and tribute bearers was over eight hundred thousand taels per annum, which also he had reduced by a tithe. He had kept a sharp watch on the expenses of the Board of Revenue, which used to spend prodigally; but since the Board had to give him a strict account of all monies every tenth day, there was a great saving to the treasury.

The difficulty of transporting taxes in kind was several times memorialised to the throne, and sometimes the memorialist was successful in converting it to a money tax. But a peculiar petition was forwarded in 1703 by the viceroy of Szchuen and Shensi. He explained that he had personally inspected the Yellow River, the route by which grain taxes had to go. There was one place with "three gates," apparently rapids, caused by a compressed channel among the rocks. The central one was called "Gods' Gate," where the river flows with great force; to the south of it was "Devils' Gate," through which the waters rushed with great fury; and to the north was "Men's Gate," through which there is a strong current, but not comparable to the other two. A couple of hundred paces below these is "Reach-the-Pillar," and 2 li further down, "Tiger-difficulty." The viceroy had himself gone in a boat with thirty *dan* of grain through "Tiger-difficulty," and it was night before he got to "Men's Gate." His prayer therefore was, that the people might be permitted to forward their grain overland, past those mentioned places, and reship below or above. The matter was "considered"!

Another matter which may be interesting enough to mention, is the Standard Measures of Capacity. In 1703, the emperor Kanghi discussed those measures with the Board of Revenue. He said that the standard *Shung* or "Pint" was thirty-one

thousand three hundred and eighty two cubic “fractions”;* the standard *Dow* or “Peck” (ten shung) was three hundred and sixteen thousand seven hundred and sixty-four fractions; and the *Hoo* (five dow) was one million and six hundred thousand fractions. There was thus a discrepancy between the cubic contents of all three; while practice diverged still more, for the *hoo* in use was twenty thousand fractions more than the standard one; though the standard should, he said, not be changed without grave reasons. He ordered a new *dow*, made of eight inches (Chinese) square and five deep, which would give a capacity of three hundred and twenty thousand cubic fractions; and a new *shung* and *hoo* in exact proportion with the *dow*. The standards were ordered to be made of brass. The standards may be at the present time what his majesty ordered them to be; but in practice these measures differ in every city, often by a tithe or even a fifth. The Board of Works provides standard measures of cast-iron for the various provincial capitals; and from these the provincial collector of taxes gets wooden specimens made wherewith the various collectors measure the tribute grain.

Exact measures of capacity were in use in China from very ancient times; and their capacity was, as it now is, gauged by the cubic measurement of the vessel. The inch and its fractions were therefore the standard by which to test the contents of the measuring vessels of the agricultural Chinese. The inch was anciently shorter than the inch of modern times. Kanghi found that a degree of latitude which measured 250 li in the period of Chow—before our Lord—measured 200 li in his own time, two centuries ago. Both the ancient and the modern inch was the length of ten average grains of the glutinous small millet placed side by side; but the ten were laid *cross-wise*, or by their narrower diameter in the period of Chow; and *length-wise*, or by their longer diameter, in the modern inch. And thus arose the difference in the length of the inch; for though this grain seems round, it will on examination be found very







* Fraction, tenth of a Chinese inch; ten of which make a Chinese foot.

slightly elongated along the line of the embryo or germ, though not nearly so elongated as in the greatly larger wheat grain. Each grain was therefore the *tenth* of an inch, and this tenth was called a *fun* or fraction. The relative lengths of the ancient and modern foot are expressed by 1 ancient to 0.81 modern; ten inches made a *foot*, ten feet a *jang*, and ten jang a *goong*. Thus the decimal system, which still prevails in China, was its most ancient known form of measurement.

The accompanying woodcut shows the measures of length and capacity. The short line with the ten black dots is the exact length of the modern inch; the black dots representing the grains, which do not touch in the cut because they are less in size than the actual grains. The longer lines at the side of the cut represent the proportion between the ancient and the modern foot; the shorter being the ancient. Both are reduced from the actual lengths, but the proportion is preserved. The dots represent the grains, and the transverse lines show the fractions on the Chinese foot-measure. In theoretical or mathematical measurement, the inch is divided to seven decimal places; and with the names, beginning from our left, of *fun*, *li*, *hao*, *su*, *hoo*, *wei*, and *ju*.

The inch is also applied to weight. The square inch of gold weighs 16.8 *liang* or Chinese ounces; of silver, 9 *liang*; of "red" copper, 7.5 *liang*; of yellow copper, 6.8 *liang*; of "black" or best lead, 9.93 *liang*; of inferior lead, 6 *liang*. The Chinese *cash* or copper currency is made of the "yellow" or inferior copper.

The *Shung* or Pint (figure 2 of the woodcut) is of 31.600 cubic inches capacity; it is 4 inches square at bottom, and 1.975 inches deep. The *Jiao* or Horn (figure 1) is one-tenth of the *Shung*. The *Dow* or Peck (figure 3) is of 316 cubic inches capacity; is 8 inches square and 4.9375 inches deep, and contains 10 *shung*. The *hoo* or bushel (figure 6) is of 1580 cubic inches capacity; contains 5 *dow*; is at mouth 6.6 inches square; at bottom, 16 inches square; and 11.7 inches deep. Two *hoo* make one *dan*.



The *Hoo* of the East Han (third century) was round, and had two handles (figure 4). It was of 860 cubic inches, 934 cubic *fun*, 420 cubic *li*. It contained 10 *dow*, and was of 7.29 inches deep, and 12.262 inches diameter. The *dow* was 0.729 inches deep, and 12.262 inches diameter; containing 10 of the *shung*, which was 1.8225 inches deep, and 2.452 inches diameter. The *ho* was a tithe of the *shung*, and was 1.096 inches deep, and 1 inch diameter; it contained 2 *lun*, a measure half the depth of the *ho*.

Under the second of the Tang emperors (seventh century), Jang Wun made a square *hoo* (figure 5) of the same capacity as the Han one above described; but while the depth was 7.29 inches as in the preceding, the *hoo* was of a square form, and was 10.867 inches square. One of the handles or "ears" was a *shung* measure, the other a *ho*. This is one way of "squaring the circle." The other measures were also made in squares, and on the decimal system; so that this simple and satisfactory mode of division has always prevailed in China.

SALT.

When it is remembered that a yin of salt is about four cwt., a glance at the table given above, showing the millions of *yin* belonging yearly to the imperial government, will give reason sufficient for the existence of many laws centering round this article. The enormous quantities of salt used over the eighteen provinces of China, are produced on the sea-side,—for the small quantities brought from the Inland Lake on the far west of China into Kansu, make but a small fraction of what is used. In Manchuria, on the shore of the gulf of Liaotung, between Newchwang and Kaichow, the salt water is led into a square pit by a small drain cut in the muddy shore of the shallow sea. This drain is closed up outside the pit as soon as enough of water has flowed in, and the action of a warm sun in a dry atmosphere, soon gives the proprietor of the pit a quantity of salt, which he throws into a great heap and covers with straw matting, to wait for the daily carts which take it away up country. The tax-gatherer is always on the spot.

We again glance over the laws of Kienlung for our information as to Chinese society of that time. The man who smuggled salt was beaten a hundred blows and banished three years. If he had arms in his possession, he was sentenced to one degree heavier punishment; and if he accused an innocent man of being an accomplice, his punishment was three degrees more severe. He was beheaded if he resisted the officers who went to apprehend him. The salt, arms, cart or boat, were all confiscated; while the man who guided the smuggler, the man who weighed for him, or the man who hid the salt on his premises, was punished only one degree less severely than the smuggler. The man who carried the salt on his back, or who provided beasts of burden to carry it, was punished one degree less severely still. Any party concerned in such smuggling, was not only pardoned but well rewarded if he turned informer; and the smuggler himself was pardoned if he repented and gave information. The magistrate was severely judged who dealt not according to law when smuggling was discovered, or who pretended that an innocent man was the smuggler. The same law applied to any salt taken beyond the bounds of the salt-pan by any master or employer, if such salt had not paid the proper duty. His fellows of the salt-pan who knew of the fraud and failed to inform, were found equally guilty. He who knowingly bought and used smuggled salt was beaten a hundred blows; the seller was equally guilty with the smuggler.

A woman found smuggling salt was not implicated if she had a husband or grown-up son cognisant of the crime, the man being responsible; but if her husband was at a distance and ignorant, and if her son was a child, the crime devolved on the woman; she being, however, subject only to the beating, but exempted from the banishment. This tells its own tale as far as the position of woman is concerned.

The magistrate who should examine the accused smuggler or any party involved, and failed to do so, or released all or any of them after they were imprisoned, but before they suffered their legal sentence, was guilty of the same crime as the party in

whose case there was a failure of justice; and if bribery was proved he fared worse.

If the officer who had charge of Customs Frontier, Barrier or River Ford, reported less salt than actually passed, he was beaten forty blows for the first offence, fifty for the second, and sixty for the third. His civil or military colleague, aware of the fact and neglecting to inform, was equally guilty. Any official retaining for his own private use salt confiscated from the smuggler, was equally guilty with the smuggler; his punishment was three degrees heavier if he sought to involve an innocent man.

The carrier, or the merchant with more salt in his possession than the duty paid *yin*, or the private vessel transporting public salt and carrying arms, were all judged by the law against the smuggler. The merchant who sold duty paid salt after mixing it with earth or sand was beaten eighty blows. His was a heavier punishment who took salt beyond the district in and for which duty had been paid; and the salt was confiscated.

The man who in an official customs pass forged the name of a well-known merchant, and took away and sold the salt, was beheaded; the weigh-man, the innkeeper giving shelter by the way, and the pass-giving official, were transported.

Whoever extorted money on the pretence that he was the Headman of a Salt-pan district or a boat-searcher, or on any other pretence, was banished, and his followers sent to the ranks of the furthest army.

A boat company numbering ten or more, flying a flag and using arms, who opposed the regular coast-guard service, and killed one man or wounded three or more, were all beheaded and the leader's head was exposed; if two only were wounded, the chief was beheaded, his accomplices strangled; and if one only was wounded, the leader was beheaded, and the accomplices sent to the ranks of the furthest army; but if no man was wounded by their opposition, the leader was strangled, the accomplices, with their wives, banished 3000 li. A band of ten or more by land opposing the coast-guard was punished one degree less severely. But if the very poor smuggled salt in quantities only

sufficient to purchase their daily bread, they were free.—This law is further enlarged by explaining the very poor to consist of old men over sixty (English fifty-nine), or youths under fifteen (English fourteen) suffering from any disease, an old woman, a widow, or an orphan, who reported themselves without friends to support them. Any of these was permitted to go to the salt pan and carry away forty catties of salt once, but only once, a day; they had to go by road and were not allowed to go by boat, nor to go beyond the district in which they received the salt. If they neglected these limitations they were subjected to punishment.

If the official set to watch over the salt himself smuggled, his offence was one degree heavier than that of the ordinary smuggler. The salt merchant with arms found in his possession was subject to the law against the carrying of arms secretly. The salt official who himself acted as salt merchant, exchanging salt for money or grain, was sentenced to the fate of the smuggler,—because he was covetous of the profit belonging to the people. The merchant who bought with a large measure, and sold with a smaller, forfeited his salt and was, with the weigh-man, beaten eighty blows, and the purchaser lost the price paid; for this was deceiving the government by using other than the standard measure.

The history of the Manchus informs us that a dismissed tax collector general for Yunnan was accused of having amassed one million six hundred thousand taels by selling smuggled salt; and when the charge was found proven, the emperor ordered him to be beheaded and his property confiscated.

The revenue from salt over all China in the time of the first Manchu emperor was slightly above two million taels per annum; in Kienlung's reign it was nearly six millions annually.

TEA.

The salt laws were applied substantially to tea-smuggling, the only difference of importance was the special law against smuggling to sell to foreigners, whether within the bounds or on the frontiers of China.

All ships from sea were required to give a correct and full Manifest to the magistrate of the port entered, and one hundred blows was the penalty of fraudulent Manifests; while the unspecified goods were forfeited; and an informer received a reward of twenty taels.

The tea taxes of the eighteenth of Kienlung produced, in eleven provinces, three hundred and sixty-four thousand nine hundred and forty-nine *yin*, which weight varies in various provinces; Shensi and Kansu produced one hundred and thirty-six thousand four hundred and eighty *bi* of ten catties each, besides six thousand two hundred and sixty-six taels in money; and Szchuen, five hundred and ninety thousand and seventy taels.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Chow dynasty raised taxes from gold, jade, pewter, and stone, besides various kinds of cloth. In Kienlung's time the provinces of Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Kweichow produced gold, silver, copper, pewter, lead, iron, and mercury. Szchuen produced most of those and sulphur.

On the shores of the sea, of lakes, rivers, marshes, and pools, a very tall and strong kind of reed grows, useful for mat-making, for supporting roofs of houses, and for fuel. Large numbers of poor people make a livelihood by cutting down and selling those reeds, or by raising water-grown rice on those ownerless lands. This product is also taxed, and the tax is known as the *Loo* or Reed-tax. In 1752 the extent of such lands, some of them always under several feet of water, was seventy-nine millions nine hundred and forty-six thousand and forty-six *ching*, or over a million of acres, in the provinces of Kiangsoo, Anhwi, Kiangsi, Hoope, and Hoonan; and the revenue therefrom was ninety-eight millions two hundred and fifty thousand and thirty taels.

In southern China former dynasties had a considerable number of artificial fish ponds, protected by special legislation. The present dynasty removed the prohibitions against utilising the bottom of those ponds, with the exception of two ponds in Kiangsi and two in Kwangtung. From the reeds grown in the

others in the provinces of Kiangnan, Kiangsi, Fookien, Chihkiang, Hookwang, and Kwangtung, a revenue was raised of twenty-four thousand four hundred and twelve taels.

These various odds and ends, with the taxes payable on the sale of lands and houses, produced, in 1753, a total of one million fifty-two thousand seven hundred and six taels.

In 1651,—we rely again on the “Holy Wars,”—the revenue yielded fourteen and a half million taels in silver, of which the army ate up over thirteen million; and though expenditure increased within three years so as to exceed income by four million, the emperor refused to increase taxation. When Sangwei revolted, Kanghi was in desperation to make ends meet. He called for voluntary contributions and sold literary degrees, but got only two million taels. The magistrates, however, had abundance of money raised for public purposes, which they retained in their own hands. But in 1722 Kanghi had a reserve surplus of eight millions, increased by his successor to sixty millions,—more than half of which Kienlung drained off in his remote north-western expeditions against the Mahomedans; and he spent the remainder and more in his wars against the Tien Shan regions. But at the same time the Board of Revenue had a surplus over Chinese working expenses of fully seventy millions. Kienlung spent over seventy millions in his wars against *Kinchuen* in 1776, but there still remained a surplus of fully sixty millions. Five years after he twice reduced taxes because he had a surplus of seventy-eight millions; and his surplus in 1795 was over seventy millions. But forty years thereafter, this surplus unaccountably disappeared; and over seventy millions called in by requests for volunteer subscriptions disappeared with it, no one being able to tell how or why. Our author, however, we think, knew where a great deal of it went, for he was writing of his own time when an English or foreign indemnity, arising out of the opium war, introduced into China its modern impecunious governments.

The revenue, which up to Kienlung was thirty million taels per annum, was raised by him in 1782 to seventy-eight millions,

and was found scarcely adequate to the strain upon his treasury. This we can account for by the fact that the great and small Kinchuen wars cost him over seventy millions, while a simultaneous drain of a hundred millions was compressed into the short space of time in which he had to put down the *Bailien kiao* rebellion in the central provinces. The resources at his command show what can be got by the usual taxation out of China when tax-collectors are less than ordinarily rapacious. Yet, as has been said above, the cure of this national gangrene must be the same which uprooted the similar corruption in England,—a largely increased salary to officials, and strict accounts with them.

The loss to the country by taxes in kind may be estimated from the cost of transport in the year 1809, when a censor and a grand secretary calculated that each *dan* of rice transported by imperial convoy from the south, cost eighteen taels for carriage alone; thus the four million *dan* coming thence cost seventy-two million taels; while by vessels carrying six hundred *dan* from Kiangsoo the cost was only a thousand dollars, or about one tael and a half per *dan*. The cost of taxes in grain delivered in Peking should never exceed the calculated four taels per *dan*. Rice cost in the place of production two taels in ordinary years, three in bad years, and four in famine. This was corroborated next year by the governors of Kiangsoo, who reported that rice in the hands of the magistrates stood for three taels per *dan*, while the public price was under one. He recommended the transport of taxes in kind by the public, instead of by imperial vessels; for this would be a gain to the government and a boon to the people, as official covetousness was alone responsible for the exorbitant charges.

Another curious piece of information is given by the "Holy Wars." It appears that the Chinese government had purchased foreign vessels at a price of a hundred thousand taels each. But as the "Holy Wars" was being printed, a schooner ship belonging to the "Barbarian" English had been burnt in Canton, and for it they demanded only twenty thousand dollars; and it

was reasoned that a full rigged ship could cost no more than double. The author, therefore, deeply regrets that the Chinese government threw away to barbarians over two millions of taels above the proper cost of the vessels they purchased. We fear the author of the "Holy Wars" had forgotten the middle-men in those transactions, to whom the lion's share of those over-charges would fall.

The following **TARIFF** of purely native goods may be interesting to compare with that of other nations. The articles mentioned, though thus taxed within the country producing them, are only taxed when passing into another province than that in which they are produced; and this is much like a passage from one country to another in Europe.

Best Satin, per piece,* Tls.	0.13800	Combs, per hundred	Tls.	0.01200
2nd class Satin, ,,	0.11400	Mica, ,, sheets,		0.12000
Flowered Silk, ,,	0.03420	Real Gold Fans, per ten,		0.00800
Coloured ,, ,,	0.02506	Black ,, ,,		0.00400
Finest Gauze, ,,	0.01708	Common Fans, ,,		0.00080
Best "Grass" Cloth, ,,	0.06800	Preserved Fruits, per cwt.		0.02680
,, Cotton ,, ,,	0.05500	Tea, per catty, - -		0.00200
Fine (Satin) Boots, one pair	0.01200	Ginsheng, ,, - -		0.10400
Cotton Shoes, ,,	0.00400	Whanglien Medicine, per cwt.		2.04000
Birds' (Swallow) Nest, per		Tortoise Glue (Medicine?),		
catty, - - -	0.01360	per cwt., - - -		0.40000
Incense, per catty, -	0.00200	Ajiao, Ass Skin Glue Medi-		
Ivory Ware, ,, - -	0.02000	cine, per cwt., - -		0.40000

Keeping in mind that the tael is valued at about six shillings sterling, the customs duties will appear ridiculously small—e.g., tea sells in Mookden at from one to two taels per catty; but supposing it to average no more than half a tael in value over China, the duty is under $0\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The same is true of Ginsheng. Silks appear to be rated at about one per cent. The customs at the open ports, whose rates were fixed by the English, charge five per cent. as the minimum rate.

Besides the ordinary revenue, there are special items provided by particular people for the emperor's private use. Many

* About fourteen yards. The decimal places are named *chien*, *fun*, *li*, *hao*, and *su*.

Manchus of Manchuria have to pay a greatly reduced or no tax on their lands. But there is a tax in kind of all the various products, other than grain, of all kinds of fish and game. The Manchus hereditarily occupied in pearl gathering, in fishing or hunting, have to provide a certain number of their specialty per head or *Ding*. Thus the pearl fisher families (Hoo) of Woola are bound to supply his majesty with sixteen eastern pearls per *Ding* per annum; the honey families with seventy catties of honey; the Ginsheng families with seven and a half *liang* or ounces per *Ding* per annum. In Liaotung, the net families of Newchwang, of whom there is a large number, have to provide yearly five hundred catties fish per *Ding*; the falcon families, one hundred falcons; the fox families, four fox skins; the honey families, fifty catties of honey; the game families, two wild boar and ninety head of smaller game, or bundles of dried venison, each bundle containing ten pieces; the otter families, four otter skins; the heron families, fifteen pairs of herons; the fish families, fifty small-scaled or fresh-water fishes per *Ding* per annum. We find the same law, with differing quantities, applied along the north border of Chihli, touching Mongolia.

There are special looms in Nanking, Hangchow, and Soochow, under high official superintendents, employed solely in weaving *dragon* and *mang* silks for the emperor. There are three chief treasuries in Peking under the Board of Revenue. One is used solely to store up silk goods; satins, silks or gauze, made for the emperor, to be used in the imperial family, or gifted by him to any individual. A second is for storing silver, and a third contains all the copper, pewter, lead, and iron, as well as various kinds of incense. Every third year there is a most careful examination made of these three treasuries, to ascertain whether the stock in hand agrees with the inventory.

EXPENDITURE.

Next in point of interest to the manner in which the taxes are ingathered, is the mode in which they are expended. The emperor is nominally absolute master of all China; but the

Board of Revenue has the keys of the treasury. The emperor's personal annual expenditure is "constant," which must mean that it is fixed. The imperial agent sends an order to the Board for whatever is wanted. The Board sends the order to that particular one of the three treasuries, where the ordered article is stored. The senior secretary in charge of that treasury sends an order to the manager in charge of that treasury; and he implements the order, preserving the document. But if the expenditure of the imperial household is fixed, the full amount is not given us; though we are persuaded it greatly exceeds the expenditure of any European court (see pp. 667-8).

But if we are in ignorance as to the imperial household, we are informed fully of the rate of expenditure on what we might call the civil list. A *Chin* wang or prince receives annually a sum of ten thousand taels, and his heir six thousand. A *Kun* wang has an allowance of five thousand taels, his eldest son three thousand. A *Beira* gets two thousand five hundred taels; *Beidsu*, thirteen hundred; *Jungwo* Goong, seven hundred; *Foogwo* Goong, five hundred; and from second class *Jungwo* commander, who has four hundred and ten taels, allowances drop by twenty-five taels at a step for thirteen grades to Commander by Favour. Every man of the imperial clan, consisting chiefly of all the descendants of Noorhachu, the founder of the dynasty, but also including the descendants of his brothers and sisters, has an annual allowance. This allowance is graduated in proportion to the nearness or remoteness of relationship to the ruling emperor. Each recipient of this imperial bounty has a title, and the lowest title confers the right to eighty taels a year; so that titles are not merely honorary. The members of the imperial family have necessarily a larger income than the more remote connections. We have just mentioned what the allowance is to the sons of majesty, *Chin* and *Kün* wang, &c. The princesses have also a yearly allowance. The chief, called the *Goolun* princess, receives four hundred taels; when married, her husband gets besides two hundred and eighty taels per annum. The *Hoshao* princess

has three hundred taels, and her husband two hundred and fifty-five. The *Künjoo* princess is allowed two hundred and fifty taels, and her husband two hundred and thirty. The other four grades down to and ending with *Hiangkun* princess decrease by thirty taels each; the same rule applies to the husbands, the lowest allowance being one hundred and five taels. Each of these various grades include a larger or smaller number of princesses, and embrace many ladies from collateral branches, created princesses to honour their fathers for any important services rendered to the state.

The Manchu government has from its earliest dawn sedulously cultivated the good-will of the restless nomadic Mongols, who used to be the bitter scourge of every preceding dynasty. Very few attempts have been made by the Mongols within the last three centuries to assert supremacy, or even to demand independence. This is the result of a cautious policy of conferring handsome yearly allowances upon the Mongol chiefs, who are graded as princes of such and such a rank by and under the Manchu government. Intermarriage is also largely resorted to, and is very influential in cementing the Mongol chiefs to the Manchu throne. The emperor sometimes marries a Mongol princess; and there are curious stories afloat among the Chinese on this subject. But the Mongol princes are very frequently married to Manchu princesses. These are not necessarily—indeed they are only rarely—the daughters of the emperor; but are nieces, cousins, or other relations, created princess of a certain grade just for the marriage. And not only is the usual allowance connected with that grade given to this princess, but an addition is made thereto. In the case of a *Goolun* princess thus married, the allowance amounts to one thousand taels a year, and thirty webs of satin; her husband receiving three hundred taels in addition to the sum connected with his title. The chief of Karka, of Toorbet, of Korsin, is always a *Chin* wang; and receives with his title a sum of two thousand taels and forty webs of satin per annum. The *Chin* wang of any other Mongolic tribe receives two thousand taels

and twenty-five webs of satin. And the heir of any *Chin* wang has a yearly allowance of fifteen hundred taels and twenty pieces of satin. The *Kun* wang of Korsin and Jassaktoo receive each twelve hundred taels and fifteen pieces of satin; their heir having besides a sum of eight hundred taels and thirteen pieces, what the Mongol Beira receives. The *Taiji* is the lowest chieftain rank, and his allowance is one hundred taels and four webs of satin per year.

Far the greatest drain on the imperial exchequer is the utterly useless, but in the aggregate enormous, payment made to the Manchu "soldiers" in the capital and throughout the empire. Their claim to be military men is based rather on their descent than on their skill in arms; and their pay is given them because of their fathers' prowess, and not at all from any hopes of their efficiency as soldiers. Their soldierly qualities are included in the accomplishments of idleness, riding, and the use of the bow and arrow, at which they practice on a few rare occasions each year. Each of the nine grades of officer is divided into senior and junior; but the difference is in grade, not in pay. The grain given is in proportion to the pay,—one *hoo* or bushel being given for every tael.

The pay of the privates in the body-guard is larger than the ordinary pay. The privates whose duty it is to be immediately around the emperor, are paid at the rate of four taels per month; a rate which foremen bow-makers also receive. The cavalry, bow-maker, and brazier receives each three taels per month; each man having an allowance besides of forty-eight *hoo* of grain per annum. The infantry of the main body of the guards have one and a half tael and two *hoo* of grain per month, which is the pay of troops in active service; garrison troops in garrison or in peace receiving monthly one tael and one *hoo*. Cannoneers in the capital receive two taels and three *hoo* each month. The three camps in the capital of Chinese troops or *Loo ying* are paid at the rate of two taels for cavalry and one for infantry; and each horse is allowed two and a half taels per month. These items are fully sufficient to give an idea of the cost of feeding men in China.

CURRENCY.

We learn from the "Holy Wars" that before the Sung period or the tenth century, there was no silver produced or used in China, gold and copper being the precious metals in use; and that whatever silver was used in China before that time, was brought in from abroad, but not used as currency. In the Han period, nineteen centuries ago, there were foreign coins brought into China of both gold and silver,—having on the obverse a face, on the reverse a rider; or on the obverse the king's "face," on the reverse his queen's. The *Kigweihüen*, *Dookialo*, and *Chiewhashu*, kingdoms of *Siyü*,* used gold and silver money, with small copper cash; and India used gold, silver, and pearls. It was men from *Siyü* who first brought silver into China. The *Sung* emperors had to forbid the selling of copper cash to foreigners who brought silver in ships with which they bought the copper. But as "foreigners were covetous," the practice was "continued by smuggling; just as now there are laws issued in vain against the exportation of silver." The various kingdoms of America, says our authority, produce gold and silver in abundance. In 807 the Tang emperor said that where there was silver to be found, there was also copper; that copper was useful for drums and cymbals and other necessary articles, but silver could not in any way be regarded a necessary; hence he forbade all within the *Wooling*, the "Five mountain ranges," to mine for silver, but permitted the mining of copper. The Sung dynasty also forbade silver mining. And the two first Ming emperors forbade the exchanging of gold or silver for goods.

Only the two Kwang paid silver tribute to *Tang* dynasty, each sub-prefecture paying from twenty to thirty taels. The Yuen dynasty received no more than fifty thousand or sixty thousand taels a year in silver. The first Ming emperor refused to accept more than twenty-four thousand taels. So that before the Ming period silver was despised and copper esteemed. But we saw in the historical portion of our work how Wanli of the Ming prayed, and yearned and worked for silver. It is not

* Neighbourhood of Tientshan.

improbable that contact with western nations made China gradually accept of silver instead of a gold currency.

Of the silver in China, the "Holy Wars" continues, that brought in foreign ships is, in proportion to that produced in China, as seventeen to fourteen; and like a *Yang-yin* fatalist or Hegelian, the author of the "Holy Wars" sees only the natural "morning and evening," ebb and flow, in the fact that foreign ships were in his own times again fast draining China of silver in exchange for opium.

Silver was in Taokwang period produced in Yunnan and Kweichow, Yunnan producing yearly sixty-seven thousand and three hundred *liang** of silver, and sixty *liang* of gold. It also produced ten thousand and eight hundred worth of silver *liang* in copper. The yield of Yungchang foo, of Szchuen, and the two Kwang, was unknown; as also the yield of pewter in those provinces and in Shensi and Hookwang, Yunnan producing the worth of three thousand *liang*. Yunnan does not sell any of those metals to the barbarian, nor Kweichow to the Miao; but every other province sells to the barbarian.

The gold mines of Kanchow and Sining in Kansu, with those of Chunchow and Tayooshan, in Hoonan, are under charge of a marshal with a band of soldiers, and are worked by night. The Darbahatai gold mine in *Ili* or Kulja, was worked by the men and under the authority of the Tatar general. In Wunchoo and other places of Chihkiang, the people were permitted to mine, on payment of a royalty of from ten to twenty per cent. There was a silver mine beyond Tungyue worked by the Burmese, and another beyond Yungchang belonging to the Gwo barbarians. The Yuen history states that the masters were many and the workers few in those mines, so that the labourers were both poor and ill treated. These labourers were wholly Miao. There were three magistrates to look after the food of the labourers and to settle disputes, and four to look after the refining of the silver.

* I prefer to use this Chinese term, for it is twenty-five per cent. heavier than the English ounce, as the catty is than the English pound avoird.

In the Ming dynasty Fukien had forty-two silver mines opened, and Chihkiang had a large number; but because of the numerous murders committed, the Ming closed the mines. Kanghi and Kienlung, the two most prosperous emperors of the Manchu line, forbade the working of silver mines. The Kin dynasty,—contemporary with the Sung, which forbade silver mining,—permitted the people to mine, charging a royalty of five per cent. A recent note to the “Holy Wars” states that the silver mines of China are exhausted; that there is the mine of Dashan, west of Kwangsi, worked by Chinese; that of Soonghing, in the north of Annam, worked mostly by Cantonese; and there is a million *liang* brought annually into China. Chinese and Annamese constantly murder each other; but the Annamese king takes his per centage on the silver produced, never troubling himself about the murders or the state of the miners.

Anciently gold was plentiful in China and silver unknown. Hiao Wang of the Liang had at his death four hundred thousand catties* of gold! A Han Wang had forty thousand catties. In the Wei period, when Buddhism made its thorough conquest of China, one emperor used up twenty-five thousand catties of gold in making images, and at another time one hundred thousand catties. It was then weight for weight cheaper than jade.

There was no silver in the beginning of the Tang dynasty (seventh century). There was a very small quantity used in the beginning of the Sung dynasty to pay taxes; and it gradually increased, till in *Yuenfung* reign gold decreased to ten thousand *liang*, and silver increased to two hundred thousand. In the reign *Tiensi* there was an income of eight hundred and eighty-three thousand *liang*. But most of this came in foreign ships.

In the Tang dynasty there was a “Flying money” currency, which means paper notes. That was eleven centuries before Law turned the heads of most Frenchmen. The Sung dynasty minted three hundred and sixty thousand strings of cash, and

* At present value this gives thirty million pounds stg.

ordered solid cash alone to be used in paying for anything, recalling the "Flying money" of Tang. But when the Sung in its turn became poor, it too issued paper money, which it called *Jiaohwi*. This paper represented, or nominally represented, tea, salt, and goods. Thus, said our author, the "light stood for the heavy," and ten real cash could be made to represent a million. If, he adds, that paper did not represent real property, the profit was with the governors; but the oppression, the loss, and the suffering with the governed. At the time he was writing, on account of the disappearance of silver and the claims of the first English war, the proposal was seriously considered in Peking of again issuing a paper currency, which the "Holy Wars" profoundly deprecated. The provinces of Kiangnan (now Kiangsoo and Anhwi), of Chihkiang, Hookwang and Fukien, refused to have anything to do with the paper currency of any of the dynasties which used it. And the "Holy Wars" states that they never adopted even the mercantile notes so common over all north China.

In 1375, one *liang* of gold stood for ten *dan* of rice, and one of silver for two *dan*; hence gold was weight for weight only five times dearer than silver. Thirty-eight years after, one *liang* of gold stood for twenty *dan* of rice, and was 7.5 times dearer than silver. A short time after, gold was ten times dearer than silver; standing for twenty *goong* salt, or thirty *dan* rice. Since one *liang* of silver would then buy three *dan* of rice, we see that grain has not always grown in price with the march of time in China.

In the Han period so scarce and valuable was silver that for eight *liang* one thousand strings of cash were paid; within a dozen centuries after, in the Kin dynasty, one hundred strings bought fifty *liang*; and in the end of the fourteenth century, one string of a thousand cash was exchanged for one *liang*; and four strings bought a *liang* of gold, this being one-fourth of its modern price. The first Ming emperor bought the *liang* of silver for six hundred cash; and the last paid sixteen hundred to two thousand cash for the same. In the beginning of the

Manchu reign, silver again fell to one thousand cash per *liang*. When the "Holy Wars" was being written, the *liang* or tael of silver rose again to sixteen hundred cash; and it was this sudden rise in price which opened the eyes of the Chinese to the drain made by the opium traffic; the Mexican dollar at the same time sold for so much as thirteen hundred cash. And this has been one very considerable element in the war against opium, perhaps indeed the chief one; but Chinese could not publicly mention this, when they had such a capital argument against it in the curses innumerable it has introduced into China. But from either motive no one would have ever found fault with China for resisting the introduction of opium if she had warred successfully; for she believes, as other nations believe, that she has a right to say what shall be allowed and what forbidden to enter her borders from foreign countries. And this right she is certain to demand ere long. What would be thought of Britain, if she compelled by costly war the State of Maine to take British whisky at five or ten per cent. duty on its cost price? Yet this is what we did and do in China.

The copper or brass currency of China is used westwards to Hami; but to the west of that place the Mahommedans use a cash which they call *poor*, one of which equals in value five Chinese cash; it is therefore apparently pure copper. Fifty *poor* they call one *tung*. To the south-west the Burmese silver currency comes in contact with the Chinese cash. It is 0.15 of a *liang* in weight, and six go to a tael. A smaller coin of 0.1, nine of which to the tael; and a smaller still, 0.05, eighteen of which are sold for the tael. Thus the Burmese charge ten per cent. in the exchange.

After Kienlung conquered Tibet he ordered exchange marts at both Nan and Bei Loo of Tienshan, where *poor* cash could be exchanged for Chinese. The Resident in Tibet was ordered to mint large and small silver coins, with the characters "Kienlung" in Chinese on the face, and *Tanggootua* or Tibetan letters on the reverse. These were after the model of the coins of Gworka or Nepaul.

In 1653, there were minted 2,097,633,850 cash, in strings called *Juchien* of 2000 each; besides 20,001,210 "copper" cash, which probably means the much larger cash used in the capital; and 128,172.⁴⁷ *tiaos* of paper money, each representing 1000 cash, were circulated. In 1682, the cash minted was 294,851,480; in 1691, it was 289,921,050; in 1703, it was 238,065,900. Large numbers of all those mintings, together with a few of much older cash, form the smaller proportion of the cash now in circulation; but the great bulk of those older cash has been melted down, as later mintings, nominally of the same value, have been much lighter in weight.

In July 1653, the Board of Works decided that cash should be minted all of one pattern; each weighing 0.¹²⁵ of a *liang*, and be finished artistically with the character *li* on the reverse. Every thousand cash should represent one *liang* of silver; and any deviation from this price should be declared criminal. The emperor agreed to this desire to have the relative values of copper and silver fixed. But there is nothing more fluctuating in China than the price of silver; two successive days rarely finding it the same, except during the few days at Chinese new year when no business is done. We learn also from this decision that copper or brass was, value for value, one hundred and twenty-five times heavier than silver.

Though copper cash is the currency and the standard metal, everything else—gold, silver, grain, &c.—changing in value according to supply and demand, silver is the measure and the currency of money land-taxes. As there is no silver coinage, the infinitesimal sums have always to be paid in small nuggets called "Loose silver" by foreigners; by the Chinese, more appropriately, "Broken silver." The receiver of taxes had to melt these down into the Chinese ingot, called "one silver" and by foreigners, "a shoe of silver," from its supposed resemblance to a shoe. The weight of this is over fifty-three taels or *liang*, and the value is about £15 stg. Alleging a loss by "Fire-waste" in the process of this conversion, the tax-gatherer demanded three per cent. more than the legal tax weight to

make good his loss. This charge for "Fire-waste" Kanghi declared an illegal impost on the people, and he issued orders to cease its collection. But it was doubtless too profitable an illegality to admit of its cessation, and the excuse for it was very plausible; even though the emperor, by his orders, implied that if there were in reality such a loss, the government and not the people should bear it. The emperor succeeding him twice within the first five years of his reign seriously denounced the same charge as an illegality. But orders were issued in vain.

That charge against the tax-payer of three per cent. was either found by the Manchu tax-gatherers in operation, which is very likely, or introduced by them from the beginning of their reign; for before the young child-emperor had gone from Mookden to Peking, the viceroy in Tientsin prayed that those taxes imposed additional to the taxation of the *Ming* should be abolished, and that the "Fire-waste" should be stopped. The regent replied in name of the child-emperor, that proclamation had been already made forbidding any official to trespass the laws under pain of death, that the three per cent. "Fire-waste" was an illegal charge, arising from "covetousness," an oppressing of the people, and a defrauding of the government; and that so far was the emperor from desiring to increase the *Ming* taxation, that he was eager to reduce even the legal tax.


When it is stated that a pound of copper in lump is three times more valuable in the markets than a pound of copper minted, it will not seem surprising that stringent and severe laws have been found necessary,—from 1698 downwards,—to preserve the only minted coin in China. So particular are the laws on this point, that it is illegal to carry quantities of cash from one city to another on any pretence. The most severe punishment is inflicted upon him who melts down cash; the next in heinousness is the crime of him who mints privately, or "sweats" or clips the edges. The third in guilt is he who melts ancient cash, or withdraws it from circulation; and the lightest offence is that of casting small cash of light weight,—probably because it is easy of detection. This last is, however, largely

practised ; for a dozen light cash can be made out of the copper of one real cash.

Were a pound weight of minted copper cash equally valuable with a pound weight of similar metal unworked, there would be no temptation to "melt;" but so extreme is the conservatism of the Chinese people in regard to currency, that they have over and over again successfully resisted the imposition by the government of a currency of lighter weight. The Koreans, in returning from Peking, used to purchase great quantities of copper cash, take it to their own country, convert it into basons, bring it back and sell it to the Chinese, making rich on the profits. The copper money of Manchuria ran the risk of utterly disappearing, when the Chinese emperor intervened and prevented further depletion, by ordering his vassal, the Korean king, to declare the melting of Chinese cash a capital crime.

The standard of English currency is gold ; that of Chinese is copper. The accompanying woodcut gives a *fac-simile* in size, obverse and reverse, of such copper *cash* or coin minted under various dynasties. Through the square hole in the centre a string is passed, by which the coins are easily carried about. A *tiao* is a string of a certain number of cash ; the number being fixed in any one city and neighbourhood, but differing in many cities. The string is always nominally 1000, though it rarely counts the full number ; it is as often really 500, 164, 162, or 160. This copper cash is the only imperial sanctioned currency.

When large accounts are settled, silver ingots or *shoes* of about four and a half pounds weight are used instead of the very cumbrous copper cash. At Chinese new-year every man must square his accounts, and settle in hard cash. At this period of universal reckoning, silver mounts up in price from ten to twenty per cent.; and after all accounts are settled, it goes gradually down again. This is, of course, so much pure gain to the banks and money lender ; and a man with a good deal of ready money and business capacity, could then make handsome sums of money. In travelling, it is also necessary to carry about silver when a draft is not attainable ; but as a rule it is not



1 are obverse and reverse of an original Manchu cash; 2 are two various forms of reverse in Manchu words of cash of present dynasty; 3 are obverse of the same; 4 are deteriorated cash of the emperors during and since the opium wars; and 5 is a false coin. All are actual size; one of each emperor of present dynasty.

difficult to get a draft on any city, however remote. On these drafts there is usually a small charge of about a half per cent.

Over the provinces in the northern half of China, the people avoid the inconvenience attending the bulk and weight of their copper cash, by using *notes* similar to our western bank notes, which are usually payable in full at sight. We have seen that notes were issued by the Chinese government twelve centuries ago; and that these notes purported to represent a certain value in salt, tea, or grain,—the taxes of the country. The notes now in use took their rise in the same manner. Their issue is not confined to banks, though banks are as numerous in northern China as in Britain; but all large warehouses, pawnshops, and storehouses, issue notes of value from twopence to ten pounds. The only apparent check on this issue, is the annual balancing of accounts, which must be in solid silver; though the extent of the capital of the house is pretty well known to the other members of the merchant guild, without whose permission no mercantile house can issue notes in Mookden. But any house may issue notes in the country, if the people will take them. Some of the more wealthy houses in Mookden will issue no notes; other houses issue more than their due share. When the new-year comes round, these to pay their accounts borrow silver for a few days at excessive interest; and when the new-year fortnight is over, re-issue their notes and repay the silver. Houses become “shut” or fail, when they are unable to secure the necessary silver to tide over that fortnight. These notes are so much working capital, but they are often thrice or four times the real capital. These notes, therefore, represent pretty closely the notes of hand, or promissory notes of our western merchants. One peculiarity of this system is that this paper money is of value only in the city and the country under the jurisdiction of the city in which it is issued; though it may be taken beyond that range if the person tendering it is known.

The accompanying woodcut is an exact imitation of the notes in use in Mookden. The printed characters are usually blue. Those large ones on the top are the name of the city and the

盛

四
早街

京

講

書

堂

字

憑帖取錢

號
台照

光緒
年
月

號

日

文光書坊

票



street in which the issuing house is located. Underneath is the name of the house or shop. The blanks are written in with the date of issue, the number and the value of the note; the mode of payment, whether at sight, or three or six months after issue, is also written. In the left hand corner is the stamp of the house, always in red. Though this is in wood, most of the notes are thrown off plates of copper or of horn, both of which produce work like steel plates; and very beautifully is this work often done. On my first entry into Mookden, silver had to be changed for paper notes; but so very numerous and so cleverly executed were forged notes at that time, that no tradesman or shopman would take a note unless guaranteed by a well-known householder. My first landlord was a Manchu, who had pretty good estates in the country. He had a large family connection, all fairly wealthy. They all owned slaves (see *Slavery*), as he did himself. One day a slave of one of his friends came into town on business, and called on my landlord. This slave gave the city man all the news from his country house, detailed the most minute and accurate information, not only concerning the persons of his relations, but about the properties of the family. After a considerable stay, the slave said that his master had sent him on business into town, giving him a large note to pay for his purchases; but as he was a stranger in town, he asked my landlord whether he would not guarantee the note. The landlord unhesitatingly did so for his friend's sake. The slave was to call before leaving in the evening, to receive any messages for his master. But his business so engaged his attention, that he did not return. The "slave" did not return, but the note did within a day or two, for it was found to be a forged one; and my landlord was the victim of a clever trick.

USURY AND DEBT.

British legislators in India have met with one of their greatest difficulties in attempting to solve the problem of "debtor and creditor;" and so perilously near is the charybdis of ruin to the debtor to the Scylla of injustice to the creditor, that legislators

have not yet found the mode of reconciling British notions of the sacredness of written engagements and contracts with the general wellbeing of the community and the consequent stability of British rule. There are many large capitalists whose loyalty is for the country which gives them the largest interest on their lent capital; and it is not at all to be expected that Indian capitalists are deeply interested in the unbroken and untroubled rule of British influence in India,—always excepting the cases in which such influence is necessary to wrest his last *anna* from the debtor, who owes such capitalist twenty times more than the original sum borrowed. We warmly recommend to the careful attention, if not to the imitation of Indian law-givers, the principles seen in the following laws of “debtor and creditor” taken from the volumes of Kienlung’s laws. The circumstances in both these huge overgrown eastern empires are to all intents and purposes similar.

In China as in India there are two occasions in the lives of the great bulk of the population, in which a man will rather die than spend only the small sum of money he can command without running into debt. These are marriages and funerals,—especially the latter. The man in need of money will therefore have it on any terms whatever, which the money-lender thinks fit to demand. He knows he must have money to spend now; and he does not realise, or he is comparatively heedless of the risks he has to run. And if the two are left to settle their bargain by themselves, none can for a moment be at a loss to know how the bargaining will terminate between the man who must have money on any terms and the man who is not necessitated to lend on any terms. The Chinese government, as well as all others, knew how the fight would and must end; and, doubtless after experiences such as India has given for years if not for centuries, legislated with the express design of curbing the avarice of the capitalist. The laws are therefore described as “laws against Exorbitant Usury.” Chinese laws, as a whole, have, as their foundation, always embodied the maxim of the “greatest happiness of the greatest number”; and it is only in perfect

consistency with the spirit of her laws in all times, that the many weak poor are protected from the few powerful wealthy. The wealthy, in this case of lending, do not require the protection of laws to prevent their ruin, the poor do. It is unnecessary to say that the wealthy, as will be seen, are protected in what the law regards as their just demands, but in demands which appear proper for them to make, the laws say, "hitherto but no further;" and this we think is what should be done in India. We now give the Chinese laws.

Whoever gives out money, or any other article, privately, at interest, must not demand or receive more than three per cent. per month;* and however many years or months pass ere the whole is paid,—when it is paid, the sum total paid by the debtor must not exceed the capital, and a sum for interest equal to the capital; i.e., the interest, however long unpaid, must on no account exceed the amount of the original capital. If a larger sum (than the original capital) be demanded as interest, the money-lender shall be beaten forty blows, the punishment to increase with the amount of the excess† demanded up to a hundred blows. If a magistrate lend money, or other valuable at interest to any person within the bounds of his jurisdiction, and take interest within the legal maximum, he shall be beaten eighty blows, with an increased punishment if he take more than that maximum.‡

* Practice makes this thirty per cent. per annum.

† The principle of forbidding accumulated unpaid interest to exceed the original capital is explained by the statute book, as being that no article should more than double its price. But we have the real signification in the title of the law,—“against extortion,” or “against unbounded usury.” We are informed by business men that the law has been since changed to a maximum of two per cent. per month, the other clause standing; and that any interest above that is not recoverable by law. Large pawn shops,—which in China much resemble money-lending jewellers in the west,—charge this two per cent.; but small disreputable pawn shops, corresponding to our British pawn shops, charge three per cent., though at their own risk. We know however that when the interest is regularly, whether monthly or yearly, paid, the law against more than doubling the original capital does not apply.

‡ This punishment is independent of the question whether he has distorted the law in compelling such payments. In any case of interest beyond the legal limit, the excess is handed back to the debtor. The magistrate or official is thus absolutely forbidden to lend.



The debtor who fails to implement his part of the (legal) agreement, in non-payment at the appointed date, shall be beaten ten blows for the first three months elapsing after the date when payment was due, if the sum of his debt is above five taels; the punishment increases by each lapsed month and by the amount of the sum borrowed. And the capital and interest must be forthwith paid to the creditor.

If a creditor seize by force a man's clothing, cattle, produce or possession, as payment of debt, he shall be beaten eighty blows. A more recent Act, however, ordains that if the debtor is willing, and if the article taken does not exceed in value the sum of the debt, there is no blame attachable, even if in the first instance the article should have been taken by force.

If a creditor take away the wife, concubine, son or daughter of a debtor as payment of debt, he shall be beaten one hundred blows; if he commit adultery besides, his crime shall be increased one degree, and two degrees if he be guilty of rape. If he take away such person or persons by force, his punishment shall be two degrees more severe, and he shall be beaten seventy blows and banished one and a half years; if in addition to such forcible seizure he be guilty of rape, he shall be strangled; and in either case, whether the debtor consented (because he could not help himself) or refused, the creditor must restore the abducted person or persons to their family, and the debt is cancelled.

Whoever borrows any article or animal, and the loan, while in his possession, is worn out, lost, stolen, destroyed, killed, or dies, he must make it good; and if while he himself wore it out or killed it, he falsely asserts that it was stolen or died, he shall be besides beaten ninety blows, and transported two and a half years. Lost articles found were to be handed to the nearest magistrate on pain of punishment. Laws follow to prevent any private person, or any person except the state, from taking possession of and levying duties at a port; against interference with the markets or fairs,—which form so peculiar and universal a feature of Chinese country life;—and against light weights and short measures.

CHAPTER XVIII.

S L A V E R Y .

THE fact that slavery in some form existed in China from a very remote period, is attested by the presence in the written language of the word for "slave." This word, *noo*, is a composite of *woman* beside, but after, *hand*. From this we might be inclined to infer that the first slaves were women. But the "Imperial Dictionary of Kanghi" informs us that the ancient mode of writing *noo*, a "slave," was by placing the character meaning *man*, beside, but after, that meaning *woman*, and it may not therefore be a far fetched idea to take this "slave" to signify a man placed under the orders of a woman,—that is, a man set apart for domestic service. The slave would therefore be called upon to do the household drudgery, which was then thought to be the peculiar sphere of woman, and to be degrading for a man with strength to furrow the ground and to draw the bow. It is extremely likely that this was the condition of the slave in the earlier history of China; but it is perhaps more difficult to determine in what manner slavery was constituted. The veteran sinologist, Dr. Williams, in his latest dictionary, under the word *noo*, states that it was "Formerly a person bought with money, chiefly now those sentenced to slavery." It is not easy to discover on what historical facts this definition is based. It is an interpretation at variance with the great Standard Dictionary of Kanghi, which states that the *noo* was "anciently a person sentenced to slavery," quoting the *Chow Li*, as its authority. There is this further difficulty against that interpretation, that anciently there was no "money" in China with which to buy the slaves. We are inclined therefore to

accept the definition of Kanghi, in preference to that of Dr. Williams, and to believe that those in ancient times subject to women in household drudgery were men sentenced to slavery by imperial or ducal order. There were doubtless many prisoners of war thus sentenced; but from a very early period of Chinese history we find prisoners of war often permitted to return to their native homes.

As the Chinese became more numerous money began to circulate, and buying and selling took the place of bartering. As wealth with its oft useful companion,—vain ostentation,—began to multiply and to concentrate, the wealthy—partly from the fondness of display, partly from the desire for personal comfort—would begin the practice of purchasing men and women for slaves. This practice, which began probably not less than twenty centuries ago, has continued in uninterrupted operation to the present day, and is likely to continue long. The purchase money is in reality a sum of money paid in advance for the labour of an individual during his life, and for that of his descendants after him; just as ordinary *wages* are a sum of money paid for the labour of a man during a given *limited* period of his life. And from all we can learn from the unfrequent jottings of stately history, too dignified to explain such ignoble subjects, it appears that servitude during a limited period and for stated wages, began to be general in the west, only after Christianity had taught the common brotherhood of man, knocked the fetters off the slave, making him his own master, permitting him to sell his labour to a man of his own choice, and on certain terms which could be reconsidered by either party at a given point of time. Slavery was simply servitude for life, and was in many instances not worse than most servitude. But it contained in it the degrading idea of the impossibility of the slave's own social improvement; and if of a manly disposition, the perhaps even more acutely painful feeling, that his children were sentenced to the same level of an instrument in their owner's hand. Most men are satisfied with sufficient food and abundant clothing, and probably slaves have rarely fared worse than if

their own masters. Yet the few among them whose disposition, talents or ambition made them groan in their captivity even when their chains were golden, lamented mainly, as we have heard them in Manchuria, over the fact that they could not regard themselves as *men*. These find their greatest delight in seeing their sons, under the borrowed surname and auspices of a friendly free family, enter the literary arena where no slave or descendent of a slave should legally appear. The proud slave father feels his own fetters broken to shreds when he hears of his son's appearance in the graduate's toga; and though that son dare appear thenceforth only as an acquaintance, the father regards himself emancipated in having cheated the law to free his son, and to place him on the first rung of the ladder whose top supports the dragon throne.

If it is difficult to write the history of slavery in China, it is easy to trace it to its source in the history of the Manchus, who were themselves, three short centuries ago, mere savages, subsisting in their forest-covered mountain ranges chiefly on the uncooked flesh of the game, which could not escape from the agile step and the sure footed bound of the Manchu, but fell an easy prey to the unerring arrow from his long bow. Slavery was an impossibility among those free if wild sons of the mountain.

It was only after Noorhachu built his "city" of Laochung near the present Hingking that slavery became a possibility; and it became a fact only after his several astounding victories threw many Chinese cities and much excellent arable soil, with its agricultural hamlets, into his hands. The slaves of the Manchus were therefore prisoners of war, and even of these, as many as would were allowed to join the regular army, and many who would as well be excused were led into the ranks as the slaves of their Manchu masters, and helped to gain many a hard won victory from the hands of their free fellow countrymen. Those prisoners of war, men and women, became so numerous, that every officer had them in numbers, and even every private soldier of Manchu blood had his slaves to do his work and wait his pleasure. Multitudes of the descendants of those slaves are slaves at this day, owned



by the descendant of those long-bowed warriors. Multitudes more have been freed, many by manumission, more by purchase, most by flight or lapse of title.

As slavery was too ignoble a subject to be treated of by the dignified pen of the Chinese historian, we can learn the condition of slaves under the Manchus only from those laws passed on the subject; and of these only a small portion has been made public. What we find in the Manchu annals and the Manchu Law Code we give below.

The Chinese prisoners of war, divided as slaves among the officers and men of the Manchu army, in numbers proportionate to the rank of the soldier, could be sold by their master, but he usually retained them as his own slaves. That the Chinese, who boast of a civilization of forty centuries, would regard it the depth of degradation to be in bondage to men who but yesterday were savages, was natural enough; and it is certain that many would prefer the risk of starvation incurred by an endeavour to regain their liberty. Indeed to so great an extent did this "running away" grow, that law after law was passed to check it; and the legislation on the runaway has not, perhaps, been more remarkable for humanity in China than in christian lands.

The first Pekinese emperor of the Manchus, or his regent in his name, complained, in 1649, to the Board of War, that the existing law anent the harbouring of runaways was too harsh. That law condemned to death the harbourer, his next door neighbours on each side of him, the head of the Ten * Families and of the Hundred Families, of which the harbourer was one,—if these several parties failed to inform the district magistrate of the hiding place of the runaway. A new and less severe law was therefore promulgated, ordaining that the harbourer should henceforth be banished and not beheaded: that both his next door neighbours should be beaten thirty bamboo blows, and the head of the Ten Families beaten twenty. But if the runaway returned of his own accord, or was handed up by his harbourer, they would both be blameless. It was also enacted that if his

* See *Taxation*.

relations became surety for his good behaviour, their prayer should be attended to if they desired him to visit them.

This slackening of their chain did not, however, settle the slavery question. At least one other law of increased severity was passed very soon thereafter, for in 1655 chief censor Toolai complained of it as an "unequal" law. He stated the law to have been enacted because runaways had been very numerous of late years, and severe repressive measures had become indispensable. The last law on the subject he described as sentencing to strangulation the slave who had thrice run away; his harbourer to decapitation; and the next door neighbours of the harbourer to transportation. Toolai proposed that if a runaway were discovered in the house of a friend of his, he should be dragged out and put to death; the property and family of the harbourer should be confiscated to the use of the owner of the runaway, and the next door neighbours and head of the village should be beaten; but the discovered runaway, who had no harbourer, should be severely beaten and handed back to his owner. Even did the name Toolai not indicate the nationality of the chief censor, the measure he proposed in order to remove the "unequal" character of the existing law, shows that he was himself a slave-owner and speaking in the interests of the slave-owning Manchus; for it is only the interests of the slave-owner which he pleaded. The law, as it stood, sentenced the runaway, in certain circumstances, to death. Toolai saw in this only a dead loss to the owner, and therefore would have a law passed which would abundantly indemnify the owner for the loss of the slave by execution. He added a sentence to say that the harbourers were probably few, and men guiltlessly involved fewer still. This one sentence, which is wholly apologetic, opens up to our view the then condition of China in regard to this question; for it shows that the laws were employed by unscrupulous cut-throats, of whom China has always a good store, to falsely accuse monied men of the crime of harbouring, thus to extort money. This bountiful well of infamy will be exposed more clearly below in the laws of Kienlung.

The memorial of Toolai was sent to the Boards to consider and report upon it. It would open more widely than before the flood-gates of heartless extortion, and neither it nor even the existing law could be regarded with other than indignant but shame-faced anger by the high Chinese officials, whose countrymen, friends and relations, were the slaves and the victims of extortion. Li Yin, a supervising censor, handed in a memorial immediately after, and apparently as a reply to that of Toolai. He stated that the laws against runaways were far too harsh, and the people involved in the clauses affecting the harbourer and his neighbours far too many. He declared that there was not a single man "within the Four Seas" (China), neither poor nor rich, neither honourable nor despicable, neither magistrate nor people, who was certain of one hour's peace, for he might be implicated at any moment; nor could he be certain of even the life of himself or family. This,—in the style of Chinese memorials,—Li Yin called the "First cause of grief." The law, as it stood, making the runaway appear an article of such value, occasioned false accusations of harbouring in order to extort money; thus breaking up the families of the wealthy, causing wide-spread misery, and destroying the reputation of their women, which was another cause of grief. The action of the law was described as most unreasonable and reckless in the extreme, for there was no examination as to the cause of flight and no enquiry as to how the fugitive got into and hid in the premises of the reputed harbourer. He then showed the impolicy of this legal action, for the imperial revenues were decreased by every family broken up; former proclamations of clemency were rendered nugatory by the cruel loss of life on account of runaways; while the laws reversed the ancient customs which ordained that man should receive civilising instruction during his whole life; for many were made savages by those laws. This was his third cause of grief. He explained the "savage" state by saying that men left to their natural dispositions chose to remain peaceably in one place; why then at that moment were there over thirty thousand men roaming homelessly over the country? He gave as reason

that there was no mercy for them to look to, and no goodness to stay their minds,—there was only a law depriving them of a place; which was a fourth cause of grief. When, besides, the military apprehended a lurking runaway, and were leading him to the place of execution, they trampled upon and crushed the people by the way in a manner which was heartrending to hear; and this was another cause of grief. Famine was just then compelling many poor people to wander about in search of food; but the diligence of the magistrates ever on the watch for runaways, made it an impossibility to relieve those famishing ones. “Alas these poor.” The emperor was mercifully giving out food and clothing daily to the poor (of the capital), why then employ cruel laws and institute minutest regulations under severe orders to persecute and to kill the poor? This was another cause of grief. Women and girls were crawling away into the wildest deserts; old men and children were falling into the ditches and perishing, and those of robust health were madly bent on joining the robber ranks; and as those who were robbers from choice were far from being exterminated, why should their ranks be swollen by driving innocent and helpless people into them;—the seventh cause of grief.

This memorial, for various reasons, is given as it stands in the history, and we are grateful to the writer for daring to give us a picture of his times. It was the warm outflow of a patriotic soul, justly angry. The emperor sent it to be considered by the high officials, and the result was that Li Yin was transported to *Shangyangpoo*. But he would have fared no better in the slave-holding Christian states of two centuries later, than he did under the absolutist rule of China. The absolutionist school was more safe in Ninguta or Shangyangpoo than in Peking, where justice and right, if advocated long and persistently, will ultimately have their own way, and the banished will be recalled.

Next month after the banishment of censor Li, the vice-president Jao Kaisin prayed for a relaxation of the “Runaway” laws, because of the deplorable state of the immense number of famishing people wandering about. The emperor replied, that

the memorialist desired to buy himself a name by selling imperial mercy; and Kaisin's "honourable" name was degraded five degrees. The slave question was a hard wall to knock one's head against. This punishment seems to have silenced the men who sought reformation; for the subject turns up again only three years after the above events, and in a speech by the emperor himself, who though still very young was master. He mentioned the rumours current about the many ways of deceiving and imposing upon the people,—some falsely pretending to be soldiers in search of runaways; some causelessly accusing men of property of harbouring runaways; some who never were slaves assuming the name of runaway; others pretending to be the owners of these pretended runaways; while some men borrowed money to carry on mercantile business, and fail to repay, declaring that their assistants had robbed them. The emperor, saying that this was enough to make the good man angry, ordered the Board of War to declare his will, that henceforth if an owner missed a slave he must publicly declare the fact, give his own name and that of his runaway slave to the proper magistrate; and if the owner failed to do so within a short period of the flight of the slave, he should not have the slave if he demand him only after a considerable lapse of time, even if the slave appear again in his neighbourhood: also, that if soldiers went among the people annoying them, or if people did so who pretended to be soldiers, the viceroy or governor should seize and punish them sternly wherever they were found; the relations of such extortioners would also be subject to punishment, because they did not exercise their family authority to prevent the evils complained of.

Thus even the emperor bears testimony to the truth of the injustice and universal oppression caused by the working of the slave laws, though he had sentenced to various kinds of punishment the censors and high officials who had freely remonstrated, as the letter and spirit of their office required them to do. The runaway laws gave scope to extortion on a vast scale, as they would do at this moment if in operation. Men pretended to be

runaways, and hid away on the extensive premises of the wealthy; who, in order to avoid the very severe laws against the harbourer, willingly gave the pretended runaway a round sum of money to get him away. It is not necessary to know much of the arbitrary method of dealing out law in China to understand what an inviting field it opened up for the genius of those villains, more common perhaps in China than in the stock-jobbing west, who heartlessly heed not the bitter misery entailed by their falsehoods on the helpless widow and the weak orphan.

The measure now ordained by the emperor was well calculated to check the mass of corruption caused by the laws made by the slave owners, thinking only of their own interests and regardless of the thousand-fold greater evils brought by their selfish carelessness on the whole of China. It is not at all unlikely that had the injustice of those slave acts not been thus early greatly modified, the Chinese would have hurled back the Manchus at an early period of their rule, as they had the Mongols because of their lawless conduct. The same measure was a new starting point for future legislation. Once again does the question crop up later on, when a censor was whipped a hundred lashes, beaten forty blows, and transported 3000 li, because he persisted in saying in private and public, that "the *Toonghai* of the south was a dangerous book, and the robbers of the north run-aways."

Though, however, the "Annals" thus give us a picture of the convulsion of all society by the laws on run-away slaves, we can gather no particulars as to the actual state of the slave nor the legal conditions under which he lived. This gap is however fully filled up by the laws on this social question issued in 1739. These we shall now quote one by one, for thus we shall not only ascertain the legal conditions of slavery, but see how minutely the Manchu laws meet every question on the subject; for my chief purpose in this work is to show the *mind* of the Chinese in practical life. The sections are numbered for easy reference.

1st. Anterior to the thirteenth Yungching (1735), no person

sold to any Bannerman,* by written deed, whether officially stamped or not, could free himself. But in the first of Kienlung (1736), it was ordained that any person purchased by private† written agreement, could redeem himself, his wife and children; but he could not redeem himself if his owner provided him with a wife. If a man had been betrothed, but not married, before he became a slave, he could still marry if the betrothed girl's family were agreeable, but if they objected, he could not compel the marriage.‡

2nd. If the slave of a bannerman borrowed the good offices of another bannerman to act for him as redeemer, or if he redeemed himself immediately, he would be sent back again to his former banner if it was discovered that his surname did not appear on the register of either a banner or the people (Chinese). The slave who secretly amassed wealth and gained power by following his master to a provincial post, and trusting to his acquired power and influence threw over his master, was sent back to be the slave of his owner, even though his name might appear on the register of the people. This was in accordance with a law of fifty-two Kanghi (1713).

If an owner was well pleased with the conduct of a slave, who was the descendant of several generations of slaves, he could manumit him, and enrol him as a free civilian in the office of nearest magistrate; nor could the sons or descendants of the liberating owner ever claim the liberated slave or any of his descendants. If any man falsely declared him to be a free descendant of his own ancestor who was discovered to be a fugitive styling himself a free man; or if the owner of the fugitive, finding such declaring relative to be a man of small property, accused, instead, the man who had employed the

* Not only Manchus but Mongols were Bannermen, as also the Chinese called *Han Kun*, who joined the Manchus before their entry into Peking.

† Every official document is stamped with a large official stamp in red ink, hence every private document is called a "white" one,—the name given here.

‡ This is almost the only case in which one party can renege from a betrothal engagement in China, where engagement is virtual marriage.

fugitive; he who made the false declaration or the false accusation was severely punished.

3rd. In the first Kienlung it was enacted that any soldier thereafter found to have before that date fled from camp, and had prayed to be enrolled on the civil register, must be reported by the proper family to the Board of Punishment; which would judge the case according to law, and restore the man to his owner. The Dsoling* who neglected to examine, and the magistrate who carelessly enrolled the name on the register, were also found guilty of crime.

4th. The descendants of slaves formerly owned in Liaotung, where the register was left; or the man who had connected himself and his lands to any of the banners, even though it should be afterwards difficult to trace the written proof of their dependence on the banner, should yet be considered under that banner, and have their names enrolled on the banner *Dang*† or register; and no such person could be permitted to enrol themselves as civilians. This law seems to be mainly intended to retain a sufficient number of men for the army.

5th. Any person purchased by bannermen by private written agreement since first Kienlung, who had not been enrolled in the able-bodied-men's list, could redeem himself and become a free civilian. But private written agreements before that period, as much incapacitated the slave from purchasing his freedom as officially stamped agreements. These slaves had all their life to serve their owner as farmer, soldier, or body-servant. But for faithful service, an owner might manumit the third generation of such slaves, whether an individual or all the descendants of one grandfather bearing his surname. Such manumission had to be reported to the Board of Revenue (or of Families, as it is really

* Dsoling is a Manchu and military officer, chief of a small clan (see *History and Army*); the magistrate is a civilian and the judge of the district.

† The *Dang* here and throughout translated "register" was originally a tablet of iron, on which, at the time of acquisition, the surname and name of the slave were enrolled, with the terms of acquisition and the name of the security. The tablets were afterwards made of wood, hence the name *Dang*. There was and continues to be one in the house of each *Ding* or head of a family.

named); those liberated also required to have their names enrolled on the civilian list of the district magistrate. They could thereafter till the ground, become soldiers or engage in trade, but they could not enter the examination halls for literary degrees.

6th. Any person connected with the stage, playing or strolling companies of any province, or any of the people following such persons, might, if they desired, and after examination as to their nativity, return to a better mode of life. But if such applicant was of a vicious character, he should not be permitted to change, but be put to shame by the magistrate; and if the district magistrate was unable to enforce the law against him, the viceroy or governor should be appealed to, and judge him according to law. This law is retained in its original position and form, to show Chinese opinion of the stage, of which they are so fond. It is forbidden players or their children, and the children of harlots, to compete in the literary examinations.

7th. The descendants of a man, who, when purchased as a slave, was in reality a free man,* could be treated by the law of the "Three Generations" (5); the grandsons could be set free, on information being given to the Board of Revenue.

8th. If a garrison bannerman found the native of the place purchased by him as a slave, really unsuitable for his purpose, he might grant the slave permission to redeem himself.

9th. Every banner slave liberated, who did not enroll his name on the civilian register, or who enrolled it only since the first Kienlung, had to be enrolled as a retainer† of his original master, under the master's banner; and all who found means to redeem themselves were still the retainers of their former owner.

If a man dropped a legal suit which he instituted against another charging him with being his runaway slave, the case could never be revived; and if during the progress of the case, the accused or his friends found means to redeem him, he still

*This could take place by the seller falsely calling him his own slave, and the purchaser taking forcible possession of him.

† This, it is evident, is for statistical, not for social purposes.

continued enrolled a retainer of the Dsoling of his original owner. The man who was redeemed by a bannerman was enrolled a retainer of the Dsoling of this redeemer. If this redeemer was a man who was not the head of a family, and had not a register of his own, the redeemed continued enrolled a nominal retainer of the Dsoling of his former owner.

10th. If a bannerman's family was broken up (became extinct), and his slaves had no clan relations to whom to go, they continued to be the retainers of the Dsoling of their master, whether they had been long in the family or a recent purchase. The able-bodied young men among the families who kept the tombs of the bannermen, could become public servants, but whether as infantry, body-servants or messengers, they always remained under their proper Dsoling. But if among those slaves were any purchased by private written agreement since first Kienlung, they might redeem themselves, the redemption money, with the wealth and property of the extinct family, entering the public treasury.

11th. No slave granted by the emperor to any official or soldier, in any province, could redeem himself; nor was his new owner permitted to sell him to any bannerman beyond the limits of his own district. If he had to sell this slave, he had to consult the district magistrate, and sell him to a bannerman in that district. If any one so sold escaped and became a robber or other vicious character, the man who bought him was responsible and taken to account; the man who sold him was blameless. If such slave was sold to a civilian, or to a bannerman beyond that district,* the seller was beaten one hundred blows, and the price confiscated.

12th. If the widow of a slave was given in marriage to another family, or to the slave of another family, her children by her former husband accompanied her to her new home, and remained with her till manhood, when the sons were bound to return to their father's owner. But if mother and sons objected

* This is doubtless the case of men sentenced to slavery; and the law is intended as a check against any transfer of the "slave," and as a means of ensuring his "imprisonment with hard labour."

to the parting, they could remain together, if both families were agreeable, but the sons would still be regarded the property of their father's owner.

If the children or younger brothers of the widow of a Chinaman followed her to the home of the bannerman, who was her second husband, the names of these sons or brothers could not be enrolled on the bannerman's family register, but had to be enrolled on a separate register kept for themselves. They had also, as well as the children of a slave widow marrying into another family, to be publicly acknowledged as of this second family. If either of those widows married a third time in a third family, the Dsoling had to report the case to the Foodootoong; and in the year of *Bienshun*, or census (every fifth year), the case had to be properly reported to the Board of Revenue. If one who was, when a child, thus given to another family, whether bannerman or Chinese, having a family register, desired to return to his original home, he might do so provided both families consented, and became security for him to the Dsoling.

13th. Whatever Chinese boy was given in the above manner to a banner family, was as much a retainer or slave of the latter, as if originally of the family.

14th. If any follower of a bannerman, already freed and duly reported free, found it impossible to ascertain whether he should be enrolled on a banner register or on that of a civilian, a separate register had to be used for himself. He might, if he so chose, enroll himself as a civilian, provided he was guilty of no crime. The man who redeemed himself with money (1, 5, 9, and 10), and privately had himself enrolled on the civilian register,—or the son or younger brother (12) brought up in a bannerman's family, who pretended to be a free man, and got himself enrolled on the register of his civilian clan, was punished according to the law against those who failed to give an official report of themselves (see *Taxation*), and then enrolled on the people's register. The man who under a false name became security to the purchaser of one who had secretly fled from

his banner owner; and the man who had enrolled himself, with his lands, under a banner for protection, but afterwards changed the surname of his sons or grandsons, and enrolled them on the civilian register, were punished according to law, and the individuals in each case restored to their original owners. The slave who, by his ability, gained influence and power in the army, and who therefore treated with insolence and contempt the widow and orphan, his weak but legal owners, and declared himself to be of the (Chinese) "people,"—was sentenced to refund the original sum paid for him to his owner, and to become the slave of a Tatar general or other high official in an outer region. This last clause was, doubtless, because he would continue to treat with contempt his weak owners if sent to them.

15th. If a bannerman purchased, by private deed, a slave whom he was unable to support; or if the slave had performed good service, the slave in either case might free himself. But if the owner did not wish the slave to redeem himself, whether because the slave was a fighter, a drunkard, or guilty of some crime, or had attempted to escape, the slave was, at law, in all respects similar to the slave sold under an officially stamped deed. The slave who attained to power in the army, and sought to compel his owner to free him, was dealt with according to law—(see 14).

16th. If any who had fled (for protection) to enroll themselves under one of the banners, or if any who had been purchased by deed before first Kienlung, proved to belong to a "Kitchen-Family,"—*Dsaohoo*,*—he was freed and sent to his *Dsao*, as soon as the magistrate had sufficiently clear evidence of his

* *Dsaohoo* or "Kitchen-Family," Dr. Williams translates house or "householder"; and the name might be supposed to suggest such an interpretation. But this leaves our law unintelligible. *Dsaohoo* is the name given to a definite number of families, whose duty it is to supply the imperial "Kitchen" with salt, &c., whence they are sometimes called *Yen Dsaohoo*. They are Chinese; but a clan carefully kept apart from the general population. They are subject to no other tax than the imperial "Kitchen" salt, and cannot be sold as slaves. They are most common about Fungzunhien in Chihli, and are forbidden to go beyond the limits of Chihli. It is said that all imperial wants are thus supplied by special districts over the empire.

identity. He who sold such a *Dsaohoo* man was subject to three months' *cangue*, the security at the sale to two months', and each beaten forty blows. But if any man, sold as a slave, pretended falsely to belong to a *Dsaohoo*, he was beaten a hundred blows, and sent back to his owner.

17th. Whoever picked up on the road or village or in a house, the child of a free man, and did not report the child to the nearest magistrate, but sold the child to be a slave, was beaten a hundred blows and banished three years; if he sold it to become a wife, concubine, or to be adopted by the purchaser, he was beaten ninety blows and banished two and a half years. The penalty was similar, though the child should turn out to be that of a slave. The child in either case was not involved, but restored to its natural guardians.

Whoever harboured and sold as a slave a runaway boy or girl, was beaten ninety blows and banished two and a half years; if he sold the child to become a wife, concubine, or to be adopted, he was beaten eighty blows and banished two years. The crime and penalty were similar though the child was that of a slave.

If the purchaser and security could be proved to have known that the child was stolen or a runaway, they were subject to the same penalties as the seller, and the purchase money was confiscated. But if they were not proved to have known the truth, they were guiltless and the purchaser had his purchase money restored him.

18th. If a man falsely pretended to be the owner of a free person and sold him or her as a slave, he was beaten a hundred blows and transported three years; if sold to be a wife, concubine, or for adoption, he was sentenced to ninety blows and two and a half years banishment. The man who sold as his son the slave of another, was beaten a hundred blows.

19th. If a student was found with one or several *aliases* at the literary examinations, or if he borrowed the name of another man and under such feigned name entered as a competitor for a literary degree, he was judged by the law against personation, and beaten eighty blows; and the graduate who was his security, if he knew the truth, suffered the same penalty.

20th. Any student found assuming a false name at the Peking literary examinations, was sentenced with his graduate security to eighty blows, while the graduate lost his degree, his graduate's robe and button. If the district magistrate and the teacher of the student failed to honestly investigate the case, or placed impediments in the way of discovery, they were punished; and if they had been proved to have received bribes, their punishment was all the more severe.

In connection with this careful exclusion of slaves or their descendants from the literary gate which leads to the pleasure-grounds of Chinese officialdom, we may relate the following incident which occurred in the reign of Kanghi (in 1713 A.D.).

A slave surnamed Jow, by his talent, pushed himself up from an infantry private to be an infantry officer. He had a son more talented than himself and so excellent a scholar that his father adopted a plan of passing him off under the surname of *Ho*, with a family of which surname he was on friendly terms. Under this surname the youth successfully grappled away his degree. The Board of Punishment discovered and reported the case to the emperor, who expressed his indignation that the literary examination hall should have been polluted by the presence of a slave, and ordered both father and son to instant execution. But in spite of the risks incurred, the plan has been and is frequently and successfully carried out. It may be here stated that the son of the veriest beggar, of the poorest of the poor, is permitted to become a literary graduate and magistrate. Not a small proportion of the famous officials of China have been and are the sons of men who had to work hard for a living, and were unable to support their promising sons as pupils. The late talented and universally respected Wun Siang was one of these. But the son of a slave, a detective, a jailor, a harlot, a player, a butcher, however wealthy, is inexorably shut out from the hall, and cannot become a graduate except by personation.

We have given the laws of the beginning of Kienlung entire, which are still binding, so that a complete picture may appear of the legal conditions under which the numerous slaves lived and live.

And in reading them over, we see a considerable relaxation of the iron chains, and find a political atmosphere less clouded with official bitterness than in the earlier period of Manchu occupation of China. From a perusal of those laws, we find that there were many kinds of slaves whom the law compelled their owners to retain as slaves; for only to the third generation of well-doing slaves (2, 4 and 5), or to the faithful slave bought by private deed (1, 5) since the first of Kienlung (1736), could the owner give permission to purchase his freedom. But we learn that he could sell to any other master, though he could not manumit.

The only important addition which personal observation and investigation have enabled me to make to the above is, that in Manchuria, where slaves are most common, it has never been permitted an owner to sell single individuals of a family. He must sell the whole family, or none at all. It sometimes happens (see 5) that several families, all descended from one ancestor, are sold together. Practice and custom enforce this custom rather than the sale of an individual family even though entire. Never has it been known that a family was broken up by the slave owner and sold individually (see 12). And however severe the laws against runaways, their application is not to be compared in severity to that of Christian peoples.

There are myriads of families in the vicinity of Mookden, the descendants of slaves of two centuries ago, who are known by themselves and their neighbours to be the legal slaves of men living; but are in reality free. Lapse of time, and the absence for generations of their owners in Peking or other parts of China, have made it impossible for their masters to prove any claim against them. A large proportion of the soldiers and runners of the city of Mookden is composed of these men; and even a larger number are the wealthy owners of the lands left in charge of their slave-ancestor. It is unnecessary to say that these can compete in the literary examinations, and become an official, civil or military. All the descendants of the slaves of the first Manchu princes—though known to be such, and though still nominally the slaves of the lineal

descendants of those princes, who are always resident in Peking—are to all purposes free men, for they are entitled to compete in the literary examinations.

As a rule, slaves in Manchuria have been long separated from their owners, who have been for generations court attaches of some kind. While many of the owners have gradually been reduced to poverty, many of their slaves have risen to wealth on and by the property of their owners; often selling the whole or a part of the lands entrusted to their slave forefathers by the men who entered Peking with or after the first emperor. The owners have, however, been so long away, that generally they cannot prove their claim to either the lands, houses, or slaves; for their claim is invalid without documentary evidence, which evidence has been lost. There are instances of slaves becoming wealthy in the absence of their owners, and carefully concealing the amount or possession of wealth; then when their owners, ignorant of the truth, appear, and are glad to realise even a small portion of the money made out of their own property, the slave is able to pay a good round sum for his freedom to him who claims his services. The slave generally, as a matter of course, remits a certain sum, but nothing like what he should; for if, like the vine-dressers, he remitted nothing, he knows well enough he would be brought to task. The property of a slave legally belongs to the owner of the slave; but the spirit of the above laws of Kienlung, which in certain instances permitted a slave to redeem himself, can only mean that the slave is permitted to enjoy at least a considerable portion of what he can acquire by his abilities; and in practice this is all but universal, indeed we have never heard of any exception. But though he may become wealthy he is a slave still, and subject to the whims or avarice of his owner; nor can he free himself except with the full consent and on the terms of his owner, which terms vary with the known position and wealth of the slave, and with the character of the owner. A wealthy owner, as a rule, never grants freedom to his slaves.

Even the wealthy slave—living in splendid style, and com-

manding whatever money can purchase—is despised, and held at arm's length by his poorest free neighbours, who willingly enough labour for him at the ordinary wage, but will not accept his friendship on any terms; for the slave is considered, and has doubtless given reason sufficient for the belief that he is, a degraded member of humanity.

Large numbers of the slaves now in Manchuria are in reality cottars, who cultivate the grounds of their absent lords—each family on its own croft or small farm. They remit to the landlord a certain portion of the produce of the harvest; less, however, than the rental paid by any British farmer to his landlord. This kind of slavery can be understood. There are large numbers more actually slaves, but doing nothing for and giving nothing to their owners; for they are soldiers or Yamun runners. They are bound to serve, but their service is scarcely sufficient to support themselves and their families. If they gain higher and more lucrative office, they may become a source of gain to their owner. Others may be attached as body servants to their owners; but these are comparatively few. Though therefore the owner is absolute lord of his slave, the actual condition of the latter differs from that of ordinary men of the same occupation and rank only in that the slave and his posterity are debarred the way to civil office; for military office is, as we have seen in the laws, open to him. Cruelties such as have occurred in Christian countries are unknown; for the slave, though he may be bought and sold, is still regarded as a man, and not as a thing or a mere animal.

We have seen many men still in bonds the descendants of two centuries of slavery, but there was nothing to distinguish them from other people. From one slave-holding family we know, a score of slaves have fled to freedom for every one still remaining, and the remainder would have no very great obstacles placed in the way of their flight. These were of course domestic retainers; for slaves on farms find it both inconvenient and undesirable to flee.

Both men and women are bought as slaves now, to whom the

above laws apply. But when ordinary families purchase slaves it is generally in order to keep the family tombs, and to live on the grounds connected with the tombs; and these grounds are the price paid. The man sells himself a slave for ever to live on the grounds, and to keep the tombs in repair; the family gives him the full and free use of the grounds connected with the tombs for the same period. His rental consists in the work of looking after the tombs, which, in China at the present time, is all but a sinecure.

But magistrates and officials of all ranks buy young men and women, about fourteen or fifteen, to act as their body servants. They pay various prices; the ordinary sum for a young adult being between £20 and £30 stg. These slaves they intermarry, and the children of such marriages belong to the owner of the parents. Roman Catholics also frequently purchase children for a small sum, by which purchase the children become absolutely theirs; and from this purchase has arisen a very large proportion of the bitter enmity against them among the Chinese. While, therefore, the Romanists in desiring to secure converts are to be commended in their efforts to save the life of children, who might otherwise be possibly permitted to die, it were well that they should desist from this purchase, which was and is the ground of the belief very general amongst the Chinese, that the Romish missionaries have evil designs upon the children.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX.

I.

SARHOO (p. 27-29)

SARHOO is the name of the hill and village which was the scene of the most important battle fought by the present dynasty for its liberty, ere it began to fight for the Dragon throne, and is the place whence the defensive warfare of the Manchus turned into the offensive against the Ming dynasty, and for a richer empire than could be founded among the glens and on the mountain sides of Manchuria. Though therefore the locality is fairly denoted on maps, a detailed description of its position, both as regards Hingking and Mookden, may be of some interest.

Starting westwards from Hingking, leaving behind the barrack-crowded *Yoongling*, the tombs of four ancestors of Noorhachu, and passing on the south side of Hinggoong palace, we cross the small pass which shuts in the west end of the valley of Hotooala. The mountains here and all the way westwards to Sarhoo are beautifully wooded, for the glens are narrow and the villages few. We there pass one enormous elm, which cannot be less than twenty feet in circumference, whose branches would form good sized trees. The Soodsu river, which we have to cross very frequently on our north-western route, has become as large a river as either the Jiaho or Jienchang branch of the Taidisu. We cross it beyond *Homoo* village, and on its western bank ascend *Homoo* pass three hundred feet high, on a well cut road and among well wooded mountains. At the foot of this *ling* we cross it again to go through an avenue of splendid old elms to *Moochi*, a large village 45 li from the old capital with at least one good inn.

Leaving this village, we have again to cross the Soodsu, passing by the hamlet of *Shwishow poodsu*, nestling under the shade of a steep hill, covered with great trees, and facing the river looking east upon it. It is one of those peace-inspiring spots on which memory delights to linger.

Our northern road leads through a narrow and difficult gorge, at the foot of which is the hamlet of Sandaogwan,—the third customs barrier, the other two being on the lings between us and Yoongling. We soon get to the top of another pretty pass three hundred feet high. On the top of this ling is a splendid black marble slab, on which is beautifully engraved in large Manchu letters the name of the ling, *Mardwun Foordan*. Foordan is a “*gwan*” or “customs barrier,” but the first word is not in the Manchu dictionary, the nearest approach to it meaning to “oppose,” “reject.” Possibly an unnoted battle was fought here in the days of Manchu infancy, when the “five passes” were conquered from the chief, who is a robber because he was defeated. Just before arriving at the top we pass on our right a remarkably perpendicular hill called *Hada* or “the stone.” It rises so perfectly straight up, with unbroken face free from crevices, that not a particle of green appears on any of its sides, but its top is crowned with a cluster of trees. Its singularity is all the more striking from the rich green foliage covering all around. These hills have received the name of *Chingloongshan*,—“the pure Dragon mountains,”—because their shadow was cast on the birth-place of the occupant of the Dragon throne. This neighbourhood is delightfully wooded. Many wild fruit trees in blossom were shedding their flowers and scattering their fragrance all around. But the place is a commentary on the Chinese proverb,—“Trees many, men few.” Descending westwards to the inn near the foot of ling, we spend the night, and next morning pass through the narrowest gully yet seen on the road, which goes north, north-west, west, south, and west, when it widens somewhat into a glen. This gully of Wooloong is not only so narrow that it would be difficult for two men to walk abreast, but its sides are like walls of solid rock. Here a

hundred men could stop an army. The small stream from this gully flows westwards for nine miles before we come upon the Soodsu, now grown a considerable river, having been largely reinforced since we parted among the valleys on its course.

Two miles further on we ascend *Goolow ling* two hundred feet high and sixteen hundred feet above the sea,—the exact level of Mardwun inn. Another small ling and two narrow glens intervene before we come upon the eastern and most precipitous side of the hill of SARHOO. This hill is here fully two hundred and fifty feet high. On its southern exposure is a small yellow tiled house, enclosing a handsome slab of bluish-black marble, eight feet square and fully one foot thick. One side is covered with beautifully cut Manchu letters containing a long and detailed account of the battle fought on the hill,—a part of the Chinese army being posted without doubt on the spot where this monument stands. The other side is covered with a translation in Chinese equally well cut. It was engraved in the forty-first year of Kienlung and is as fresh as when first cut. This is because of the enclosure, to look after which a man of the village 2 li to the west is paid about thirty shillings a year; and the manner in which the monument is kept, is in exact accordance with the amount of the salary.

The dry bed of a stream winds close in by the base of the hill all along its southern side beyond the village, and turns north at the west end of the hill falling into the Soodsu. The fairly wide valley to the south of the hill is very gravelly and destitute of soil. On the evening when the Manchus came in hot haste along our route and took up their position at sundown in this valley beyond the stream and opposite to the Chinese army which was posted on the south and south-west slopes of this hill, they found a forest of willow trees to cover them, and the stream ran bubbling by in its purity and innocence on its sandy bed; but ere midnight had come, Chinese blood made it a stream of gore. The Chinese soldiers were well posted, and fought as brave soldiers alone can fight; but never was the superiority of generalship over mere bravery made more apparent

than in the battle which saved Hingking from annihilation and made a future march on Peking possible. Had Noorhachu been merely a brave fighter, that Chinese army could have eaten up himself and his men, and his name would have been known in Chinese history only as a mountain robber who had dared to raise his hand against the heaven-ordained emperor of the world.

Through the village of two thousand people we go eastwards between two pawn shops and turn north by a high road rising so gradually over the loess ground that the hundred feet elevation gained in the mile walk is attained imperceptibly. Any number of men and horse could march up and down there as on level ground. The ground reached is a wide and level plateau of rich loess, stretching southwards to that hill of Sarhoo which we passed and the top of which is higher than our gradually rising plateau. Ascending a grass-covered bank, which looks like a natural elevation to another plateau, we find it to be the remains of an old wall. And here was the fourth Manchu capital, the large city of Sarhoo;—a fact of which the natives, Manchu and Chinese, on the spot and all the way to Hingking, were ignorant. And such is glory! The descendants of the men who fought on both sides with the most desperate fury, living peaceably on the very battle field, entirely ignorant and as careless as ignorant of the fact!

Like the wall of Hingking, this much larger wall follows the outer edge of the plateau, enclosing sufficient to make a very large city. The west side of the plateau is the only one which is of any height, the others sloping gently down to the level valley. The plateau itself is however higher than Hingking by twenty feet. The east wall is only about 2 li north to south. It then winds to the north-west corner for about 7 li. It disappears below the western ridge for a li, then reappears going south, east, south, and again east to join the east wall. In the wall are numerous gates.

The north-west corner of the plateau, like its south-east corner, was higher than the east wall. In that north-west corner had been the palace, and having seen the entirely ruinous condition

of this newer city, we at once, without hesitation, concluded that the palace west of Hingking, in fairly good condition, could never have seen Taidsoo's (Noorhachu) day, but that, as the name—Travelling Palace—imports, it had been built after the Manchus had gained Peking, and was intended to "rest" the emperor when going to sacrifice to his ancestors at Yoongling.

The soil at the east and west sides inside these old walls gradually slopes down to the centre of this old city, in the hollow of which are the beds of two streams flowing, one north and one north-west, into the Soodsu, which is seen six or seven miles east of the city making its way northwards, then westwards, sweeping by the southern base of the grandly rugged, precipitous, serrate, and bare *Tiebaoshan*, double the height of Sarhoo shan and north-east of it. On *Tiebaoshan* was the city of *Jiefan*, being built before the battle of Sarhoo; and the headstrong, impetuous Fourth Beira, must have galloped northwards to the aid of his city and his four hundred men, round by the east of Sarhoo, thus completely avoiding the Sarhoo Chinese army, and he either kept the Jiefan army in check and prevented them crossing the ford, or he himself crossed northwards and acted offensively. But as he had only a thousand men, he must have been compelled in spite of his daring to remain on the defensive till his father had carried Sarhoo hill, drove the Chinese into the river, and in the flush of victory swept the Jiefan army clean before him.

The Soodsu disappears to the west and falls into the larger branch of the Hwun, seen flowing from beyond the Jiefan hills. The Hwun proper rises in *Funshwiling*, 80 li east of Hingking, making a wide detour northwards to receive numerous streams from the glens which it passes;—one very large stream, rising to the north of Yoongling mountain, falls into it at *Bajiadsu*. Thence it winds its south-west course to the point of junction with the Soodsu, then south, south-west past Mookden, south-west receiving the Taidso and joining the Outer Liao to form the Liao river. The Hwun, west of Sarhoo, washes the eastern base of a line of mountains, and it is almost certain that Doosoong

crossed the river by the ford now in use, south-west of Sarhoo, which an ordinary fall of rain makes impassable.

Doosoong's plan was a good and a bold one, had he possessed the prudence, which was as requisite in marching against an unknown enemy, as the bravery which he undoubtedly displayed. He set twenty thousand men to invest and take Jiefan city, which, though on a difficult mountain, should be carried by assault, as it had only four hundred men, and was an unfinished fortification. He would thus have none to pester his rear as he marched in through the narrow glens upon Hingking, for he had no conception of the possibility of the mountain robber daring to forestall and attack him. His post on the side of Sarhoo hill, where he camped his thirty thousand to await the fall of Jiefan, was also well chosen; but he was apparently unprovided with scouts; and his army would not have been broken up so easily, had he good discipline and order inside his strong camp.

Not a house exists on the plateau, all the land being cultivated by men living in the village of Sarhoo, or others in the village of *Chungjuhoo*, "Behind-the-city." These prosaic sons of the soil have often come across iron and brass arrow-heads, swords of various descriptions and sizes, old guns, spears, &c., all of which they sold to the smith, as old iron, for a penny per lb! Though we offered good prices, not an article was forthcoming.

The road by which Doosoong marched eastwards was probably that by which we go through the wide, fertile loess valley, between Sarhoo and the Hwun, past several villages and through an avenue of very ancient willows, which might have seen the march past of Doosoong's army. The trunks of the trees are broken off about ten feet above the ground, whence jut out young branches. In one of them a pair of black-throated crows, with white neck and breast, of the size, flight, and walk of the jackdaw, had their nest, entering by a hole in the side of the old trunk, once the socket of a branch.

On the north side of the river, which after a long, dry spring, was easily forded in its half-mile wide bed, we pass some villages and see a fine stream coming from the south-west valley, leading

up to a narrow opening in low, precipitous mountains, on the south south-west. The valleys become wider, the mountains lower and less frequent the further we advance to the west. We got to one hamlet, *Duagoo*, and rested in an inn, in which a patriarchal great-grandfather was hopping about as actively as if his great-grandson had been his youngest son. The hamlet is composed of his family, some of whom have opened the inn, while others till the neighbouring grounds. We were astonished to hear the twitter and love-song of several swallows; and looking up saw many swallows flying into, out of and around, their nests among the naked rafters,—coming in and going out by the open window or door at pleasure.

Further west is the pretty village of *Hiajangla*, after crossing a fine stream from the north-east, flowing through a wide surface of fine dry, unproductive sand, from which the strong south wind drove into the cart light dust and gravel, into mouth, eyes, and nostrils. We leave the north-west road, apparently leading to Tieling, and turn westwards along the north of the river, past *Hiajangla*, and round a large pool at the base of a small but precipitous hill, where the *Hwun* tries for a passage which does not exist, and has to flow backwards again.

We pass one ling, through widening valleys, by several villages, to the city of *Fooshwun*, whence *Doosong* issued with such haste to meet his fate at Sarhoo. East of the city is a bank, which is apparently the remains of the old barrier between Chinese and Manchu land. The fine valleys to the east of it are at this day occupied by Manchus. There is a small isolated hill north of the city, facing the mountains which trend westwards, on which is a tower or “*Ta*,” said to have been built by the Tang dyasty; for recent dynasties do not build such towers. It would require very strong evidence indeed to believe that this or any other *Ta* is over twelve hundred years old. A temple to *Poosa* reposes on the south side of *Gaorshan*.

The modern city, which has certainly been rebuilt by the present dynasty, is one li square, beautifully situated, but of a deserted appearance; the villages outside being much more

populous. To the west, the valley becomes from three to four miles wide; the road being a mile from the northern mountains and another from the Hwun, which flows westwards at an equal distance from the low southern hills. The hills on both sides are low and narrow; not so the Hwun, which not only occupies a very wide bed, but ruins thousands of acres by the fine sand, blown off its bed all around. We pass a large pool stocked with small tortoises, over which a diverging branch of the Hwun flows after heavy rains.

After passing through a half mile of willows, elms, thorns, and many a tangled bush and flowering shrub, we come suddenly upon a branch of the Hwun, which has struck out from the main current in a north-west direction, and rushes with rapid flow against the southern side of the hill on which is FOOLING, "The Happy Tomb," in which lies buried Noorhachu, the founder of the reigning dynasty. The river then strikes off the brick wall erected to save the hill from its destructive attack, and flows south-west to rejoin the main river. This branch is unfordable after a heavy rain, and carts have to make a long detour round the north side of Fooling. After crossing this river, we are inside the forest of many miles circumference which surrounds the Fooling; and it is most delightfully soothing, after that eastern choking and blinding dust, to walk under the mottled and changing shade of these old trees. A slab of stone—fifteen feet high and three feet wide—attracts the eye at a distance, seen through the spaces between the trunks of the trees. It is engraved on its north and south faces in five languages—Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, *Jamooji*, and Chinese. The inscription orders "All below the rank of *wang* or 'king,' official or other man to dismount here." This is a much more important and imposing tomb than Yoongling. But the two thousand men paid to look after it, do little more than go by fifties to the gate; for the only work we saw being done, was the clearance of withered branches for firewood. Dilapidated walls, ruined walks, and rank weeds were allowed to look after themselves; and the "deers' horn" fence, twelve

miles round, is disappearing gradually under the influence of the seasons. The south gate, with its imperial yellow tiled roof, presents a very imposing appearance from a great distance, as it is seen cropping up above the old cedar trees. The wall on each side is emblazoned with an enormous dragon, done in green glazed brick-work. There are cross paths inside laid with stone flags; but the real tomb is a very modest building, as well as the small houses to the south, where the great officials go when sacrificing. But the rest of the enclosed space of ground is as disorderly as the outside, though crowded with magnificent cedars.

From Fooling village, in a cloud of dust, sand, and small gravel, enabling one to realise the importance of such a cloud on the day of battle, seven miles west-south-west bring us to the east gate of Mookden; in all, 270 li from Hingking and 158 li from Sarhoo. Mookden is fully eight miles further north than Hingking, and is west-south-west of Sarhoo. The country west of Sarhoo is much more open than that between Sarhoo and Hingking.

II.

HINGKING.

TRAVELLING eastwards for two hundred and seventy li, or ninety miles, by a zigzag road* from Mookden, brings the traveller to the valley of *Hotooala*, though this name is now unknown to its own inhabitants. The valley runs east and south-east, and is widest at its east end. From east to west it is over seven miles long, and about two wide at its east end. It is far the largest valley among these mountains; those east, south, and north of it, being extremely narrow, mostly forming little more than a bed for a stream of water between two lines of hills. We can, therefore, at once understand the importance of the valley for strategical purposes. Enclosing it on the west are mountains running south-west and west. In this west end there is an entrance to the valley by a narrow but low *ling* or pass, which is called the "First Customs' Pass." About two miles east of this is the Hinggoong Palace, believed by the natives to have been built by the first emperor or founder of the Manchu dynasty. This belief, however, is one which is wholly unfounded. The palace consists of nine small detached yellow-tiled houses, facing all directions, and containing eighty-one *jien* or rooms. The whole is enclosed by a wall two or three hundred feet square, and looks much in need of repair.

Two miles further east is the large village of Yoongling, crowded with soldiery to the number of two thousand. North of the village is a wide extent of a thick tangled wilderness of green branches, delightfully grateful to the eye, coming from the southern hills bared of wood by the prodigal cottars. These

* See Appendix I. The distance in a direct east and west line is 210 li; but Mookden is 24 li or 8 miles further north than Hingking is. The distances were carefully noted in going over the ground, and the directions marked at every turn, by a capital compound instrument, aneroid and pocket compasses, by "Mathieson, Edinburgh."

trees, principally ancient elms, crowd each other all the way up to and on the summit of a hill which forms the Tombs of the Four Ascending Ancestors of Noorhachu. Round the foot of the hill, traversing a circumference of fully twelve miles, is that fence of wood in the form of a St. Andrew's Cross, piercing a strong central beam, and called the "Deers'-horn fence." But this has rotted away under the influences of a hundred summers and winters. It is in many places broken down, and in more, ready to crumble at a touch. There are sacrifices paid to these four ancestors at new and full moon, as at the Mookden tombs. To the south of Yoongling is the mountain of *Yentoong*, so-called certainly not from any resemblance to a chimney, unless the resemblance be found in the fact that it crops out above the neighbouring and surrounding hills. It is remarkable only for the magnificent green of its crowded forest, access to which is forbidden to any but men of Manchu blood. It is said to contain gold.

Along the north side of the widening valley we go for three miles eastwards, and cross the *Jiaho*, coming from the north-east. Another half mile brings us to the ancient southern gate leading into Hingking, the first important capital of the young Manchu power. This very old gateway, as well as the east and north gates, are built of stone and lime, and are, apparently, the same gates built nearly three centuries ago by Noorhachu. The original city is 1 li square, and its wall follows the irregular edge of the top of the low detached hill on which it is built. This small hill is eighty feet above the plain at the south gate, and rises inside to a hundred feet; and fully fourteen hundred feet above the sea. It is detached by a short space from the much higher range of hills from the north-east, of which it forms the southern extremity. The hill inside the city divides into two unequal hollows, formed by three ridges. A wall runs along each outer ledge, and the central ridge is in the centre of the city. Towards the north of the city the ridges re-unite and the hollows disappear.

Of what the irregular wall was originally built it is difficult

to say ; for we have seen the ruins of many cities built about the same time, whose walls can be known to have been built of brick, only from the quantity of fallen brick lying around. A wooden fence thickly set, and about six feet high, is the only wall on the face of the steeper sides of the hill. The earthen ramparts forming the remainder are supported by bricks and stone, which are probably a portion of the original wall. For, surrounded as he was by swarming and watchful foes, it is not likely that Noorhachu would have trusted himself to mere earthworks. He had, besides, moved his "capital" from Laochung, 5 li south in the open plain, to the hill, it being more than likely that Laochung was walled with mud walls. Greater power and increasing fame created a wider circle of more powerful enemies, against whom it was necessary to build a stronger citadel ; hence the origin of Hingking. Hence, too, we infer that the walls first built were in keeping with the stone-built gateways,—but of brick, or layers of stone on layers of brick. The present gates are of a similarly feeble character with the walls, being composed of thin pine-boards nailed on stronger beams, but such as a smith could knock in with a blow of his big hammer. The whole wall is in a state of disrepair and decrepitude, exactly in keeping with all the other ancient vestiges of the rise of the Manchu dynasty.

At the foot of the hill is a sunk cart-track, with a pretty high earthen bank on its outer side. This appears to have been a moat, the earth dug out of which would have formed a low wall on its outside. One foot high of an earthen wall on the inner side of the track, would seem to lend colouring to the inference. But the rains of two centuries have washed back into the moat most of the earth, and it is now a good cart road, except when it is flooded by heavy rains, when it becomes a rapid torrent. The city is surrounded by fine old elms ; and the May air was laden with the fragrance of the snow-white blossom of the "sugar" or "sweet" pear,—a wild variety, growing on the walls.

Fully 2 li or nearly 1 mile beyond the existing wall, is the three feet high remaining portion of a long wall, drawn at a

similar distance all round the city. It runs in a circle of a mile diameter all round over the mountain on the north-east, and on the plain below. The late Consul Meadows, of Newchwang, a man of undoubted talents, seems to have mixed up his notes on this outer wall with those on the wall of the city proper, predicating of the latter what is true only of the former; and Dr. Williamson * makes the mistake still greater by inserting the word "northern," stating that the city is built on the "northern," whereas it is built on the southern extremity of the range. This outer wall was built in 1603, five years after the city proper was erected. And it was inside its shelter that sixty thousand Manchus waited with terror the approach of a quarter of million of Chinese soldiers.

Hills with no visible opening, range upon range, throw their protecting arms towards "Hingking," the "Capital of Prosperity." On the east, north, north-east, and north-west, the Hotooala valley lies nearly two miles wide, from the gate to the hills on the south, and several miles east and west; and the only visible proof that there is an outlet among the mountains to the south and west, is the beautiful river Soodsu, flowing westwards south of the city. Hence the *Doonghwaloo* states that Noorhachu "built a capital in the valley of Hotooala, in the land between Jiaho and Sookoocho rivers." The present city is a contrast to the crowded streets of ancient times; for there are, according to Mr Meadows' estimate, only two thousand inhabitants. The people there reckon their number at four thousand, but this includes a few neighbouring hamlets. The valley is very fertile, the most of the soil being rich loess, supporting many villages, and certainly a dozen of thousands of inhabitants. There are two magistrates in the city: a district magistrate who is a Chinaman, to whom cases are appealed by a Chinaman, whether the defendant be Chinese or Manchu,—and a superior military Manchu official, who has charge of the city, and who is the judge of all cases in which a Manchu is pursuer. As the Manchus, though barely if at all a majority, are principally soldiers, and

* Journeys in North China, II. 88.

all hangers on of the government, the Chinese are here, more than elsewhere, conspicuously and ignominiously the subject race.

Fourteen years before we passed through in 1875, a band of five hundred well trained robbers, under a Shantung Mahomedan, burst upon Hingking from the north, seized the city, killed the magistrate Liw in his Yamun, pillaged all they thought of value, and deserted the city again before the commandant at Yoongling had courage and men ready to attack them. But at that time robbers were in reality masters of Liaotung. The general of Manchuria hearing of the capture of the cradle of the dynasty, which was under his care, tore the knob of office out of his hat, threw it on the ground, refused to act as governor; but remained in his palace in Mookden till word should come from Peking. That word confirmed the act of degradation inflicted by himself; and only in 1876 was he again placed in a much more subordinate position as a military officer to atone for his offence. A temple was being built in Hingking in 1875 to the memory and honour of the murdered magistrate, who is still held in great esteem as a most upright judge. His son was appointed magistrate in his father's stead, and removed from Sinmintwun, west of Mookden, where he had been grossly insulted as a magistrate by an arrogant Romish priest. Indeed, these priests are sowing a wind over China, which, by their high-handed deeds, unheard of in the west in any age, will, if continued, some day breed a whirlwind of "persecution" in the future as it has done in the past; and they are responsible by this defiance of Chinese law and by their support of natives in trampling on Chinese law for nine-tenths of Chinese hatred and exclusiveness against the foreigner. Believing that we were of the same character, the authorities there regarded our visit with the greatest suspicion; and a private secretary, a smart and scholarly youth, was sent to our inn to discover our object. But when it was discovered that we had no connection with the hated and feared priests, we had an invitation to visit both the superior magistrates; which invitation was declined for want of time.

Both the Chinese and Manchu magistrates were very highly

spoken of by the people as upright judges; a character as highly prized as it is rare in China, where the nominal emoluments of the magistrate compel him to put his hand deeply into the pockets of the litigious people. For in China the Chinese proverb is most applicable: the "Big fish eat the little fish, and the little fish eat mud." This Chinese magistrate, Liw, has revived in Hingking a practice once much more common than now. He goes to the temple on stated days; where, or by the way, a poor man, unable to go to court, may kneel and have his case heard.

If we desire to travel north from Hingking, we can turn northwards by the *Jiaho*, and go up the glen or *gow* of *Jiaho* right northwards over a mountainous road, with numerous and difficult mountain passes; or making a slight detour to the west, we may take the longer but easier north-west route, which falls in again with the northern at the "Three Families," and on to Kaiyuen. We can also get to Tieling by this road striking off westwards at *Diaopitwun*, or "Sable-fur village." But direct north-east and north-west there are only pathless mountains. A narrow opening to the east leads towards northern Corea.

Starting southwards from Hingking, across the valley at its greatest breadth, two miles bring the traveller to the remains of the walls of Laochung, the first Manchu city. These remains consist of a bank two feet high all along the site of the ancient wall; the inside of the wall being a houseless field, supporting some poor Manchu cottar, whose house is in the nearest village. One mile further south opens up the narrower but still fertile and lovely valley, which extends away west and south-west. Along this valley flows the Soodsu, a beautiful mountain river, clear as crystal; showing that it flows over another bed than loess, which soil we soon leave behind. Our new glen widens somewhat as we go west-south-west, past two villages, to that of "Under-the Elm"; so called probably from the splendid elm tree growing there, the largest we had seen in Manchuria. Under its shade was a small wooden temple, erected over a coarse stone and brick scaffolding. The tree must have seen

the march southwards along our route of the army which made the Manchu empire possible. Five miles still further west we come upon the hamlet of *Tohoolo*, or the "Glen of *To*," where the valley is at its widest, being little less than a mile in breadth. But it suddenly narrows; for a new line of mountains from the west fills in the valley and leaves only a narrow gully, along which is the main road. It is possible for men to go on at the right of this new line of hills, and be for miles shut out from the view of those taking our left or main road. It is well to notice this feature in the ground; for it will help to explain an essential move of the Manchu army against the Kwandien army in the third and decisive battle fought to save Hingking from strangulation.

Westwards still we go in the narrow gully, hemmed in by mountains; the northern or right hand line being so unbrokenly precipitous as to be all but impassable up to *Changchoongling* or "Serpent Pass," 55 li from Hingking. At the north side of this pass springs the Soodsu, receiving many tributaries on its course; and at its south side rises the Taidu, flowing south then west past Liaoyang into the Liao, again mingling its waters with those of the Soodsu. This pass is two hundred feet above its base, and two thousand three hundred above the sea; this being the highest point touched by my excellent aneroid along the route. But before reaching the pass we rest at the inn of *Koochanggow*,—the glen of everlasting weeping, as that glen is called through which we have just been passing. The natives, Manchu and Chinese, were utterly at a loss to account for the name; and were not in the least excited when I recited to them the dreadful slaughter of the day which cowed the Chinese soldiers before the Manchus.

Before getting to Koochang inn, a small opening in the north range of hills exposed the possible spot where that deception (p. 31, 32) was played upon the Chinese troops which was the cause of their destruction. There is another opening still further east, not far from Tohoolo, which might serve the purpose, but not so well. It was without doubt under the hills on the northern slope of Changchoongling that the Chinese

commander drew up his eighty thousand men with such skill, and placed his "deers' horns" to such advantage, that it was impossible to force him or to fight till he was drawn out beyond Koochang inn by one of the clever stratagems in which the founder of the Manchu dynasty excelled. Had the Chinese general been as cautious as he was brave, ten times the Manchu force would not have moved him; for all along, from the pass to Tohoolo, the valley is not only narrow, but both lines of mountains are such as to render impossible any attack down their sides.



III.

YELLOW RIVER.

THE emperor Kanghi was from his childhood an eager student. He read the classic sages with satisfaction and profit; but he took especial delight in geographical and astronomical knowledge. In the Annals, he himself informs us that geography was his special delight as a child. To ascertain more accurately than any books or literati, native or European, could inform him, he sent a selected body of literary men to explore the sources of the Yellow river, the Yangtsu, the Heishwi, the Kinsha and the Lantsang rivers, all of which rise from either of the two sides of the great western range of *Nomoochwunwooba* in the south-east of *Kunlun*. The rivers were to be traced accurately on a map.

They started from Peking on the fourth day of the fourth moon—May—and returned on the ninth moon—Oct.—Nov. Thirty-nine days out brought them to *Chinghai* or Kokonor, the next day to *Hoochooboolak*. They found the atmosphere of Central Asia very rare. It “seemed to descend and the earth to ascend,” and during the whole route between *Soongshan* west of Ninghia to Hinghü hai, respiration was difficult. Had they aneroids they would have known that the earth “ascended” considerably. On the sixty-second day they arrived at the marsh of *Woling*, of over 200 li in extent, and considerably to the east of *Hinghü hai*, or the Starry Sea. The marsh *Jaling* is over 300 li in circumference, 30 li west of *Woling*; and in two days from *Woling* they got to Hinghü hai. This watery region is over 7600 li from Peking. Viewed from the east when the sun was setting, the innumerable streams flowing eastwards from the eastern side of the great *Korkwun* mountains, appeared so brilliant, shimmering like numberless stars in the face of the western sun, that the Chinese gave that region the name of the Starry Sea—*Hinghü hai*. The Mongols called it *Naodundali*,

and the natives *Solomoo*. They scaled a high hill in order to see the size of the sea, but they found it to be of immense* extent. To the south of this starry sea is the great mountain range of *Goorbantoorha*; to the south-west *Boohoojoorhei*; to the west *Barbooha*; to the north that of *Aktayinchichi*; and *Woolandoosh* to the north-east. The streams flowing from, and springs rising along, the foot of *Goorbantoorha*, unite, and are called *Harmatang*; those from *Barbooha*, *Harmachun moolang*,† and the united streams from *Aktayinchichi*, are called *Harmachinni*. These three rivers flow eastwards into the *Jaling* marsh, whence, still apart, they flow eastwards, one through the *Woling* marsh, which then gets the name of *Hwang ho* or Yellow river. East of *Woling* the other two rivers, greatly swollen, together with smaller streams innumerable, join the Yellow river.

The travellers began their return journey on the eleventh of sixth moon—July—and after going two days in a south-easterly direction, they ascended the mountains of *Harji*, whence they saw the Yellow river flowing eastwards by the south of the mountains of *Hoohootolohai*. Another day brought them to the west of *Shwi shan*‡ or water mountain, extremely high and ever hid in cloud and mist. This range is said by the Mongols to be over 300 li in length, to have nine high peaks, which were never known to be free from clouds, and so moist is the region, that scarce three days in a month were clear from heavy falls of rain or snow. After passing *Hoohootolohai* the river flows south, winding past the south side of *Chuchooka shan*, and north again to the south of *Bartolohai shan*. They arrived at the land of

* *Lit.* “Myriads and ten myriads would not contain it.” Another authority—the Great Geography—gives its Mongol name as *Woduntala*; and the mountains in one place called *Korkwun* are in another called *Koorgun*, while their Chinese name is given as *Koolun*. This illustrates the difficulty of transliterating other languages into Chinese.

† *Moolang* is doubtless the Mongol *mooren-water*.

‡ Text is *Shwi*, but we believe it is a missprint for *Bing*, “Ice,”—the name “ice mountain” being appropriate, while the other is not; and the two Chinese characters differ only by a dot.

Hilakootar when sixteen days from Shwi shan, southwards from which, passing *Sungkooli* with its high passes for more than a 100 li, they came again upon the bank of the river, and inferred that it flowed north-east from Bartolohai, on the north of *Kweite poo* and south of *Daka shan*, between the two mountain ranges, into *Lanchow*.

Ancient geographers always mentioned that the Yangtsu and the Yellow river rose in the mountains, and the geography of Yü states that the Yangtsu rose in *Mangshan*. This mountain was proved however to be a mountain in Szchuen by which the Yangtsu flowed, and was not by any means its source. It was discovered by the geographers of Kanghi that the Yangtsu, or as it is called at its source, the *Mangkhang*, rose at the mountain *Chichilahana* of the range *Bayenhala ling*, this source by the natives being called *Mangnayakja*. It flows through *Whangshung gwan* in the mountains of *Naichoo* of Szchuen, by *Kwan hien*, where it divides into several dozens of branches, which reunite at *Sintsin hien*, and the united river receives the *Kinsha* at *Hüchow foo*.

The *Kinsha* rises in the north of Dalai Lama's territory, in the range called *Wooniyinwoosoo* * *fung*, and by the Chinese *Niwnai* (cow's milk) mountains. The name of the river there is *Mooloosu Woosoo*, and when it enters Yunnan at *Tachung gwan* after flowing south-east into Komoo land and passing central Burma—*Dien*—it is called the *Kinsha kiang*, or Gold river. It has the name of *Loo Kiang* at Lookiang foo. At Yoongpe foo it receives the *Tachoong* river, and passing Wooting foo, it enters Szchuen, flows to Hüchow, and falls into the Yangtsu, into which at Wochang falls the Hankiang, rising in Shensi. The *Lantsang kiang* has two main sources. One is called the *Dsachoocho*, rises in the mountains of *Gorjidsahar* of Komoo, which is south-east of *Lali* and subject to *Banshan*, the priestly ruler of Dsang or west Tibet. The other called the *Naomoojo ho* rises in *Jilakuntala*. To the

* *Woosoo* is water, and *fung* is a high mountain. From the Chinese name we might infer the existence of many cataracts.

south of *Moochamoodo* temple they unite and form the river *Lakochoo*. Thence entering Yunnan it is called the *Lantsang*, and flows southwards through *Chuali* into Burma as the *Kiwloong Kiang*.

The *Kolarwoosoo*, or the Black water of Yü's geography, the Lookiang of Yunnan, rises in *Halalier*, in the north-east of Dalai Lama's land, and flows through the south-east thereof, through *Komoo* but west of the *Lantsang*, and south-east into the land of *Nooyi*, where it is called the *Nookiang*. It enters Yunnan by *Datangai*, and under the name of *Lookiang* flows past Yoongchangfoo, through Lookiang Miao lands, into Burma.

The *Loongchüen Kiang*, west of the latter river, springs from *Chwundoling* mountains of *Komoo*; flows southwards by *Datangai* into Yunnan, and westwards, as the *Loongchüen*, through *Hanloongguan*, into Burma.

The *Binlang Kiang* springs east of *Gangdis* of *Ali* in Tibet. Its origin is in the mountain of *Damoojoo Kobooboo*, or the "Horse's mouth." It is there called the *Yaloodsangbooboo Kiang*; flows south, then east, passing by *Dsangwei* lands, beside the city of *Yiharhar*, where it joins the *Harjaowoolun Kiang*, then south by the lake of *Goongbooboolo*; enters Yunnan by *Gooyoong*, and flows out by *Tiepoogwan* into Burma. South of *Gangdis* is the mountain *Langyūkobooboo*, or "Elephant's mouth"; out of which flows a stream which ultimately flows westwards into the lands of *Sangnan*. North of *Gangdis* is the mountain *Dsunggokobooboo*, or "Lion's mouth," which produces another river, flowing westwards to *Sangnan*, where it joins the preceding. From *Maboojiakobooboo*, or "Peacock's mouth," west of *Gangdis*, flows another river southwards to the lands of *Nakolasoowoodo*, where it joins the preceding river which has flowed south from *Sangnan*, then east. The united river then flows south-east to the kingdom of *Anatokoko*, where it is called the *Ganghowoolun Kiang*. This is, says the imperial geographer, apparently the *Weifai hien shwun hung ho* of the Annals of the Buddhist kingdoms; or it may read, the *Hienshwunhung* river of the "Sublime

Method of the Annals." We think these various "mouths" look very like a description of the Tibetan sources of the Ganges.

We now return to the Yellow river,—a river which demands more engineering attention than any other river, lake or sea, on our globe. Anciently the Chinese people were a small, diligent agricultural community surrounded by savage nomads. Twenty centuries before the Christian era their country apparently extended southwards as far as the Yellow river, and was doubtless bordered by that river both at the west and the south. As much of the magnificent loess soil through which the river flows is often below the level of the bottom of the river, central China was originally, without doubt, a succession of shallow lakes and marshy swamps, and the wide-spread waters of the river would form many islands of extreme fertility. The emperor or king Yü acquired his pre-eminent celebrity by his eight years of engineering effort to drain that extensive region; and his successful operations opened up to the plough rich plains which in extent would embrace several Hollands. But so great is the quantity of silted earth contained in the waters of this river, that it raises its bed above the surrounding country, or forms great banks at its widely extended mouth, so that the country once won from its inundations, is ever threatened by re-annexation to the rule of its yellow waters. Hence the engineering labour and expense begun by emperor Yü has been in yearly requisition from his time to the present; so that the money expended in attempting to retain its waters within banks would purchase many times over all the debts of all the governments in the world. Yet notwithstanding that incessant outlay and that annual labour, the erratic river does ever and anon assume the mastery; now inundating hundreds or thousands of acres, now flooding ever so many villages, and anon knocking down the walls of a fortified city; and the human lives drowned by that wilful river must aggregate an enormous number. Hence it is that the emperor *Keaking*, of the present dynasty in his last will, calls the river "China's sorrow," *

* Davis' "Chinese."

complains of its bursting its banks, overflowing the country, and always draining the treasury. The following incidents connected with the river will serve to illustrate the nature of the sorrow.

When the sudden clash of arms and the crash of falling cities threw consternation into the councils and strained the resources of his southern neighbours, the governor of Honan found as formidable a difficulty to cope with in his own province. The people were in the greatest distress from the unceasing calls and the ever increasing amounts of taxation demanded of them to keep the river within bounds. From March to December of every year the people were subjected to intermittent visits from the tax-collector, till the taxes became at last so burdensome that all who had any government employment by which they could eke out a living preferred to leave their lands fallow rather than have to meet the common and oppressive taxation. Some of the bolder people, who had no resource apart from their land, opened deep ditches around their houses, fortified themselves there and defied the tax collector. The burdens of the people who were loyal and obedient became therefore all the more overwhelmingly crushing. The governors prayed the emperor to interfere in the interests of justice, to fix the price of labour at two taels, or twelve shillings sterling, per man per month as in the period of his predecessor, instead of the three or four taels, which were being paid; and to reduce the period of labour to nine instead of ten months. Those measures would diminish expenditure to one hundred and eighty thousand taels, or half of what was then paid out. It was decreed that the rate of taxation was anciently laid down at so much per li, each square li containing a hundred *ching*, or about sixteen hundred acres, and supporting ten soldiers. This rule was re-enforced, and every means were ordered to be employed to compel all to pay equally; for those who opened ditches must not be allowed to evade, nor the more honest be compelled to exceed the proper amount. In 1668, it had been ordained that Kiangnan must prepare, as its contingent against the river ravages, two

million seven hundred thousand bundles of willow stumps, of which one million had to be yearly laid down in the banks. Four years after, the required stock of bundles was not ready; the river threatened to burst upon and overwhelm the city of Yangwoo near Kaifung; and the people had to cut down all their peach, pear, apricot and plum trees to stop the breach. Every boat trading on the river was now ordered to provide from two to three hundred bundles, and the people were required to carry the requisite number where no boat traffic existed; and if the supply by the people proved inadequate, the magistrates were commanded to find the needful bundles by purchase, giving for every bundle of wild or garden-grown willow branches one sixtieth of a tael. But the emperor again urged the necessity of always having a store of bundles on hand.

In 1682, when the great rebellion was being extinguished, a censor who had been sent to examine into the condition of the Yellow river, reported that in the neighbourhood of the city of Yifung it was needful to at once raise the banks of the river for seven thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine *jang*, each of about twelve English feet; at Fungkiw, three hundred and thirty *jang*; and at Yoongtsai, two hundred and ten *jang*. In the following winter the Boards and Yamuns decided that to protect the seven *chow* and *hien* cities of Kao, Pao, &c., a sum of two millions seven hundred and eighty thousand taels, or nearly a million sterling, was indispensable; and the half of that sum should be forwarded at once to pay for work to be immediately done. Half a million taels were needed for the banking of small rivers higher up which flowed into the Yellow; and less than a million and a half of taels was considered insufficient to bank the river above those affluents. The emperor knew from personal observation the frightful ravages of the river near its mouth, and declared that works must be started there immediately; but before deciding on the general work to be done, he ordered Chungloong, then overseer of the river, to hasten to the capital and consult with the Boards. On the arrival of this functionary, he found a grand secretary

advocating the building of both banks of the river from its mouth to a height of sixteen feet; a height which he declared necessary to protect the country from the floodings caused by the tide. This measure was opposed by Chungloong, who, instead, recommended the deepening of the channel of the river as it flowed into the sea. The officials ranged themselves into two parties on the subject; the one recommending building, the other digging. Warm debates went on for days, but they educed nothing but heat. The emperor therefore ordered the magistrates of the seven cities of Kao, Pao, Hing, Lan, Shang, Kiang, and Tai, to give their opinion as between the two plans. They were living in the region affected; and as their interests were much concerned, and their families all dwelling in the neighbourhood, their advice was regarded as safe. They agreed unanimously that the plan of Chungloong was easy of accomplishment, and would greatly benefit the people; while the building of banks of sixteen feet high, raising the water eleven feet above the existing level, would seriously endanger the country, for the tops of the houses would be below that water level; and a breach in the bank, which was very possible, would cause incalculable damage to the people. The emperor agreed that the plan of Chungloong, which both secured the lives of the people and was much less expensive, would be adopted.

Operations to deepen the river channel were at once begun; but ere long serious opposition was made against the digging by high officials, who had gone thither and reported the works as useless. Many of the inhabitants of the affected region joined in the petition of those officials; and the emperor after a long consultation with Chungloong, ordered a cessation of the works, and threw the responsibility of stemming the floods on the inhabitants of those extensive and very fertile plains. The grand secretary saw in that course an opening by which to push on his own plan, proposed miles of high banking at a cost of millions sterling, and promised to reclaim over six hundred thousand English acres; but his proposals were remitted to the Boards.

A commission, consisting of a president, vice-president, and other officials, was sent from Peking to inspect the banks and to ascertain the views of the people. Bin, one of the subordinates who returned last of all, reported that there was much conflict of opinion among the crowded populations over that wide region. Very many believed that the deepening of the channel over the bar would be of great utility; but on account of scarcity of grain and the high price of labour, the available money would not pay for half the necessary work. On the other hand the people in and under Kaochow and Hinghwa strenuously opposed any deepening, because the high tides would destroy their graves and flood their houses. He explained that all the officials who had been on the commission of enquiry had seen the tide rush up like a racehorse; but had observed that the retreating waters had no way to flow swiftly. The superior officials, knowing that his majesty had himself seen the many houses submerged, and fearing similar if not greater dangers to the country and even the cities from a deepened channel, whereby the sea waters could rush up all the more swiftly, did not venture to memorialise the throne on their return. He was himself much perplexed what advice to offer; for he could not promise that any deepening would drain the whole country. But he would say that deepening would be a benefit to the country, and great in proportion to the depth of the channel cut to admit the flow of the river. He recommended that all the revenue derived from the seven cities should be retained on the spot, and applied to the work of deepening the river; thus the formidable undertaking could be paid by the revenue of the region, and carried out by the men of the place.

The two superior officials of the commission were summoned; and in giving their apology for not presenting a report on their return to Peking, flatly contradicted the statement of Bin that they had agreed with his views, for there had been no consultation. They emphasised the difficulty of the deepening and the hostility of the people. The emperor was therefore as much at a loss as ever what to do; and ordered all the great officials

to deliberate, and. to call in as witnesses every official high or low then in Peking from the neighbourhood of the seven cities. These witnesses were unanimous in supporting the scheme of Bin; which, though expensive, they declared far the most valuable; even though it could not drain all the low lands. The great ministers therefore supported Bin, because he had long been governor in that neighbourhood; while the president and vice-president were terrified at seeing the great rushing inlands of the tide. The emperor censured these two officials; and the ministers recommended the dismissal from his office of the superintendent of Yellow river works, and of Lo Foo the grand secretary, who had recommended the "building" or dyking as against the deepening plan.

Bin again memorialised the throne to say that he had discovered that formerly there were four shallow lakes made by the river at and around Hühchow; but that now there were thirty such lakes, making probable a large increase in the future of the conversion of rich fields into lakes. The president of Works stated that the ancients adopted the plan of deepening the bar to drain away water which embankments had collected; and declared that it was by his embankments that Foo was now flooding so many houses and good lands. The only result of the two years of debate, thus briefly outlined, was that the president and vice-president were degraded, but Foo was retained in office, as the ministers who recommended his dismissal could not give the emperor a plan whose superiority they would venture to guarantee.

The question was again discussed on a long memorial of another official who gave many reasons in support of the dyking plan. These were considered so important that the emperor nominated him a commissioner to assist Foo. But it soon leaked out that he had been instigated by Foo, who was therefore brought to Peking; but his subsequent examination left the emperor in the same uncertainty. Another commissioner was therefore sent to enquire; but it served only to cause the emperor to consult Chungloong, who could do no more than reiterate his first plan, and declare his conviction that the plan

of Foo would ultimately inundate all that neighbourhood; for the level of the river always rising would soon cause the *Whai* river to pour into it; and if the numbers of men drowned and houses ruined were large already, there would then be far more terrible havoc.

Four years after the first named commission, a censor accused Foo of having failed to secure "merit,"—a mild way of declaring him unworthy of his post. Another, in a memorial of extraordinary length and with, even for a Chinese official, a superabundance of circumlocution, charged Foo for remaining so long in that post only because he was appropriating half the monies paid out in name of the river expenditure; and he accused by name other officials of sharing the plunder with him. The long accusation was laid before the ministers, whose "consideration" of the matter and examination of Foo again resulted in nothing. The emperor, under whose inspection proceedings were carried on, declared in a long speech that he had long been aware of the principles of action not of Foo alone, but of every official high and low connected with all the departments; but as they could come to no decision, he had nothing to say. In private, however, he informed the grand secretaries that the ministers were afraid of the power of Foo. The advice and testimony of Chungloong were again asked for, and were exactly the reverse of Foo's. The latter was accused of oppressing the people; but the emperor said that the question was how to allay the evil done by the river. Foo was at length dismissed from the superintendency, and many other officials who had supported him were degraded or dismissed according to the nature of their crimes; just when the last great revolution was taking place in England. But in 1689, when his majesty was on his tour of investigation to ascertain for himself the state of the river, he was so well satisfied with the firm character and the extent of the dyking by Foo, that he reinstated him in his original rank; and with all the greater readiness, because his successor was not doing well; and in 1691 Foo was again nominated superintendent of

the Yellow river. Thus went on the Yellow river, swamping good lands and able ministers, vomiting bad marshes and raising interested cabals and cliques, sapping down city walls and swallowing yearly as much money as might support a small kingdom.

This incident will illustrate the difficulty of the problem of dealing with the Yellow River in China, where there are no skilful engineers and no mathematical knowledge. It also shows how difficult it is for an absolute monarch, willing and eager to do good, to ascertain the real facts, even in a matter of such magnitude and gravity as the Yellow River and its evils. And the story, together with all that goes before, is interesting to us westerns, because, though it is but the history of the rise and progress of the present reigning dynasty from its infancy to its full manhood, we learn therefrom the actual condition of Chinese law and practice at the present day. Ministers had and have their own private interests to consult, their private friends to conciliate, their private faction to support; and these weighed with them more than the well or ill-being, the life or death, of myriads of their fellow countrymen, who were far removed out of sight, and whom their able master was anxious to save and benefit. We are, however, the less surprised at this in China, when very recent events prove that in what are called highly civilised and Christian nations human life and common justice are light as a feather in the scales of personal interests and official influence.









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
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